Since the outbreak of the Arab Spring the Middle East is going through a turbulent phase as violence, internal conflicts and civil wars are ravaging a number of countries. Even relatively stable Gulf monarchies are not untouched by the impact of popular demand for change. For India, the Persian Gulf is an extended neighbourhood and this region of vital importance receives scant attention. In the light of the Arab Spring, Iranian nuclear deal and the rise of ISIS, it has become impossible for India to be indifferent to the changing internal dynamics. This anthology presents a broad view of the social, political and economic dimensions of the Gulf region and their relevance and significance through issues such as renewable energy, sustainable development, and education policy.

Professor P. R. Kumarswamy teaches contemporary Middle East in Jawaharlal Nehru University. He is the honorary director of Middle East Institute, New Delhi and editor, Contemporary Review of the Middle East, a quarterly published by Sage.

Md. Muddassir Quamar is doctoral candidate in School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and is specialising in reforms in Saudi Arabia.
Contemporary Persian Gulf

Essays in Honour of Gulshan Dietl, Prakash Chandra Jain and Girijesh Pant

P. R. Kumaraswamy and Md. Muddassir Quamar

Editors
**Contents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Table and Figures</td>
<td></td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the Contributors</td>
<td></td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>P. R. Kumaraswamy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Investment in Renewable Energy in the GCC States:</td>
<td>Sameena Hameed</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status and Policy Options</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Transition to a Green Economy: Emerging Challenges for the GCC</td>
<td>Kannan Ambalam</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Shiism, Rentier State and Illiberal Democracy in Iran</td>
<td>Mahnaz Zahirinejad</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Sectarianism, Geopolitical Rivalry and the Syrian Civil War</td>
<td>Stanly Johny</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The Widening Gulf: Arab Spring and the Saudi-Iranian Divide</td>
<td>Prasanta Kumar Pradhan</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Qatar-Hamas Relations: Between Strategic Calculations and Ideological</td>
<td>Tsopokyemla</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. India – GCC FTA: Ray of Opportunities</td>
<td>Sayeeda Khatoon</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Thicker than Oil: The India-Iraqi Ties</td>
<td>Kallol Bhattacherjee</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Profile: Gulshan Dietl</td>
<td></td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Profile: Prakash Chandra Jain</td>
<td></td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Profile: Girijesh Pant</td>
<td></td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td></td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Tables and Figures

Tables
1.1 The Persian Gulf’s Share in India’s Total Trade 5
1.2 Share of Oil in Imports from Persian Gulf, 2013-1 5
5.1 Number of Schools in Saudi Arabia, 1967-2014 60
5.2 State Universities in Saudi Arabia 65
10.1 India Balance of Trade with GCC Countries (Export Value – Import Value) (in US$ million) 136
10.2 Export and Import Intensities of India and Bahrain 140
10.3 Export and Import Intensities of India and Kuwait 141
10.4 Export and Import Intensities of India and Oman 142
10.5 Export and Import Intensities of India and Qatar 142
10.6 Export and Import Intensities of India and Saudi Arabia 143
10.7 Export and Import Intensities of India and UAE 144
10.8 Indian Expatriates in GCC Countries 148
10.9 FDI Inflows in GCC Countries (in US$ million) 149
10.10 FDI Outflows from GCC Countries (in US$ million) 150
10.11 FDI Inflows in India from GCC Countries (April 2000 to September 2014) 150
10.12 India – GCC Countries: Total Trade Turnover 152
10.13 GCC RCA with the World (RCA > 1) 153
10.14 GCC RCA in India (RCA > 1) 154
10.15 India RCA in GCC Countries (RCA > 1) 156

Figures
10.1 Total Trade Turnover of India with Bahrain (in US$ million) 136
10.2 Total Trade Turnover of India with Kuwait (in US$ million) 137
10.3 Total Trade Turnover of India with Oman (in US$ million) 137
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>Total Trade Turnover of India with Qatar (in US$ million)</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>Total Trade Turnover of India with Saudi Arabia (in US$ million)</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>Total Trade Turnover of India with UAE (in US$ million)</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>Structural Change in GCC’s Nominal GDP</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
About the Contributors

Professor **P. R. Kumaswamy** teaches contemporary Middle East at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi, serves as honorary director of the *Middle East Institute, New Delhi* (www.mei.org.in) and edits the *Contemporary Review of the Middle East*, a refereed quarterly launched by Sage in March 2014.

**Md. Muddassir Quamar** is doctoral candidate at the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies (SIS), JNU. He was a Visiting Fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, Riyadh from November 2014 to February 2015.

**Kallol Bhattacherjee** is a foreign affairs correspondent *The Week* based in Delhi. He submitted his M.Phil. dissertation *Construction of West Asia in American Public Opinion: A Critique of Neo-Orientation in Visual Culture* in the Centre for West Asian and African Studies, SIS, under the supervision of Professor P. C. Jain in 2004. He has also reported on the Arab Spring-related conflicts in the Middle East since 2011.

Dr. **Kannan Ambalam** is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Public Administration and Development Management, Wollega University, Nekemte, Ethiopia. He pursued B.Sc. (Chemistry) at Thiagarajar College, Madurai during 1995-98 and completed M.A. (Public Administration) from Madras Christian College, Chennai in 2000. During 2001-08 he pursued his M.Phil. and Ph.D. degrees in Centre for West Asian and African Studies, SIS, JNU under the supervision of Professor Gulshan Dietl. His dissertation was on *Global Environmental Governance: The Role of UNEP in West Asia with Special Reference to Regional Seas Programmes* and his doctoral thesis was *Administrative Approach to Combating Desertification in the GCC Countries*. His areas of interest include food sovereignty, food security, natural resources management, desertification, global environmental governance and multilateral environmental agreements.
Dr. **Mahnaz Zahirinejad** is a Visiting Professor at the Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures, Polish Academy of Science in Warsaw. She was awarded a Ph.D. from Centre for West Asian Studies, SIS, Jawaharlal Nehru University for her doctoral thesis on *Iran's Energy Policy Towards China And India: A Comparative Study*. She pursued her research under Professor Girijesh Pant. During 2010-11 she was a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Warsaw, Poland and a Visiting Professor at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow during 2012-13. Dr. Zahirinejad has continued to study Middle Eastern politics focusing on the state-middle class interaction, a subject of immense interest to many yearning for the democratic development in the region. She has authored and co-authored two books on the Middle East has published many papers and articles and her book on the middle class in Iran will be published this year.

Dr. **Prasanta Kumar Pradhan** is Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). He completed his doctoral thesis on *Human Rights in Islam: The Case of Saudi Arabia* in 2007 under the supervision of Professor Gulshan Dietl. Before joining IDSA, he worked as a Research Associate at the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, from December 2006 till June 2008.

