Volume 26

HOW RUSSIA MAKES WAR
HOW RUSSIA MAKES WAR

Soviet Military Doctrine

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
Despite unimpressive performances in earlier struggles, the Red Army emerged from World War II the largest and in some respects the most powerful ground force in the world. The politico-military influence exerted by this army not only assured the communist domination of the Axis satellite states, but, even in the face of a temporary American monopoly of atomic weapons, gravely threatened the security of western Europe. It remains the principal menace to world peace. Yet so little is known about this military force that one author writing on the Red Army appropriately entitled his book *The Unknown Army*. The number of really useful books on the Red Army appearing in the English language can be listed on the fingers of one hand. Until Mr. Garthoff supplied the deficiency, there was not a single one available on Soviet military doctrine.

Military doctrine may be said to consist in the guiding policies, basic assumptions, fundamental principles, and methods of achieving a nation's political objectives by military means. Strategy and tactics, weapons systems, training and discipline all contribute—under the guiding influence of doctrine—to the attainment of the objectives sought. If the doctrine is sound and well calculated to serve the national interest in a given situation, the attainment of objectives will be accomplished in economical fashion. If not, false doctrine may lead to national disaster. The usefulness of Mr. Garthoff's soundly documented pioneer study to anyone trying to understand the requirements of western European and American security can hardly be overestimated.

In preideological days the study of military doctrine was a simpler matter than it is today. Since Soviet military doctrine is bound up with revolutionary and party origins, with the day-to-day matters of political control of the USSR and its satellites, and with the inevitable problem of world conquest, it is, as the reader of this volume will
soon discover, a complicated matter requiring frequent restatement in order to win full acceptance even among its own authors. Once accepted, however, doctrine takes on a special political "sacredness" which makes it hard to alter in any way.

It is precisely in the claim that its military doctrine is something unique and always "correct" that the Soviet Union lays itself open to the most dangerous errors in the future. It is also in this field that history presents the most embarrassing refutations of its theories. As in the case of "Führer worship" with the Nazis, the glorification of Stalin—or whoever may be the ruler of the Soviet Union in the future—is certain to present grave handicaps to the efficient functioning of the Red Army. This will be true simply because the military doctrine he has approved must always be "right." The corrective force of experience has been and will be slow to make itself felt in the military operations conducted by the Soviet Union, even in the face of threatening disaster.

This accounts in part for the narrow margin by which the Soviet Union escaped military defeat in the summer of 1941. Soviet military doctrine had not changed substantially in the period from 1939 to 1941; yet Stalin, in an expansive mood at Teheran, admitted that the Red Army was poorly organized and inefficient during the Finnish war (1939–1940) and had to be "reorganized." Despite this he said that the Red Army was unable to meet the Wehrmacht on equal terms in the summer of 1941. It had to be "reorganized" again in the midst of the German war before it became what Stalin called a "genuinely good army." The Russian people and the troops of the Red Army were heroic; this Stalin admitted. Soviet military doctrine was "correct"—it had to be. What, then, can explain the defeats and losses which almost destroyed the Soviet State in the summer of 1941? The answer may well be found in the frantic efforts made in the Soviet Union to glorify Stalin as a military leader and thus conceal his primary responsibility for the failures and losses of that year.

Military forces in action look and perform differently from the way they do in theory or on the parade ground. Thus, when Stendhal's youthful hero in La Chartreuse de Parme rushed toward Waterloo to see Napoleon's famous army, he found only a rabble of thieves and
cutthroats who promptly stole his horse. So it was with the Red Army in World War II. Despite all the precautions which the Soviets took to keep Allied observers away from the fighting front, a considerable number of Allied officers and large numbers of Germans saw the Red Army in action. What they saw did violence to many of the doctrines enshrined in Soviet military literature. As Lord Kitchener once said, "One makes war as one must—not as one would like to." The task of the student of military affairs is to determine how much of Soviet military doctrine is real and how much is political window dressing, or klyukva, a Russian word sometimes used to describe a certain type of amusingly inaccurate information.

