THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL MINORITY PARTICIPATION IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE
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For more information, please contact us at:

EastWest Institute
700 Broadway, Second Floor
New York, NY 10003
Tel (212) 824-4100, Fax (212) 824-4149
Website: http://www.iews.org
E-mail: iews@iews.org
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CONTRIBUTORS

Jonathan P. Stein is a research associate at the EastWest Institute's Prague Centre.

Carlos Flores Juberias is a professor of law at the University of Valencia.

Janusz Bugajski is Director of East European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Neil J. Melvin is a professor of government at the University of Leeds.

Nenad Zakošek is an associate professor of political science at the University of Zagreb.

James Pettifer is a research fellow of the European Research Institute, University of Bath, UK.

Ivan Ilchev is a professor of history at the University of Sofia.

Michael Shafir is an analyst at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Prague.

Erin Jenne recently completed a Ph.D. in political science at Stanford University.

Jack Snyder is a professor of political science at Columbia University.
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been no shortage of reminders of the terrible consequences of ethnic conflict. As we have seen in the Balkans and around the globe, in a matter of days and weeks, peoples can be relegated to abject human misery and whole societies set back decades in their quest for a better life. The gap between the prosperous nations and those whose economies are unable to grow becomes wider. Visions of democracy, prosperity and cooperative inter-state relations remain but dreams. Wherever inter-ethnic tensions are high or where they can easily be inflamed by politicians, the path to power is shortened for extremist forces, who typically maintain control by quashing internal dissent, hijacking the economy for the benefit of political cronies, and provoking conflict with neighboring states.

While this tendency has been widespread throughout the developing world, post-communist Europe has provided an environment particularly conducive to authoritarian nationalism. The post-communist transition has witnessed the emergence of weak states that are incapable of ensuring security for their citizens and migration patterns and border changes that have left territorially concentrated minorities outside “their” states, all of which is exacerbated by a deep economic malaise. Insecurity and instability, coupled with the collapse of official Communist ideology, have created fertile ground for opportunistic political leaders to mobilize long-standing and deep-seated ethnic rivalries for their own political gain. Profiteers have been successful in exploiting these conflicts for financial gain. The wars of Yugoslav succession and the recent devastation endured by the peoples of Kosovo and Serbia provide only the most tragic examples of ethnic nationalism’s destructive potential.

Elsewhere in post-communist Europe, the absence of state-organized or state-sponsored ethnic violence has not meant an absence of ethnic conflict, but has merely kept it largely out of the view of Western publics. Nevertheless, constitutional provisions assigning symbolic precedence to ethnic majorities, restrictive language laws, exclusionary citizenship measures, biased electoral
systems, the denial of cultural rights to ethnic minorities, and failure by officials to curtail localized violence are frequent features of the post-communist political landscape. Wherever they are present, they have represented an ongoing threat to democratic consolidation, aided forces hostile to economic reform, impeded integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, and damaged the fragile confidence-building processes necessary to building lasting regional stability. Even leaders with clearly demonstrable track records of being in the European democratic tradition have demonstrated their willingness to use ethnic politics to enhance their power or attempt to stay in power.

As part of its efforts to promote democracy, economic transformation, and security throughout central and eastern Europe as well as in Russia and the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, the EastWest Institute (EWI) has placed the need to study and address ethnic conflict within post-communist polities at the center of its concerns. The present volume, generously funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, grew out of the EWI's Program on Managing Ethnic Conflict, an initiative established at the very outset of the post-Cold War era to develop innovative methods for reducing the fear and mistrust between ethnic majorities and minorities that can derail positive social and political change. This volume follows a highly successful volume the Institute published in 1993, Minorities: The New Europe's Old Issue. The Institute's projects in South Eastern Europe, including the Task Force on the future of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, address the issues dealt with in this volume as Europe seeks to transform its southeastern part into a secure, stable, democratic, and prosperous region.

The recurring crises in the Balkans have, however, tended to obscure from view promising developments elsewhere in central and Eastern Europe over the past decade. In the latter half of the 1990's, Estonia and Latvia responded to the prolonged engagement of western institutions, including non-governmental organizations such as the EWI, by gradually adopting frameworks for extending citizenship to their Russophone minorities. Ethnic Hungarian minorities played a key role in allying with democratic forces to dislodge populist authoritarian regimes in Romania and Slovakia. At the same time, Bulgaria's Turkish minority integrated politically with liberal forces to defeat a post-communist government that had led the country to the brink of economic collapse. Clearly, close examination of these states' experiences can provide invaluable lessons for promoting stability and reconstruction in the Balkans.

Nevertheless, the course of post-communist transformation remains exceptionally fluid, and ethnic groups' mutual mistrust and recrimination will continue to endanger the gains made so far. It is our hope, therefore, that
the present volume will assist students of the region, leaders, and policy makers in familiarizing themselves with the problems of political accommodation confronted by multi-ethnic post-communist states, as well as encouraging further attention to the obstacles that remain to be overcome. The Board of Directors of the EastWest Institute is proud to sponsor the publication of this series and welcomes comments and suggestions from its readers.

John Edwin Mroz

President and Founder, EWI

István Gyarmati

Senior Vice President, EWI
The gestation of this book has been unusually long, which may, alas, be the inevitable price to be paid when contributors are scattered far and wide, and when a volume's incubator is as extraordinarily dynamic and fast-changing an organization as the EastWest Institute (EWI). The volume was originally conceived by Robert W. Mickey, who, after his departure from the EWI, continued to make many important contributions to its realization. For his patience (and prodding), I must also express my profound gratitude to Stephen B. Heintz. During Stephen's term as Executive Vice President of the EWI and Director of its Prague Centre, his leadership, energy, and intellectual depth set an example that was nothing short of inspiring, and I remain honored by his friendship and camaraderie. Istvan Gyarmati of the EWI and Vasil Hudák, the current Director of the Prague Centre, read the entire manuscript and provided valuable comments. Nevertheless, the contents of the book remain solely the responsibility of the editor and authors. They should not be construed as reflecting the views of either the EWI or the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

I also benefited greatly from suggestions made by my editor at M.E. Sharpe, Patricia Kolb, which have made this a more thematically cohesive and, I hope, accessible volume than it otherwise would have been. Prior to his departure into the New Economy, Scott Rogers provided reliable administrative (and moral) support as the Institute's Director of Publications. In the book's latter stages, Natasha Randall stepped coolly into the breach, copyediting the manuscript and coordinating its final preparation with admirable professionalism. Scott Tennant's typesetting skills are also gratefully acknowledged.

Finally, I must also thank my long-time friend and partner, Vladěna Steinová, for helping me in innumerable ways to keep everything in its proper perspective. An altogether different sort of debt is owed to my brother, Ethan, whose company I shared for the last time shortly after taking on this project. To him is owed the incalculable debt of memory, and it is to that sustaining memory that this volume is dedicated.

Jonathan P. Stein
May 11, 2000
Over the past decade, the assertion of ethnic identity has dominated much of the politics of post-communist central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. During the period of Soviet state-building and later during the Cold War, this region, extremely diverse ethnically both within and across neighboring states, was marked by a rigid channeling of political participation that attempted uniformly to suppress officially unsanctioned demands and modes of expression, including those emerging from ethnic cleavages. With the collapse of communism, however, there has been a dramatic expansion of distinctively ethnically-focused political action, ranging from ethnic voting to ethnic cleansing. Clearly, the recognition, cultivation, and assertion of ethnicity is now unbound from the strictures of the recent past.

But exactly in what sense is the high salience of ethnic group identities and their claims upon the state a response to the demise of communism? On one level, ethnicity “unbound” seems to be in keeping with conventional wisdom. Observers often assume that the mobilization of ethnicity as the primary cleavage of post-communist social and political conflict is inevitable, a thesis that comes in both vulgar and analytically more sophisticated variants. In its vulgar form, communist repression is seen as having placed latent ethnic antagonisms in a “deep freeze.” According to this view, significant portions of the region’s populations managed covertly to bear their ethnic identities—intact, unaffected, and primary—across two or more generations, resolved and prepared to seize the first available opportunity to settle old accounts with ethnic foes. Thus, the post-communist “thaw” reac-
tivated a host of dormant group conflicts, border disputes, and primordial or ancient “tribal” hatreds.¹

Stated in such a reductionist manner, this view has been widely challenged by scholars who locate the “necessity” of post-communist ethnopolitics in the collapse or weakening of states whose stability depended on the political monopoly of a single party. To be sure, historical grievances may contribute to shaping the form ethnopolitics assumes.² Yet ethnic categories provide an attractive template for building new states or strengthening old ones not because they express some underlying condition sub specie aeternitatis, but because they are relatively fixed and are thus easily identifiable by actors within emerging polities and potential challengers who have been excluded from them. One need not have well-developed state institutions to frame the distinction between friend and foe or collective self and other; in their absence, “groupness” itself becomes a highly valued resource, the more so as individuals perceive increasing threats to their economic and physical security. Thus, ethnopolitics fills the ideological and institutional vacuum left by the collapse of the party-state.³

Clearly, there is much to recommend focusing on the structural context of nation-state building, for in many respects, the dynamics of the region’s ethnic conflicts are similar to those found in the postcolonial developing world, which have themselves exhibited remarkable similarities.⁴ Recognition of these similarities is reflected in renewed attention to the influence of the international environment on ethnic conflict within states, particularly the relational dynamic between ethnic minorities, their external homelands (or “kin states”), and the “home states” in which they reside.⁵ Such similarities also form the premise for efforts to come to grips with the successes and failures of (non)intervention by intergovernmental organizations and other interstate actors.⁶ All of this suggests that ethnic conflicts, while informed by the past, are more usefully thought of as eminently rational political struggles over the future.⁷

This volume shares many of the assumptions and analytical foci of the rationalist approach to ethnopolitics, recognizing that it is precisely the primordial concern with communal solidarity, the preservation and expression of collective identity, and the allocation of group prestige that provides politicized ethnicity with its profound mobilizational power and gives competing claims their zero-sum character.⁸ Indeed, because rational and primordial motivations usually operate simultaneously within ethnic communities, and because the state is the primary locus of the material and symbolic power for which they strive, there often seem to be precious few brakes on ethnicity’s
momentum as a political force. In the absence of external hegemony, internally weak multi-national states, such as those that emerged from communism, face the threat of disintegration into smaller parts, only to produce unstable successor states that are themselves wracked by ethnationally conflict. Ethnicity “unbound” can seem to resemble a machine that goes of itself, fueled by the dismal Hobbesian logic of a culturally homogenizing war of all against all.

But from the perspective of this volume’s contributors, ethnicity “unbound” connotes something quite different, for its contemporary political importance in much of the region, while undeniably conditioned by structural factors, has been far from inevitable and uniform. Rather, given the numerous ways in which political participation and contestation have been organized, the relative salience of ethnic cleavages and the consequences of their mobilization require a good deal of explanation. Moreover, ethnic categories, even those operative in the region’s most heated pairings of ethnic majorities and minorities, are often more malleable than many scholarly observers and policymakers recognize. Indeed, as the first decade of post-communism comes to a close, it is not at all obvious that ethnic identity must or will remain among the central motive forces of social and political conflict. On the contrary, perhaps the most important lesson to be drawn from this volume is that ethnicity, as it has functioned in post-communist politics, is best considered “unbound” by explanations that are all too often freighted with teleological assumptions.

The varied contours of ethnopolitics in post-communist Europe require a conception of ethnic conflict that is not restricted to organized inter-communal violence. In fact, notwithstanding the widespread attention it has received as human tragedy or international security threat, and despite the extremely high stakes for national minorities implied by the formation of 22 new states in post-communist Europe and the former Soviet Union, inter-ethnic violence has remained exceedingly rare. This does not mean that ethnic relations within these states are typically harmonious or that cultural heterogeneity has not significantly affected their ability to consolidate democratic regimes and develop the institutional coherence required for urgent tasks such as economic reform. It is no accident that of the five post-communist countries invited in July 1997 by the European Union to begin “fast-track” accession negotiations, four—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia—most closely approximate the nationalist ideal of congruent ethnic and political boundaries, while the fifth (Estonia) achieved a similar result at independence through the proxy of ethnically exclusive citizenship.
Organized, and especially militarized, violent ethnic conflict is often sufficient to undermine a state's efficacy, if not its viability, but it is not necessary to such an outcome, as the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia most plainly demonstrates. Ethnic conflict is therefore best defined as describing a broad range of circumstances in which different ethnic groups inhabiting the same state's territory maintain antithetical goals regarding the degree of public recognition and autonomy accorded to them by the political system. Thus understood, differences in the determinants, degree, and form of conflict, and in the ability of domestic and international actors to manage it, can more readily be identified and analyzed. At the same time, and of equal importance to scholars and policy makers concerned with the prospects for democratic consolidation in the region, the contributors to this volume collectively attempt to provide a deeper understanding of the complicated interplay between ethnic conflict and post-communist regime transition.

The chapters include a comparative analysis of post-communist electoral systems, an examination of nationalist ethnic majority parties, five country-specific case-studies, an exploration of the politics of the region's Roma population, and a concluding chapter that evaluates options for ethnic conflict management by domestic- and international-level actors. The focus of these studies is limited in two important ways. First, and most obviously, the volume's geographic scope is largely contained to post-communist Europe and the Baltic successor states of the former Soviet Union. The decision to forgo treatment of the extremely complex ethnopolitics within what is now the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) reflects not only a pragmatic concern with what a single volume can feasibly achieve, but also the marked gap in political development within the post-communist world. Compared with central and eastern Europe and the Baltic states, the CIS is uniformly characterized by far lower state institutional capacity, dramatically poorer democratic performance, higher susceptibility to external threats, and weaker receptiveness to western influence. As James Pettifer's chapter demonstrates, some of these distinctive macro-political features have played a central role in shaping ethnic relations also in Albania.