Dr. **Sameena Hameed** is Assistant Professor in the Gulf Studies Programme, India-Arab Cultural Centre, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. She completed her M.Phil. and Ph.D. from Jawaharlal Nehru University under the supervision of Professor Gulshan Dietl. Her doctoral thesis was on *Domestic Petroleum Subsidy and Oil Recourse Management: A Comparative Study of India and Iran in 1990s* and her MPhil dissertation was *Market and the Cartel: A Critique of OPEC Decision of 26 March 1999*. Her areas of specialization include Middle Eastern Economy and India’s economic relations with Middle East and energy security issues. She has presented papers in prestigious international and national conferences conference including Gulf Research Centre-Cambridge annual conferences, Asia Energy Summits. She prepares research papers for Public Diplomacy Division of the Ministry of External Affairs and other government, trade and commerce organizations. She has been a member of MEA constituted *Select Group on Gulf and West Asia*. She has been a member of various track two dialogues with Saudi Arabia and UAE.
Dr. **Stanly Johny** is an assistant editor with *The Hindu*, and has written on Middle East in several publications including *The Hindu*, *The Hindu Business Line*, *Frontline*, *Economic and Political Weekly*, *Business Standard* and *Counter Punch*. In 2012 he was awarded a Ph.D. from JNU for his thesis on *Hezbollah and Asymmetric Warfare in Lebanon*, under the guidance of Professor Gulshan Dietl.

Dr. **Syeeda Khatoon** teaches in the Department of Economics, M. M. H. College Ghaziabad since 2001 and has also taught in the Department of Economics, Doon University, Dehradun during 2011-12. She was awarded a Ph.D. from Jawaharlal Nehru University for her doctoral thesis on *Bilateral Free Trade Agreements between USA and Israel, Jordan, Bahrain: Comparative Study* under the supervision of Professor Girijesh Pant.

**Tsopokyemla** is Documentation Officer in Gulf Studies Programme, Centre for West Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi since 2007. Her research interests include politics and foreign policy of Lebanon and Syria and ethnic identity and conflict resolution in Middle East region. She received her M.Phil. degree in 2006 for her dissertation on *The Role of Maronite Christians and the Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1976* under the supervision of Professor Gulshan Dietl.

**Dipanwita Chakravortty** is doctoral candidate at the Centre for West Asian Studies, SIS, Jawaharlal Nehru University and a recipient of the Israel Government Scholarship for 2015-16.

**Manjari Singh** is doctoral candidate at the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. She is recipient of Japan government sponsored SYLLF Fellowship (Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leader Fellowship Fund) for 2015-16.
1. Introduction

P. R. Kumaraswamy

The Persian Gulf region is of immense value to India. While it has strong historic connections with Iran, Iraq and Yemen, India shares strong economic relations with the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Geographic proximity, robust economic engagement, substantial energy security consideration and the presence of large expatriate labour make the Persian Gulf region strategically significant. In numerous ways, the region is more critical to India’s economic growth and great power aspirations than the immediate South Asian neighbourhood. Unlike the latter, the Gulf region offers immense challenges and opportunities for India to demonstrate its politico-diplomatic acumen and power capabilities (Kumaraswamy 2014). Some of the existing and emerging problems will undoubtedly test India’s leadership skills and diplomatic imaginations. If the Arab-Persian and Sunni-Shia divides are insufficient, there are severe internal tensions within the more cohesive GCC.

These considerations should make the Persian Gulf a region of extreme importance to India, its elites and the academic community. This, unfortunately, is not the case. The importance of the Persian Gulf for India is inversely proportionate to the interest, knowledge and expertise that are currently available within the country. The Indian bureaucracy is generalist by nature and area specialisation is an exception than the norm. With notable exceptions, most Indian diplomats only have nodding acquaintance with the Middle East or Persian Gulf. As a result, firsthand diplomatic knowledge is often confined to one or two postings that the individual had in the region.

The situation of other segments is not impressive either. Media houses rarely pay any attention to the region and most are happy relying on agencies or stringers to meet any contingency situation. For long, the century-old The Hindu was the only Indian media that had a resident office in the Gulf, first in Manama and later in Dubai. But due to financial reasons and competition from electronic media, this arrangement was ended in 2014. The only exception is the vernacular Malayalam media, mainly because of the presence of the about 1.42 million strong Keralite expatriate community in the Gulf region (The New Indian Express 2013). Thus, the Indian media not only relies on second hand
sources, but its interests are kindled only by crises, violence and instability in
the region.

The indifference of the media and inadequacy of the bureaucracy in
promoting understanding of the Middle East and Persian Gulf region is
compounded by the sorry state of affairs in Indian academia. As a specialised
area, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region are taught only in four
Universities in the country; out of them, three are Central Universities,
namely, Aligarh Muslim University, Jamia Millia Islamia and Jawaharlal Nehru
University, while Mysore University offers a Master’s Degree in Middle Eastern
studies. Besides these, International Relations programmes available in a few
universities offer courses on the region.

As a result, the number of persons who have specialised in or make
the Middle East or Persian Gulf their lifetime occupation is extremely
minuscule. Even a liberal interpretation of ‘expertise’ will not expand
the list to beyond a couple of dozen spread across the country. Mostly by
design and partly by accident, the majority are located or concentrated in
the national capital and even those who are located outside the capital have
been trained or inspired by Professor M.S. Agwani, the pioneer and doyen
of Middle Eastern studies and by extension Persian Gulf studies, in the
country. Since joining the erstwhile Indian School of International Studies,
which subsequently became the School of International Studies when
Jawaharlal Nehru University was established in 1969, Professor Agwani
moulded, trained and inspired scores of pupils to be passionate about the
subject. However, without adequate institutional support and foresight, his
tribe has been small and has been unable to make its mark internationally.
Many in the country consider and venerate him as their Guru and seek
inspiration in his scholarship. Among the handful of scholars are my former
colleagues Professors Gulshan Dietl, Girijesh Pant and Prakash Chandra
Jain. For about three decades, they have taught, researched and spoken
about various aspects of the Persian Gulf and in the process inspired scores
of young scholars to study and understand this region. This volume is a
modest commemoration and celebration of the commitment, scholarship
and contribution of these three scholars to the study of the Persian Gulf in
India.

Spending a lifetime in trying to understand, and in the process specialise
in the region, is often a thankless mission. If the recognition is meagre, the
challenges are daunting. Let us look at some of the challenges one faces in India
while trying to understand the contemporary Persian Gulf.
Daunting Challenges

Leaders and officials do not hesitate to depict the region as India’s extended neighbourhood and hence an area of considerable importance. Speaking before the Constituent Assembly in March 1949, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru observed:

If you have to consider any question affecting the Middle East, India inevitably comes into the picture. If you have to consider any question concerning South East Asia, you cannot do so without India. So also with the Far East. While the Middle East may not be directly connected with South-East Asia, and the Far East, both are connected with India (Nehru, 1967:235).