Though change is slow, the rate at which it occurs in Soviet military doctrine is a matter of vital importance to all countries outside the iron curtain. If the Soviets maintain for a considerable period of time the doctrines described in this volume, the menace which the Red Army poses to the security of western Europe and the United States will remain at a certain degree of magnitude. If these doctrines should undergo radical change in the next decade, the danger might be of an entirely different character.

Up to the present, Soviet doctrine has tended to minimize the importance of strategic air operations. Does this attitude arise from poverty of equipment and lack of experience or from a fixed belief? History records one rather frightening example of an empire's imitating and then perfecting the war methods of another in order to destroy the country providing the model. Rome lost the command of the seas to Carthaginian galleys early in the Punic wars. By first copying these galleys and then perfecting boarding tactics, the Romans won back the command of the seas and prepared the way for the eventual destruction of Carthage. Fortunately for us the "new" Soviet history explains the downfall of Carthage in strictly Marxist terms!

Mr. Garthoff's achievement in sifting this considerable body of information concerning Soviet military doctrine from the numerous sources he consulted is a very real one. It proves once again that the great libraries of a nation are among the first sources of really useful military intelligence. The author can enjoy the satisfaction which
comes from having thrown a considerable amount of light on one
dark area of what Mr. Churchill, attempting to describe the Russian
problem, once called "an enigma wrapped in mystery."

H. A. DeWeerd
Chairman, Department of History
University of Missouri
Author's Note

This study is a contribution to the research program conducted for the United States Air Force by The RAND Corporation.

In the preparation of this study I have been fortunate in having the encouragement and criticisms of my colleagues on the staff of The RAND Corporation. I am particularly indebted to Nathan Leites, mentor in analyzing Bolshevism, and to Hans Speier and Bernard Brodie for their valuable suggestions on this study. For extensive editorial assistance I am very grateful to John Hogan.

To compensate for the fact that I am not a professional military man, a number of officers have carefully read the draft manuscript of this study and generously given advice on the basis of their professional knowledge. Other persons in government service have contributed valuable advice and assistance in the collection of materials.

This study is largely a revised and extended version of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Yale University, with permission of The RAND Corporation.

Responsibility for the study and its interpretations and conclusions must remain mine.

Raymond L. Garthoff

Washington, D.C.
To

My Wife and Inspiration

VERA ALEXANDROVNA
## Contents

**Preface**  
ix

**Author's Note**  
ix

**Introduction**  
1

**Part I**  
**Bases of Soviet Military Doctrine**

**Chapter**

1. Soviet Strategy, Military Doctrine, and "Cold War"  
   Politics and War  
   Soviet Strategy  
   Cold War  
   9

2. The Soviet Conception of Military Doctrine  
   The Formative Debates over Military Doctrine  
   "Stalinist" Military Science  
   Military Science and Art  
   The "Superiority" of Soviet Military Science  
   Soviet Principles of War  
   25

3. Fundamental Influences on Soviet Military Doctrine  
   Marxism-Leninism  
   The Imperial Heritage  
   Foreign Influences  
   Current Development of Soviet Military Doctrine  
   37

**Part II**  
**Soviet Principles of War**

**Chapter**

4. The Principle of the Offensive, and Defense  
   The Marxian Legacy  
   Offensive Primacy  
   The Offensive  
   The Relation of Forces: Determination of Offense or Defense  
   The Role and Nature of Defense  
   The Counteroffensive  
   65

67

68

72

73

80
## CONTENTS

5. The Principles of Maneuver and Initiative 83  
   The Civil War and Maneuver 83  
   Maneuver and Initiative 86  
   Mobility and Speed 89  
   Activity and Anti-Passivity 90  
   Positional Warfare 91  

6. Forms of Offensive Maneuver 97  
   The Frontal Blow and Breakthrough 100  
   The Salient Thrust 103  
   Double Envelopment and Encirclement 106  
   Attacks on the Flanks and Rear 117  
   Meeting Engagements 119  

