INDONESIA'S ROLE IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM
Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem

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S.V. University, India
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## Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>AMDA</td>
<td>Anglo - Malayan Defence Agreement</td>
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<td>ANS</td>
<td>Sihanoukist National Army</td>
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<td>ASA</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asia</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>BAKIN</td>
<td>Badan Koordinasi Interlijin (State Intelligence Coordinating Board)</td>
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<td>CGDK</td>
<td>Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CPC</td>
<td>Communist Party of China</td>
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<td>CPV</td>
<td>Communist Party of Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Centre for Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>Democratic Kampuchea</td>
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<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized Zone</td>
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<td>DRVN</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Vietnam</td>
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<td>FEER</td>
<td>Far Eastern Economic Review</td>
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<td>FPDA</td>
<td>Five-Power Defence Agreement</td>
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<td>FUNCIPEC</td>
<td>French acronym for the United National Front for an Independent, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRUNK</td>
<td>Royal Government of National Union</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Control Commission</td>
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<td>ICCS</td>
<td>International Commission for Control and Supervision</td>
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<td>ICK</td>
<td>International Conference on Kampuchea</td>
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<td>ICM</td>
<td>International Control Mechanism</td>
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<td>IGGI</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia</td>
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<td>IMC</td>
<td>International Meeting on Cambodia</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IPKF</td>
<td>International Peace Keeping Force</td>
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<td>JIM</td>
<td>Jakarta Informal Meeting</td>
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<td>KPNLF</td>
<td>Khmer People's National Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>KUFNS</td>
<td>Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation</td>
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<td>LPDR</td>
<td>Lao People's Democratic Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maphilindo</td>
<td>A regional association comprising Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>Americans Missing in Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMWG</td>
<td>Mixed Military Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>NADK</td>
<td>National Army of Democratic Kampuchea</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NEFOS</td>
<td>New Emerging Forces</td>
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<td>NGC</td>
<td>National Government of Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLF</td>
<td>National Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEFS</td>
<td>Old Established Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-5</td>
<td>Permanent Five Members of the United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PICC</td>
<td>Paris International Conference on Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRK</td>
<td>People's Republic of Kampuchea</td>
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<td>SEAARC</td>
<td>Southeast Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
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<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>SNC</td>
<td>Supreme National Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOC</td>
<td>State of Cambodia</td>
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<td>SRV</td>
<td>Socialist Republic of Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWB</td>
<td>Summery of World Broadcasts</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZOPFAN</td>
<td>Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality</td>
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This work is a revised version of my thesis for Ph.D. Degree from the Centre for Studies on Indochina and South Pacific, Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati, embodying several alterations in terms of deletions and additions made in the name of pruning to suit the needs of the reading public.

In this work, I have tried to make an enquiry into the role of a "peace-maker" that Indonesia volunteered to play by way of resolving the complex Cambodian question that had been threatening to become a vexed question for quite sometime. Great deal of scholarly ink has been spilt over Indonesian foreign policy or its diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with other countries but its otherwise memorable role in the Cambodian peace process did not receive the deserving attention of scholars obviously because, all these scholarly works were published much before Cambodian problem manifested itself in its totality. Mention may be made here of George Modelski's edited work, *The New Emerging Forces: Documents on the Ideology of Indonesian Foreign Policy*, (1963); Indonesian Foreign Ministry's publication *Dua Puluh Lima Tahun Departem Luar Negri Republik of Indonesia, 1945-1970* (1971); Lau Teik Soon's *Indonesia and Regional Security: The Djakarta Conference on Cambodia* (1972); Anak Agung Gde Agung's *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-1965* (1973); Franklin B. Weinstein's *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Soekarno to Soeharto* (1976). Indonesia's role in the resolution of the Cambodian problem came to be discussed only briefly in Michael Leifer's *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (1980) and Dewi Fortuna Anwar's *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (1994). These were followed by the following few articles on Indonesia's foreign policy with reference to the Cambodian peace process: Donald E. Weatherbee's "ASEAN: Indonesia's 'Dual-Track' Diplomacy" *Indochina Issues*, No.4, February - March 1986; Andrew J. Maclntyre's "Interpreting Indonesia's Foreign Policy: The Case of Kampuchea 1979-1986", *Asian
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Survey, May 1987 and Justus M. van der Kroef, "Cambodia: The Vagaries of 'Cocktail' Diplomacy", Contemporary Southeast Asia, March 1988. Even in the foregoing articles, published before the Paris Peace Agreement was signed, Indonesia's peace role in Cambodia was not completely traced for obvious reason. Otherwise, several articles written by scholars of no mean repute which appeared in reputed international Journals, mostly confined themselves to Indonesia's foreign policy in general. Therefore, an imperative need for a micro level analytical study of Indonesia's diplomacy in resolving the Cambodian conflict and the dearth of full-length studies exclusively on this issue, prompted me to make this modest attempt at an in-depth study and a critical analysis of Indonesia's diplomatic involvement in the Cambodian peace process.

In the course of presenting a graphic account of Indonesia's peace mission in Cambodia which was a grand prelude to its sacred mission of finding a regional solution that would eventually be deemed an international solution, I have raised and answered the following issues which form the mainsprings of Indonesia's peace diplomacy:

1. Why did Indonesia jump into the fray of Cambodian quagmire?
2. What motivated Indonesia to resort to 'Dual-Track' diplomacy?
3. Of all the ASEAN states why was Indonesia alone chosen to play an "interlocutor" between ASEAN and Indochina? How far did Indonesia live up to the expectations of ASEAN?
4. How did the Cambodian factions and ASEAN states react to Indonesia's peace moves?
5. Why was the process of JIM talks supplanted by the PICC?
6. Why did France choose Indonesia alone as the Cochairman of the PICC?
7. How far did Indonesia succeed in its role as a "mediator"?
8. What was the fallout of its peace mission?

Needless to say that this study is based on a wide gamut of sources on which I drew fairly heavily. The primary sources include the official documents of the ASEAN (ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta) and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, the PRC, the USA, the erstwhile Soviet Union and Australia. In
addition to these, I consulted official publications in the form of Pamphlets, Brochures, Monographs, Newsletters and Press Releases brought out from time to time by the governments of Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the USSR and India. The secondary sources, too many to enumerate, include books, newspapers, and journals, both Indian and foreign. Thanks to my familiarity with Vietnamese language which put me in a better stead as I went through some of the Vietnamese publications like *Nhan Dan* (Vietnam's official daily). Discussions with scholars who have been working on Cambodia and Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries enabled me to gain a fairly deep insight into the Cambodian problem and Cambodian peace process. All scholarly observations being the illuminating insights of all those who have been formidably committed to the resolution of the Cambodian issue, are quoted profusely but not tiresomely as they readily fit in their respective places leaving no room for the usual charge of mere cramming of the critical remarks.

Section one of the first chapter gives a catalogue of the salient features of Indonesia's "active" and "independent" foreign policy and an account of Jakarta's endeavours for promoting the regional cooperation, a convenient device to purge the region of tensions of the cold war. Section two traces the genesis and the growth of the Cambodian conflict. The second chapter deals with the origin and growth of ASEAN's interest especially Indonesia's absorbing interest in the Cambodian imbroglio during 1979-1981.

In the third chapter, divergent security threat perceptions of the ASEAN states with regard to the SRV and the PRC are explained and Indonesia's 'Dual-Track' diplomacy designed to exhort Vietnam to strive for a negotiated settlement is also dealt with. The fourth chapter seeks to describe Indonesia's indefatigable efforts to bring together the mutually antagonistic Khmer groups along with Vietnam to the negotiating table and also to give an account of the proceedings and the outcome of the first and second Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIMs).