Likewise, while inaugurating the West Asian Centre in the Jamia Millia Islamia in 2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh observed:

…it would be safe to say that our domestic pre-occupations in the past have, to an extent, detracted from our traditional focus on the important West Asian region. This happened at a time, which unfortunately, was one of the most complex periods in that region’s history. I hope your Centre must therefore play a major role in sharpening the focus of both Government and academics on this vital area in our proximate neighbourhood (Singh 2005).

Similar sentiments have been echoed by various leaders, officials and political pundits (Raja Mohan 2000).

The reality, however, is rather depressing. If one excludes the heyday of the Nehru-Nasser friendship (see Pasha 2009), that lasted a decade after the Bandung Conference of April 1955, the region has remained marginal in India’s foreign policy calculations. The emergence of the Persian Gulf as the major source of hydrocarbon in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, and the resultant influx of millions of expatriate workers, did not bring about any fundamental transformation in its approach.

Public rhetoric and economic relations never transformed into robust political engagement between India and the Persian Gulf. While many Indian presidents and vice-presidents have visited the region, its political and symbolic importance is marked by visits by Indian Prime Ministers. If one uses this as a yardstick, the picture is abysmal. Since the early 1990s, India has been hosting
heads of state of various countries, with President Mohammed Khatami and King Abdullah being given the honour of being the chief guests during the Republic Day celebrations in 2003 and 2006 respectively. This, however, has not spurred reciprocal visits by Indian prime ministers. Indeed, Indira Gandhi was the last Indian Prime Minister to visit Kuwait and UAE in May 1981. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Oman and Qatar in November 2008 and Saudi Arabia in February-March 2010. The last prime ministerial visit to Iraq took place in January 1975 when Indira Gandhi paid a state visit. If one excludes the summit meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in August 2012, Atal Behari Vajpayee was the last Indian Prime Minister to visit Iran in April 2001. Unfortunately, no Prime Minister has visited Bahrain and Yemen since India became independent.

Furthermore, since the outbreak of popular protests in the Arab world, India has undertaken no state visit to the Arab countries. President Pratibha Patil’s visit to UAE and Syria in November 2010, literally weeks before Mohamed Bouazizi set off popular protests in Tunisia, was the last Indian state visit to the wider Middle East. Such political indifference to a region of considerable importance does not bode well for India’s aspirations to be a responsible international actor.

India depends heavily upon the Gulf for its energy requirements as the nine countries along the Persian Gulf have been supplying substantial quantities of oil and gas (Table 1.2). As economic reforms accelerated India’s energy imports from the early 1990s, the share of trade with the Gulf has also increased and accounts for about 60 per cent of India’s total imports of hydrocarbon. Geographic proximity, lower costs of production of oil and gas and their transportation make the region the most attractive supplier for India’s galloping energy needs. Any increase in supplies from countries such as Nigeria, Venezuela or Australia will not be able to replace the dominant role played by the Gulf countries. For long, Iran was a major supplier but the US-led sanctions and the consequent difficulties in making payments have considerably reduced the quantum of India’s imports from the Islamic republic.

As a result of the high level of energy trade, the quantum of bilateral trade between India and the Persian Gulf is substantial and since 2008–09 it accounts for about one-fourth of the total trade. For example, in 2008–09, the Indo-Gulf trade stood at US$115.39 billion when its total trade was US$488.98 billion, and in 2013–14 it rose to US$186.82 billion against US$764.6 billion (Table 1.1). This rosy picture, however, has serious problems. Trade is heavily skewed against India with its imports from the region far outpacing its exports,
thereby leaving a huge trade deficit. Second, its imports are dominated by a single commodity, namely, oil and gas imports. In recent years, hydrocarbons account for over 90 per cent of India’s imports from Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Yemen (Table 1.2). Only with the UAE does India have more diversified trade, with oil accounting for about 45 per cent of India’s imports. To a lesser degree, its trade with Bahrain and Oman is also diversified, but because both are smaller economies, the impact is minimal.

Table 1.1: The Persian Gulf’s Share in India’s Total Trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Trade</th>
<th>Trade with Persian Gulf</th>
<th>Share (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005–06</td>
<td>232,739.35</td>
<td>21,917.96</td>
<td>9.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006–07</td>
<td>312,140.55</td>
<td>65,340.34</td>
<td>20.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007–08</td>
<td>414,751.34</td>
<td>90,326.06</td>
<td>21.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008–09</td>
<td>488,981.25</td>
<td>115,397.22</td>
<td>23.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009–10</td>
<td>467,124.31</td>
<td>107,178.31</td>
<td>22.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010–11</td>
<td>619,584.68</td>
<td>146,672.58</td>
<td>23.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011–12</td>
<td>795,283.41</td>
<td>182,707.58</td>
<td>22.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012–13</td>
<td>791,137.23</td>
<td>197,052.87</td>
<td>24.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013–14</td>
<td>764,605.09</td>
<td>186,827.20</td>
<td>24.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Director-General of Foreign Trade, New Delhi, www.dgft.gov.in

Table 1.2: Share of Oil in Imports from Persian Gulf, 2013–14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Oil Imports (US$ million)</th>
<th>Total Imports (US$ million)</th>
<th>Share (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>359.23</td>
<td>563.24</td>
<td>63.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>8,556.95</td>
<td>10,307.16</td>
<td>83.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>18,450.33</td>
<td>18,520.86</td>
<td>99.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>16,121.78</td>
<td>17,153.55</td>
<td>93.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1,514.11</td>
<td>2,951.18</td>
<td>51.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>14,590.81</td>
<td>15,707.99</td>
<td>92.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>32,781.57</td>
<td>181,382.59</td>
<td>90.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>13,263.35</td>
<td>29,019.82</td>
<td>45.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>762.62</td>
<td>782.18</td>
<td>97.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Director-General of Foreign Trade, New Delhi, www.dgft.gov.in
An energy-dominant trade with the Gulf is a strategic liability for India as it discovered as a fall-out of the US-led sanctions against Iran over the nuclear controversy. Due to the high quantity of oil imports, the trade balance was heavily tilted in favour of Iran and this became a problem when India sought to settle its oil payments. New Delhi’s oil payments to Iran have been hampered by India’s exports to Iran being smaller than its imports from that country. Despite the drop in imports, for example, during 2014–15, its imports from Iran stood at US$10.30 billion while it exported US$4.97 billion worth of goods to Iran; in other words, exports accounts for only 48 per cent of its imports from Iran. Hence, the rupee payment arrangement that was worked out in February 2012 was inadequate to meet India’s problems. Even if it could use the arrangement to increase its exports, the arrangement covers only 45 per cent of payment dues. Thus, its ability to settle the payments depends entirely upon India securing periodic exemptions from the US, which in turn means New Delhi kowtowing to American diktats and demands. Furthermore, India’s position is in direct contrast to China’s (Taneja 2015). Besides bourgeoning energy trade, China has undertaken a number of construction projects in Iran, such as the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline and a railway project connecting Imam Khomeini Airport with Tehran. This enables China to enter into a swap arrangement for its oil imports from Iran (The Huffington Post 2013).