Similarly, while western Europe is clearly experiencing an ethnic "revival" as it accelerates simultaneous processes of integration and regionalization, the causes and consequences of ethnic conflict in the East are sufficiently
distinctive to merit separate attention. The region's pre-communist history, the legacy of communist rule, and the vagaries of the exceptionally uncertain and fluid post-communist context all caution against a continent-wide analysis, at least until the politics of ethnicity in central and eastern Europe, like the region's political regimes more broadly, exhibit more settled patterns that are better understood.

Second, the country case studies focus almost exclusively on political interactions between ethnic majorities and the largest of each country's ethnic minorities, despite the presence in each of these states of other ethnic minorities of varying sizes. The rationale for this is not an ethnic minority's size, however, but rather its "ethnicness," that is, the degree of its consciousness as a distinct collectivity and the extent of its political organization to maintain itself as such. It is politically conscious and organized ethnic minorities' demands concerning past and present treatment, their mobilization within or against the political system to realize these demands, and the political system's response to this mobilization that are of most serious consequence both domestically and internationally. In short, these are the ethnic minorities whose modes of political participation shape the establishment of either civic and inclusive or ethnically defined and exclusive polities.

The remainder of this introduction examines several themes that emerge in the individual chapters and attempts to situate them within current theorizing about ethnicity and post-communist political change, occasionally referring to cases from the region that are not included among the country studies. An important caveat is in order, however. While there are many common factors shaping post-communist ethnopolitics, the manner in which they operate is often difficult to tease out. In some cases, they seem to fuel or exacerbate ethnic conflict, while in others they appear to reflect or be caused by ethnic conflict itself. A la Tocqueville, indirect effects often seem more important than direct effects, and dependent and independent variables are frequently difficult to distinguish. It may be helpful, therefore, to think of these relationships in terms of a process of structuration in which political institutions established by a set of agents affect social attitudes and identities, which in turn potentially lead to further institutional change. Above all, the variations on the themes discussed below point to the contemporary fluidity of political outcomes and the explanatory and predictive limitations analysts must confront. While they do highlight a number of useful lessons for policymakers, they also underscore the need for caution, circumspection, and a healthy dose of skepticism toward any proposed policy response.
Historical Legacies, Path-Dependency, and Feedback Mechanisms

In recent years, scholars have emphasized the importance of placing historical and institutional legacies at the center of theorizing about political, social, and economic change.¹⁵ Social scientists have thus begun to develop more systematic understandings of the manner in which attention to temporally linked sequences and feedback processes can improve the study of large-scale change, highlighting in particular the self-reinforcing properties of such processes.¹⁶ Beginning from often highly contingent starting points, political, social, and economic interactions produce outcomes that feed back on themselves, narrowing over time the range of further possible outcomes.

This approach is particularly useful in examining the domestic sources of ethnopolitics in the post-communist context, for it sheds important analytical light on a phenomenon that appears in several of the contributions to this volume, namely the tendency of majority-minority interactions to spiral towards political marginalization of the minority. Two factors underpinning this sequential process merit attention. First, the historical legacies that communist rule bequeathed to political institutions, actors, and identities serve to prod ethnopolitics along certain paths and not others. A second and related domestic “path-setting” factor highlighted by many of the contributors is the definition of statehood embraced by post-communist constitutions.

The Leninist Legacy

Ken Jowitt has powerfully described the debilitating social, cultural, and political legacies of “Leninist” rule for post-communist politics: intense privatism and ingrained patterns of dissimulation, fragmented personal and public identities, the absence of an established successor elite, and the lack of widely shared standards of legitimacy with which to sanction reconstituted political authority.¹⁷ Moreover, Leninist regimes served in certain respects to sustain key elements of pre-communist traditional political cultures that further impede the adoption of democratic norms and practices—an important theme in James Pettifer’s contribution to this volume.¹⁸ What concerns us foremost here, however, are the consequences for multiethnic post-communist states of emulating, to varying degrees and for varying periods of time, Soviet nationality policies, and the sudden shift from no effective electoral participation to universal suffrage in an environment where partisan loyalties are undeveloped, interest groups are non-existent, and economic issues loom large.

All multinational communist states attempted to shore up their stability by ex-
exploiting their ethnic diversity, using means ranging from the development, promotion, and cooptation of ethnic minority elites (e.g., Albania, Bulgaria), to the provision of autonomous territories for larger ethnic minorities (e.g., Romania until 1968, Kosovo and Vojvodina in the Serbian republic of Yugoslavia), to the grandest experiment of all, ethnoterritorial federalism (the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia). None of the states in this last category still exists, two of them have been the site of a great amount of bloodshed, and the survival of many of their successor states is by no means guaranteed.

For post-communist political actors in states that adopted ethnoterritorial institutional arrangements, this experience remains the dominant frame for viewing majority-minority relations. Governing elites belonging to today's ethnic majorities frequently were yesterday's minorities in federal states. Moreover, following the collapse of communism, what previously had been merely formal constitutional provisions, such as the right of federal units to secede or extravagantly high legislative supermajority requirements, could be exploited to gain independence either by design or, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, by default. Now facing their own "national problem," these elites perceive all demands for territorial autonomy, partner—nation status, or federal arrangements as a slippery slope to secession—precisely because it is one that their own ethnic constituencies slid down. Simply put, ethnic majority elites in the Baltics, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovakia, and elsewhere "know better," and their lessons have not been lost on neighbors, such as Romania, that never knew full-scale ethnofederalism.

The second legacy issue is an acute form of the problem addressed by Samuel Huntington in his classic work on politics in the developing world: the lagging capacity of existing political institutions to respond to the rapid expansion of participation by newly mobilized social forces. Given that the capacity to extract societal resources (i.e., an effective taxation bureaucracy), a monopoly of the legitimate means of violence, and effective administrative control mechanisms are all necessary to a state's survival, the debility of post-communist public agencies, high levels of crime and corruption, unstable and ineffective governments, and uncertain relations between constitutional branches represent a serious cause for concern. Most importantly, the crucial element of social and political stability for Huntington, well-institutionalized parties capable of channeling popular mobilization, aggregating divergent societal preferences, and providing coherence to legislative and executive action, are also largely absent from much of the post-communist landscape. In contrast to most post-authoritarian countries, where old parties were successfully resurrected after the lifting of repression, post-communist party systems
have arisen almost entirely de novo, with even communist successor parties “new” to the extent that they must attract authentic popular support and have been no less prone to fragmentation than other parties. 24

The establishment of new parties in post-communist polities is made problematic by what Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan call “the relative flatness of the landscape of civil society.” 25 While rich with status distinctions of considerable political importance, communist party-states embraced as their raison d'être the suppression of socioeconomic class distinctions and autonomously articulated interests and identities. Weakly organized societies, on this view, impede the rapid institutionalization of parties, leaving would-be elites without stable electoral constituencies and thus with a strong incentive to establish catch-all parties that appeal to more easily identifiable regional and ethnic identities.

This view is not without its critics, however. Herbert Kitschelt, for example, points out that what he calls the categorical “tabula rasa” view fails to account for variations in the region’s party systems and implausibly assumes that a decade hence, voters remain unable to comprehend their economic interests. 26 Neverthelese, while Kitschelt does find examples of relatively successful parties arrayed programmatically along more traditional socioeconomic cleavages, of the countries he studies, only Bulgaria is marked by politically salient ethnic differences—and there, as Ivan Ilchev’s chapter shows, declining salience has been due in large part to Turkish emigration. Clearly, marketization and closer ties to the West have introduced new socioeconomic cleavages, issue dimensions, and political attitudes. However, these changes have proceeded furthest precisely in those states where politically mobilized ethnic minorities—and thus a “stateness” threat to the central, coordinating authority required to formulate and implement the policies necessary to bring them about—are absent. 27

Indeed, even where formal democratic procedures are upheld, political actors threatened by the transition from a command to a market economy have good reason to perpetuate the perception of a stateness threat. Particularly where organized opposition to the old regime was weak and antireform communist elites formed barely reconstructed successor parties that gained power following the first democratic elections, the combination of inchoate socioeconomic classes and economic dislocation has been met by ethnonationalism as a tactical means of diverting mobilization around competing economic interests and agendas. 28 As Janusz Bugajski’s chapter demonstrates, cronyism in privatization, slowness in liberalizing prices, and rampant clientilism are encouraged and exploited by nationalist ethnic majority parties, which
favor a high level of dirigisme precisely in order to maintain control over the ethnic distribution of public benefits. Not surprisingly, therefore, they have served as "flank" parties and often as coalition partners of reactionary leftist-populist parties with roots in the old regime, a pattern that has marked post-communist politics to varying degrees in Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia. Together, these forces mobilize the most vulnerable segments of the population—industrial workers, the elderly, the less educated, and rural inhabitants—around real or imagined internal and external threats to national survival, thus lowering the traceability of political responsibility for economic malaise.

Ironically, in some cases, such as the Russian-speakers of Latvia and the Albanians of western Macedonia, the exclusion of minorities from public employment as a result of job discrimination or language requirements has served to push them more quickly into the private sector, where they often prosper. However, privatization can also exacerbate economic discrimination, as Erin Jenne's chapter on the Roma points out. Most importantly, however, economic uncertainties amplify all groups' fears concerning the future and their place in it, potentially resulting in more radical policy demands by ethnic minorities and thus raising overall levels of ethnic tension. For example, demands for minority-language universities reflect in part the fear that non-university graduates will be shut out from higher-status employment opportunities. Yet such demands also feed ethnic majority fears that minorities are attempting to develop parallel and eventually separate societies rather than joining or acceding to majority state-building designs.

Ethnicity and Constitutional Symbolism

A fundamentally important institutional consequence of the establishment of entirely new parties is that between 1990 and 1993, most of the countries in the region adopted new constitutions or radically revised existing ones. Constitutional framers typically committed themselves to the usual basket of western principles: representative democratic institutions, guarantees of individual rights, some form of judicial review, civilian control of the military, social welfare rights, and protection of private property. However, most of the constitutions adopted by multiethnic post-communist states share another important feature that directly reflects the legacy of communist nationalities policies: preambles that define statehood in national-cultural, rather than civic-territorial, terms. The state's basis in popular sovereignty is, in other
words, established in a few brief phrases, while its symbolic “ownership” is simultaneously transferred to the dominant ethnic group.

The degree to which such definitions have structured ethnic conflict cannot be overestimated, for they introduce a chronic blurring of the distinction between the “normal” politics played out within an established constitutional framework and the “extraordinary” politics aimed at altering that framework.33 Simply put, for ethnic minorities seeking equal status with the “state-bearing” nation, politics remains stuck in an extraordinary mode, with profound implications for social and political stability. Indeed, wherever constitutions proclaimed the dominant ethnic group’s symbolic ownership of the state, politically mobilized ethnic minorities opposed their ratification, reflecting the irrelevance at moments of political founding of standard hermeneutic practice, according to which preambles are considered “formally symbolic rather than legally binding” as compared to provisions contained in the constitution’s “operative text.”34 For, despite inclusion of “civic” provisions in the text, the preamble “states and reinforces constitutional nationalism,” establishing de facto permanent second-class citizenship for non-members of the dominant group—in some cases preserving communist constitutions’ practice of explicitly categorizing non-members by ethnicity.35

At issue in this founding conflict is group status. Yet, as Donald Horowitz notes, “[w]hereas material advancement can be measured both relatively and absolutely, the status advancement of one ethnic group is entirely relative to the status of others.”36 Thus, nationally defined statehood reifies precisely those political claims that are least amenable to bargaining, negotiation, and compromise. Moreover, as the country studies detail, such constitutional symbolism has been used by legislators, jurists, and administrators to interpret provisions concerning public use of minority languages, minority-language education, and local government in ways molded to fit the aspirations of the national group in whose name the state has been created. Similarly, in Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania, ethnic majority actors attempted to interpret vague provisions concerning the legal status of ethnic minority-based parties in the light of preambles to deprive them of the right to electoral participation.

Michael Shafir’s chapter on the Hungarian minority in Romania offers a particularly trenchant analysis of how these constitutional politics establish a destabilizing feedback mechanism. The more broadly applicable lesson is that as the status accorded to minorities is perceived as threatening their long-term domination by the ethnic majority, politically mobilized minorities frame their demands in response to it, pressing for firm guarantees of linguistic, cultural, and educational rights. Combined with their initial opposition to
the constitution, this lends credibility to arguments that they are disloyal to the state, which in turn may weaken moderates within the ethnic majority. The ethnic majority's intransigence then provokes increasingly desperate and radical demands as ethnic minority moderates similarly lose influence, reinforcing the political salience of ethnicity and the electoral incentives that follow from it. Eventually, as has happened with Albanians in Macedonia and Kosovo, an ethnic minority may entirely reconcile itself with the repudiation of the civic state and accept nothing less than partner-nation status, territorial autonomy, or outright independence.

The Role of New Political Institutions

Obviously, constitutions structure and channel political power in explicit as well as symbolic ways, while quasi-constitutional features of post-communist political systems can have similarly important effects on the quality of ethnic relations. The role of four such institutional influences interests us here: electoral systems, parliaments, presidents, and devolution of political power to municipal and regional administrations.

As Carlos Flores Juberías's chapter shows, a variety of post-communist electoral paradigms for ethnic minority participation have been established. For the region's larger minorities—those that can mobilize sufficient support to surpass electoral thresholds—proportional representation has ensured regular parliamentary representation. However, whether helping or hindering the electoral prospects of ethnic minority parties through the use of thresholds, districting, ballot laws, or other devices, none of these states' electoral legislation comprehends the crucial distinction between representation "in the tangible but narrow sense of legislative office holding" and in the "broader sense of incorporating [an ethnic group's] concerns and interests in the calculations of politicians belonging to a variety of groups."37 Thus, while party list proportional representation has led to party proliferation and the need for seat pooling to create coalition governments, in no case has electoral legislation provided incentives to construct multiethnic governing coalitions through vote pooling encouraged by schemes such as the single transferable vote or alternative vote models of proportional representation.38 In the absence of such incentives, not only have multiethnic governing coalitions been extremely rare, but where they have emerged, as in Romania following the 1996 general election or Slovakia after the 1998 elections, there has been little of the electorally motivated moderation of party positions that would make their persistence, and lasting accommodation, more likely.
Regardless of the initial choice of electoral systems, however, it was virtually inevitable, given the absence of institutionalized political parties, that parliaments would become the dominant institutional site of ethnic conflict following the first competitive elections after the fall of communism. Even where “bottom-up” mass movements formed in opposition to the old regime, their fragmentation and recrystallization as ideologically distinct, electorally viable parties invariably occurred through the “top-down” formation of parliamentary factions. And, while electorally successful ethnic minority parties typically gained stable constituencies and maintained relatively high levels of party discipline from the outset, the electoral incentives for ethnic majority party-builders to sharpen ideological distinctions, together with the path-setting legacy issues discussed in the preceding section, tended to exacerbate rather than mitigate ethnic tension. This was reflected, particularly in the first electoral term, in the projection nationwide of divisive parliamentary debates among ethnic elites, opposition to ethnic minority parties’ proposals, and charges of disloyalty owing to legislative agendas dominated by non-negotiable symbolic issues such as anthems, seals, and the design of flags and banknotes. As Nenad Zakošek’s chapter on Croatia demonstrates, in such circumstances walkouts by outvoted and outmaneuvered minority parties could have especially tragic consequences.