7. The Principles of the Concentration and Economy of Force 121  
   Mass 121  
   Decisive Superiority 126  
   Determination of the Main Blow 130  
   Economy of Force 133  

8. The Principles of Momentum of Advance and of Consolidation 139  
   Momentum 139  
   Pursuit 142  
   Consolidation 146  

9. The Principle of Annihilation 149  
   The Military Aim of Annihilation 150  
   Annihilation in Detail 152  
   Annihilation by a "Series of Battles" 153  
   "To the Very End" 155  

10. Retreat 157  
    Retreat: An Adverse Relation of Forces 157  
    Retreat and Defense in Depth 160  
    Controls on Withdrawal 161  

11. Reserves 165  
    The Role of Strategic Reserves 166  
    Operational and Tactical Reserves 168  

12. The Principles of Unity and Combined Arms 171  
    Monolithic Compactness and Unity 171  
    The Fallacy of the Single Weapon 173  
    Combined Arms and Cooperation 177  
    Combined Troop Command 180
CONTENTS

13. Leadership, Planning, and Command
   Stalin: Man and Myth
   The High Command and Stavka
   The General Staff
   Leadership
   Orders and Regulations
   Field Command and Initiative
   Field Staffs
   Officer Status

   Qualities of the Soviet Soldier
   The Communist Theory of Morale
   Indoctrination
   Surveillance
   Discipline, Punishment, and Reward

15. Prediction, Intelligence, and Reconnaissance
   Prediction and Chance
   Intelligence and Espionage
   Reconnaissance and Combat Intelligence

16. Deception, Surprise, and Security
   Deception and Camouflage
   Surprise
   Security

17. Preparation, Training, and Improvisation
   Preparation
   Training
   Improvisation

18. The Importance of the Rear
   The Soviet Conception of the Rear
   The Operation of the Rear Services
   Logistics, Supply, and the Noncombat Services

PART III
SOVIET DOCTRINE ON THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL
EMPLOYMENT OF THE COMBAT ARMS

Chapter
19. Soviet Employment of Ground Forces
   Infantry
   Artillery
   Armored Forces
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers and Chemical Service</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>20. Soviet Employment of Airpower</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Army Air Force (VVS-SA)</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter Aviation of the VVS</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Aviation of the VVS</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing Aviation of the VVS</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-range Bombing (ADD)</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne Troops (VDV)</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense (PVO)</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Aviation Training</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>21. Soviet Employment of Sea Power and Amphibious Operations.</strong></td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Soviet Navy (VMF)</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Defense</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Fleets</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Naval Air Force (VVS-VMF)</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Operations</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>22. Special Combat Conditions</strong></td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forests and Swamps</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountains and Elevations</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steppes and Desert</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavily Populated Places</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers and Water Barriers</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter and Arctic Conditions</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>23. Soviet Employment of Partisan Forces</strong></td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Warfare in Soviet Strategy</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparations for Partisan Warfare in World War II</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Organization and Command Channels</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Tactics</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Effectiveness of Partisan Warfare</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**APPENDIX**

| I. The Organization of the Soviet Armed Forces                        | 411  |
| II. The Trial by Arms: June to December, 1941                          | 423  |