Thus, both to reduce the huge trade deficits and to avoid the payment problems a la Iran, India will have to diversify its trade with the Gulf countries. Indian companies should be encouraged to participate in the construction activities in the Gulf—especially in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. In recent years the undertaking of mega overseas construction projects partly contributed to the economic growth of countries such as South Korea and Turkey, and India should learn from such experiences.

Secondly, the sovereign wealth fund (SWF) is an attractive proposition for investments. Some of the largest SWFs in the world are to be found in the Gulf region. According to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, as of April 2015, the UAE has the richest fund estimated at US$773 billion, followed by Saudi Arabia at US$757.2 billion (SWFI 2015). For a variety of political and strategic reasons, the oil-rich Arab countries have looked to the West for investment opportunities and partaking of their oil wealth. The increase in the flow of arms into the region since the early 1970s resulted in conservative monarchies viewing the US not only as a safe investment haven, but also as a security guarantor. Following the end of the Cold War, however, things began to change. The much-heralded unipolar world did not endure and a host of
events since the 11 September terror attacks exposed the economic and hence political limitations of the US. The involvement of 15 of its citizens led to a backlash not only against Saudi Arabia, but also against Islam itself. These were compounded by the economic crises and political instability in the region. As a result, some of the oil-rich Arab countries began looking at non-western options, especially Asia. Keeping all this in mind, during his visit to Saudi Arabia in January 2012, the then Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee observed that India would require about US$1 trillion in investments in the next 5-7 years for its infrastructure development (The Hindu 2012a).

The investment climate in India is anything but friendly. According to the World Bank (2015), India ranks 142nd in 2014 in the world in term of business friendliness. The economic reforms introduced in 1991 have not completely removed the dreaded license raj and even now, myriad approvals/sanctions are required to start a business (Mehdudia 2013). Some of the high profile investments from the Gulf region have turned sour. Emirate telecommunication firm, Etisalat, invested US$900 million in the bourgeoning telecom industry, only to get its licenses cancelled following the 2G scam (The Economic Times 2012). Likewise, Etihad’s investments in Jet Airways have been embroiled in controversies and legal hassles (The Hindu 2013). Unlike countries such as the US, Japan, Germany, France or Israel, the Arab countries do not have technological expertise to participate in the Make in India campaign launched by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. At the same time, some of these countries have considerable excess wealth which can be invested in India’s development plans. To achieve this goal, India’s investment climate will have to improve.

Thirdly, the energy reserves of countries such as Bahrain and Oman are depleting fast and their ability to maintain the welfare state mechanism depends upon them diversifying their economies. Though banking and other services are attractive, both face tough competition from resource hubs such as Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha. India’s ability in the banking sector is limited and could be confined to opening branches that cater to the needs of the Indian expatriate community or companies which are active in the Gulf region.

Education, however, is one arena where India has significant expertise which can be used for mutual benefits. It could use these skills to transform some of these countries into centres of excellence and education hubs. Presently, the Indian presence in the Gulf is dominated by primary and secondary schools run by the Kendriya Vidyalaya, and, as of 2014, there are 156 Indian schools in the Gulf countries, including one in Iran (CBSE 2012; The Hindu 2012b). While most of the pupils are children of the Indian labourers working in the
region, there are also other expatriate communities who benefit from Indian schools. The presence of higher education, however, is limited. Until now, only Manipal University has a campus in Dubai. Arjun Singh, as Human Resources and Development Minister under the Manmohan Singh government, took some initiatives in developing cooperation in higher education (*Hindustan Times* 2006) but the time has come for India to share its expertise in science and technology as well. There are American Universities in UAE and Kuwait and in recent years, Doha has opened campuses of various leading American Universities such as Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and Texas A&M University (Hukoomi 2015). In 2010, Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) decided to establish branch campuses in different parts of the country and perhaps India should be encouraged to start such a campus in the Gulf. It could also explore the possibilities of sharing its experience and expertise and expand its educational footprints through IITs and IIMs and other institutions of higher learning.

Fourthly, many western diplomats view Pakistan as India’s ‘centre of gravity’ and this was never more palpable than during the era of the Cold War. For long, India’s approach to the wider Middle East and the Gulf region has been dominated by its constant competition and rivalry with Pakistan. Its prolonged refusal to normalise relations with Israel is a classic example. Apprehensions over Islamabad’s diplomatic manoeuvres have often coloured India’s ability to pursue a policy based on reciprocity and mutual respect. Indeed, its infamous gate-crashing at the first Islamic summit in Rabat in September 1969 exemplified this approach (Baba 2008; Kumaraswamy 2010).

It was only after the end of the Cold War that India managed to consciously deal with the region without the Pakistani prism. Two factors contributed to this shift. Economic growth and its increasing economic power gave it greater confidence and resulted in India delinking Pakistan while dealing with the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia. Economic growth also presented India as an opportunity for the Arab countries and a guaranteed market for their oil and gas exports. Furthermore, its great power aspirations compelled India to relook its Pakistan-oriented Gulf policy. It could not be competing with Pakistan while still aspiring to play a greater role in the world; in short, it cannot be behaving like a South Asia-centric power while wanting a permanent membership in the UN Security Council. This detachment is visible in the absence of any references to Pakistan when dealing with the Middle Eastern countries and this is true of India’s dealings with Israel. Despite the religious proximity, a stable and
economically prosperous India offers a better bet for the Arab countries than the internally struggling Pakistan.

There is, however, some bad news. The marginalisation of Pakistan in India’s Gulf policy has been replaced by a new obsession with China. Since the end of the Cold War, the Indian strategic community tends to view the outside world through the Chinese prism and the Gulf region is no exception. This is especially true for Iran which has seen considerable Chinese investments and engagements. India’s interest in the development of Chabahar port in southern Iran, for example, is driven by its concerns over the Chinese role in the development of the Gwadar Port in Pakistan (Taneja 2015). But there are others like Meena Singh Roy (2013) who believe that “the strategic importance of Chabahar is immense. It not only gives access to the oil and gas resources in Iran, but also provide access to Central Asian Republics” (p. 4).

India cannot prevent the engagement of Pakistan and China with the Gulf countries. So it should avoid the temptation of designing its interest and involvement only in reference to these countries. Such a policy will be counterproductive and harmful. At the same time, it could learn from the experiences of China and Pakistan while trying to improve its relations with the region. On the nuclear controversy surrounding Iran, for example, China has skillfully managed its assets and positioned itself as a country of great importance to both sides. The US needs China to avoid a veto in the UNSC. At the same time, due to its great power position and economic clout, Iran could not criticise Beijing despite the latter voting with the US on several occasions since March 2003—three times in the IAEA and seven times in the UNSC (Harold and Nader 2012). This was in contrast to the public anger and displeasure in Iran against India’s three negative votes in the IAEA in September 2005.