Notwithstanding strong criticism of presidential as opposed to parliamentary regimes in recent years, it is plausible that directly elected presidents may ameliorate some of the conflict-generating consequences of democratisation described above. Once in office, directly elected presidents may have relatively more autonomy from partisan considerations than presidents elected by parliaments, using their popular mandate to override the more corrosive effects on ethnic relations of party formation and competition. Moreover, presidents that are empowered not only symbolically through direct election but also constitutionally relative to prime ministers and parties may be even better situated to carve out political space for managing tensions.

Outcomes in individual cases are, however, too unruly to draw firm conclusions regarding such institutional effects, while more contingent factors such as statesmanship and political relations between presidents and prime ministers appear (at least so far) to play a more important role. The indirectly elected Lennart Meri of Estonia, despite swearing a constitutional oath of office that obliges the president to fulfill his or her duties “for the benefit of the Estonian people,” supported the establishment of a presidential roundtable on ethnic relations which has been the most successful of those in the region precisely because of his moral authority and political will. Yet attempts
by the indirectly elected former president of Slovakia, Michal Kovác, to use his office to develop similar back channels of interethnic compromise quickly ran aground after Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar, whose minority government lost a no-confidence vote initiated by Kovác in March 1994, returned to power six months later following early elections. Meanwhile, former president Ion Iliescu of Romania demonstrated that even where a directly elected president is precluded from political party membership, he may nonetheless exercise his role as a national, rather than a state, guardian.

The tendency of directly elected presidents to view themselves as representing the dominant ethnic group (and to be perceived this way by minorities) may become even more pronounced in cases where constitutionally strong presidents are permitted to continue as political party leaders. This seems particularly true of presidents such as Franjo Tuđman or Slobodan Milošević of Croatia and Serbia, respectively, whose parties consolidated themselves in power through the waging of ethnonationalist war. Moreover, as with the lack of incentives for interethnic accommodation in parliamentary electoral law, nowhere in post-communist Europe are directly elected presidents, whether strong or weak, constitutionally or statutorily obliged to win the support of a minimum proportion of ethnic minority votes. Nevertheless, the record on ethnic mediation of even directly elected, strong post-communist presidents is by no means unambiguous. In Macedonia, which excludes the president from holding a political party appointment, Kiro Gligorov made very effective use of the constitutionally mandated Council for Inter-Ethnic Relations, whose members the president is empowered to appoint.

Finally, efforts to consolidate democratic rule in post-communist Europe have been premised on commitments by state actors to devolve previously highly centralized power to local and regional authorities. There are three respects in which this issue has been influenced by, and has affected, ethnic relations. First, in many cases devolution has been delayed by concerns that it would mean de facto territorial autonomy for autochthonous minorities. To the extent that democratic consolidation requires some degree of self-governance by previously impotent local political units, the braking effect of ethnopolitics is obvious. Second, and conversely, the refusal to enhance local self-rule has led several autochthonous minorities to radicalize their demands and press for territorial autonomy, as this seems the only alternative in the face of unwilling central governments. Third, in some cases, notably the ethnically mixed city of Cluj in Transylvania, national politicians with a strong local power base who are intent on exacerbating ethnic tensions have foiled efforts by more moderate ethnic majority elites to develop state-wide policies that adequately address ethnic minority concerns.
The International Context: Kin States, Home States, and Interstate Actors

The international context in which post-communist ethnopolitics is played out can be characterized quite simply: uncertain, dangerous, and fraught with misperceptions. Most post-communist states lack effective security guarantees, while the West's feckless response to the wars of Yugoslav succession and turmoil in the Caucasus has done little to assuage their leaders. Unless and until they build sufficient institutional capacities, they are "weak states" internationally, and the politically emergent nations that "own" them will remain fearful of external threats and internal fifth columns. At stake is more than territory: external challenges to these nations' statehood typically entail a threat to their cultural survival or unity as well. As James Pettifer's chapter points out, persistent Greek claims to Northern Epirus are premised on a rejection of a distinct Albanian ethnicity and heritage. Similarly, Bulgarian irredentism's challenge (so far rhetorical) to Macedonia's statehood rests on rejection of "Macedonianness," as have Greek efforts to isolate the new state diplomatically. Finally, with many home states also kin states to ethnic minorities elsewhere, the international environment is one in which behaviors are likely to be misunderstood, opportunities for actors to distort their significance plentiful, and potentialities for conflict strong.

Kin State Behavior

Presently, most post-communist kin states are unable and unwilling to employ aggressive, irredentist policies. However, influential actors within kin states—government officials and agencies, political parties, media outlets, religious and charitable organizations, commercial firms, and other nongovernmental organizations—often play an important role in framing and supporting demands by home state minorities. These actors may be motivated by one or more of a variety of factors: the level of ideological commitment to ethnic solidarity, the electoral interests of office-seeking elites, and the presence or absence of effective external incentives to comply with the preferences of international actors.

Official kin state behavior thus falls along a spectrum that can include varying levels and combinations of material support for home state minorities, resettlement assistance, initiatives in international fora, and bilateral contacts with home state governments. At the extreme end of intervention, kin states may back favored home state political forces more or less openly by promoting leadership rifts or taking advantage of them when they emerge. For example,
Albania sanctioned provocateurs to distribute leaflets in western Macedonia in 1994 mocking the moderate wing of the ethnic Albanian Party of Democratic Prosperity and used state-controlled satellite media in an effort to convince ethnic Albanians of the need to replace their "ineffective" leadership. The chapters by Neil Melvin and James Pettifer addressing, respectively, the role of Russian nationalist forces in fomenting anti-independence sentiment in the Baltics and the destabilizing influence in southern Albania of Greek Orthodox clergy in northern Greece, provide similarly telling examples of the importance of non-state (or quasi-state) actors.

**Home State Responses**

Post-communist home states commonly interpret kin state behavior as hostile, that is, intended to increase the propensity of minorities to embrace, and ultimately attempt to realize, secessionist aims. Their own weakness and the absence of international security guarantees magnify home states’ fear that kin states will increase the benefits and lower the costs for ethnic minorities to challenge their territorial integrity. Of course, some kin state behaviors engender more outrage than others. Donations of textbooks are less troublesome than donations to political parties, which, unsurprisingly, are viewed by home states as a grave violation of their sovereignty. Aside from direct and sustained involvement with home state minorities, forms of intervention likely to be perceived as aggressive can include public pronouncements endorsing, for example, demands by ethnic kin that they be granted “partner-nation status.” Beyond protesting to intergovernmental organizations, home states may respond by punishing, or threatening to punish, ethnic minorities on the ground. They may withhold or rescind implementation of policies to protect minority interests or attempt to demobilize minority political actors through legal changes, while pressure from domestic sources such as increased countermobilization of ultranationalist groups may push more moderate officials to undertake these and other measures and to adopt tougher positions when negotiating with kin states. Finally, home states may attempt to rebuff their own ethnic minorities’ kin states by embracing a kin state role themselves. Thus, Vladimir Meciar’s government repeatedly countered Hungary’s attempts to defend its ethnic kin in southern Slovakia by accusing Hungary of pursuing assimilationist cultural “genocide” against the tiny Slovak minority in Hungary.
Interstate Actors

In view of these dynamics, an array of interstate actors has attempted to contain and resolve conflict and reduce the potential for its emergence. The field of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) includes NATO, the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, formerly the CSCE), the Council of Europe (CoE), and the United Nations (UN). In addition, several relatively influential non-governmental organizations (NGOs) disseminate information, pressure home states and kin states, and work to enhance efforts at preventive diplomacy. Finally, there are "Great Power" states that wield disproportionate influence over decision-makers in the region, acting directly on government officials and ethnic minority leaders, as well as indirectly through their dominant positions in IGOs.49

The set of policies these actors have cobbled together has been uneven in several respects. The response of Germany, the United States and IGOs to the Yugoslav secession crisis of 1990-1992 and, later, to the war in Bosnia, revealed that the actors themselves do not always share common interests and goals, occasionally pursuing contradictory policies with disastrous results.50 Moreover, their influence on regional actors has varied greatly. In some cases, states' behavior has been altered significantly by their desire to join IGOs such as the EU and NATO. Yet this approach has worked to a more limited degree in the case of the CoE, admission to which was tied to acceptance of Recommendation 1201, a series of conceptually muddled blandishments concerning ethnic minority local self-governance adopted by the Council's Representative Assembly. Their interpretation was left to home states' jurists and politicians, who unanimously rejected any construal of its ambiguous provisions that might underwrite the notion of collective rights.51

At the same time, the incentive of western integration has in some cases been a double-edged sword. Shafir demonstrates how the Romanian government's relations with Hungary and its treatment of the country's Hungarian minority improved while Romania was under consideration for inclusion in the first wave of eastward expansion by the EU and NATO, only to deteriorate following exclusion. This raises the question of just how "deep" changes in state behavior resulting from international incentives and pressure really are. As Nenad Zakosek's chapter points out, while modification of Croatia's constitution to include more generous and ameliorative provisions for Croatia's ethnic Serb population was the result of "successful" international pressure on Croatian officials in 1991, this did nothing to prevent the forced exodus of
Serbs that has since rendered the provisions irrelevant. On the contrary, cases such as Croatia, Serbia, and Slovakia suggest that international "imperialism" can contribute to mobilizing ultranationalist forces.  

While the limitations of international pressure described above mainly concern efforts to influence home state behavior, international actors may be more effective in dissuading post-communist kin states from exacerbating conflict situations. The incentive of integration with the West is perhaps the decisive factor underlying the quieter line adopted by Hungary's Horn and Orban government following the nationalist assertiveness of Joszef Antall's first post-communist government. While Greece's membership in the EU and NATO has shielded it from international pressure and enabled Greek elites effectively to block unfavorable policies, Albania's heavy dependence on EU financial assistance and military assistance from the U.S. make it especially susceptible to such pressure. Albania's early aggressive moves on behalf of its ethnic kin in Macedonia and Kosovo were effectively halted by the international community, although recent support from Albania for separatist rebel forces in Kosovo may be an indication that the Albanian state's extremely weak institutional capacities are likely to render international leverage ineffective to the extent that officials are unable to implement any policy consistently. Similarly, despite early dire predictions, the West's relations with Russia in the 1990s have been marked by remarkable success in preventing destabilizing official Russian behavior qua kin state. Since many of the region's larger minorities (Albanians, Hungarians, and Russians) are dispersed across many home states, successful efforts to improve kin state behavior may have a powerful multiplier effect in ameliorating ethnic tensions.

An important component of the international community's success in influencing kin state behavior has been its emphasis on urging kin state/home state pairs to sign bilateral basic treaties. Historical precedents, including the German–Danish treaty, the settlement between Austria and Italy over South Tyrol, and the more recent German–Polish and German–Czech treaties, suggest that bilateral pacts can be effective in dampening the potential for conflict, independent of the possibility that the signing of a treaty itself suggests reduced levels of tension. Such treaties reduce long-term uncertainty regarding standards of minority treatment, codify cooperation on issues related to compliance and monitoring, define and regulate acceptable forms of kin state behavior (for example, cultural exchange and border cooperation), and thus weaken radicals among home state minorities. Perhaps most importantly, they signify the kin state's unambiguous recognition of the home state's sovereignty and territorial integrity. While the main problem in
the post-communist context remains compelling states to sign on the dotted line, the record of such treaties concluded thus far—particularly Hungary’s treaties with Romania and Slovakia—is somewhat encouraging.

Finally, a related factor shaping ethnic relations domestically, as well as helping to manage disputes between kin states and home states, is the array of international legal instruments developed by the UN, the CoE, and the OSCE. These instruments’ provisions recognize individual rather than collective rights, which are thus conferred upon members of cultural groups rather than upon the groups themselves. While this distinction can lead to conceptual and legal confusion, as the CoE’s Recommendation 1201 illustrates, these instruments nonetheless hold out the promise of giving ethnic grievances a more stable cast. In the case of home states, recourse to international law offers predictable limits to the types of claims kin states may make concerning their ethnic kin abroad. For minorities themselves, rights discourse provides a patina of moral legitimacy with which to apply political leverage from a position of weakness, and may even serve an educative function in polities unaccustomed to constitutionalism and the rule of law. However, precisely because rights operate as “gag rules” that categorically exclude specified types of claims from political discourse, it is also worth worrying about the potentially problematic long-term effects of habitually invoking them. That is, “rights talk” may ultimately render majority-minority conflicts less amenable to resolution, as it has with political contestation over cultural issues in the West, to the extent that it operates to suppress politically-derived alternatives for managing ethnic relations in the future.