The fifth chapter gives a graphic account of Indonesia's role as a Cochairman of the Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC) which led to the historically significant 'Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia' on October 23, 1991. By way of summing up, the last chapter brings together the main observations made in the preceding chapters.
I have taken every care to see that no unwarranted encomium is indiscriminately poured over Indonesia’s role in the Cambodian affair lest it should smack of undue etherealisation of Indonesia. Whatever I have said in favour of Indonesia is by way of giving whatever is due to that country and is determined by my study only.

I owe the successful completion of this revised version of my thesis to the benevolence, constant encouragement and guidance of my Teacher and Research Supervisor, Prof. A.Lakshmana Chetty, Director, Centre for Studies on Indochina, S.V. University, Tirupati.

I am ever indebted to Prof. V. Suryanarayan, Former Director, Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Madras, who offered invaluable suggestions. Also my sincere thanks are due to Prof. Parimal Kumar Das, Former Director, Centre for South Central, Southeast Asian Studies and South West Pacific Studies, School of International Relations, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, Prof. Savitri Viswanathan (Rtd.), Centre for Chinese and Japanese Studies, University of Delhi, Prof. S. Nagarajan, Head, Department of Southeast Asian Studies, Tamil University, Tanjore. Prof. Bastiam Pillai, Department of History and Political Science, University of Colombo, Prof. Tom A. Travis, Bucknell University, Louisbourg, USA, Prof. Nancy Brendlinger, Department of Political Science, Columbus College, Georgia, USA, Prof. K.S. Nathan, Department of International Relations, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur and Dr. Sridhar Krishanaswami, formerly Southeast Asia Correspondent of The Hindu based in Singapore and currently Special Correspondent of The Hindu in Washington, for their encouragement and valuable suggestions.

I am also deeply indebted to the University Grants Commission, New Delhi, for granting me a Junior Research Fellowship which greatly facilitated my Ph.D. research. I shall remain grateful to the reading public if they find this humble study of mine worth their reading.

Tirupati
June 2001

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1 Introduction

Indonesia's Foreign Policy and Regional Cooperation

The Republic of Indonesia is the largest and most potential country in Southeast Asia and comprises more than 17,500 islands spread over an area of 5,193,250 square km.1 It is the largest multi-ethnic archipelago in the world with 583 distinct languages and dialects2 in vogue. It is also the world's most extended archipelago forming at once a "bridge" between Asia and Australia and a "gate" from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. Indonesia also assumes importance because of its geostrategic location which controls crucial sea lanes at the cross-roads of East-West trade routes. It has a population of about 197 millions3 and is the fourth largest in the world and in Asia it is next to China and India. Besides, Indonesia is richly endowed with several natural resources such as petroleum, nickel, tin, coal and manganese and its agriculture mainly comprises rice, tobacco, palm oil, coffee and rubber. Though the Republic of Indonesia is sprawling into the vast sea territory, the people of Indonesia not only enjoy cultural unity but also experience greater political stability than any other Southeast Asian state.

Indonesians proclaimed their independence on August 17, 1945, soon after the surrender of Japan at the end of Second World War. From that moment until the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch, Indonesians were engaged in a revolutionary struggle against the Netherlands. Finally, colonial rule ended on December 27, 1949, when the Dutch granted independence to the Indonesians.

The Principal Tenets of Indonesian Foreign Policy

The evolution of the basic features of Indonesian foreign policy could be traced from the period of Indonesian struggle for freedom. The architects of foreign policy of free Indonesia inherited three important elements from their...
nationalist movement. The first and most important element was to support the anti-colonial struggle in various parts of Asia and Africa. Indonesia groaned under the yoke of Dutch colonialism for about three and half centuries. After a prolonged bitter struggle, the Indonesians secured their independence from the Dutch. Thus, it was but natural for the Indonesian leaders to pursue the policy of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. Expressing Indonesia's unequivocal opposition to colonialism, the opening to the Constitution of the Indonesian Republic read:

Whereas Independence is the natural right of every nation, colonialism must be abolished in this world because it is not in conformity with Humanity and Justice.

And the struggle of the movement for the independence of Indonesia has now reached the hour of rejoicing by leading the People of Indonesia safe and sound to the gateway of the Independence of an Indonesian State which is free, united, sovereign, just and prosperous.4

The country was not totally free from the Dutch colonial domination as the West Irian continued to remain under the control of the Netherlands and hence the fierce tirade of Indonesian leaders against colonialism. This was voiced vociferously at the historic Afro-Asian Conference organised by Indonesia in Bandung in 1955. Pouring his ire on colonialism and citing the example of his own country, Sukarno remarked in his inaugural address at the Bandung Conference:

For us, colonialism is not something far and distant. We have known it in all its ruthlessness. We have seen the immense human wastage it causes, the poverty it causes and the heritage it leaves behind when, eventually and reluctantly, it is driven out by the inevitable march of history. My people and the peoples of many nations of Asia and Africa know these things for we have experienced them.5

Sukarno had gone a step further to caution the Afro-Asian nations to beware of not only classical form of colonialism but also various other forms of colonialism. To quote him further:
I beg of you, do not think of colonialism only in the classic form which we of Indonesia, and our brothers in different parts of Asia and Africa, knew. Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. It is a skilful and determined enemy, and it appears in many guises. It does not give up its loot easily. Wherever, whenever and however it appears colonialism is an evil thing, and one which must be eradicated from the earth.  

Another important element of Indonesian foreign policy was the pursuit of non-alignment which the Indonesian leaders chose to call as "independent" and "active" foreign policy. "Independent" policy meant that Indonesia would not only keep itself divorced from the two power blocs but also abstain from courting military alliances. "Active" policy meant that Indonesia would not remain a passive spectator in international politics. On the other hand, as stated in the "Opening to the Constitution" of the Republic, Indonesia would "contribute in implementing an order in the world which is based upon independence, abiding peace and social justice...". Outlining the main characteristics of "independent" and "active" foreign policy Mohammad Hatta wrote in 1953:

The policy of the Republic of Indonesia is not one of neutrality because it is not constructed in reference to belligerent states but for the purpose of strengthening and upholding peace. Indonesia plays no favourites between the two opposed blocs and follows its own path through the various international problems. It terms this policy 'independent' and further characterizes it by describing it as 'independent' and 'active'. By active is meant the effort to work energetically for the preservation of peace and the relaxation of tension generated by the two blocs through endeavours supported if possible by the majority of the members of the United Nations...

The desire to put political relations with other nations on a footing of mutual respect, despite difference in the governmental structure and ideology, is a primary factor in this approach to international relations. Nations recently become (sic) independent are strongly influenced by national sentiment and feel the need to maintain their self-respect. The memory of the colonial status that bound them for centuries makes them resist anything they consider an attempt to
In shaping the "independent" and "active" foreign policy, the Indonesians were largely influenced by the attitude of superpowers during the Indonesian independence movement. In the period of pro-Soviet Amir Sjarifuddin's Prime Ministership (July 1947-January 1948), Moscow had extended full cooperation for the Indonesian freedom movement and treated it as a struggle against colonialism and imperialism. However, a change in Soviet attitude was noticed when Prime Minister Sjarifuddin was replaced in January 1948 by Mohammad Hatta, a liberal democrat. Following the suppression of Madiun communist revolt in September 1948 by the Indonesian Revolutionary government, Moscow began to pursue a hostile policy towards Jakarta. The Soviet involvement in the Madiun insurrection was perceived by the Indonesians as "a stab in the back" at the crucial stage of the revolution. Indonesian leaders were also unhappy with the US which did not render all out support to their freedom struggle for fear of offending the Dutch ally. On the other hand, the US supplied military assistance to the Netherlands during the two Police Actions against the Indonesian Revolutionary government. Prof. Kahin, who was in Indonesia during the freedom struggle, wrote:

Indonesians had been keenly disillusioned with both the United States and Soviet Russia during the course of their revolutionary struggle; the policies of both of these powers toward Indonesia during the critical years 1946-1949 appeared to them to be much more actuated by calculations of narrow self-interest than by the principle of self-determination for subject peoples.