**GLOSSARY OF SPECIAL TERMS**

**FOOTNOTES**

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**

**INDEX**
Illustrations

1. Diagram of the Offensive in Soviet Doctrine 71
2. Diagram of Sustained Defense in Soviet Doctrine 78
3. The Stalingrad-Don Counteroffensive (November 19–December 30, 1942) 99
4. The Soviet Offensive on Orël (July 12–August 17, 1943) 102
5. The Soviet Winter Offensive of 1945 (December 16, 1944–February 15, 1945) 104
6. The Encirclement at Brody (July 16–22, 1944) 107
7. The Encirclement at Korsun-Shevchenkovsky (February 3–14, 1944) 112
8. Liquidation of the Encirclement at Stalingrad—I (Historical) 114
9. Liquidation of the Encirclement at Stalingrad—II (Instructional) 115
10. Diagram of the Concentration and Economy of Force in Soviet Doctrine 135
11. Pursuit and Encirclement at Lvov (July 20–27, 1944) 145
12. Planning Chart for an Offensive (Simplified) 179
13. The Soviet Far Eastern Campaign (August 9–23, 1945) 194
15. The Position of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Government Structure 417
16. The Ministry of War (VM) 418
17. The Chief Administration of the Army Air Force (VVS-SA) 419
18. The Ministry of the Navy (MVMF) 420
19. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) 421
20. The German Invasion and Advance (June–December, 1941) 427
The author wishes to thank the following for permission to quote from the books and articles listed:

*Aviation Week:*


*Doubleday & Company, Inc.:*

*Crusade in Europe,* by Dwight D. Eisenhower, copyright 1948.


*Duell, Sloan & Pearce, Inc.:*


*Russia's Fighting Forces,* by S. N. Kournakoff, copyright 1942.

*Harper & Brothers:*


*Thirteen Who Fled,* edited by Louis Fischer and Boris Yakovlev, copyright 1949.

*Henry Holt & Company, Inc.:*

*A Soldier's Story,* by Omar N. Bradley, copyright 1951.

*Houghton Mifflin Company:*


*The Hinge of Fate,* by Winston S. Churchill, copyright 1950.

*Hutchinson & Company, Ltd.:*

*Behind the Front Line,* by P. K. Ponomarenko, translated by A. Gritsuk, copyright 1945.

*The Defense of Leningrad,* by N. I. Tikhonov, copyright 1943.

*Our Partisan Course,* by S. A. Kovpak, copyright 1947.

*Partisans of the Kuban,* by P. K. Ignatov, copyright 1944.

*The Red Army,* by I. Fomichenko, copyright 1945.

*The Red Fleet in the Second World War,* by I. S. Isakov, copyright 1944.

*Stalingrad,* Anonymous, copyright 1943.

*Strategy and Tactics of the Soviet-German War,* by I. Korotkov, copyright 1942.

*We are Guerrillas,* Anonymous, (Soviet War News Books, No. 3), copyright 1942.

*Ives Washburn, Inc.:*

*Russian Cavalcade: A Military Record,* by Albert Parry, copyright 1944.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.:
The Year of Stalingrad, by Alexander Werth, copyright 1947.

J. B. Lippincott Company:
Hands Across the Caviar, by Charles W. Thayer, copyright 1952.

Alexei Markoff:

McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.:
The Operational Code of the Politburo, by Nathan Leites, copyright 1951.

Military Service Publishing Company:

William Morrow & Company, Inc.:

Pioneer Publishers:
The Revolution Betrayed, by Leon Trotsky, copyright 1937.

Princeton University Press:

Random House, Inc.:

Martin Secker & Warburg, Ltd.:
The Red Army, by Erich Wollenberg, copyright 1940.

Sidgwick & Jackson, Ltd.:

Sifton Praed:

Street & Smith Publications, Inc.:
"Air Power is Important, but . . .," by L. Zacharoff, Air Trails, January, 1943.

U. S. News & World Report:

Viking Press:
The Strange Alliance, by John Deane, copyright 1947.
INTRODUCTION

The intention of this study has been to construct the pattern of Soviet military doctrine and to offer certain interpretations of its basis. This means largely discovering and clarifying that which is taught, believed, and intended by the Soviets as the basis for their conduct of war and battle. At the same time, an endeavor has been made not merely to determine manifest Soviet doctrine, but also to formulate and to make explicit those tenets which are themselves not recognized by the Soviets as part of their formal doctrine, but which nonetheless actually play a substantial role in it.