The Ethnic Minority Party

As we have seen, the motor of post-communist ethnopolitics is the confluence of ethnic groups’ fears about the future and electoral competition in a context of weak state capacities and uncertain national identities. Thus, understanding the causes and consequences of ethnic minorities’ political mobilization lies at the heart of this book. The effect of incentives for ethnic majority political actors to aggravate ethnic tensions, in turn shifting the balance of power within minority communities toward more radical leaders and demands, suggests that in some cases ethnic relations will worsen. As in Kosovo, some of the politically volatile situations that result can be expected to lead to violent confrontations. There is, of course, no reason to expect this depressing logic to be ineluctable and universal. On the contrary, the salience of ethnic cleavages can be expected to diminish, and other, more po-
politically tractable, cleavages to be mobilized, to the extent that “stateness” problems are overcome, whether through channels established by international incentives and pressure, domestic statecraft, or, as is most likely, a combination of the two. The prospects for this, however, are not comprehensible without a better understanding of the minority political organizations that compete for power.

**Common Features**

Throughout the region, ethnic minority parties represented in parliaments resemble what Shafir calls “holding companies” for the range of interests within ethnically bounded communities. In the limiting case of the Hungarian community in Romania, the Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania (UDMR) serves as an organizational umbrella for a broad array of voluntary and professional associations and entities, as well as ideological tendencies that typically parallel those expressed in separate parties among the ethnic majority. Usually, a single party dominates, or, as in Slovakia, a highly stable, well-integrated coalition of parties has emerged. Their membership and constituencies are coeval with the minority’s population, electoral mobilization is unproblematic, and turnout becomes akin to a census. Politically disciplined constituencies are mirrored by politically disciplined party organizations. Despite a wide range of preferences among minority voters and elites, the party or coalition is united in its legislative behavior, typically voting *en bloc* even on non-ethnic issues.

Arrayed along the dimension of tactics and goals, from cooperation with ethnic majority parties to secession, all of the region’s ethnic minority parties have experienced rifts among moderates and radicals, with the latter gaining significant influence. Nevertheless, despite often severe internal disagreements, they have been highly successful in blocking the entry of intra-group competitors. Where new parties have been formed, they usually have been successfully marginalized. There are two major political consequences of these communities’ ability to maintain the authority of single parties or party-like coalitions. First, their political power remains less diluted than it would be otherwise, particularly given electoral laws that penalize smaller parties. Second, it impedes the formation of cross-ethnic coalitions, as moderate minority leaders are unable to peel off activists and voters and join forces with moderate ethnic majority parties.

While it thus seems clear that ethnic minority parties have organized and electorally mobilized their constituencies with a high degree of discipline, this
begs an important question: Why ethnic parties in the first place? Why were ethnic minority elites and activists unable or unwilling to establish permanent channels of political participation with like-minded ethnic majority political forces from the outset of the old regime's demise? And why has this situation remained virtually unchanged even after party systems have crystallized to the point that ideological affinities with ethnic majority parties are much clearer? Two answers emerge from the country studies and from the discussion so far.

First, with the decay of the old regime's repressive capacity, ethnic minority elites established their own organizations, whether political or non-political. In some cases, these organizations were set up as human-rights advocacy groups (Albania's Omonia, for example). In others, they developed in order to articulate and defend ethnic minority interests through electoral contestation, but in coordination with umbrella opposition movements (Slovakia, Romania, the Baltics). Once established, however, non-party organizations transformed themselves into parties, and all ethnic minority parties were eventually forced to compete separately due to the exclusionary rhetoric and policy positions adopted by ethnic majority elites among reactionary ex-communist and opposition groupings. In still other cases, ethnic parties were founded with the clear aim of contesting local and national elections alone in anticipation of the likely mobilization of nationalist political forces (Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia). But in all cases, the initial development of separate organizational entities narrowed considerably the possibilities for future cross-ethnic political organization.

Second, policy preferences on ethnic issues diverge widely enough that cross-ethnic parties, coalitions, and alliances have been exceedingly rare and even more difficult to sustain. Majority parties with whom ethnic minority parties agree on non-ethnic issues often part company on a range of ethnic issues, from the distribution of symbolic goods (official language status, the use of national symbols) and material goods (regional development plans, the allocation of resources and power to sub-national governments) to macro-level conflicts over group status and state “ownership,” usually contested through constitutional politics. Moreover, given the absence of electoral incentives that would benefit moderate forces, even when these preferences do not differ much, the electoral liabilities of cross-ethnic cooperation have been perceived as prohibitively high. Smaller liberal parties in Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia, for example, have chosen to coordinate political and electoral activities with minorities at best on a limited ad hoc basis. Those parties that unambiguously devote themselves to interethnic accommodation (Janis Jurkins' Harmony for Latvia is a rare example) do not survive or hold power for long.
That mobilized minorities have organized in a common manner and have faced similar structural constraints is clear. But it is a mistake to assume that all of them, absent these constraints, would seek to establish civic polities based on equal and universal citizenship rights within a defined territory. Western observers eager to point out the obvious illiberalism of ethnically defined statehood often overlook this fact, and to some extent the myth of minority virtue has been reinforced by minorities' own embrace of the discourse of rights. However, that today's majority oppressors were yesterday's oppressed minorities should caution us against believing that today's minorities are somehow automatically predisposed to greater liberalism than those now adopting ethnically exclusionary policies. In the case of Romania, Shafir argues that ethnic Hungarians moved toward a national conception of the polity only after their civic conceptions were rejected by ultra-nationalist Romanian elites. He argues cogently that Hungarian political radicalization was a consequence, rather than a cause, of their political marginalization. However, among Albanians in Kosovo and western Macedonia, among Serbs in Croatia, and among various groups of Russian-speakers throughout the former Soviet Union, the call for ethnic autonomy during the post-communist period came quickly. These demands are understandable given the institutional legacies and dynamics of constitutional politics described above, yet it is necessary to acknowledge the independent effect they have had on ethnic relations.

In this respect, the distinction between large and small minorities becomes more important. Smaller minorities (Vlachs, Germans, Pomaks, Armenians, Roma, and others) have in many cases been granted the means of cultural autonomy through state-funded educational provisions, cultural facilities, and the like, and in some cases have been offered guaranteed—albeit token—parliamentary representation. Larger, and especially geographically concentrated, minorities, in contrast, are more likely to define, and to be perceived by ethnic majority actors as defining, ethnic autonomy in territorial terms. While cultural versus territorial definitions of autonomy are at the core of internal party splits between ethnic minority moderates and radicals, their proponents differ mainly over the scope of decision-making powers to be sought in those geographic regions in which they dominate numerically. Yet these regions are themselves typically ethnically mixed, with many of their urban areas "ruralized" by large influxes of ethnic majority peasants *cum* workers under communist-era industrialization and population policies that were intentionally designed to promote greater homogenization of culturally
mixed territory. Unsurprisingly, areas with large concentrations of minorities—often adjacent to kin state frontiers—have therefore been marked by higher levels of activity by nationalist majority parties in the name of ethnic majorities threatened by a loss of status and power at the local level.\textsuperscript{60}

The symbolic corollary to large minorities' demand for autonomy is the demand for "partner-nation" status, which has been articulated by Hungarians, Serbs, Albanians, and some communities of Russian-speakers. In practical terms, this status connotes joint decision-making with the ethnic majority on major issues (such as membership in interstate alliances); reform of institutions, from electoral systems to legislatures to executives, in order to privilege the larger minority; proportional ethnic representation in public agencies; and a host of other public policy provisions, symbolic and material, which are thought to follow from this status.\textsuperscript{61} Clearly, this vision of shared state "ownership" by \textit{nationally defined} citizens departs considerably from the civic notions of collectively exercised individual rights that animate the operative and proposed legal instruments promulgated by IGOs such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE. On the contrary, "partner-nation" status is much closer to power-sharing concepts advanced by Arend Lijphart and others under the heading of "consociational democracy."\textsuperscript{62} That this approach is illiberal in the name of stability is self-evident; that its requirement of highly disciplined constituencies discourages democratic practices within ethnic groups is also clear. As Carlos Flores Juberías's analysis of the Dayton Accord's constitutional proposals for Bosnia suggests, what remains surprising is its staying power, given a two-decade understanding that the very conditions required for the success of consociational arrangements obviate the need for them.\textsuperscript{63}

\textbf{Policy Implications}

In one sense, this volume is straightforwardly concerned with the consequences of ethnic majorities' numerical superiority over politically mobilized ethnic minorities. The significance of numbers is clear from ethnic minorities' justifications for claims to special status, as well as from the adoption of quasi-consociational arrangements even where, as in Croatia, they were soon rejected in practice. It is similarly reflected in ethnic majorities' fears of ethnodemographic trends and political contestation of how these are measured, with the Macedonian census in 1994, for example, requiring more international observers than were dispatched to monitor its elections.\textsuperscript{64} The relative numerical balance of majorities and minorities is, in Donald Horowitz's words,
"an indication of whose country it is," and it translates through ethnically-based parties directly into political power.\textsuperscript{65}

In these circumstances, domestic elites and international actors face several conceptual difficulties in developing policy responses appropriate to encouraging multiethnic democracy. First, the historical lessons of Leninism's constitutional legacy with respect to nationality suggest little more than pitfalls to be avoided, but which in most cases have not. Moreover, many of the region's elites do not perceive as role models western counterparts who hector them regarding the political practices that follow from national definitions of statehood. On the contrary, nationalist governments frequently resort to \textit{tu quoque} tactics, invoking a morally equalizing argument well captured in one western scholar's admonition to his colleagues that "for many, a few months' intensive reexamination of Anglo-American experience would be more valuable than as many years devoted to immediate examination of Soviet nationalities."\textsuperscript{66}

Second, concepts fundamental to developing long-term policies to ameliorate ethnic tension have failed to provide much assistance in structuring political discourse. Minorities often propose public policies that few (including their drafters) understand. For example, Shafir demonstrates the conceptual incoherence of "communitarian autonomy" proposed by the UDMR, and shows how its incoherence was in part the result of the requirements of compromise within an increasingly divided party. Of course, conceptual ambiguity can have healthy political consequences: the "implied contract" nature of much legislation is useful in overcoming disagreements and uncertainties that may result in immobilism.\textsuperscript{67}

However, weak states that are deeply divided ethnically resemble internally the international environment.\textsuperscript{68} In post-communist Europe, proposals built on concepts that are prone to misinterpretation are likely to remain "essentially contested" and thus to invite actors to hedge their bets by imputing worst-case intentions when they are advanced by ethnic opponents.\textsuperscript{69}

The lack of definition in the region's political cultures and institutions of the rule of law in general, and of complex concepts such as "rights" in particular, similarly impedes political action, apart from that of committed nationalists and political entrepreneurs seeking to capitalize on ethnic tensions. International actors such as the Council of Europe have made matters no clearer by imposing on new members Recommendation 1201, whose vague and incomplete language provides ammunition for all sides and clarity for none. Unfortunately, it is symptomatic of the problems international actors face in sequencing their policies. Short-term problems require quick responses, but policymakers have done an inadequate job of guarding against the possibility
that these may freeze in place otherwise fluid ethnic categories and thus maintain the political salience of ethnicity to the detriment of long-term conflict management. Erin Jenne’s chapter on the Roma goes even further, suggesting that this may produce the unintended consequence of mobilizing unorganized ethnocultural groups to claim the mantle of nationhood itself.

This returns us to a point raised at the outset: ethnic identities tend to be more fixed relative to those of class, but are less so in absolute terms than many observers acknowledge. The Roma, as Jenne notes, are a notoriously difficult category; it is unclear, for example, which individuals seek or “objectively” deserve the label. Neil Melvin demonstrates the political consequences of the fluidity of “Russianness” among non-Estonians and non-Latvians and how, particularly in Latvia, political contenders responded to relatively porous sociocultural boundaries between Russians and Latvians by reinforcing them, thereby ethnicizing politics to the detriment of civic outcomes. Similarly, Ivan Ilchev illustrates the race to claim the Pomaks, ethically Slav Muslims, as ethnic kin by both Turkish and ethnic Bulgarian political parties. Even among majority ethnic groups, ethnic categories can lose their sharpness at the edges. As Pettifer observes, political divisions and mutually exclusive kinship ties among the Ghegs and Tosks in Albania mediate the Albanian/Greek conflict and complicate policy responses to asymmetries in regional development. In an environment where elites and individuals are still determining who is who, puzzling over policy approaches becomes even more difficult.

The point here is not that ethnic conflict results from conceptual and identity-driven misunderstandings. Opposing ethnopolitical forces comprehend their situation remarkably well, anticipating each other’s moves and responding accordingly. Thus, the key concern for policymakers should be to gain a thorough understanding of their predicament. Overall, the region’s ability to “unbind” itself from ethnicity and to develop civil polities is obscured by a powerful paradox. Civil polities historically have depended on strong states. Liberal democracy has historically followed, not preceded, effective political institutionalization, or, as Huntington put it, “[a]uthority has to exist before it can be limited.” Weak polities, such as those in post-communist Europe, find it easier to structure political competition around ethnocultural cleavages. How, then, can they avoid reifying the resultant conflict and construct civic polities while simultaneously developing the state capacities necessary to support them? In the volume’s concluding chapter, Jack Snyder offers some provocative suggestions along these lines.
Notes


9. See Laitin and Fearon, *op. cit.*, p. 716. The authors note that in only one of the Soviet Union’s fourteen non-Russian successor states (Moldova) has there been violent conflict between Russians and the titular nationalities for which these states (formerly union republics) are named. Similarly, ethnic violence between Russians and titulars has occurred in only two of the
sixteen former autonomous republics within the current Russian Federation (Chechnya and Tuva). The incidence of ethnic violence between the forty-five non-Russian minorities and titulars in the fourteen non-Russian successor states is even lower, occurring in just two cases. See also John R. Bowen, "The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 7, no. 4 (October 1996), pp. 3-14.

10. For this definition of nationalism, see Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 1. NATO membership also was offered the same month to three of these states—the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.


18. Ibid., ch. 4. On communist "neo-traditionalism" and its implications for the ongoing transitions, see also Grzegorz Ekiert, "Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration," *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 21 (Fall 1991), pp. 289-313. The effects of neo-traditionalism are particularly revealing in Slovakia, where the geo-
graphic distribution of support for Vladimir Mečiar's populist-nationalist Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, dominated by former communists, is far more closely correlated with support in the inter-war period for Andrej Hlinka's authoritarian Slovak People's Party than it is with regional unemployment. See Jonathan Stein and Mitchell Orenstein, "Dileme izgradnje demokratske države u Slovačkoj," Politička misao (Zagreb), vol. 33, Nos. 2-3 (1996), pp. 121-51.