The "independent" and "active" foreign policy of Indonesia was also dictated by the exigencies of its economy. Indonesia emerged as an independent country with its economy in a shambles. Describing the deplorable state of Indonesian economy Hatta wrote:

When the Kingdom of the Netherlands transferred sovereignty on 27 December 1949, the new regime inherited a devastated land.
Furthermore, it found itself with an empty treasury; the budget for 1950 envisaged a deficit of 1.5 billion guilders, approximately 17 percent of the total—a huge sum for a poor nation that had no facilities for raising capital within the country.¹³

Indonesian leaders also believed that their economy would not be reinforced without economic assistance from all the countries including those belonging to the communist bloc and capitalist bloc. Vice President Hatta, therefore, wrote in 1953:

Internal consolidation is the primary task. The government must show evidence of economic and social betterment if it is to offset the influence of agitation by radical circles. A foreign policy that aligned the country with either of the Great Powers would render this internal task infinitely more difficult.¹⁴

The "independent" and "active" foreign policy was also dictated by the internal political situation. Indonesia was a country with various political parties holding divergent views. Alignment with military blocs would undermine its harmonious political system needed for Indonesia to surmount its economic, social and administrative barriers.

Strictly adhering to "independent" and "active" foreign policy and maintaining equidistance from two power blocs and remaining a "friend of all and an enemy to none", Indonesia not only refused to join the American-sponsored Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO),¹⁵ chiefly designed to contain communist China, but also condemned it. The Indonesian leaders believed that by forming military alliances in Asia, western powers were imposing unwanted protection on countries of Asia. They were also convinced that their participation in military alliances would facilitate the interference of the big powers in their internal affairs and thus pose threat to the sovereignty of their newly independent countries. Making Indonesia's stand on SEATO explicit, Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo said:

The foreign policy of Indonesia is independent and active aiming at world peace. It was Indonesia's firm conviction that entering into the
In tune with the "independent" and "active" foreign policy, Indonesians strove to promote friendship and cooperation with all countries, particularly the neighbouring countries.

One of the most interesting developments of post-world war period has been the emergence of Asian and African countries as an important factor in world affairs. This new era was heralded by the first Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi in March-April 1947, in which thirty Asian countries including Indonesia participated. It was a watershed event in the history of Asian relations because for the first time Asian countries had come together to stress the need for 'Asian Unity'. The Indonesian leaders emphasised the need for mutual cooperation and friendly relations with each other to ensure peace, security and development. In the opening session of the Conference, Abu Hanifa, the leader of the thirty two member Indonesian delegation, said:

We Indonesians are a peace-loving people. We do love living in peace with other nations, who respect our right to be free and independent. And to build up our independent state we desire lasting peace and friendship especially with the countries surrounding us.\(^\text{17}\)

Further, at the closing plenary session, Soetan Sjahrir, the Prime Minister of provisional Indonesian government, pleaded the newly independent Asian states for preserving the spirit of 'Asian sentiment' and also to strive for the realisation of the vision of 'One Asia' and 'One World' and eventually "the dream of the oneness of mankind".\(^\text{18}\)

**Bandung Conference** Indonesia's major step for promoting international cooperation was by organising the Bandung Conference in 1955. Since most of the Afro-Asian countries were the victims of western colonialism, Indonesian leaders hoped to give boost to the Afro-Asian solidarity in the light of their common background. In view of the common colonial past and the common problems faced by the Afro-Asian states, the Indonesian leaders hoped that the Bandung Conference couched in the 'Bandung spirit', would
serve as a platform to discuss common problems and find solutions. In his opening address at the Bandung Conference, on April 18, 1955, Sukarno observed:

This Conference is not to oppose each other, it is a Conference of brotherhood...Rather it is a body of enlightened tolerant opinion which seeks to impress on the world that all men and all countries have their place under the sun-- to impress on the world that it is possible to live together, meet together, speak to each other, without losing one's individual identity; and yet to contribute to the general understanding of matters of common concern, and to develop a true consciousness of the interdependence of men and nations for their well-being and survival on earth. 19

By organising the Bandung Conference, Indonesia also hoped to muster the support of the Afro-Asian countries for its claim on West Irian. The Final Communique of the Conference stated:

The Asian-African Conference, in the context of its expressed attitude on the abolition of colonialism, supported the position of Indonesia in the case of West Irian based on the relevant agreements between Indonesia and Netherlands. 20

The Bandung meet also helped Indonesia to move closer to the communist bloc, particularly China. During the Conference, Indonesia signed an agreement with China on April 22, 1955, on 'dual citizenship'. 21 American hostile attitude towards the Bandung meet also induced Indonesia to develop cordiality with the communist countries. Further, while the communist bloc countries supported Indonesia's position on West Irian, the US was not forthcoming. 22 In an article contributed to an American journal, Mohammad Hatta wrote:

The United States stand on neutrality in the feud between Indonesia and the Netherlands over West Irian does, in fact, give support to the Dutch ... One can understand the difficulties raised for the United States by the Indonesia-Netherlands dispute, for it is a friend of both countries. But its so-called neutral attitude creates a tragedy for the United States too.
It wants to eradicate communism, but its policy merely helps it spread. ... The problem of colonialism cast its shadow upon the friendly relations between the western world ... and Indonesia ... (But) because Indonesia is fed up with the policies of the west, she will develop relations with the other nations of the East and will culturally enrich herself.  

Sukarno's fulminations against imperialism and strong "anti-colonial" policy took Indonesia closer to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The result of distinct tilt towards the communist bloc was that Indonesia gradually accommodated the non-aligned policy. Internally too, Sukarno's government relied increasingly on the support of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). By 1965, Sukarno was trumpeting to the world that an anti-imperialist axis, like the axis of "Djakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang", would marshal the 'emerging forces' of the new Afro-Asian nations.  

According to Sukarno's ideology, the world was divided into two blocs - Old Emerging Forces (OEFOS) representing the western bloc and New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) - representing Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Socialist countries and the progressive groups in the capitalist countries. He also interpreted the prevailing international tension as a conflict between the OEFOS and the NEFOS rather than a cold war rivalry between the super powers.  

Addressing the non-aligned states at Belgrade Conference in September 1961, Sukarno said:

Prevailing world opinion today would have us believe that the real source of international tension and strife is ideological conflict between the great powers. I think that is not true. There is a conflict which cuts deeper into the flesh of man and that is the conflict between the new emergent forces for freedom and justice and the old forces of domination, the one pushing its head relentlessly through the crust of the earth which has given it its lifeblood, the other striving desperately to retain all it can trying to hold back the course of history.  

Sukarno also criticised western aid holding that it only curbed the independence and freedom of the NEFOS. Deeply disenchanted with the US
policies and particularly the strings attached to its financial assistance, the infuriated Sukarno rebuffed: "Go to hell with your aid".  