Similarly, for long, Pakistan has reaped considerable benefits through its military cooperation with a number of Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia. At one time, it had over 15,000 troops (Riedel 2008) for the protection of the Saudi regime. During the Kuwait crisis, Pakistan contributed 13,000 troops and 6,000 advisors to protect the monarchy (Kamran 2013). However, such an involvement has, gradually, been creating more problems for Pakistan than benefits. Following the outbreak of popular protests, a number of Pakistanis were recruited by Bahraini security forces which were fighting the Shia opposition. This did not go down well with Iran (Mashal 2011). Likewise, despite strong political and economic connections and dependency, in April 2015, for example, Pakistan rejected a Saudi request to contribute troops for the Arab military campaign against Yemen (Riedel 2015).
Thus, sending troops to quell internal unrest or facilitating mercenaries to the Gulf to fight various sectarian wars are not an option for India. At the same time, there are critical but less controversial security areas where India could actively engage with the Gulf countries. The most prominent one is counter-terrorism. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in January 1992, India has been actively cooperating with Israel on counter-terrorism, which includes sharing of intelligence information, surveillance and technical and technological expertise. This model can be expanded and adopted in India’s dealings with the Gulf countries. Since the 11 September terror attacks in the US, the Arab countries have undergone a transformation in their approach to terrorism and the need to combat various extremist groups that threaten the region and undermine various regimes. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries have been victims of terrorism and hence have invested considerable assets in fighting the menace. Hence, as part of its bilateral relations, India should expand and strength counter-terrorism cooperation with countries such as Saudi Arabia, UAE and Jordan. Such cooperation, in recent years, has led to India securing the custody of persons wanted for terrorism-related offenses (Lakshmi 2012). The UAE being a major financial hub also makes a case for cooperation against money laundering. Frequent cases of sea piracy along the Somalian coast also bring India closer to the Gulf in protecting the sea lanes of communication (Shabandari 2013). Given its dependence upon the region for its energy security, India will not be able to ignore the periodic fears over the possible closure of the Strait of Hormuz. This would entail India seeking military presence or facility in Oman, with which it has had close relations for centuries (MEA 2014).

Fifthly, the presence of a large Indian expatriate community comes at a price, especially when the region is in turbulence. The Kuwait crisis of 1990–91 forced India to evacuate over 175,000 of its citizens (Fabian 2011) and likewise, following the Arab Spring India had to evacuate more than 300 citizens from Egypt and 12,000 from Libya in 2011 (NDTV 2011). In the wake of the intensifying civil war in early 2015, it brought home nearly 5,000 persons from Yemen (Indian Express 2015). The number of persons who were rescued following the Arab Spring is manageable but carrying out similar operations in countries which have a substantial expatriate community would be daunting; for example, there are about 400,000 Indians in Bahrain which is still reeling under domestic unrest. Emergency evacuation of such a large population is a logistical nightmare even for a developed country. Such measures cannot be carried out through airlifts and using ships would mean delays. As highlighted
during the rescue mission in Yemen, India will have to rely on neighbouring countries for logistical support for such an operation (Ibid). Hence, part of the mandate for the National Disaster Management Authority should be to evolve a contingency plan which can be activated at short notices in case India is forced to consider a large-scale evacuation.

The expatriate community has two additional drawbacks. At one level, a number of Arab countries have initiated the process of Arabization of their labour force (Randeree 2012). This is aimed at reducing the dependency upon expatriate labourers in various sectors of the economy. With the exception of Saudi Arabia and conflict-ridden Yemen, the expatriates constitute the bulk of the population. In Bahrain, for example, the native population makes up only 46 per cent of the total resident population (CIA 2010). The picture becomes grave when one studies the issue of labour force. The Arab workforce continues to be smaller than the expatriate labourers in all the Arab countries of the Gulf. For example, nearly 80 per cent of the work force in private sector in all GCC countries comprise of foreign nationals (IMF 2013).

Furthermore, improving women’s education and hence the demand for employment as well as economic demands associated with the Arab Spring have resulted in the Arab countries seeking to pacify their youth by preferring to employ locals rather than foreigners. The process of Arabization of the labour force began in 1990s but was intensified in the wake of popular protests in various Arab capitals. In Saudi Arabia, it took the form of Nitaqat, whereby, companies which employ foreign workers would face a host of sanctions and limitations (The Economic Times 2013). Local Arabs who enter the labour forces are unlikely to replace those employed in the blue collar or menial jobs such as nurses, domestic help, taxi drivers or clerical staff in companies or government offices. This may not be case for middle-level positions or careers in service industry. The entry of women into the labour force would significantly affect professions such as banking, tourism, education, health care and similar other services. In countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, fields such as engineering, architecture and industry, which hitherto have remained a male prerogative, are being opened to women. These measures will have an adverse effect on the quality of the labour force from India; even if the numbers do not drop drastically, their composition will be affected by these changes in the Arab countries. Therefore, if India wishes to continue the flow of expatriate labourers to the region, it will have to impart skill development, thereby making the labour forces competitive, both in terms of skills and wages.
Furthermore, for the expatriates there is also a flip side. At one level, they have established themselves as a professional and dedicated community that eschews involvement in domestic Arab affairs, both political and religious. Their contributions to the economic development of the oil-rich Arab countries are recognised and appreciated. At the same time, one cannot ignore the image problem associated with the expatriate labourers in the Gulf. Arab citizens, both affluent and ordinary, are exposed to India and its culture first and foremost through maids, cooks, drivers and housekeepers whom they encounter on a daily basis. Thus, the Arabs and their governments will not be able to understand and appreciate the other side of India. This is not different from the snake charmer image that the West had about India in the 1950s. That India has the fourth largest global economy with IT skills is yet to percolate into popular Arab consciousness. While every Indian is not an IT whiz kid, neither is he/she a menial worker. Even though the Arab elites and business community are slowly recognizing the bigger picture of India, the popular Indian image in the Arab world is not flattering.

Above all the presence of a large Indian workforce has not resulted in any systematic and accurate estimates. The numbers put out by various agencies of the government often vary from 6 to 7.5 million. Indeed, even the Ministry of External Affairs often puts out contradictory figures without any explanation or clarification. For example, in February 2013 a document on India-GCC relations gives a figure of 6 million Indian expats in the Gulf, while its Annual Report 2012–13 gives a figure of 6.4 million (MEA 2013a; 2013b). The only accurate figure concerning expatriate Indian workers is the Emigration Check Required (ECR) data and pertains to those without class X certificate. The rest of the numbers are merely estimates or extrapolated from smaller sample surveys. The introduction of the Aadhar Card and other identity documents should enable India to prepare a more accurate number of its nationals present in the Gulf. This should be useful not only for offering services, but also during emergency evacuates.