No comprehensive study of "Western military doctrine" or of the military doctrines of other states exists to serve as a point of comparison and departure in preparing this study. Accordingly, it has been necessary to avoid the temptations and dangers of considering military ideas common to other armies as being peculiarly "Soviet." The author has been assisted in this by the comments of a number of USA and USAF regular officers and by a careful comparison of Soviet and U.S. Army manuals and regulations. References to these regulations are made where the comparison or contrast will assist the reader in perceiving distinctive Soviet ideas or nuances. Many of the points set forth apply to the military science of other nations; no attempt has been made to locate principles of exclusive relevance to Soviet doctrine. Yet the picture of Soviet military doctrine which emerges from this study includes significant differences in stress from what might have been expected in terms of knowledge of Western military science, or Marxism, or Russian military history. It is the total combination of principles (which in themselves may each be but variations of ideas held by other military thinkers or doctrines current or historical) which is distinctive. Similarly,
Marxism-Leninism, Imperial Russian doctrine, foreign influences, and the geographic-political basis of the power situation of the USSR all have contributed to the formation of Soviet military doctrine. The first chapter of this study deals with the fundamental problem of the relation of Soviet military and political doctrines and strategies. From this perspective, the present study is significant not only for its analysis of Soviet military doctrine per se, but also for the light it may shed upon Soviet modes of thought and upon the over-all behavior pattern of the Soviet elite.*

Primary among the many available Soviet sources which have been used are the Field Regulations and manuals of the armed forces, the relevant writings of political and military leaders, and the military press in general, all of which have been studied intensively. The Bibliography includes the more worth while of those works consulted. There is a common misconception that all Soviet writing is "merely propaganda" and hence is not capable of pointing to real effective doctrine. There is a certain foundation for this, in that the Soviet popular press is limited to a number of standard and repetitive themes often quite alien to fact and to practice. But it must be remembered that the military regulations, and the periodical and other military press, provide the bases for the education of Soviet officers and the guide for their conduct of war. A considerable amount of information, even candid admissions of shortcomings, can be found in them. It is not unusual for Soviet generals to contribute articles on tactics to the military journals. In fact, the journal Military Thought (which is restricted to field grade and general officers) includes the results of research at the Frunze General Staff College. Suggested innovations or changes in tactical doctrine are occasionally published (always with the express notation "presented

* The pioneer analysis of Soviet political doctrine by Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo, The RAND Series, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1951, provides a basis for a comparison with the conclusions of this study, a number of peculiarities in doctrine in each either corresponding or being identical.
by way of discussion”). The Bibliography to this study includes a brief note on all the Soviet military periodical publications.

Soviet statements concerning actual performance of the armed forces are presented not as statements of the record of Soviet military history, but rather as illustrations of points of doctrine. They may or may not be correct. Even when exaggerated, the exaggeration tends to reach toward the ideal and is hence useful as an indication of doctrine. Various non-Soviet, especially German, commentaries on the Soviet armed forces and their doctrine have also been consulted. None of them, however, survey or even summarize Soviet military doctrine, “formal” or actual.* In addition to these sources, the statements of former Soviet officers who have left the Soviet Union and have contributed their knowledge of Soviet military affairs (through articles published abroad and by personal interviews conducted by this author and his colleagues) have been cautiously used.

The presentation of Soviet military doctrine by current operative principles has been adopted as being a more meaningful and useful approach than a chronological historical development. The author has not attempted to write a study of the war experience of the Red Army, but reference is made to illustrations and evidence from the record of the recent war.

Part I of this study is concerned with the relation between Soviet military doctrine and Soviet political doctrine and strategy. The fundamental Bolshevik “combat image” of the world and political relations is discussed, and the chief basic assumptions of Bolshevism that provide the framework within which Soviet military thought is cast are evaluated.