**Confrontation with Malaysia**  
Malaysia was formed on September 16, 1963 when Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah joined Federation of Malaya. When the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tungku Abdul Rahman first proposed in 1961 the creation of Malaysia, Indonesia did not raise any objection. However, on the eve of the formation of Malaysia, Indonesia not only objected to the formation of Malaysia but also severed its diplomatic relations with it. It was against this background that Indonesia pursued the policy of 'confrontation' towards Malaysia. 'Confrontation' assumed the form of sending Indonesian "armed raiding parties into Malaysian territory; acts of sabotage; menacing behaviour of Indonesian aircraft and naval vessels; an embargo on Singapore's entrepot trade with Indonesia; diplomatic disparagement of Malaysia in Afro-Asian circles". Far from being interested in negotiations, President Sukarno declared that "crush Malaysia" was Indonesia's chief aim. As the Indonesian Herald, which generally represented Foreign Ministry's viewpoint, had pointed out, Indonesia "feared that the enlarged Malaysia would compete with her for the leadership of South-East Asia". Further, in the light of the revolt staged in Sumatra in 1958 against the Indonesian government, Jakarta feared that Sumatra Island being rich in resources, might break away to join Malaysia.  

Indonesian opposition to the formation of Malaysia became intensified particularly after West Irian was incorporated into Indonesia following the Dutch withdrawal in 1963. Sukarno contended that colonial territories would attain true independence only by snapping economic, defence as well as political ties with former colonial rulers.  

The Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) concluded by the governments of the United Kingdom and the Federation of Malaya in October 1957, made a provision for the former to assist the latter in matters of the "external defence of its territory". In 1959, with the joining of Australia and New Zealand, AMDA became Four-Power Defence Agreement (FPDA). The hostile attitude of Indonesia towards Malaysian scheme reached its feverish pitch following the conclusion of the agreement of July 1963 between the UK and the Federation of Malaya when all the territories of future Malaysia were brought under the purview of the defence agreement.
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Indonesia's staunch opposition to this defence agreement was clearly brought out in a note issued by the Indonesian embassy in London in February 1964. To quote the note:

Decades of bitter experiences of the Indonesian people in their struggle against colonialism and imperialism have imparted to them a mental alertness and a sharper insight into the subtleties of colonial politics, just enough to discern the implied meaning of such an imposed change in the status of those British colonial territories.

It is, therefore, only understandable that Indonesia could not remain passive towards such developments in that area, because of its physical and geographical proximity. It became more and more keenly interested in what the British government was planning and doing in those British colonial territories which are geographically linked with Indonesia.33

China's clear and unconditional support to Sukarno inspired him to become adventurous. Ill-conceived and hasty policies of Sukarno besides weakening the country internally, did significant damage to the image of Indonesia on the world stage as a non-aligned country. In late 1964, UN Security Council passed a resolution 'deploring' the infiltration of the Indonesian armed 'volunteers' into Southern Malaysia and called on both the sides to refrain from all threat or use of force and "to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of each other".34 Indonesia withdrew from the UN in January 1965, when Malaysia was elected to the non-permanent seat in the Security Council. In a letter to the UN Secretary-General, Jakarta justified its action in terms of a response to "another absurd colonial manoeuvre".35

Fall of Sukarno By 1965, Indonesia's fascination for China-oriented foreign policies manifested itself in an increasingly anti-US posture in Indonesia's foreign policy.36 Sukarno's militant anti-colonial policy and alignment with China were in complete violation of officially declared "independent" and "active" policy. However, the volte-face in Indonesian policy came to be noticed following the failure of the coup of October 1965, launched by the PKI.37 The attempted coup not only bespoke of Sukarno's debacle as a nation-builder but also diminished Indonesia's international prestige. It also
eventually led to the downfall of Sukarno and the rise of the army to power under the leadership of General Suharto, the senior most military leader.

Suharto's "New Order" government reversed the policies of his predecessor. First of all, the new government gave up the militant foreign policy of Sukarno and abandoned confrontation with Malaysia following the talks sponsored by Thailand in Bangkok in June 1966 between Malaysia and Indonesia and also applied for Indonesia's readmission into the United Nations. Second, the relations between Jakarta and the communist bloc began deteriorating only to culminate in Jakarta's snapping of its diplomatic relations with Beijing on October 9, 1967. Third, it also pursued an active and assertive role in international affairs within the framework of its official independent foreign policy. Hence, the Suharto regime decided to reaccept not only the conventions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) but also the aid from Japan, Western European countries and the United States. Moreover, Sukarno's strategy of intimidating neighbours through a "Jakarta-Peking axis" was replaced by "good neighbour" policy. Accordingly, Suharto government started strengthening the bonds of unity and cooperation among the Southeast Asian countries, believing that it would not only forewarn China against aggression but also keep the Southeast Asian countries in a good stead even if China chose to toe the path of aggression and expansion. In other words, Suharto government's implicit message to other Southeast Asian countries was "United we stand, divided we fall". Nonetheless, the end of 'confrontation' with Malaysia became indispensable as an important precursor to the formation of wider regional organisation in Southeast Asia.

Role of Indonesia in Promoting Regional Cooperation

Any discussion of the growth of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia begins with the formation of Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961 comprising Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand and this was a "moderate" attempt at promoting regional "integration" in Southeast Asia. Indonesia did not join ASA perceiving that it was "nothing more than a colonial tool and an extension of SEATO". Joining ASA was regarded as a "deliberate violation" of the "independent" and "active" foreign policy of Indonesia. Though ASA accomplished little particularly because of the dispute between
Malaya and the Philippines over the issue of Sabah, "it provided a working model for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)" founded six years later. The next regional organisation to be formed was Maphilindo. The proposal came from President Sukarno prior to the 'Confrontation' against the formation of Malaysia. Maphilindo was founded in August 1963 by Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines which were "bound together by close historical ties of race and culture". The chief objective of Maphilindo was "to intensify the joint and individual efforts of their countries to secure lasting peace, progress and prosperity for themselves and their neighbours in a world dedicated to freedom and justice". Though founded with lofty ideals, ASA went into oblivion because of Indonesia's 'Confrontation' that led to Malaysia's exit. On the other hand, Maphilindo founded later, gained importance because this was the first time Indonesia associated itself with a Southeast Asian regional organisation which "provided an impetus to Indonesia's later participation in ASEAN".

As the Suharto government evinced interest in the promotion of regional cooperation, Thailand invited Indonesia to join ASA for purposes of effecting the revival of interest in it which was also the concern of Malaysia and the Philippines. But Jakarta did not respond favourably to the invitation. Chaidir Anwar Sani pointed out that Indonesia being the largest and most populous country in Southeast Asia, was averse to becoming a junior member of the association. Jakarta on the other hand, evinced interest in creating a new regional organisation by associating with it the non-aligned Southeast Asian states - Burma and Cambodia - and Singapore, predominantly populated by the Chinese. Determined to give a concrete shape to its move for a new regional organisation, Indonesia proposed the creation of Southeast Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SEAARC) by borrowing "the ideas enshrined in both ASA and Maphilindo".