The situation of the expatriate community cannot be delinked from their right to practice their faith. Though they are not citizens and hence not entitled to all rights, religious rights are fundamental human rights and are recognized under Article 18 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations 1948). While some Gulf countries are accommodative of the socio-religious needs of the expatriate Indian population, others are not. Some like Saudi Arabia continue to oppose public worship of non-Islamic faiths. While the involvement of the Indian government in such issues is inappropriate and
counter-productive, scholars and elites should take an active interest in the conditions of the non-Muslim communities.

Sixthly, while seeking friendly ties with Arab and non-Arab countries along the Persian Gulf, India should be prudent enough to recognize regional tensions and cleavages. Islam is not monolithic (Hasan 2008; Hirji 2010) and the emergence of various sects or new faiths such as Ismaili, Ahmadiyya or Baha’is signifies its liveliness and diversity. Likewise, contrary to popular notions of denial, Sunni-Shia differences are real and the political contestation has returned with vigour in the wake of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia consider themselves as the legitimate heads of Shia and Sunni Islam respectively and the contest for supremacy is being played out in various conflicts in the region (Wehrey et al. 2009). In some way or the other, the rivalry between the two Gulf powers has contributed to the tensions and violence in Bahrain, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine and Syria. The intensification of the civil war in Syria and Yemen and continuing violence in Bahrain is partly due to Iran and Saudi Arabia backing rival factions. The same holds true for the political stalemate in Lebanon after President Michel Suleiman’s term ended in May 2014 (Saab 2015).

The sectarian schism is manifested by the emergence of ISIS, the most radical religious extremist movement so far. Its brutality against non-Muslims, minorities, women, children, Shias and those it considers to be unIslamic has made other militant groups look passive and even peaceful. If one excludes the Hezbollah, the Shia militant group in Lebanon, much of the terror and violence, in the Middle East and beyond, are attributed to various Sunni militant groups. From the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan, jihadi groups fighting against the Assad regime or the ISIS, various Sunni groups have resorted to militancy to fight against their perceived marginalisation and for supremacy. The terror attack in a Shia mosque in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia in May 2015 is merely another attempt to ignite sectarian violence in the Arabian Peninsula (Al-Rasheed 2015).

Therefore, it is essential to recognize two closely-linked issues. Over the years, the degree and manifestation of religious extremism have increased considerably. Though called ‘freedom fighters’ by President Ronald Reagan, the Mujahedeen are a product of religious extremism and contributed to the emergence of Afghan Arabs. Then came the Taliban exhibiting their extremism by dynamiting the Bamiyan Buddha statues in March 2001; a few months later, the al-Qaida carried out the largest single act of terrorism in world; and subsequently came the salafi-jihadi who entered the civil war against the Assad regime in Syria and
finally the ISIS. Thus, over the years, the scope and extent of religious extremism and violence have expanded considerably and the ISIS is its latest avatar.

At the same time, it is essential to recognise the context of religious extremism and hence the nomenclature. If one were talking in the context of Sri Lanka and Myanmar, it would mean Buddhist extremism and in the American continent it would refer to Christian extremism. In the multi-religious Indian context, it would imply extremism in every colour and hue. Hence, in the Middle East, this would mean extremism by various Islamist groups and organisations. The ISIS and all other movements explain and justify their brutality in the name of Islam and hence recognising religious extremism in the Gulf and beyond is a precondition to understand the region, its problems and hence possible remedies (Moaddel and Karabenick 2013). Merely brushing aside everything as a western conspiracy (Prashad 2015) or as the result of the ill-fated American invasion of Iraq (Cockburn 2014) would be ideologically satisfying without addressing the problem.

Growing sectarian violence should enable India and its elites to recognize the status of various religious, ethnic and national minorities in the region. For long, their attention has been focussed only on the Palestinians, Kurds and to lesser degree various groups in Lebanon. The rest of the minorities have escaped their attention or scrutiny. The root cause of the ISIS menace, for example, is its intolerance towards a non-Sunni population. It is not possible to study the Islamic Republic of Iran without examining the mistreatment of the Baha’is or limitations imposed upon the three recognised religious minorities in the country, namely, Jews, Armenian Christians and Zoroastrians (Ghanea and Hass 2011).

Challenge
One: The absence of adequate scholarship on Persian Gulf is a major challenge facing India. The importance of the region and its myriad problems are not reflected in the promotion of these areas in Indian institutions. While only a handful of institutions have some interest in the Persian Gulf, most think tanks are dominated by their obsession with South Asia. Even top Indian industrial households which are active in the Gulf such as Tata, Birla, Reliance, Infosys, Wipro, etc have not found it necessary to further the understanding of the region. This level of ignorance on a region of considerable importance cannot be sustained for long.

Two: India will have to recognise regional tensions, cleavages and rivalries in the Gulf. The traditional Arab-Persian rivalry is on the ascendance and there
are new tensions among Arab countries. The GCC is a classic example. At one point of time, it was seen as a follower of EU-type political union (Fürtig 2004) and not long ago, the group was planning to expand by including Jordan and Morocco (Hamdan 2011). Of late, things have soured and the Qatari position on political transition in Egypt has divided the regional organisation (Kholaf 2014). While all the GCC members have joined the Saudi military campaign against Yemen, the endurance of the cooperation remains doubtful. Qatar tends to prefer a political solution to the Yemeni crisis while Saudi Arabia seems to prefer a military option. Oman which has always had a soft corner for Iran does not wish to antagonise Tehran (Al-Jahouri 2015).

Three: Taking sides in the Arab-Persian or intra-Arab division is not an option for India but at the same time, it will not be able to remain aloof in the wake of the growing tensions among key players. Adopting a nuanced approach that advocates resolution of all conflicts and differences through peaceful negotiations could be a fair point to start. This would mean India’s readiness to engage with all parties to a conflict without favouring one or taking sides. Such a course of action cannot be pursued by normal channels of diplomacy but has to be covert. It is about effectively using its security-intelligence assets to forge and maintain contacts with various groups that are active in the region, especially in Iraq and Yemen. Through a policy of compartmentalised engagement or need-to-know approach, India should pursue its interests with warring groups without compromising its political positions vis-à-vis the country in question. Unlike politico-diplomatic contacts, intelligence engagements enjoy greater leeway and deniability.