20. Yugoslavia now exists as a "confederation" of Serbia and Montenegro. Thus, it shares only the name of the pre-1991 state.

21. This is not to say that indigenous ethnic elites under communism did not support existing federal arrangements on instrumental grounds, for which the center provided strong material incentives. In much of the Soviet Union itself, notably the Baltic republics, this was the case until demokratisatsia and glasnost undermined indigenous elites' monopoly of mobilizational resources and empowered counter-elites pressing a more primordialist ethnic agenda. See Philip G. Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," World Politics, vol. 43, no. 2 (January 1991), pp. 196-232.


29. Flank parties are defined as "ethnically based parties surrounding a multiethnic coalition and typically espousing ethnically more extreme positions than the coalition, with its mixed
support, is able to do." Donald L. Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa?* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 167. In post-communist Europe, where multiethnic coalitions are the exception, nationalist flank parties may be better understood as parties that press a primordial ethnic agenda on entrepreneurial politicians for whom ethnopolitics is more clearly instrumental to realizing other political or economic interests.


33. For this distinction, see Bruce Ackerman, *We the People* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).


40. A second, albeit derivative, factor in the failure of parliaments to mitigate ethnic conflict may be their own low level of institutionalization—a lack of qualified non-partisan research staff, poor communication with constituents, the absence of normatively binding rules of decorum, and so forth. For a good summary description of these shortcomings, see William H. Robinson and Francis Miko, "Parliamentary Development Assistance in Central Europe and Former Soviet Union: Some Lessons from Experience," in Lawrence D. Longley, ed., *Working Papers on Comparative Legislative Studies* (Appleton, Wis.: Research Committee of Legislative Specialists, International Political Science Association, 1994), pp. 409-28.


42. This may be true of the role of presidents in post-communist democratization more generally. See Ray Taras, ed., *Post-Communist Presidents* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). See also Thomas A. Baylis, "Presidents Versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe," *World Politics*, vol. 48, no. 3 (1996), pp. 297-323.


44. Delays have come about either by failure to enact constitutionally required statutes on local and regional governance or by refusal to implement existing legislation.

46. This last factor may, of course, be epiphenomenal: for example, the desire to secure greater international relief assistance in the case of Albania, or European Union and NATO membership in the case of Hungary, is likely to be premised on the interest of kin state officials in winning re-election.


49. Economic forces constitute an additional, albeit nonpurposive, “actor” in the international context that greatly affects ethnopolitics. As the Albanian and Bulgarian case studies demonstrate, regional economies have profoundly affected migratory patterns to reorder the dynamics of kin state/home state relations. For a thorough discussion of these issues, see Myron Weiner, ed., *International Migration and Security* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).


51. Recommendation 1201’s vagueness on the issue of collective rights may be the chief reason it was made binding only on new admissions to the Council, not on existing member states.


53. Moreover, as James Pettifer’s chapter argues, Albania’s official behavior over the long term is likely to remain indeterminate until a wider and more permanent Balkan settlement is reached.

54. See generally Bloed, ed., *The Role of Bilateral Treaties in Regulating Minority Rights*.


57. For a discussion of this phenomenon in ethnically divided postcolonial polities, see Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, pp. 326-30.

58. Obviously, such ethnic “outbidding” occurs among ethnic majorities as well. Bugajski notes, for instance, that Franjo Tudjman’s ruling Croatian Democratic Community, declared itself to be “the most Croatian of all parties.” In general, these dynamics closely resemble those affecting the multiethnic coalitions, alliances, and parties described in Horowitz, *ibid.*, pp. 365-440.

59. Russians, Hungarians, Serbs, and Albanians within home states are thus also more likely to argue that their own minority status should be sharply distinguished from that of smaller cultural groupings, which have indeed often been over-represented in governmental nationalities commissions and other special-bodies in order to dilute the influence of minorities viewed as more “threatening” by nationalist elites. For a useful discussion of the distinction between cultural and territorial autonomy, see Brubaker, “Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutionalist Account,” pp. 55-56.
60. Indeed, nationalist ethnic majority parties have done very well precisely in those electoral districts that comprise the massive communist-era housing estates on the fringes of such “ruralized” cities as Bratislava and Cluj. See Gyorgy Enyedi, “The Transition of Post-Socialist Cities,” European Review, vol. 3, no. 2 (1994), pp. 171-82.


63. For an early demonstration of the tautology of the consociational approach, see Eric A. Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies, Occasional papers in International Affairs, no. 29 (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1972). For a similar critique of Lijphart’s consociational proposals for South Africa, see Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa?, ch. 5.


70. Huntington, op. cit., p. 8.

1. See, for example, art. 1.2 of the 1991 Bulgarian Constitution (“The entire power of the State shall derive from the people”); art. 2.2 of the reformed Hungarian Constitution (“In the Republic of Hungary all power resides in the people exercising its sovereignty through its elected representatives as well as directly”); and art. 2.1 of the 1994 Moldovan Constitution (“National sovereignty belongs to the people of the Republic of Moldova, who exercise it directly or through representative bodies in the manner established by the Constitution”).

2. See, for example, art. 3 of the 1993 Russian Constitution (“The multinational people of the Russian Federation shall be the vehicle of sovereignty and the only source of power in the Russian Federation”).

3. See art. 1.2 of the 1990 Croatian constitution (“Power in the Republic of Croatia emanates from the people and belongs to the people as a community of free and equal citizens”); art. 8.1 of the 1992 FRY constitution (“In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, power shall be vested in the citizens”); art. 3 of the 1991 Slovenian constitution (“In Slovenia, supreme power is vested in the people. Citizens exercise that power directly, and most notably, at elections”); art. 2.1 of the 1992 Slovak constitution (“The power of the state is vested in the citizens who shall exercise it directly or through their representatives”); and art. 2.1 of the Macedonian constitution (“Sovereignty in the Republic of Macedonia derives from the citizens and belongs to the citizens”). But note the more exclusionary organic conception of popular sovereignty contained in art. 2.1 of the Romanian constitution (“National sovereignty resides with the Romanian people”), while art 4.1 similarly proclaims that “The State foundation is laid on the unity of the Romanian people.”
4. Art. 3.1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (annexed to the 1992 Czech constitution). See also the similar wording of art. 14 of the 1991 Slovenian Constitution ("Everybody in Slovenia is guaranteed equal human rights and basic liberties, without respect to nationality, race, sex, language, religion, political or other convictions, marital state, birth, education, social status or any other personal circumstances. All are equal before the law"), and art. 12 of the 1993 Estonian Constitution ("All persons shall be equal before the law. No person may be discriminated against on the basis of nationality, race, color, gender, language, origin, religion, political or other beliefs, financial or social status or other reasons"). Even Romania’s constitution, despite its proclamation of exclusive national sovereignty, contains a similar clause at art. 4.2 ("Romania is the common and indivisible homeland of all its citizens, without any discrimination on account of race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political adherence, property or social origin").

5. See, for example, art 67 of the Bulgarian Constitution ("1. Members of the National Assembly shall represent not only their constituencies but the entire nation. No Member shall be held to a mandatory Mandate. 2. Members of the national Assembly shall act on the basis of the Constitution and the laws and in accordance with their conscience and convictions"); art. 66 of the 1991 Romanian Constitution ("1. In the exercise of their mandate, Deputies and Senators shall be in the service of the people. 2. Any imperative mandate shall be null"); art. 21 of the Albanian Constitutional Law ("It is the duty of a deputy to the People’s Assembly to serve the people and the homeland conscientiously"); and art. 70.1 of the 1998 Albanian constitution ("Deputies represent the people and are not bound by any obligatory mandate"). Similarly, the Constitution of the Czech Republic requires that deputies and senators take a vow contained in art. 23 (3. "I promise allegiance to the Czech republic. I promise upon my honor to exercise my mandate in the interest of all the people and according to the best of my knowledge and conscience"), while art. 26 stipulates that "Deputies and Senators shall exercise their mandate personally in accordance with their vow, without being bound, in doing so, by any orders.”

6. For the purposes of this essay, I will assume the definition of ethnic minority set forth in art. 2.1 of the Convention for the Protection of Minorities adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe following the proposal issued by the European Commission for Democracy Through Law on February 8, 1991. An ethnic minority is thus "a group which is smaller in number than the rest of the population of a state, whose members, who are nationals of the state, have ethnic, religious or linguistic features different from those of the rest of the population, and are guided by the will to safeguard their culture, traditions, religions and languages.” An essentially identical definition is the one proposed by Prof. Capotorti in his role as a special rapporteur for the United Nations Subcommittee on Human Rights. See UN Doc. E/CN 4/sub. 2/385 rev. 1, p. 102. On this issue, see Mitja Zagar and Ales Novak, "La protección de las minorías nacionales en la Europa Central y del Este a través del Derecho Constitucional e internacional," in Carlos Flores Jubenés, assoc. ed., Derechos y libertades en las nuevas democracias de la Europa del Este, Humana Iuris, 8/9 (1998/1999), pp. 19-69 (esp. pp. 27-34).


11. For recent work in this area, see, for example, Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan, *The Morality of Nationalism* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), and the articles collected in Kymlicka, *The Rights of Minority Cultures*.


14. While seat-allocation formulae are the most obscure and difficult to understand element of proportional representation systems (particularly as they are amenable to a seemingly infinite array of modifications), the implications of this choice are especially consequential for minor parties. Essentially, what is at issue is the extent to which the formula comprehends residual votes in setting the "cost" of seats, since the importance of residual shares, i.e., the number of votes exceeding the quota needed for each additional seat, will be proportionately greater the smaller the party. See Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, pp. 28-39.


16. In all cases, the thresholds operate at the state-wide level, and in a few of them, e.g., Estonia and Poland, they are complemented with additional thresholds for surplus or national list for district list mandates.

17. On the different types of majoritarian systems, see Taagepera and Shugart, *Seats and Votes, passim*, and Lijphart et al., *Electoral Systems*, pp. 16-21.


25. See "Law on Elections for the People's Assembly of the Republic of Albania [enacted February 4, 1992]," in Nix, Election Law Compendium, pp. 14-24. The mixed system introduced by this law was substantially reformed on February 1, 1996, by a new law which essentially enhanced its majoritarian features, raising thresholds and reducing by 15 the number of seats allocated proportionally from the national list.


32. Romania introduced a rather similar system by means of the April 26, 1996 Law on Political Parties, though given the ethnic structure of the country it is unlikely to produce such devastating effects on ethnic minority representation. With the intention of limiting "party inflation," the new law requires parties seeking registration to prove an enrollment of at least 10,000 members, local branches in at least 15 counties, and no less than 300 members in each county. The Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania (UDMR), the most significant ethnic minority party in the country (and the only one that has not required the benefit of guaranteed representation), already has branches in 19 counties, making it unlikely that the new provisions will jeopardize its legal status. See Michael Shafir, "Political Engineering and Democratization in the New Law on Political Parties," Transition, vol. 2, no. 14 (July 12, 1996), pp. 60-63.


36. See Walzer, "The Politics of Pluralism," pp. 142-44. It should be pointed out, however, that many of those counted as Slovaks in the most recent census in 1991 are Roma, who have been disproportionately affected by highly controversial measures aimed at preventing them from obtaining citizenship following the breakup of Czechoslovakia on January 1, 1993. As with the Russian minority in Estonia and Latvia, consideration of these measures is beyond the scope of this chapter. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The Czech and Slovak Citizenship Laws and the Problem of Statelessness (February 1996).


38. It should also be pointed out that, despite assurances of civic equality, the Macedonian constitution's preamble contains the strongest endorsement of ethnically-defined national sovereignty of the three countries ("Macedonia is established as a national state of the Macedonian people"). Even so, the sheer concentration of ethnic Albanians in the Western part of the country has assured significant representation, while post-electoral formation of inter-ethnic government coalitions has helped maintain a degree of political stability. See Rober W. Mickey, "Unstable in a Stable Way," Transition, vol. 1, no. 1 (January 30, 1995), pp. 38-41, and Robert W. Mickey and Adam Smith Albion, "Success in the Balkans? A Case Study of Ethnic Relations in the Republic of Macedonia," in Ian M. Cuthbertson and Jane Leibowitz, eds., Minorities: The New Europe's Old Issue (Institute for EastWest Studies, 1993).

39. This point is emphasized in Stephen B. Heintz and Oleksandr Pavliuk, Securing Sovereignty: Ukraine's First Five Years of Independence (Institute for EastWest Studies, 1997), p. 16.


48. In contrast, under the less restrictive 1991 law, the representation of ethnic minorities in the Sejm was more than three times larger: the German Minority got seven seats, the Movement for Silesia’s Autonomy got two, and one seat each was obtained by the Association of Podhale Residents, the Eastern Orthodox Party, the Wielopolska Region and Poland Party, and the Electoral Coalition of the Piast Ethnic Group. On the political significance of the German minority in Poland, see Tomasz Kamusella, "Asserting Minority Rights in Poland," *Transition*, vol. 2, no. 3 (February 9, 1996), pp. 15-18, and Tomasz Kamusella and Terry Sullivan, “The Germans in Upper Silesia: The Struggle for Recognition,” in Karl Cordell, ed., *Ethnicity and Democratisation in the New Europe* (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 169-81.


50. The majority-rule, multiple-vote system was used to elect all councilmen in cities with under 10,000 inhabitants and one-half of all councilmen in cities with over 10,000 inhabitants as well as in the 22 districts of the capital.

51. This was the system used to elect the remaining councilmen in cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants and in the capital.


57. On the UDMR, see Michael Shafir’s chapter in this volume.
58. These organizations were the Union of Armenians of Romania, the Bulgarian Union Banat-Romania, the Greek Union of Romania, the Community of Russian Lipovenians of Romania, the Union of Poles of Romania 'Dom Polski,' the Democratic Union of Serbians and Krashovanians in Romania, the Democratic Union of Slovaks and Czechs in Romania, the Turkish Democratic Union of Romania, and the Union of Ukrainians in Romania. On the first competitive elections in Romania, see, *inter alia*, Tom Gallagher, "Romania. The Disputed Election of 1990," *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 44, no. 1 (1991), pp. 79-93, and Nelson, "Romania."