There were reasons for Indonesia to come out with this concrete proposal for the establishment of an alliance "bigger than Maphilindo and larger than ASA". Indonesia was guided more by "the need for economic strength of Southeast Asian nations for prosperity than political or military pursuits". As Professor Suryanarayan pointed out, "security concerns were dominant in the formation of ASEAN; but from an Indonesian perspective,
ASEAN was never intended to be a military alliance in the formal sense".\textsuperscript{53} Emphasising the point that the development of "national resilience"(ketahanan nasional) and "mutually beneficial cooperation among the nations of the region" was the best way of promoting the security, Foreign Minister Adam Malik, who was instrumental in drafting SEAARC proposal, said:

Indonesia...aspires to see Southeast Asia develop as rapidly as possible into an area of indigenous stability and security, capable of withstanding any negative influences from outside. This is only possible if the nations of Southeast Asia can, jointly and separately, develop the ideological, socio-economic, political and military strengths, which together constitute a nation's real capacity or endurance to resist, or as President Suharto has termed it, the ketahanan nasional of a country or a region.\textsuperscript{54}

Second, Indonesia was also averse to the continuation of western influence in Southeast Asia, especially in military affairs. Indonesia felt that instead of relying on extra-regional powers like the US, the UK, Australia and New Zealand for preservation of peace in Southeast Asia, Southeast Asian states by themselves could ensure regional peace and in this respect Indonesia was prepared to lead without feeling guilty of imposing "hegemonism".

In order to sell its SEAARC idea, Indonesia geared up its diplomatic machinery. Except Burma and Cambodia, all other Southeast Asian countries like Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore responded positively. The only modification made in SEAARC proposal was the change of nomenclature of the new organisation. Finally, the Bangkok Declaration of 1967 gave birth to a new regional association called ASEAN, whose aims and purposes were patterned on its "two direct antecedents".\textsuperscript{55} Stressing that the ASEAN was exclusively "an Association for Regional Cooperation", the Bangkok Declaration stated that the chief objective of the Association was to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian Nations.\textsuperscript{56}
Indonesia had every reason to feel proud of the central role it played in the formation of ASEAN based on its draft proposal and hence, Suharto's legitimate claim in the People's Consultative Assembly in March 1968 that ASEAN had been formed on the Indonesian initiative. The fact that ASA and Maphilindo did not survive and that ASEAN emerged as an effective organisation clearly indicated that any regional organisation in Southeast Asia would not succeed without Indonesia's membership or wholehearted support. No wonder, at their first ever summit meeting in Bali on February 24, 1976, Heads of ASEAN states decided to establish a permanent ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta with General Hartono Rekso Dharsono, an Indonesian, as its first Secretary-General.

Indonesia was not content with the establishment of ASEAN with five Southeast Asian countries -- Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia. It hoped to rope in the three Indochina countries as well. Jakarta, therefore, intensified its efforts in this direction following the establishment of communist governments in the Indochina states in 1975. Indonesia which was the first ASEAN state to recognise the communist government in Vietnam, initiated steps undoubtedly with the support of its ASEAN colleagues, to integrate the Indochina states with ASEAN. Reasons for this are not far to seek. First, Indonesia believed that ideological differences should not be a barrier for promoting regional peace, friendship and cooperation. Second, confrontation between communist and non-communist states in the region could be avoided. Third, it would not allow room for outside powers' involvement in the region. Fourth, by making ASEAN broad based, "a strong and viable community of nations" could be established.

Despite the fact that on the eve of the ASEAN summit at Bali Vietnam denounced ASEAN as a stooge "to rally all pro-American reactionary forces to oppose the revolutionary movement in Southeast Asia", Heads of ASEAN states issued a joint press communiqué on February 24, 1976, in which they expressed "their readiness to develop fruitful relations and mutually beneficial co-operation with other countries in the region". Vietnam's negative response because of its mistrust of ASEAN, did not dampen the enthusiasm of Jakarta as it continued its efforts for peaceful
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co-existence between communist and non-communist groups in the region. On March 11, 1978, President Suharto told People’s Consultative Assembly:

We are glad to welcome the end of this (Indochina) war. We will always respect the wishes of the peoples in that area to determine their future according to their own ideals and in their own ways ... As far as we are concerned, there is not the least obstacle whatsoever for friendship and co-operation with other nations that follow to social or political system different from ours. This is one of the reflections of the implementation of an active and independent foreign policy.63

Indonesia’s efforts did not go unrewarded. Even though Vietnam did not join ASEAN, Hanoi reciprocated ASEAN overtures by deputing its diplomatic and trade delegations to the five ASEAN capitals in September 1978. Particular mention may be made here of the Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong’s goodwill mission to Southeast Asia in September-October 1978. During his visit, Dong told ASEAN leaders that Vietnam truly respected the independence, unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their states. Prime Minister Dong also categorically stated that Vietnam would not support subversive groups in the ASEAN countries either overtly or otherwise.64 This helped dispel ASEAN states’ mistrust of Vietnam to a large extent. It was unfortunate that this congenial atmosphere gave place to a hostile atmosphere between the communist and non-communist states of Southeast Asia within a month as a result of the conclusion of Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the SRV and the Soviet Union in November 1978 and Vietnamese military intervention in Kampuchea in December 1978.

Genesis of the Kampuchean Problem

Kampuchea,65 although a small country, is reckoned as a prominent one among Southeast Asian countries on account of its geographical location and rich cultural heritage. Kampuchea, was well-known as a ‘peaceful’ and ‘gentle’ country. Even though archaeologists have claimed that Cambodia had human habitation for at least 40,000 years, its recorded history started in the early years of the present era only when an Indianised kingdom called Funan was founded.66 Located in the southern part of Southeast Asia, Cambodia has an
area of about 181,000 sq. km. and an estimated population of 9.7 million with Khmers forming a major ethnic group. It shares border with Vietnam on the east and southeast, Laos on northeast and the Gulf of Thailand on the west and southwest.

The geographical extent of present Cambodia is much smaller compared to that during the heydays of Angkor period. This was largely due to the invasions during 19th century by its powerful neighbours, Vietnam and Thailand, which annexed a large part of its territory "either as compensation for the aid requested by Cambodia or as a prize of war". Had these periodical invasions been allowed to continue, Cambodia would have undergone the process of inevitable extinction which, thanks to the French colonial rule, was ultimately averted. Thus, the colonial rule turned out to be a blessing in disguise, for Cambodia.

Cambodia which was colonised by the French in 1863, remained a "protectorate" till 1945. On January 7, 1946, King Sihanouk signed a modus vivendi with France which provided an autonomous state for Cambodia within the French Union. Although the sovereignty of Cambodia was proclaimed by the French at the end of 1953, it was not deemed legal because Cambodia was still under the control of the French authorities. The real international recognition of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cambodia was secured only at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina. Prince Norodom Sihanouk became king of Cambodia in 1941, when France "by-passed the direct royal line in the hope of placing on the throne a compliant monarch". Ironically enough, the same Prince Sihanouk spearheaded the independence movement against France to a successful end. However, he abdicated the throne in favour of his father, Prince Norodom Suramarit, a few months before the first general elections were held in 1955. The reason given by Prince Sihanouk himself for his abdication was that he was fired by a zeal for interaction with his people and it was hard to realise this, by sitting on the throne "because of the traditional distance between the king and his subjects". Prince Sihanouk sincerely wished to establish a "true socialist egalitarian democracy". He founded Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Popular Socialist Community), a new political movement and also participated in the first general elections held on September 2, 1955 and bagged all the 91 seats in the National Assembly. Before he was dethroned as a result of the
Coup d'état in 1970, Prince Sihanouk took part in three general elections held in 1958, 1962 and 1968 and achieved landslide victory in all these elections thus proving that he was the only leader most popular in Cambodia. During his fifteen years rule, Prince Sihanouk pursued a policy of neutrality and refused to join either the capitalist bloc or the communist bloc. Prince Sihanouk felt that, situated strategically south of China and between Thailand and Vietnam, the two avariciously aggressive neighbours, Cambodia had no other option except to pursue the policy of neutrality. Emphasising that the policy of neutrality was guided by geopolitical exigencies, Prince Sihanouk affirmed:

Our neutrality has been imposed on us by necessity. A glance at a map of our part of the world will show that we are wedged in between two medium-sized nations of the Western bloc and only thinly screened by Laos from the scrutiny of two countries of the Eastern bloc, North Vietnam and the vast People's Republic of China. What choice have we but to try to maintain an equal balance between the "blocs".