Four: India and its elites have been coy about the nomenclature. While the whole region addresses itself as the Middle East, for long India’s preferred expression has been ‘West Asia’. Though Indo-centric, it also appears to be an imposition of its view upon the countries of this region and is hence imperial in connotation. The Middle East is the preferred expression of countries of this region and employing any other nomenclature is indeed a sign of hegemony. One hopes that the same applies to the other historical expression, that is, Persian Gulf. Like other geographic terms, such as the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, the expression ‘Persian Gulf’ does not denote Iranian ownership of the said waters and there is no reason for India to settle for a prefix-less ‘Gulf’ to describe the Persian Gulf. Since assuming office, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been using the term ‘Middle East’ and the same was the case in the foreign policy resolution adopted by the BJP in April 2015 at its National Executive meeting (BJP 2015).
Five: The most daunting task facing India will be to skilfully manage Iran and the controversies surrounding it. Despite periodic euphoria, India lacks a coherent understanding of the complexities surrounding Iran. Both policy makers and academics are confronted by ideological blinkers and wishful thinking and suffer from their refusal to recognise and accept complex realities. Some even saw Iran as the new rallying point for their anti-American worldview. For its part, the US and its incoherent handling of Iran since 1979 have complicated India’s ability to pursue an independent option vis-à-vis Iran. Periodic American pressure and demands were partly responsible for New Delhi’s inability to pursue normal relations with Tehran. At the same time, Iran also complicated things for India. At regular intervals, Iranian leaders and officials have been making bellicose statements and actions against countries that are friendlier toward India; frequent anti-Israeli rhetoric, especially during the tenure of Iran’s President Ahmadinejad, was a case in point. Therefore, even while welcoming the politico-diplomatic resolution of the nuclear controversy, the Modi government will not be able to ignore the strategic concerns of Israel and Saudi Arabia vis-à-vis Iran and the latter’s regional influence, if not hegemony. On the energy issue, without working out a stable arrangement for the payment issue, India should desist from entering into any long-term energy deals with Iran.

Six: The Iranian quagmire is complicated by the perceived decline in the influence of the US in the Middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf region. A number of American actions in the Persian Gulf region have come under public criticism and closer scrutiny. The exclusion of Saudi Arabia (and also Israel) from the Geneva agreement was not well received. The surprising refusal of Saudi Arabia to take up its non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council was attributed to Riyadh’s displeasure over some American policies, especially in relation to its engagement with Iran. India will have to learn to manage the fallout of growing tensions between the US and Saudi Arabia.

A Personal Note
While every teacher aspires to be a Confucius and every student an Arjun, the reality is often different and less flattering. The student-teacher relations are unique and interdependent. If the teachers are known by their students, the latter are moulded by the former. Yet, every teacher was a student at some point of time and should be prepared to learn from wherever possible. Knowledge is an ocean and whoever has a drop of it is a teacher, even if only in the informal sense. In that sense, Professors Gulshan Dietl,
Prakash Chandra Jain and Girijesh Pant were my colleagues and shared their knowledge with me unstintingly; this volume is both a celebration and commemoration of their immense contribution to the study of the Persian Gulf region.

*Thank You* at times is too small an acknowledgement of one’s debt and cannot adequately reflect and communicate one’s true feelings of gratitude. Long associations, especially the one which has been close to three decades with Professor Gulshan Dietl, cannot be summarised with an acknowledgement, greeting card, bouquet, gift or a nice meal. How do I say thanks to someone like Professor Pant who was instrumental in me moving to Jawaharlal Nehru University from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem? How does one express gratitude to Professor Jain who shouldered the administrative responsibility of my students each time I was away during my semester breaks. This volume is also a token of my deep regard for my esteemed colleagues.

*Contemporary Persian Gulf* is part of the outreach activities of the Middle East Institute (MEI@ND) founded in October 2010 as a private academic initiative. Since then, the MEI@ND has undertaken a number of academic and outreach activities, including the launching of a refereed quarterly *Contemporary Review of the Middle East* published by Sage (India).

The contributors to this volume are the former students of these three teachers and I am grateful to them for taking time out and in joining the celebrations. As an editor of this volume and as the Honorary Director of the MEI@ND, I would like to convey my sincere thanks and gratitude to them. Special thanks are reserved for Md. Muddassir Quamar, the co-editor of the volume, as also to the ever-dependable Dipanwita Chakravortty for their delicate skills in improving the earlier drafts; and, of course, to Uma Purushothaman for her skilful editing amidst her child-caring responsibilities.

MEI@ND is grateful to *Knowledge World* for the quick and efficient execution of the project and particularly to Jose Mathew for successfully seeing the volume through. I am responsible for any omissions and commissions.

31 May 2015
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

**References**


Kumaraswamy, P. R. (2010), India’s Israel Policy, New York: Columbia University Press.


Singh, Manmohan (2005), “Prime Minister's Address”, Inaugural Address by Dr. Manmohan Singh, Hon'ble Prime Minister of India on the occasion of the Inauguration of the Centre for West Asian Studies, at Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, 29 January, http://jmi.ac.in/bulletinboard/eventmodule/latest/detail/514/22969.


INTRODUCTION


Investment in Renewable Energy in the GCC States: Status and Policy Options

Colombo, Silvia (2013), Italy and Saudi Arabia Confronting the Challenges of the XXI century, Roma: Edizioni Nuova Cultura.


Transition to a Green Economy: Emerging Challenges for the GCC Countries


Economist Intelligence Unit (2009), The GCC in 2020: Outlook for the Gulf and the Global Economy, A report from the Economist Intelligence Unit Sponsored by the Qatar Financial Centre Authority.


GRC (Gulf Research Centre) (2007), Green Gulf Report, Dubai: Gulf Research Centre.


Philander, S. George (2012) Green Economy In Encyclopaedia of Global Warming and Climate Change, SAGE Publications.


Woertz Eckart, Samir Ranjan Pradhan, Nermina Biberovic and Christian Koch (2008a), Food Inflation in the GCC Countries, Dubai: Gulf Research Centre.


UNEP (2010). The Environment Outlook for the Arab Region. UNEP Regional Office for West Asia, League of Arab States and CEDARE.


UNEP (2011b) Towards a Green Economy: Enabling Conditions supporting the Transition to a Global Green Economy, Nairobi: UNEP.

UNEP (2012a) Green Economy: Metrics and Indicators, Briefing Paper, Nairobi: UNEP.


Trajectories of Education Policy in Saudi Arabia


---

**Shiism, Rentier State and Illiberal Democracy in Iran**

Alnahas, Ibrahim Mahmoud Yaseen (2007), *Continuity and Change in the Revolutionary Iran Foreign Policy*, PhD dissertation, Department of Political Science Morgantown West Virginia.


Herb, Michael (2005), No Representation without Taxation? Rents, Development, and Democracy, Comparative Politics, 37 (3): 297-316.


Tessler, Mark (2002), Islam and Democracy in the Middle East, Comparative Politics, 34, pp. 337-354.


Sectarianism, Geopolitical Rivalry and the Syrian Civil War


Friedman, Thomas (1989), From Beirut to Jerusalem, New York: Doubleday.