64. For the election results, see http://www.izbori.hr. The new law also significantly altered the electoral system's basic traits, transforming the existing mixed formula into a purely proportional one, introducing ten 14-member districts (plus another two special districts for ethnic minorities and Croats living abroad), and a 5 percent threshold.


67. The small size of the National Assembly, moreover, gives both communities exceptionally strong influence relative to ethnic Slovenes. While the ratio of citizens to representatives is roughly 22,000/1 nationwide, it is 8,500/1 for the Hungarian minority and 3,000/1 for the Italians. This disproportionality is further magnified by the fact that, unlike in Croatia, ethnic Italians and Hungarians may also participate in the election of the rest of the lower house, in effect giving them a double vote.


69. In the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, each republic was entitled to 75 seats in the 150-member House of the Nations. In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, both Serbia and Montenegro send 20 representatives to the Chamber of the Republics, despite the fact that Serbia's population is 17 times larger than Montenegro's. In the Russian Federation, the Federation Council is composed of two representatives from each of the 89 federal units — 21 republics, six *krai*, 49 *oblast*, two federal cities, one autonomous *oblast*, and 10 autonomous districts.
70. Bosnia's population at the time was already overwhelmingly self-identified in ethnic terms: 40 percent Muslim, 32 percent Serb and 18 percent Croat. The Muslim-based Democratic Action Party (SDA) received 41.2 percent of the vote, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) 34.5 percent, and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) 20.7 percent. See John B. Allcock, "Yugoslavia," in Bogdan Szajkowski, ed., New Political Parties of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Harlow: Longman, 1992).

71. For the collective Presidency, Muslim candidates Fikret Abdic and Alija Izetbegovic obtained 44 percent and 37 percent of the vote, respectively; Serbs Nikola Koljevic and Biljana Plavsic, 25 percent and 24 percent; and Croats Stjepan Kljuic and Franjo Boras, 21 percent and 19 percent. Ejup Ganic was elected to represent all other ethnic communities. See Allcock, "Yugoslavia," op. cit.


73. The constitution's wording is confusing at times, reflecting the highly unwieldy state structure envisaged. Thus, the “Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina” is the territory jointly inhabited by the Muslim and Croat communities and the Republika Srpska. The Federation and the “Republika Srpska” are “entities,” and it is the aggregation of both that creates “The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

74. The Bosnian electoral law can be found at http://www.oscebih.org/documents/docs.htm. For the results of the 1998 presidential and parliamentary elections, see http://www.oscebih.org/98results/el98-results.htm.

75. A factor clearly affecting the way this axiom operates is when an ethnic minority's political relevance derives from inter-state relations, in which case the quality of these relations, and the power and incentives represented by the neighboring state, may be determinative of the treatment the minority receives. At one pole, this certainly appears to be the case with Slovenia's generous provisions for its Italian minority, while the other pole may be represented by the hostile treatment by Slovakia of its much larger Hungarian minority (although primarily only at the level of linguistic rights and cultural provision) until Vladimir Meciar's government lost power in 1998.


77. Edith Oltay, “Hungary Passes Law on Minority Rights,” RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, no. 33 (August 20, 1993), pp. 57-61. It should also be noted that the absence of guaranteed representation has not prevented the Hungarian National Assembly from being a rather ethnically diverse body. During the first parliament (1990-1994), the parties represented in the Assembly contained eight ethnic Germans, two Roma, one Jew, one Armenian, one Pole, one Slovak, and one Croat, with the Alliance of Free Democrats being by far the most ethnically diverse of the parliamentary factions. See Benoît-Rohmer and Hardeman, “The Representation of Minorities,” p. 110.

78. The Virginia Declaration of Rights, Sec. 3.


12. For a compelling discussion of the dangers to democracy that follow from working-class mobilization along non-class lines in Eastern Europe, see David Ost, “Labor, Class, and Democracy: Shaping Political Antagonisms in Post-Communist Society,” *Working Papers on Transitions from State Socialism* #93.3 (Cornell University, Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies, 1993).


16. See Sharon Fisher, “Domestic Policies Cause Conflict with the West,” *Transition*, vol. 2, no. 19 (September 20, 1996), pp. 56-61. Of the five post-communist associate members with which the EU declined to begin formal accession negotiations in March 1998, Slovakia was the only candidate excluded solely on political grounds.


25. See Michael Shafir’s chapter in this volume.


34. This seems all the more true given that declining support for Funar’s party was confirmed in the election. See Michael Shafir, "Opting for Political Change," Transition, vol. 2, no. 26 (December 27, 1996), pp. 12-16.


37. On the failure of official efforts to prohibit the DPS from electoral competition, see Carlos Juberias Flore's chapter in this volume.

38. On these more recent developments, see Ivan Ilchev's chapter in this volume.


44. The same could be said of the subsequent introduction of the *kuna* as the new currency in May 1994. Although this was the ancient name of Croatian money, it was also the name of the currency used by the Ustasa regime.


46. See Patrick Moore, "An End Game in Croatia and Bosnia?", *Transition*, vol. 1, no. 20 (November 3, 1995), pp. 6-12.


50. In fact, a "Belgian" solution has from the outset been one of the Albanians' principal demands, and a successful referendum on territorial autonomy organized by the Albanian parties in January 1992 was declared illegal by the Macedonian authorities. See Perry, *ibid.* For the full text of the Macedonian constitution see *Nova Makedonija*, Skopje, November 25, 1991, in *JPRS-EER-92-016-S*, 10 February 1992.


1. See Agentia nationala de presa-Rompres, *Partide politice*, 1993 (Bucharest: Rompres, 1993), p. 147. Its Romanian name, Uniunea Democrat Maghiara din Romania, is commonly rendered in English either as above or as the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania.


5. See Appendices 2 and 4, in *Partide politice*, 1993, pp. 175-191.

6. See Appendix 5 in *ibid.*, p. 192.


8. For example, Czech and Slovak minorities, as well as the German minority centered around Sibiu in Transylvania, are each represented by a single deputy as a result of this provision, which was later also included in the Constitution.


10. See the interview with Chamber of Deputies chairman Adrian Nastase in the daily *Cronica romana*, September 8, 1995; and the declarations of the PUNR executive secretary Valer Suian, *Radio Bucharest*, 16 August 1995. Victor Surdu, the leader of the small Democratic Agrarian Party (another adversary of the UDMR on national matters) has already predicted that the UDMR would not manage to be represented in parliament by more than one deputy if the law were changed along these lines. *Jurnalul national*, August 9, 1995.

12. See Romanian Institute for Human Rights, *Rights of the Persons Belonging to the National Minorities* (Bucharest: Monitorul oficial), 1993, Appendix I/1, p. 112. There are also large Hungarian concentrations in four other Transylvanian counties (Mures, 41.3 percent, Satu Mare, 35 percent, Bihor, 28.5 percent, and Salaj, 23.7 percent). Other counties with significant Hungarian minority concentrations are Cluj (19.8 percent), Arad (12.5 percent), and Maramures (10.2 percent). An additional seven counties have Hungarian populations ranging from 2.2 percent (Caras-Severin) to 9.8 percent (Brasov).


17. Cited in Oltay, “The Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania.”

18. These six platforms were officially recognized prior to the UDMR’s Fourth Congress in May 1995. See *Monitorul U.D.M.R.*, no. 6, January 1995, p. 5.


20. Interview with Niculescu and Biro, June 1995.


27. Interview with Niculescu and Biro.


30. Nor was the return to old patterns of discourse in 1990 limited to ethnic relations. The FSN’s “main electoral base consisted of former party officials, peasants, and unskilled workers,” inspiring a “campaign [that] made good use...of many ideas from Ceausescu’s time.” Verdery and Kligman, “Romania after Ceausescu: Post-Communist Communism?,” p. 122.


32. See *Viața capitalei*, June 26, 1990; Azi, July 22 and 25, 1990; and *Dimineata*, August 4, 1990 (for Cornea); and Azi, July 25, 1990 (for Ratiu). The first issue of the FSN daily, *Azi*, included an article by an FSN senator describing the Hungarians as hordes plaguing humanity. Azi, April 11, 1990. The same tone was echoed in publications supported by Ionuș Constantin Dragan, an emigre sympathizer of the interwar fascist Iron Guard who amassed a fortune in Italy and was named honorary chairman of *Vatra*.

33. See Crisula Stefanescu, “Disputes over Control of Romanian Television,” *Report on Eastern Europe*, vol. 2, no. 8, 1991, pp. 28-33; and Helsinki Watch, *Struggling for Ethnic Identity*, pp. 46-50. As a result of the protests, the directive was never implemented, but neither has it been officially rescinded.


41. See Oltay, “The Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania.” According to the prominent radical Imre Borbély, the first “great confrontation” of the two nascent tendencies had already occurred at the first Congress in 1990, and pitted those who had previously held functions in the PCR and the people promoted by then against those who had been “spontaneously elected” as delegates to the Congress. See the interview with him in *Cronica Romana*, May 12, 1995.

43. See ARPress, May 26, 1994; Buletin informativ U.D.M.R, no. 110, 1 June 1994; Romania libera and Radio Bucharest, June 1, 1994; and Adevarul, June 2, 1994.
46. See Evenimentul zilei, June 23 and 24, 1994; and Romania libera, July 1, 1994.
55. See the interview with Bela Marko in Cronica Romana, July 1, 1995; and Curierul National, August 17, 1995.
56. See the clarifications issued by the UDMR chairman's cabinet on the Federation's objections to the law in Azi, August 16, 1995; and Curierul National, August 17, 1995. For Archbishop Ioan Robu's denunciation of the law as "no better than the old communist one as regards relations with the Church," see Reuters, September 15, 1995.
60. For the text of the decision, see Romania Libera, July 19, 1995. The only Hungarian-ethnic on the Constitutional Court had been recently replaced with a Romanian, eliciting further protest from the UDMR. See Buletin informativ U.D.M.R, no. 360, June 9, 1995.
65. Politia, no. 175, July 8, and no. 176, July 15, 1995.


73. See Shafir, “The Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania: Postponed Confrontations.”

74. See Tineretul Liber, October 27, 1992; Romania Libera, October 28, 1992; Lumea Azi, no. 45, November 5-11, 1992; Shafir, “The Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania: Postponed Confrontations.”

75. Craiutu, “The Dilemma of Dual Identity.”

76. For details, see Shafir, “The Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania: Postponed Confrontations.”

77. Radio Bucharest, October 29, 1992; Expres, no. 44, November 3-9, 1992 (Domokos); Flacara, no. 44, November 4-10, 1992 (Tokes).

78. See the interviews with Domokos in Dreptatea, October 31, 1992, Flacara, no. 44, November 4-10, 1992, and Brassoi Lapok, December 23, 1992; and the interview with Tokes in Romania Libera, November 4, 1992. For the attempted dismissal of Domokos, see Rompres [in English], November 4 and 11, 1992, Romania Libera and Adevarul, November 11, 1992, and the interview with Tokes in Romania Libera, November 4, 1992. For Domokos's admission that the text of the Cluj declaration was ambiguous, Radio Bucharest, October 29, 1992.

79. See the interview with him in Pesti Hirlap (Budapest), January 27, 1993.

80. For the text of the draft, see Gabrial Andreescu, Valentin Stan, Renate Weber, Study on the Conception of Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania on the Rights of National Minorities: A Critical Analysis of the DAHR Documents (Bucharest: The Center for Human Rights APADOR-CH, 1994), pp. 40-56. A law on the national minorities had been promised by the Council of the NSF in its early January 1990 declaration, but, as was the case with other promises, it was never carried out. This is what determined the UDMR to come out with its own legislative initiative. A draft worked out by the Council of National Minorities was submitted to the government, apparently accepted after alterations, but in the end never submitted to parliament. See Cronica Romana, May 24, 1995 and Adevarul, June 6, 1995. The Center for Human Rights-Helsinki Committee has worked out a third draft law on the national minorities. See Legislatia in Transita (Bucharest: The Center for Human Rights-Helsinki Committee, 1995), pp. 103-112.

81. Ibid. For a response by the UDMR see Miklos Bakk, “Conceptia UDMR privind drep-turile minoritatilor nationale,” Revista Romana de drepturile omului, no. 6-7, 1994, pp. 86-103.


83. In ibid, the Romanian translation is rendered as “self-administration.” This seems to be intentionally misleading, judging by the other specifications concerning “personal autonomy.”


85. Author’s interview with Tokay, May 1993.

86. Author’s interview with Bela Marko, Bucharest, June 1995.

87. See Michael Shafir and Dan Ionescu, “Romania: A Crucially Uneventful Year,” RFE/RL
90. See the interview with Borbely in *Transition*, vol. 1, no. 19, 1995 (October 20, 1995), pp. 32-36.
92. Ibid., p. 429.
93. Ibid., p. 430.
94. Ibid., p. 431.
95. For a detailed discussion of pressures on both Hungary and Romania, see Michael Shafir, "A Possible Light at the End of the Tunnel," *Transitions*, vol. 2, no. 19, 1996, pp. 29-32.
97. Linz and Stepan, op. cit., p. 429.
98. For further details, see Michael Shafir, “Ciorbea si democratizarea: bilant intermediar,” *Sfera Politicii*, vol. 6, no. 55 (December 1997) (in Romanian).

3. This contrasts with Lithuania, where the so-called “zero-option” was employed: citizenship was offered to anyone resident in the republic prior to the introduction of the citizenship law. For details, see *The Citizenship and Alien Law Controversies in Estonia and Latvia* (Cambridge, MA: Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, April 1994).
5. Estonians, in particular, see themselves as resisting a historic process of assimilation of Finno-Ugric peoples, such as the Mordvans, Urdmurts, and Komis, by the Russians.


10. As a result of World War II and Stalinist repression, Estonia lost approximately 200,000 people (18 percent of its population).