Again, addressing the 15th session of the UN General Assembly on September 29, 1960, Prince Sihanouk observed:

Cambodia knows and applies only one neutrality, and the whole Cambodian people wish the great powers to recognize once and for all, not only in their words but in their deeds, this neutrality which is the only guarantee of our survival as an independent and free nation.

Adhering to the policy of neutrality, Prince Sihanouk refused to offer military bases in Cambodia. He also refused to join military alliances particularly SEATO which was seen by the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles as "the critical chain that would contain China". Prince Sihanouk asserted that joining SEATO would mean providing communists an excuse to interfere in the affairs of Cambodia. On the other hand, Prince Sihanouk seemed to have felt that the keen rivalry between the two blocs could be exploited to the advantage of Cambodia. He also believed that friendly relations with communist China would help him to keep Thailand and South Vietnam at bay and "would also encourage restraint on the part of the North Vietnamese
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government and the Cambodian left-wing". At the same time, he believed that any association with America, while ensuring economic assistance, would also keep internal communists under control.

The pursuit of the policy of neutrality became more and more difficult with the growth of American military engagement in Vietnam. William Shawcross hence wrote:

It was to be the expansion of the United States involvement in the region that precipitated Sihanouk's disappearance. If Sihanouk had been walking a tightrope, then as the interests of the superpowers and the tensions within Vietnam grew, the pole of studied neutralism with which he tried to balance himself and his country shortened; his step, as a result, became less and less steady.

Taking advantage of the American disenchantment with the policies of Prince Sihanouk, Marshal Lon Nol engineered a bloodless coup on March 18, 1970 and deposed Prince Sihanouk who was in Paris then to undergo medical treatment. The Lon Nol regime collaborated with South Vietnam and the US to check the activities of the Viet Cong in the Cambodian territory. Consequently, Cambodia was subjected to heavy bombing till August 15, 1973, when the US Congress decided to stop the US bombing of Cambodia. In 1971 alone, the single B-52 squadron dropped half the tonnage of what was dropped by the US planes in the entire Pacific Theatre during the Second World War. In spite of the large scale economic and military assistance from the United States, Lon Nol regime could not control the internal situation which got aggravated, following the suspension of the American assistance to Phnom Penh after the conclusion of the Paris Peace Accords between the United States and the SRV in January 1973.

Taking advantage of the adversities of Lon Nol, his adversaries - the Khmer Rouge and the Royal Government of National Union (GRUNK), an exile government founded by Prince Sihanouk in Peking on May 5, 1970 with himself as "head-of-state" - launched an armed struggle. The curtain was finally drawn on Lon Nol government on April 17, 1975 when the Khmer Rouge forces triumphantly marched into Phnom Penh and established a new regime called Democratic Kampuchea (DK). Though Prince Sihanouk was made the life-time "chief-of-state", the Khmer Rouge restricted his activities
to the palace in which he was staying and the "real power" rested in the hands of the Khmer Rouge leadership. In April 1976, Prince Sihanouk was replaced by Khieu Samphan who remained a titular head because of the dominant role played by Pol Pot.

Drawing inspiration from Maoist ideas of revolution, the Khmer Rouge leadership embarked on an extremely radical programme. The first thing that the Khmer Rouge did immediately after capturing power was "the instant evacuation of Phnom Penh and other towns". As Pol Pot himself declared, evacuation was one of the important factors "in safeguarding the fruits of the revolution". The urban population encompassing civil servants, teachers, doctors, nurses, monks and various other skilled persons, thus moved to the countryside and was forced to work in "agriculture communes" or "rural communes". Consequently, schools, factories, shops, and hospitals were closed. Drugs were not available while 80% of the people were suffering from Malaria. Ambitious irrigation programmes were taken up without proper planning, personnel and funds. Khmer Rouge government had no answer to the acute food shortages. Cambodia was taken to the "brink of starvation". Social life was disrupted. Suffice to say that "men and women lived apart". During the 1300 day rule of Pol Pot, Cambodia was cut off from the outside world. The only country with which Cambodia had connection was China. The result was, the outside world was ignorant of the goings-on in Cambodia. The only source of information was that of the Cambodians who escaped to Thailand and Vietnam. Giving a graphic account of the barbarous rule and genocidal policies of "Pol Pot and Co.", Haing S. Ngor, one of the survivors of the Red Khmers genocide rule, observed in his book:

The Khmer Rouge wanted a complete change of society, from top to bottom ... The families were broken up, the children and the elderly sent off to live in their own groups. There were no more cities. No more markets, stores, restaurants or cafes.... No schools. No books or magazines. No money...just the sun that rose and set, the stars at night and the rain that fell from the sky. And work. Everything was work in the empty, primitive countryside.
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*Spirit of Survival*, another comprehensive work on the radical experiments of Pol Pot to undermine the "social structure" of Cambodia, recorded:

The Khmer Rouge had nearly perfected a particular form of social reconstruction-auto-genocide-defined as the murder of more than one quarter of a nation's population by its brothers. Mass graves were later found outside almost every village. In one just Phnom Penh, a total of 8,895 victims had been blindfolded, their necks broken with iron hoes, and their bodies dropped into pits. Ammunition was saved for use against the Vietnamese. Moreover, the Khmer Rouge were instructed that the people they annihilated were not worthy of the cost required to kill them by a round of bullets.91

The cherished ambition of the Khmer Rouge leadership was to recapture "Khmer Krome"92 which was formerly part of the Khmer empire and which over the past two or three centuries, had been infiltrated and occupied by the Vietnamese forces and settlers.93 The Khmer Rouge was encouraged to become more adventurous as a result of the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations. Describing the SRV as the "eternal enemy" and the "enemy No.1 of Kampuchea", the DK government intensified its attacks against the border provinces of Vietnam from April 1977 with a view to bringing pressure on the Vietnamese to vacate the disputed territory.94 Extending full support to Kampuchea's military provocations against Vietnam, China dispatched several thousands of Chinese military personnel and technicians to Cambodia. The invading Khmer soldiers committed "crimes of unheard savagery" against the Vietnamese in the border area. As a result, a large number of Vietnamese fled from border provinces to the interior parts of Vietnam for safety. Vietnamese economy which was already in a deplorable state due to decades of war and the infiltration of several thousands of Cambodian refugees, became still worse as a result of large-scale movement of Vietnamese from border provinces into the interior.95 In spite of the Vietnamese repeated calls for a negotiated settlement, the DK intensified its military forays and denigrating campaigns against Vietnam.96 In the developing situation, the SRV was "forced to take up arms for self defence".97 The Vietnamese People's Army (VPA) which began its limited counter attacks in April 1977, found itself engaged in large scale military operations in November 1977 in order to drive the DK troops out of Vietnam.98
Within Cambodia itself, opposition to Pol Pot's barbarous rule started since its very inception in April 1975. It sustained despite the severe measures taken by the Democratic Kampuchea. In order to stamp out the dissidence, "Pol Pot clique" carried out purges among the Khmer Rouges accusing them of being "agents of the CIA, the KGB, or the Vietnamese". Senior communist leaders including Chea Sim, a former member of the Khmer Rouge People's Representative Assembly and Heng Samrin, a former Khmer Rouge Forth Division Commander in the Eastern Zone of DK, fled to Vietnam for safety. Several other young leaders of the Khmer Rouge army also took shelter in Vietnam to avoid purges. Also, various other Cambodian groups in Vietnam were scheming against Pol Pot. On November 11, 1978, Heng Samrin appealed to his fellow countrymen to overthrow the "Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique of traitors and their gang". Taking advantage of the eruption of Vietnam - Kampuchea border war, all these forces opposing the Khmer Rouge rule, banded together and moved into the Cambodian territory and liberated border areas under the leadership of Heng Samrin. They formed KUFNS (Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation) on December 2, 1978, with the sole aim of ending Pol Pot's rule. In order to bring the armed struggle to a successful end, a Central Committee was formed with 14 members representing the peasants, workers, intellectuals, youth, petty bourgeois, Buddhist clergy, minorities and women. As Prof. SarDesai pointed out, KUFNS "was clearly a Vietnamese smoke screen created on the eve of their invasion to legitimise it in world opinion". In any case, the supporters of KUFNS backed up by about 100,000 Vietnamese forces, launched their military campaign on the Christmas day of 1978 against the forces of Pol Pot. The DK army was hardly in a position to offer any serious resistance. Pol Pot and his men fled to Thai-Cambodian borders to launch a guerrilla war. Phnom Penh fell to the invaders on January 7, 1979, following which, a new government was formed under the leadership of Heng Samrin, the very next day. The pro-Vietnamese government thus established in Phnom Penh, was called People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).