Soviet concepts of military thought are also examined. In general, they correspond to those of the West, with two significant exceptions. First, the Soviets distinguish an “operating art,” between the tradi-

tional categories of strategy and tactics, which is considered to correspond to field military operations by an Army or Front (Army Group). Second, the Soviets do not formulate an explicit enumeration of principles of war (although there is a partially equivalent list of "permanently operating factors"). In fact, there is an implicit set of Soviet principles of war corresponding generally to those of the Western powers but exhibiting interesting peculiarities.

The background influences of Marxism, Imperial Russian doctrine, and foreign military authorities on the development of Soviet military doctrine are also reviewed. The chief conclusions of Part I are: (1) Marxism-Leninism exerted relatively little direct influence on Soviet military doctrine per se and there is no new "Stalinist military science." The chief direct influences are the attitudes toward morale and initiative and the institution of political commissars. (2) The influence of the Imperial Russian army and doctrine is very considerable. (3) Foreign military influences, notably the ideas of Clausewitz, have contributed to Soviet military doctrine.

Part II of the study represents a distillation and analysis of the current basic Soviet principles of war. The fifteen chapters of this Part analyze these principles, the sum of which is the essence of Soviet military doctrine. The salient principles of military action are the offensive, maneuver and initiative, the concentration of force, the economy of force, surprise and deception, momentum of advance and pursuit, annihilation of all opposition, maintenance of strong reserves, and the close cooperation of combined mutually supporting arms.

Part III of the study is a more detailed examination of the operational, tactical, and organizational field doctrine of the various combat arms of the Soviet armed forces. The missions of land power, airpower, and sea power in Soviet doctrine and the doctrine for implementing these missions are analyzed.

Many of the data date from the Soviet-German war, but sufficient material from recent postwar years is available to warrant assumptions of current applicability, with some exceptions as noted. More-
over, the Soviets themselves stress that the data of the recent war are the basis for the further development of their military doctrine.

Transliterated Russian terms for organizations and key words are included where the inconsistency of Western translation or the novelty of the term to Western thinking requires specific indication of the original.* The appended Glossary includes such terms.

* The Library of Congress system of transliteration has been used, except in the case of proper names or place names well known in a different spelling, and with the exceptions of a ʹγ instead of the double ʹιι at the end of, and ʹγα or ʹγυ instead of ʹια or ʹιυ at the beginning of, a proper name.
Footnotes

CHAPTER 1

Soviet Strategy, Military Doctrine, and "Cold War"


3. V. I. Lenin, Sochineniia ("Collected Works"), 2d ed., Vol. 19, Moscow, 1929, p. 50 (all subsequent quotations from the 2d ed.).


12. Cherkezov, Voennaia Mysl', No. 9, 1940, p. 23.


15. Stalin's "On the Strategy and Tactics of the Russian Communists" first appeared in Pravda, No. 56, March 14, 1923, and is found in his collected works, Sochineniia, Vol. 5, Moscow, 1947, pp. 160-180. Quotations given were translated from this latter work.


FOOTNOTES

Strategii i Taktiki v Trudakh I. V. Stalina Perioda 1921-1925 Godov (''Questions of Strategy and Tactics in the Works of J. V. Stalin in the Period 1921-1925''), Moscow, 1950, for a recent discussion of these and other relevant writings by Stalin.

18. Leonov, op. cit., p. 108.
22. Obshchaia Taktika (''General Tactics''), Vol. 1, Moscow, 1940, p. 16.
26. Col. A. Kononenko, in Stalingrad, London, 1943, p. 7. (Minor revision of this translation has been made.)

CHAPTER 2

The Soviet Concept of Military Doctrine

2. K. Marx and F. Engels, Sochineniia, Vol. 8, p. 460, quoted in Leonov, op. cit., p. 82.
3. For other commentaries on these discussions, see especially D. D. Fedotoff White, The Growth of the Red Army, Princeton, 1944, especially pp. 158-276; D. D. F. White, ''Soviet Philosophy of War,''' Political Science Quarterly,
FOOTNOTES


4. Stalin's role at the time was negligible. In his Short Course Party history, written in 1938, Stalin chastises both but is more favorable to the Military Opposition. Frunze, who is praised highly in Soviet military literature, is not identified as having been the leader of the Military Opposition. See J. V. Stalin, History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course, New York, 1939, p. 235; hereinafter cited as History of the CPSU(B).