11. It should be noted that sporadic guerilla resistance to Soviet rule persisted in Estonia until the mid-1950s.

12. Soviet language policy was based on the 1938 Communist Party and Council of People’s Commissars decision “On Compulsory Study of the Russian Language in Schools of Non-Russian Republics and Regions.”

13. In a survey conducted in Estonia in 1988, 78 percent of the Russians questioned identified themselves as members of the “Soviet nation,” while only 15 percent identified themselves as belonging to another national group. The figures for Estonians were 10 percent and 73 percent, respectively. *Vikerkaar*, vol. 5 (1988), p. 76.


22. Data from the Estonian polling organization Mainor-EMOR.


30. An earlier attempt had been made to transform the Interfront into a more effective organization stressing Russian rather than Soviet identity. Established in March 1991, the Russian Community of Latvia (*Russkaia oshchchina Latvii—ROL*) was to operate under the control of the Soviet loyalist organizations and was initially led by leading members of the Interfront. Internal conflict soon arose, however, and the largely pro-independence rank-and-file removed the Soviet-loyalist leadership in September 1992. The contradictory principles of identity underlying this power struggle led to the ROL’s rapid disintegration, leaving only a small Russian cultural organization. Author’s interview with Vladimir Vladov, President of ROL (Riga, October 1993).

31. The triumvirate that formed the leadership consisted of two ethnic Latvians (Rubriks and Dimanis) and a Jew (Zdanok).

32. Equal Rights was close to the Committee on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Cooperation. The Committee campaigned extensively in the local Russian press in support of the “zero variant” for citizenship and in May 1993 held a press conference in the Moscow Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Diena* (September 22, 1993), p. 8.

33. The main groups were: the Cossack Circle, closely linked to Soviet officers organizations; the Union of Latvian Communists, formed in early September 1992 from the core of the Communist Party of Latvia and the Interfront; the Union for the Defense of Veterans Rights, which succeeded the Council of USSR War, Work and Armed Forces Veterans (banned in August 1991); and the Association of Russians in Latvia.


35. Interview with Janis Jurkans, Riga (October 1993).

36. Gundar King and J. Thad Barnowe, “Complementary and Conflicting Personal Values of Russophone Managers in Latvia,” *Journal of Baltic Studies* XXV, no. 3 (Fall 1994), pp. 249-72. However, while the prospect of attaining a standard of living higher than elsewhere in the former Soviet Union suggested that Russian-speakers in Latvia would be prepared to endure many of the travails of the current situation, this amounted to tolerance, not commitment. Brian J. Boeck, “Legacy of a Shattered System: The Russian-speaking population in Latvia,” *Demokratizatsiya*, vol. 1, no. 2 (1993), pp. 70-85. Moreover, traditional economic links with Russia such as joint manufacturing ventures were often rejected by the Latvian authorities for fear that such moves would presage loss of control of the national economy. See, for example, “Latvia Votes Down Russian Military Factory Deal,” *The Baltic Independent* (June 4, 1993).

37. The city’s population was 65 percent Russian, 12.5 percent Latvian, 12.5 percent Polish, 8 percent Ukrainian, and 3 percent Belorussian. Many ethnic Latvians, moreover, spoke Russian as their first language. “Language Is Key in Daugavpils,” *The Baltic Independent* (June 2-8, 1995), p. 2.


39. Eight parties entered Parliament: Latvian Way (36 seats), the Farmers Union (12 seats), Equal Rights (7 [8] seats), Fatherland and Freedom (6 seats), CDU (5 seats),
Democratic Party (5 seats), Harmony for Latvia (13 seats), and the Latvian National Independence Party (15 seats), making a total of 99. Rubriks was elected on the Equal Rights list but remained imprisoned.


42. Criticism from the Russian Federation and the suggestion that Latvian membership in the Council of Europe might be blocked if the bill was not changed concentrated parliamentary minds very quickly. “Ulmanis Blocks Disputed Citizenship Law,” The Baltic Independent (July 1-7, 1994), p. 1.


45. In light of Siegrist’s behavior, President Ulmanis blocked his party’s inclusion in the diverse governing coalition formed in December 1995.


47. These incidents included a bombing near the Russian embassy in Riga, the break-up of a demonstration by mostly Russian-speaking pensioners, and the participation of a number of leading politicians in a march that featured Latvian veterans of the Waffen-SS. See Economist Intelligence Unit, Latvia (Country Profile) (London: June 22, 1998), pp. 10-12.

48. Moreover, because of its citizenship law, Latvia was in 1995 the last of the Baltic states to be admitted to the Council of Europe.


50. Currently, the Saeima contains eight parliamentary factions.

51. Pettai and Kreuzer, op. cit.

52. The original language law was passed on January 18, 1989. However, Estonia’s republic-level administration lacked the authorization to implement it fully. See David D. Laitin, “National Revival and Competitive Assimilation in Estonia,” Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 12, no. 1, p. 31.


57. Interview with Sergei Gorokhov, a sociologist in Narva, October 1993.
58. An EMOR poll suggests that half the respondents in Narva were unhappy with the work of the local council there—much higher than in other areas of the country. Fifty-four percent said the local council "should work in close cooperation and unity with the Estonian Government." "Second Referendum Called in Northeast Estonia," *The Baltic Independent* (July 5-9, 1993).
59. Sergei Gorokhov, "Spetsifika uchastiia neestonskoi chasti naseleniia respubliki v protsesse sotsial'no-politicheskoi aktivnosti," *Severnoe pobereze* (May 26, 1993), p. 4. The most powerful myths are that the Baltic states were not annexed but agreed to voluntary union with the USSR and that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact never existed.
61. The party embraced Russian nationalists, such as Sergei Kuznetsov, as well as ethnic Estonian former communist elites such as Lembit Annus and Vladimir Kukk.
62. The distribution of seats was as follows: Democratic Labor Party (12), Narva Trade Union (12), and Narva Estonian Society (7).
69. This is in contrast to Latvia, which has continued Russian-language primary and secondary schools.
71. Although enacted in December 1998, the law did not apply to the March 1999 elections. Latvia's Department of Citizenship and Immigration was criticized by Helsinki Watch for 'serious systematic abuses' in failing to uphold the December 1991 law on the registration of residents. "Watchdog Condemns Latvian 'Abuses,'" *The Baltic Independent* (November 5-11, 1993).
72. A series of surveys has found increasing support for Estonian statehood among the Russian-speaking population. Maley has found higher support among Russian-speakers in the Baltic states for their own governments than for the Russian government. William


83. In early 1996, the Fatherland and Freedom Party launched a drive to overturn the law on citizenship and naturalization introduced in 1994. In particular, they sought the introduction of quotas for naturalization by non-Latvians or Livs (a small group indigenous to Latvia). Significantly, the initiative was opposed by a variety of Latvian political parties, including Latvia's Way. "Latvia Votes on Non-Citizens," *The Baltic Independent* (January 18-24, 1996), pp. 1 and 5.


85. While tighter requirements for citizenship, introduced in January 1995, were aimed primarily at new arrivals to the country, this move was reinforced by the new, more conservative language law adopted in February 1995, which further restricted use of the Russian language. However, the Estonian authorities did display considerable flexibility in extending the period for non-citizens to register as residents beyond the deadline of June 12, 1995.


87. International organizations have generally given both countries a clean bill of health regarding formal legal rights. A United Nations mission to Latvia in October 1992 found that the laws did not infringe international norms and that there were no systematic vio-
lations of rights but that "it would be desirable if Latvia, for humanitarian reasons, would tend its nationality to the majority of its permanent residents who express a desire to be loyal citizens of Latvia." The report suggested that the problems were not legal but social. It was also noted that the Department of Citizenship and Immigration was involved in discrimination. See also the collection of reports including that from the CSCE "Human Rights in the Baltic States," Finnish Helsinki Committee, no. 6, (1993). However, in October 1995 a UN human rights committee criticized the citizenship regime adopted in Estonia. "UN raps citizen policy," The Baltic Independent (November 3-9, 1995), p. 3.

1. See Enver Hoxha, Two Friendly Peoples (Tirana: 8 Nentori, 1985) for a general view of how the Albanian communists viewed the Greek minority issue after 1944 and under communism. It is clear that Hoxha had little information on the early stages of the Greek Civil War and its effects on the Greek minority in Albania.


5. The history of Albania during the Second World War has been highly controversial, with most of the protagonists in the argument British ex-Special Operations executive officers involved in the anti-Axis campaign. The best general account is to be found in Sir Reginald Hibbert, Albania's National Liberation: The Bitter Victory (London: Pinter, 1991). For a contrary view, see Sir Julian Amery, Sons of the Eagle (London: Macmillan, 1948). A good account of an important part of the military campaign is to be found in Brigadier T. Davies, Illyrian Venture (London: The Bodley Head, 1952).

6. For an analysis of how elements of clan-based social organization and its core principles of unbending loyalty and honor have influenced Albania's post-communist political culture, see Fabian Schmidt, "An Old System Blends into the Present," Transition, vol. 2, no. 18 (September 6, 1996), pp. 50-53.

7. The figure of 3 percent is taken from estimates by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook, 1994.


10. For the best account of the destruction caused in Epirus and southern Albania by intercommunal violence during this period, as well as the main diplomatic intrigues which affected this region, see Rene Puaux, The Sorrows of Epirus (Chicago: Argonaut reprint, 1963).


12. There has been very little study of the Northern Epirus issue in this period. For an interesting but highly pro-Greek view, see Pyrrus Ruches, Albania's Captives (Chicago: Argo Press, 1964).


17. Some important Albanian communist leaders were wholly or partly Greek, like long-serving Politburo member Spiro Koleka, who came from the predominantly ethnic Greek town of Himara.


19. See my report in *The Independent* (London), February 6, 1991. The best account in English of the outlook of the northern Greek bishops on the persecution of the Orthodox Church under communism is to be found in Metropolitan Sevastianos of Dryinoupolis, *Northern Epirus Crucified* (Athens, 1986).


22. It is not clear to what extent MAVI was a significant political and paramilitary formation rather than merely a fanatical splinter group. At the time, the Albanian government claimed that Greek army and secret police personnel were involved in the attacks. The name is adopted from the wartime Northern Epirot organization which fought as a separate resistance group against the Axis in 1943. It was destroyed in vicious fighting with the German occupiers and the Albanian nationalist forces of the Balli Kombetar, and it played no part in the final liberation of the country.


24. For a comprehensive overview of church history from a Greek perspective, see Apostolis Glavina, *The Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox Church* (Thessaloniki: Zita, 1992). See also Sevastianos, *op. cit.*


27. Focusing on the role of such organizations as the Orthodox Church thus represents an important qualification and extension of Rogers Brubaker’s very useful “triadic” framework for analyzing ethno-politics in eastern Europe, where twentieth-century border movements have left national minorities in “home states” adjacent to their ethnic “kin states.” See Rogers Brubaker, “Home States, Kin States, and Ethnic Minorities in the New Europe,” *Dazedelus* (1995).


29. See generally *Blue Guide to Albania*, *op. cit.*
30. Balkan News (Athens), November 1994. A great deal of other material related to the "Omonia five" appeared in the Greek press at the time. The Greek police later began their own investigation of MAVI, arresting three Greek citizens and four Greek Albanians following another thwarted border raid in the spring of 1995. Confirming Albania's earlier accusations, the police said MAVI was likely headed by Anastasios Giorgos, a former Greek army officer, while the Greek press suggested that the Greek secret service may indeed have been either involved with the organization or had overlooked its activities. At the same time, a former Greek government minister, Theodoros Pangalos, admitted that the Omonia five had "very probably been linked" to MAVI. See Sullivan, op. cit., p. 16.


32. Rightist forces such as the group led by Tomas Dosti within Berisha's Democratic Party, for example, played a prominent role in shaping the government's repressive anti-Greek measures from 1994 to 1996.

33. These themes have frequently been aired in Albanian public debate, particularly in such newspapers as Rilindja, in which the Kosovar influence is apparent.


37. Indeed, a new problem has emerged, as it is widely believed in Tirana that a large sum of aid money was stolen by the Berisha government or people close to it and placed in Greek banks. However, given restrictive Greek banking legislation, recovery will likely prove difficult for Fatos Nano's Socialist government even if criminal activity can be demonstrated.

38. For example, conflict over Greek control of the Orthodox Church arose in 1996 in Elbasan.

1. Throughout this chapter, I use "Rom" and "Roma" to refer to persons of Romani origin. The term "gypsy," while still widely used, is a malapropism and has its roots in the historic European belief that the Roma originated in Egypt.

2. This can be compared with a Europe-wide estimate of 7 to 8.5 million, including Russia. See Commission of the European Communities, "School Provision for Gypsy and Traveller Children," COM (96) 495 final (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997), pp. 8-10. On the difficulties of obtaining accurate population statistics due to their inflation by Romani leaders, underestimation by governments, and reluctance by many Roma to identify themselves as such, see Jeremy Druker, "Present but Unaccounted For," Transitions, vol. 4, No. 4 (September 1997), p. 22.

4. While the emigration of Czech and Slovak Roma to Great Britain and Canada involved a relatively small number of Roma and constituted discrete episodes, its significance was heightened by broad coverage in western media, putting pressure on the Czech government, in particular, to persuade Roma to remain. See, for example, "Outcasts of Europe," *Time*, November 3, 1997, pp. 32-35.


7. Indeed, Romani communities are still subject to the discretion of their governments, as international documents still allow signing governments to define their national minorities.


18. *Minorities at Risk Project*, *op. cit.*


20. These crimes generally consist of petty theft. *Minorities at Risk Project*, *op. cit.*

21. The highest number of reported Roma deaths at the hands of police are in Romania and Bulgaria. See Dimitrina Petrova, "'Get Out, You Stinking Gypsy," *Transitions*, vol. 4, no. 4 (September 1997), p. 17.

22. *Minorities at Risk Project*, *op. cit.*


27. This historical overview draws substantially on David Crowe and John Kolsti (eds), The Gypsies of Eastern Europe (Armonk, N.Y., M. E. Sharpe, 1991).