Reaction to Vietnamese Military Intervention in Kampuchea

The international community was divided on the issue of overthrowing the DK government with Vietnamese support. While the ASEAN countries and
their allies – the PRC and the United States – condemned the Vietnamese military intervention in Kampuchea as a gross violation of International Law, the principles of Non-alignment and the Charter of the United Nations, the Socialist bloc countries and their supporters described the liberation of Kampuchea from the "Pol Pot clique" as an act of humanitarian considerations.

**Reaction of ASEAN States** The installation of pro-Vietnamese PRK government under the leadership of Heng Samrin, enraged the countries of ASEAN. ASEAN states felt that the Vietnamese military intervention in Kampuchea had altered "power balance" in Southeast Asia. ASEAN also saw in the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, the loss of a "buffer-state" between communist Vietnam and Thailand. As a result, Thailand, the front-line state of ASEAN, had to face immediate security problems from Vietnam-dominated Kampuchea. ASEAN countries were also unhappy because Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia took place at a time when they were endeavouring to turn Southeast Asia into a "zone of peace". In a hurriedly arranged "special meeting" in Bangkok on January 12-13, 1979, ASEAN Foreign Ministers issued a Joint Statement in which they deplored "the armed intervention against the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Kampuchea" and called for "immediate and total withdrawal of the foreign forces from the Kampuchean territory". They also "strongly urged" the UN Security Council "to take necessary and appropriate measures to restore peace, security and stability in the area".

Though ASEAN countries maintained "consensus" in urging the SRV to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea, they did not respond uniformly to Vietnam's military intervention in Kampuchea. Thailand, which shares border with Kampuchea, expressed a sense of "grave concern" over the developments in the Indochina region. Addressing ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on June 28, 1979, Thai Foreign Minister Upadit Pachariyangkun said that the armed intervention of Vietnam "suddenly shattered" all hope and expectation of starting a new era of "constructive and peaceful coexistence" among the peoples of the Southeast Asian region. He added:

> There was concern that the conflict would result in a spill over of fighting into Thailand which could lead then to a larger conflagration.
involving the rest of Southeast Asia and the major powers outside of the region.\textsuperscript{107}

Singapore, the hardliner among the ASEAN states, castigated Vietnam. Singapore Foreign Minister, S. Rajaratnam, told the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting on June 28, 1979:

The Vietnamese fish moves in Kampuchea not through water but on Russian tanks. The Vietnamese are now encountering not Pol Pot but Kampuchean patriotism. The Vietnamese have found their Vietnam in Kampuchea.\textsuperscript{108}

Expressing solidarity with the directly affected Thailand, Rajaratnam said shortly after the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting: "Where we feel another member country is in trouble, we have to speak out and sometimes it is easier to speak louder when you are far away from the antagonists because their arms do not reach that far. Those who are closer may have to speak softly".\textsuperscript{109}

Malaysia also expressed its anguish. In a statement, Mahathir Mohammad, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, said: "What is happening now in Indochina region is unfortunate and will not be conducive to the establishment of peace and stability in the region, which we all desire".\textsuperscript{110}

The Philippines also reacted sharply. Addressing the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on June 30, 1979, Carlos P. Romulo, the Foreign Minister of the Philippines, said:

The Philippines cannot remain indifferent to the development in Indochina. A threat to the peace of a member country is a threat to the peace of the whole region. We, therefore, support measures to invite the attention of the international community to the grave threat posed by the present situation in Indochina, in particular the border areas of Thailand and Kampuchea.\textsuperscript{111}

Reacting to the Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea, Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, issued a statement as Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, on January 9, 1979, in which he "deeply" deplored "the escalation and enlargement of the conflict between two states in Indochina". The statement also expressed "grave concern" over the
Implications and impact of this development on the peace, security and stability in Southeast Asia. But in the capacity of an individual country, Indonesia was not harsh. Trying "to de-emphasise the significance" of the Kampuchean situation, Mochtar remarked at the Halim Airport, Jakarta, soon after his arrival from the "Special Meeting" in Bangkok, that "to get together soon without condemning what had happened in Kampuchea is very important". Reacting to Singapore Foreign Minister's accusation that Vietnam was seeking hegemony in Southeast Asia, Mochtar noted that the fall of Phnom Penh "does not mean the establishment of the Indochinese Federation, because for that it should be clear who the members and what its aims are".

The allies of the ASEAN countries - the PRC and the US - condemned Vietnamese action in Kampuchea. The PRC, the chief supporter of the Pol Pot regime, reacted violently. In a statement which was submitted to the UN Security Council on January 7, 1979, the PRC denounced the SRV for "towering crimes" and for "acting as a surrogate for the Soviet Union in its expanded strategic plan". The PRC also charged that Hanoi was trying to annex Cambodia in order to establish "an Indochina Federation under its control". The US, as was to be expected, accused its erstwhile enemy the SRV, of invading Kampuchea and called for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. The US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, told a press conference on January 12, 1979: "We have made it very clear that the invasion of Cambodia threatens regional peace and stability and violates the fundamental principle of the integrity of international boundaries". Vance also stated:

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\text{we have repeatedly stated our support for stable system of independent states in Southeast Asia; and we believe that this system includes an independent Cambodia, despite the strength of our concern over the human rights situation in that country. We believe that all countries, interested in peace, stability and independence should make clear their opposition to this invasion which has taken place, work towards withdrawal of the invading foreign forces from the country, and to act to ensure the integrity of all states in the area.}\]

Unlike the PRC and the US, the Soviet Union felt that "a reactionary, dictatorial clique" of Pol Pot was itself responsible for the change of
government in Phnom Penh and dismissed the "charge of aggression". The Soviet News Agency, *Tass* commented: "All progressive mankind welcomes the nation which has risen in the struggle for national salvation. The birth of a free and independent Kampuchea will be an important factor for peace and stability in Southeast Asia". In a congratulatory message to the PRK regime, Leonid Brezhnev, President of the Soviet Union, affirmed that Moscow recognised the Revolutionary Council as the sole legitimate government in Kampuchea and also said that the new government was "backed by the broadest strata of the population". Shrugging off the accusations of the adversaries of Hanoi, Pham van Dong, the Prime Minister of the SRV, hailed the victory of the Kampuchean revolution as "a victory of the indomitable struggle of a people ... for independence and national sovereignty" and "a victory of the traditional friendship and militant solidarity between the peoples of Vietnam and Kampuchea".