Pinto, Paulo Gabriel Hilu (2013), Contextualising the Syrian Uprising in Prashad, Vijay and Paul Amar (ed.) Dispatches from the Arab Spring, New Delhi: Leftword, pp. 233-278


Prashad, Vijay (2012), Arab Spring Libyan Winter, New Delhi: Leftword


The American Enterprise Institute (2013), Remarks by Senator John Mccain on Syria at The American Enterprise Institute


The Widening Gulf: Arab Spring and the Saudi-Iranian Divide


Al-Arabiya (2012), Saudi foreign minister says supporting Syrian opposition is a duty, March, http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/03/31/204429.html.


Al Saud, Turki Al Faisal bin Abdul Aziz (2013), Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy, Middle East Policy, 20 (4): p. 42.


Rafati, Naysan (2012), "Iran and the Arab Spring," in Nicholas Kitchen (ed.), After the Arab Spring: Power Shift in the Middle East?, LSE Ideas Report, London: London School of
Qatar-Hamas Relations: Between Strategic Calculations and Ideological Ties


Barakat, Sultan (2012), The Qatari Spring: Qatar's emerging role in peacemaking, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States, July.


Crystal, Jill (1990), Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


Hroub, Khaled (2013), Qatar: Geostrategic Media and Foreign Policy, Norwegian Peace building Resource Centre, NOREF, Policy Brief, February.


India GCC FTA: Ray of Opportunities

Alpen Capital (2013), GCC as an Investment Destination, 5 November, Dubai, UAE, pp. 27-29.


Thicker than Oil: The India-Iraqi Ties


Profile

Transnational Gas Pipelines: Global Context, India Imperative, [Forthcoming]


Iranian Role in Afghanistan: Balancing the Two Adversaries (Gulshan Suchdeva (ed.), European Engagement in Afghanistan (Pentagon Publishers, New Delhi, Forthcoming).


Eurasian Union: Substance and the Subtext (Rashpal Malhotra, Sucha Singh Gill and Neetu Gaur (eds.), Perspectives on Bilateral and Regional Cooperation: South and Central Asia (Chandigarh: Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development, 2013).


SCO: A Checkmate on a Chessboard by Dietl, Gulshan, Contemporary Central Asia, 2007, vol. 11, nos. 1, 2 and 3.


Middle Kingdom and the Middle East: The Energy Connection by Dietl, Gulshan, China Brief, 25 February 2003, vol. 3, no. 4, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3564&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=193&no_cache=1#.VZDnSBuqKQo.

West Asian Relations IC Diary, May-June 2002, vol. 16, no. 3.
Reviving a Dream IC Diary, September-October 2001, vol. 15, no. 5.
Flashpoint Near East: Challenges for Europe: Round Table Conference held by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 23 November 1987 in Bonn Orient (Opladen), 1987, vol. 28, no. 4.
Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia: Internal and External Contexts India Quarterly, July-December 1985.
The Black November Over Economic and Political Weekly, 3 December 1983.
West Asia: Winner Takes All Economic and Political Weekly, 25 June 1983.
Waiting for an Arab Response Economic and Political Weekly, 6 November 1982.
183 Palestinian Perspectives on Arab-Israel Conflict Economic and Political Weekly, 16 January 1982.
Indians in the Gulf Mainstream, 24 October 1981.
India and West Asia: Friends and Neighbours India and Foreign Review (New Delhi), vol. 18, no. 15, 15-30 May 1981.
Glimpses of Zia Pakistan Secular Democracy (New Delhi), April 1981.
Current Situation in the Gulf Political Science Review (Jaipur), vol. 18, no. 4, October-December 1979.
Indian Labour Migration to the Gulf Countries: Past and Present
India Quarterly, 2005, vol. 61, no. 2, pp. 50-81.

Indians in Kuwait

Notes on Religion and Social Organisation among the Jains

Indians in Bahrain

Indian Diaspora in Yemen

Indian Diaspora: An Overview
Think India, 2003, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 8-17.

West Asian Diasporas: Migration Patterns, Population Size and Geographic Distribution

Political Economy of the Demise of Apartheid

Notes on Contemporary Arab Diasporas

South Africa: Indian Community's Changing Socio-Political Position

On the Apartheid Regime and its Western Allies

Population and Society in Israel

Indians in Canada: And How they have Influenced Indo-Canadian Ties

Turkey and Egypt: A Socio-Demographic Comparison

Population and Development: Trends in North Africa

The Palestinian Diaspora: Population Size and Distribution

Theories of Ethnic and Race Relations: An Overview

The Impact of the Kuwaiti Crisis on the Gulf Societies

Political Economy of Communalism and Communal Violence

Colonialism, Forced Labour Systems and Ethnic/Race Relations

Overseas Indians and Ethnic Relations

189 Indian Emigration to the Caribbean

Gulf NRIs and India

Sociological Theories of Development: A Critique in the Third World Context

Rehabilitating the Returning Migrants from the Gulf

Emigration and Settlement of Indians Abroad

Exploitation and Reproduction of Migrant Indian Labour in Colonial Guyana and Malaysia

Towards Class Analysis of Race Relations: Overseas Indians in Colonial/Post-Colonial Societies

Apartheid and Indians in South Africa

Racism in Canada: Some Recent Surveys

Indians Abroad: A Current Population Estimate

Working Papers, Gulf Studies Programme, JNU, New Delhi

On the Success of NRI Entrepreneurs in the United Arab Emirates
GSP Working Paper [Forthcoming].

Indian Diaspora in the Arab World
GSP Working Paper, Co-authored [Forthcoming].

Indians in the United Arab Emirates

Indian in Oman
Profile

World Oil Crisis and India (in Hindi), 1975.
People’s Struggles and Movement for Equitable Society (New Delhi: Indian Academy of Social Sciences, 2013), Co-edited.
People’s Struggle and Movements for Equitable Society: Perspectives from Diverse Locations in N. P. Chaubey, Debabrata Panda and Girijesh Pant (eds.) People’s Struggles and Movement for Equitable Society (Delhi: Daanish Books/Indian Academy of Social Science, 2013).
Imagining West Asia beyond Neocon Construct: Defining an Indian Perspective in Rajendra M. Abhayankar (ed.), West Asia and the Region: Defining India’s Role (New Delhi: Academic...


Gulf Labour Market in Transition Implications for India, World Focus, February 2008.


Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline: Shifting Geopolitics, Gulf-Asia Bulletin, No. 4, February 2008, Gulf Research Center, Dubai.


India-Gulf Strategic Partners in Building Knowledge Economy, India Research Bulletin, 2006, Gulf Research Center, Dubai.


India's Search for Energy: Challenges to Foreign Policy, World Focus, October-December 2004.


India's Search for Energy: Challenges to Foreign Policy, World Focus, October-December 2004.