6. Ibid., p. 28.


15. Vorob'ëv, Tovarishch Stalin, p. 17. The author has interviewed at some length the co-leader of this anti-Bolshevik mutiny, former Imperial Guards Capt. Alexander Vasiliev, and there seems to be no basis for considering the Bolshevik action either daring in terms of conventional military science or particularly brilliant in execution. Captain Vasiliev declares that aircraft were not used in this operation.


FOOTNOTES

23. Svechin, op. cit., passim; Cherkezov, Voennaia Mysl', No. 9, 1940, p. 23; and Maj. Gen. P. D. Korkodinov, "The Operating Art of the Red Army," Morskoi Sbornik, No. 6, June, 1946, p. 8. The conception of an "operating art" between strategy and tactics apparently originated immediately prior to the First World War with two Imperial Russian General Staff officers, Gen. A. Gerua and Col. E. Messner, who coined the term operativa to represent this conception. Svechin (and his German contemporaries) apparently adopted the idea from this source. Cf. A. A. Kersnovsky, Filosofiia Voiny ("The Philosophy of War"), Belgrade, 1939, pp. 31ff.
25. Ibid.
28. Stalin, Bol'shevik, No. 3, 1947, p. 7. This theme is often stated; see Bulgainin, Tridtsat' Let, p. 9; Vorob'ev, Tovarishch Stalin, p. 4; Voroshilov, Bol'shevik, No. 24, 1949, p. 38.
34. Because of the consequences of error in the Soviet Union, military theorists hesitate to compile lists of war principles. To the author's knowledge, only two such compilations have been made recently, both by members of the Historical Division of the General Staff. See Korkodinov, Morskoi Sbornik, No. 6, 1946, pp. 19–34; and Lt. Gen. E. A. Shilovsky, L' Art Militaire de L'Armée Rouge, Moscow, 1944, pp 3–4; hereinafter cited as L' Art Militaire. (The Russian edition was, unfortunately, not available to the author.)
FOOTNOTES

451


37. Isayev, New Times, No. 52, 1949, p. 22. See also Pukhovsky, op. cit., p. 28.


CHAPTER 3

Fundamental Influences on Soviet Military Doctrine

1. V. I. Lenin, Sotsializm i Voina ("Socialism and War"), Moscow, 1933, p. 5. First written, with Zinoviev, in August, 1915.


3. Stalin, History of the CPSU(B) (written in 1938), pp. 167–168. See also Stalin's letter to Gorky, January 17, 1930, in Sochineniia, Vol. 12, 1949, p. 176, for an interesting statement of how "just" wars are desirable, despite bloodshed equal to that in an "unjust" war.


9. Ibid.


15. For example, see Stalin, History of the CPSU(B), p. 235, and also Bulganin, Tresscat' Lot, p. 4.


18. Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Voina Klassov ("The War of Classes"), Moscow, 1921, p. 27.


23. Ibid., speech of April 23, 1918, p. 316.

24. Ibid., speech of April 22, 1918, p. 238.


28. Hittle, op. cit., p. 239.


32. Alexander Barmine in an interview with this author.


34. This and subsequent statements by Barmine are all taken from an interview with him.

35. For a brief biographical résumé, see Berchin and Ben-Horin, op. cit., pp. 105–109.

36. Shaposhnikov, Mozg Armii, Moscow, 1927–1929, Vols. 1, 2, and 3. This work is discussed in Chap. 13.

37. Hittle, op. cit., p. 242; Hittle does not indicate his source. Both Hittle and White stress the strong influence exerted by Tsarist doctrine.