28. Mirga and Gheorghe, op. cit., 9. Almost every consolidating nation-state in western Europe had adopted anti-Roma legislation between the years of 1471 and 1637. Road signs were erected in many countries warning Roma that they would be expelled or even hanged if found there. England favored hanging and expulsion, while France under Louis XIV branded and shaved the heads of Roma. In the Czech lands, Bohemia severed the right ear of Romani women, while Moravia severed the left. Fonseca, op. cit., pp. 229-30.


31. Many observers note that there is no such tradition within the Romani community itself, and that self-proclaimed royalty do not enjoy legitimacy among the Roma. See, for example, Rudko Kawczynski, “The Politics of Romani Politics,” Transitions, vol. 4, no. 4 (September 1997), p. 27; Fonseca, op. cit., pp. 287-91.

32. Hancock, op. cit., pp. 142-43.

33. Ibid., p. 143.

34. Although founded by Roma, some Romani activists have criticized the IRU as lacking a proper organizational structure and thus lending itself to capture by “representatives (who) are often found by chance, just because they happen to be there.” Kawczynski, op. cit., p. 28.

35. Hancock, op. cit., pp. 145-49.

36. This contrasts with the official recognition of ethnic identity in the communist federations of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the U.S.S.R. In these cases, central governments constitutionalized the existence of particular “nations” in the context of territorial frameworks that gave them considerable de jure power. Such guarantees meant little in practice, however, since these “federations” were remained subject to single-party rule. For the most exhaustive treatment, see Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

37. Although policies toward the Roma throughout the region were largely uniform, there
were important variations. The Hungarian government, for example, provided the Roma some cultural autonomy and formal political representation. These policies were intended to serve as models for neighboring states with large Hungarian minorities. However, the Romani minority was denied the same level of minority status as other national minorities in Hungary. See David Crowe's Conclusion, in Crowe and Kolsti, op. cit., p. 155.


43. In his detailed analysis of Roma labor strategies in the Czech workforce, Sirovátka argues that chronic unemployment within the Romani community is due more to employers' responses to institutional incentives than to cultural factors. After the fall of communism, employers responded to new economic uncertainties by laying off sectors of their workforces and increasingly relying on a secondary or “shadow” low-wage labor force, often using ethnic markers to reduce information costs concerning the likely productivity of prospective employees. Because the Roma were tied to unskilled positions under communist regimes and had few competitive advantages in the labor force, they were an obvious group to consign to the secondary market. Moreover, the consensus among government actors and employers concerning the need for this market and that employment offices should primarily serve employers' interests reproduces ethnic stratification. In economic terms, this generates a moral hazard inssofar as it is often more rational for Roma to refuse employment altogether, as anticipated wages fail to exceed welfare benefits. Sirovatka, op. cit.

44. Ibid., p. 10.


46. Interview with Ondřej Gifka, Minority Representative on the National Council for Minorities, Czech Republic, November 24, 1997; Interview with Karel Holomek, Minority Representative on the National Council for Minorities, Czech Republic, and Co-founder of the Romani Civic Initiative, the single Romani political party in post-1989 Czechoslovakia, March 9, 1998.

47. Minorities at Risk Project, op. cit.

48. The dearth of skilled Romani political leaders has been noted by many activists. Ondřej Gifka cites it as one of the most urgent problems faced by the Romani community. Mirga and Gheorghe note that while many older elites command authority among the Roma, they often have little training to assist them in negotiating the increasingly complex political landscape. In contrast, while the younger generation of better-educated Romani elites possesses these skills, they lack traditional legitimacy among the Romani population. Mirga and Gheorghe, op. cit., p. 13.

49. This phenomenon is aptly described by a Council of Europe report: “... all major institutions in a society are governed by certain habits, rules and regulations, whether formal or informal, that are rooted in the dominant culture of that society. The more people are familiar with these rules and regulations, the easier it will be for them to gain access to those institu-
tions." Community and Ethnic Relations in Europe, final report of the Community Relations Project of the Council of Europe. MG-CR (91) 1 final E (Strasbourg: Council of Europe)

50. Giňa Interview, op. cit.


53. Giňa interview, op. cit. Mirga and Gheorghe, however, go much further, questioning whether negotiations between governments and Roma appointed to advisory positions can conceivably represent negotiations between the Roma and non-Roma communities at all, for a democratic leadership "legitimized by the constituency of a formal organization," they argue, is a notion that has not yet taken root in Romani communities. Mirga and Gheorghe, op. cit., p. 13.

54. Similarly, the widely-noted patrimonialism and clan-like nature of Romani communities can be understood as the result of the break-down of self-policing mechanisms in a context of close proximity with Romani communities governed by different social norms. Thus, social and economic transactions have largely been confined to the family level where rules are known and enforceable. In contrast, transactions between families or communities are perceived as being open to mutual defection. See Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Chicago: The Free Press, 1958), Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), and Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). The logic underlying this phenomenon can be extrapolated to behavioral differences in inter-ethnic as opposed to intra-ethnic interactions. See James D. Fearon, "Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem" (unpublished manuscript, 1993) and Barry Weingast, "Constructing Trust: The Political and Economic Roots of Ethnic and Regional Conflict" (unpublished manuscript, 1996).


56. Kawczynski, op. cit., p. 28.

57. See above.

58. European Committee on Migration (CDMG), The Situation of Gypsies (Roma and Sinti) in Europe, Strasbourg, August 1, 1995, cdmg 11.95e, p. 11.


60. Ibid.

61. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

62. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

63. Ibid., p. 15.

64. Although the Czech government claimed that it initially rejected the report because "the research was too basic," alterations amounted to "less than 1 percent" of its original content, while a deputy minister confirmed that there had been "political pressure" to adopt following the Roma exodus to Great Britain and Canada, which resulted in the latter re-imposing visa requirements on Czech citizens. Michele Legge, "Cabinet Approves Romany Report," Prague Post, November 5-11, 1997, A3.

65. Slafkovský interview, op. cit.

66. See, for example, Mirga and Gheorghe, op. cit., p. 15, and Hancock, "The Struggle for Control of Identity," Transitions, vol. 4, no. 4, (September 1997) p. 44.
This chapter was completed prior to the January 2000 parliamentary election. The election's outcome heralded the accession of a new government promising democratic and economic reform, as well as closer cooperation with the West. However, it did not mark any change in the framework for ethnic minority representation analyzed here. On the contrary, as the discussion of the election in Carlos Flores's chapter in this volume demonstrates, the main features of that framework were reinforced.

15. Ibid., pp. 241-246, 260-265.


20. Ibid.


23. For a comprehensive description of the war’s dynamics and outcome, see Božidar Javorović, Velikosrpska najezda i obrana Hrvatske (Zagreb: Defini, 1995).


29. See Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium, mimeo, 2.


31. Ibid., p. 37.

32. Ibid., pp. 45-52; Narodne novine, September 21, 1995, p. 1833.


34. Ustav SFRJ/SRH (Zagreb: Informator, s.a.), p. 212.


36. Temporary establishment of a Provisional Court was provided for, with a majority of judges to be appointed by countries of the European Union.


41. See also Lajić, “Demografski razvitak Hrvatske u razdoblju 1991. do 1994,” p. 60. A considerable number of residents of these territories appear to have fled to Serbia and western
countries even before the Croatian military operations of May and August 1995.

42. Službeni rezultati izbora zastupnika u Zastupnički dom Sabora (Zagreb, 1995).

43. For the election results, see Izborna komisija Republike Hrvatske, Izvjećje, no. 30 (August 11, 1992) and no. 32 (August 12, 1992).

44. Only three of the eight SDP deputies remained members of this party throughout the electoral term, while the others became independents.

45. Izborna komisija Republike Hrvatske, Izvjećje o provedenim izborima za zastupnike u županijski dom Sabora Republike Hrvatske.


47. In this article it was not possible to present the political developments of 1996 and 1997. It should be only briefly noted that in 1997 Pupovac’s SSS merged with the local Serb activists from Eastern Slavonia into a new party, Independent Democratic Serb Party (Samostalna demokratska srpska stranka—SDSS). SDSS took part in the 1997 House of Counties county and local elections and won a significant number of mandates in county assemblies and city and municipal councils (e.g., 6 mandates in the assembly of Osječko-baranjska county and ten mandates in the Vukovarsko-srijemska county, an absolute majority in the Beli Manastir city council, etc.), while its president, Vojislav Stanimirović, became a member of the House of Counties in the Croatian Sabor.

1. The term “Bulgarian-speaking Muslims” denotes Slavic Bulgarians living mainly in the Rhodopes and parts of the Balkan mountain range who practice Islam. They are commonly called Pomaks, although they consider this to be a pejorative term. The Bulgarian Turks, of course, are also Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, so the term is inevitably somewhat artificial, but it will be used here to maintain a distinction that has played an important role in Bulgaria’s ethnic politics.


8. This tendency already existed to some extent among young Turks, who often placed a Bulgarian name alongside their Turkish names when in mixed company.

9. On these events, see the following memoirs of Bulgarian secret police agents: G. Sotirov, Turskite teroristi i az edin ot Shesto (Sofia, 1991); A. Musakov, Shesto. Spomeni na poslednija nachalnik na VI upravlenie v Durzhavna sigurnost (Sofia, 1991); N. Krusteva, B.阿森ov, Poturchvane II (Sofia, 1993). Numerous descriptions of the situation in northeast and southeast
Bulgaria in the 1980s and early 1990s are provided in the monograph *The Ethnic Situation in Bulgaria 1992* (Sofia: Club 90, 1993).


11. 24 Tchasa, January 4, 1993; *Prava i svobodi*, September 24, 1993; *BTA*, June 19, 1995. It should be added that over the same period, some 300,000 ethnic Bulgarians left the country for Western Europe, North America and South Africa.


15. P. Mitev, “Vruzki na suvmestimost i nesuvmestimost vuv vsekidnevieto mezhdu hristijani i mjusjulmani v Bulgarija,” *Sozioigichesko isisledvane. Vruzki na suvmestimost i nesuvmestimost mezhdu hristijani i mjusjulmani v Bulgarija* (Sofia, 1994), Table 1-10.


17. The media quoted hundreds of examples during the first years of democracy. See, for example, *Prava i svobodi*, Nov. 19, 1993; 24 Tchasa, June 21, 1993; *Demokratzija*, May 11, 1993; *Duma*, April 20, 1993.


19. The regimen faced by children in some villages is extremely grueling. They must study at school for six hours a day, including lessons in Russian and a west European language, and many Muslim children are then expected to study Turkish for three hours per week. At the same time, they must help their parents in the tobacco fields. It is little wonder, then, that initial enthusiasm for attending Koranic schools to learn Arabic was short-lived.


21. In 1996, for example, reports appeared that the Turkish emigrant organization Pulgyoc had sent missionaries to establish Muslim “colonies” in the Pomak areas of the Pirin and Rhodope regions, with Orthodox inhabitants warning that “Islamicization” would be the first step to Muslim autonomy in Bulgaria. See *Standart*, August 4, 1996. Similarly alarmist reports of Islamic proselytizing in the Pirin and Rhodope regions by foreign missionaries—allegedly including members of Middle Eastern groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah—dating back to 1992 have continued to appear in the Bulgarian press. See, for example, *Monitor*, February 1, 1999.


28. Dogan had already accused the BSP of provoking ethnic tension after its candidate in the 1996 presidential election, Ivan Marazov, claimed on national television that the DPS and the SDS had a secret agreement that would allow the “Islamicization” of the Rhodope mountains by giving Muslims there greater power. *Standart*, October 16, 1996. Marazov lost the election to the SDS candidate, Petar Stoyanov.

32. See, for example, *Standart*, September 6 and 10, 1994; *Demokratzija*, January 6, 1994.
36. More than four hundred guests were invited to a reception dinner in the most expensive restaurant in Varna. In the northeastern city of Isperih, 15,000 people were entertained at the city stadium with more than six hours of music, folk dances, and wrestling matches. *Prava i svobodi*, Nov. 5, 1993. The marriage lasted six months.
37. Dogan’s salary for the three years that he was a deputy up to that point was 342,000 leva, while the apartment cost two million. See *Trud*, July 25, 1994, *Standart*, August 25, 1994.
47. *Prava i svobodi*, December 3, 1993. Recently one of the leaders of the movement asked that the old system of privileges for the Turks be reintroduced.
54. See the persuasive analysis by Konstantin Subchev in *Kontinent*, May 23, 1998.
55. *BTA*, December 20, 1994. Many potential voters in Turkey are illegal immigrants who may have been deterred from voting by fears that casting a ballot would bring them to the attention of the Turkish authorities.
60. See the first part of the multi-faceted research carried out by the Centre for Minority Studies in Sofia, supported by the PHARE program, especially V. Mutafchieva, “Obrazut na turtzite, evreite i tziganite,” *Vruzki na suvremnost i nesuvmestimost mezhdn hristijani i mjusjul-
mani v Bulgarija (Sofia, 1994), pp. 5-34, and D. Dimitrova, “Etnicheskie plashila v pechata i traditizionnite modeli na obshtuvane mezhdju hristiani i mjusjulmani v Bulgarija,” Ibid., pp. 176-188.

61. See, for example, the interview with Dogan in The Turkish Daily News, November 16, 1998.
62. On the DPS’s active support of illegal emigration, see the statement by Idris Mehmed, chair of the party’s Kurdzhali municipal organization, in Pari, July 21, 1998.
64. BTA, January 26, 1995.
65. Bulgaria’s economy contracted by 10.9 percent in 1996, while the value of the leva depreciated by around two-thirds, causing monthly inflation to exceed 200 percent by the beginning of 1997.
68. BTA, December 10, 1997. Dogan has never confirmed or denied the allegation.
76. Although ethnic Bulgarians also continue to leave the country for western Europe, North America, and South Africa for economic reasons, their emigration has not, in the absence of ethnic kinship, raised analogous concerns about political identity and loyalty.
77. For details of the agreements, see, for example, Standart, December 4, 1997.


25. Horowitz's own recommendations on the ethnic composition of military forces in South Africa are complex, taking into account both professionalism and representativeness. *A Democratic South Africa?*, pp. 227-231.