*World Press Reaction to the SRV's Intervention in Kampuchea*

While reacting to the developments in Kampuchea, world press by and large condemned Vietnam's intervention in Kampuchea. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, a well informed Indochina watcher from Hong Kong, observed:

In what must be one of history's greatest ironies, the Vietnamese, whose guerrilla forces so recently fought the heavily-armed Americans to a bloody defeat, now find their heavily-armoured columns bogged down on the roads of Kampuchea. They evidently failed to learn the very lesson they taught the Americans -- that weapons and armour count for little in a war against rural guerrillas in an unfriendly environment.

A few weeks after their virtually unopposed drive into Phnom Penh the Vietnamese appear to have achieved little more than, literally, a hollow victory.

*The Sing Sian Yit Pao*, a Thai publication, warned the Southeast Asian countries thus: "The Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea was planned by the expansionists behind the scenes. It is not only aimed at conquering Khmer but controlling the whole Southeast Asia." *The Bangkok Post*, a leading Thai daily in English, said in an editorial: "The capture of Phnom
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Penh by Vietnamese-supported rebels should make it clear to any who thought otherwise that Vietnam in fact is an aggressive and imperialistic power".\textsuperscript{125} \textit{The Straits Times}, an English daily from Singapore, editorially commented: "This intervention of Vietnam, after oft-repeated professions of peaceful intentions, must earn for Hanoi the everlasting distrust of non-communist nations in Southeast Asia".\textsuperscript{126}

Reflecting the reaction of the Western countries, \textit{The New York Times} mentioned in its editorial: "What is really shocking is the rapid transformation of Vietnamese as they engineered this invasion. Until recently, Hanoi claimed to embody the very spirit of 'national liberation'. Now it has thrown its considerable armed might behind the claim that it will decide who rules Cambodia".\textsuperscript{127} Australian press was still more caustic. \textit{Vanguard}, an Australian publication, observed:

> With the recent events in Kampuchea the fascist, imperialist nature of the Soviet Union and its Vietnamese puppets has been made clear.... Using the technique of the big lie perfected by Hitler, the Soviet Union spread lies and slander against Democratic Kampuchea in an attempt to isolate the Kampuchean revolution and prepare the way ideologically for its invasion through the Vietnamese puppet army. The Soviet Union plans to use Vietnam to Asia in the same way as it used the Cubans in Africa - turning African against African and Asian against Asian, thereby increasing Soviet hegemony.\textsuperscript{128}

It is interesting to note that the reaction of the Indonesian press was not uniform. Blaming Vietnam for its military intervention in Kampuchea, \textit{The Indonesia Times} wrote: "Only the ignorant believe Vietnam's assertion that the fighting inside Kampuchea, against the legal government, was started by the so-called national united front for national salvation".\textsuperscript{129} But \textit{The Indonesian Observer}, took a different view of the Kampuchean developments to condemn the PRC. While describing the fall of Phnom Penh as a contributing factor to the stability of the Southeast Asian region, \textit{The Indonesian Observer}, noted: "The development in Kampuchea may serve as a lesson for Peking and other big powers, that every effort to make a puppet from an independent country will meet with failure".\textsuperscript{130} \textit{The Indonesian
Observer, therefore, remained soft towards Vietnam and thus seemed to voice the official stand to Jakarta.

Notes

7. For "Constitution", n.4.
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15. The SEATO was signed by eight nations in Manila on September 8, 1954. However, only two of the members were from the region, namely the Philippines and Thailand. The mutual defence treaty's main objective was to prevent or counter any "communist aggression" to subvert the freedom or to destroy the sovereignty or territorial integrity of nations in the treaty area. See *Time*, September 20, 1954, pp. 35-36. For further details, see George Modelski (ed.), *SEATO: Six Studies*, (Canberra, 1962).


22. Holland was a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and for this reason the USA followed a 'neutral policy' towards the Indonesian-Dutch dispute.


30. *Ibid*.


32. For text of "Agreement on External Defence and Mutual Assistance between the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Federation of Malaya, October 1957", see Gullick, n.28, pp.98-101.


35. Leifer, n. 24, p. 103.


38. For a perceptive analysis of this theme, see Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesia Abandons Confrontation: An Inquiry into the Functions of Indonesian Foreign Policy*, (Ithaca, 1969).


44. Chang Li Choy, n. 41. Also see Anthony Smith, "Indonesia's Role in ASEAN: The End of Leadership", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 21, No. 2, August 1999, p. 240.


48. Sani served as assistant to the Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik and a member of the official delegation to Bangkok meet in August 1967 when ASEAN was formally inaugurated.

49. Anwar, n. 42, p. 50.


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56. For full text of the 'Bangkok Declaration', see ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Documents (Jakarta, 1978), pp.1-3. Also see ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN: The First 20 Years, (Jakarta, 1987), pp.52-53.

57. Leifer, n.24, p.122.


63. For full text of speech, see Republic of Indonesia, Address by the President of the Republic of Indonesia/Mandatory of the People's Consultative Assembly, (Jakarta, 1978).


65. "Kampuchea" derived from the traditional Khmer name for the country, "Kambuja", was first used in the 10th century. The Khmer country which was called the Kingdom of Cambodia until 1970 was rechristened as Khmer Republic in 1970. Again it was renamed as Democratic Kampuchea in 1975, the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) in 1979, and the State of Cambodia (SOC) in May 1989. Therefore, the author, while referring to the Khmer nation, called it Kampuchea and Cambodia interchangeably.


68. Asia 1996 Yearbook, p.228.


74. For full text of Prince Sihanouk's speech at the 15th session of the General Assembly of the UN on September 29, 1960, see Cambodia News, October 1960, pp.1-16.
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76. Leifer, n.70, p.73.


78. For critical analysis over US intervention in Cambodia, see Shawcross, n.75, p.63.


82. The term Khmer Rouge (Red Khmers) was first used by Prince Sihanouk in the 1960s and later by Western journalists to designate the extreme left-wing opponents of Sihanouk's rule. In the early 1980s it was occasionally used to describe hard-line supporters of Pol Pot. For a comprehensive account on the origin and growth of the Khmer Rouge, see Burchett, n.80, pp.47-78.

83. Shawcross, n.75, p.370.


88. Shawcross, n.75, p.376.


92. This fertile lower Mekong Delta region, which today comprises a large part of South Vietnam was until the mid-18th century an integral part of Cambodia. Majority of the Khmer population had settled in this area and for this reason Cambodian leaders referred to this area as a "Khmer Krom" or "Kampuchea Krom". See Smith, n.71, pp.153-55. Also see Milton Osborne, "Kampuchea and Vietnam: A Historical Perspective", *Pacific Community*, Vol.9, No.3, April 1978, pp.249-263.


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98. Burchett, n.80, p.148. Also see Nayan Chanda, "That's far enough, says Hanoi", FEER, August 19,1977, pp.11-12.


101. For a good account on the formation of KUFNS, see Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War after the War, (New York, 1986), pp.338-341.


111. For Statement of the Philippines Foreign Minister, see, Statements by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, n.107, pp.337-338.

112. For full text of the Statement made by the Indonesian Foreign Minister, see, ASEAN Documents, n.56, pp.146-147.


118. Third World Unity, No.14, February 1979, p.4.

119. Ibid.


129. *Ibid*, p.84.

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