40. For recent Soviet accounts praising Brusilov, see Col. A. Redkin, "Brusilov's Breakthrough," *Voennaia Mysl*, No. 6, June, 1946, pp. 53–66; and Kor-kodinov, *Morskoii Sbornik*, No. 6, June, 1946, pp. 26–27.


53. Vice-Admiral S. O. Makarov’s basic work, *Voprosy Morskoi Taktiki Podgotovki Ofitserov* (“Questions of Naval Tactics and the Preparation of Officers”), was republished in 1943 without censorship for the guidance of naval officers. The military academies for young future naval officers, the counterpart of the Suvorov schools of the army, are termed Nakhimov schools. Compare also *Russkoe Voenno-Morskoe Iskusstvo* (“Russian Naval Art”) (Capt. of the 1st Rank R. N. Mordvinov, ed.), Moscow, 1951, 455 pp.


60. Lenin, *Sotsializm i Voina*, p. 9; see also Lenin, *The Fall of the Second International* (1915), for a similar statement.


63. Stalin, “Comrade Stalin’s Answer to a Letter from Comrade Razin,” *Bolshevik*, No. 3, February, 1947, pp. 4–8. Razin was a colonel engaged in writing an eight-volume military history, five of which were completed after 15 years of study, two of them revised as suggested by Shaposhnikov (who died in 1945). (Stalin gratuitously refers to them as “your brief theses on war.”) The problem arose when Razin questioned a sharp criticism of Clausewitz, made by Lt. Col. G. Meshcheriakov (in *Voennaia Mysl*, Nos. 6–7, 1945). Razin referred to passages from Lenin, including those which this author has cited above, in defense of his position. (These letters have been translated in *Military Affairs*, Vol. 13, No. 2, Summer, 1949, pp. 73–78, and discussed in an article by Lt. Col. Wm. R. Kintner (USA), “Stalin on War,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, August, 1948, pp. 55–59.)


69. Cf. Vladimir N. Ipatieff, *The Life of a Chemist*, Stanford, 1946, pp. 350ff; and a letter from Ipatieff to this author, dated April 14, 1949, in which he described the difficulties encountered in this sphere. He was at that time the chief Soviet chemist in these joint projects with Germany.

70. According to Berchin and Ben-Horin (as cited by Hittle, *op. cit.*, p. 247), "Groups of 100 superior officers of the Red Army were sent to Berlin each year for military instruction." Hittle goes on to say that "Practically all of the Red Army's high command participated in this educational program."

71. From an interview with this author.


73. Bol'shevik, editorial, No. 5, March, 1944, p. 15.


78. In this study considerable use has been made of the *Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav RKKA*, 1936 (PU-36) (" Provisional Field Regulations of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army"), Moscow, 1937, 215 pp. (hereinafter cited as *Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936*); the *Polevoi Ustav Krasnoi Armii, 1940 Goda* ("Field Regulations of the Red Army, 1940"), projected, Moscow, 1940, 366 pp. (hereinafter cited as *Polevoi Ustav, 1940*); *Polevoi Ustav Krasnoi Armii" ("Field Regulations of the Red Army"), projected, Moscow, 1944, 395 pp. (hereinafter cited as *Polevoi Ustav, 1944*); the *Boevoi Ustav Pekhotsy Krasnoi Armii* ("Infantry Combat Regulations of the Red Army"), Vol. 1 (Soldier, Squad, Platoon, Company), 267 pp., and Vol. 2 (Battalion,
FOOTNOTES

Regiment), 1942, 293 pp. (reissued in 1943, 1944, and 1945 without change; not known to have been superseded) (hereinafter cited as Boevoi Ustav Pekhoty, 1942–1945); and also of combat regulations and manuals of the other arms and services, which include specific points of doctrine.


CHAPTER 4

The Principle of the Offensive, and Defense

2. Quoted by Sergei N. Kournakoff, Russia's Fighting Forces, New York, 1942, p. 61.
5. Ibid., p. 4, letter of July 18, 1920. Later, on January 14, 1921, he suggested a regular Red Army under the Comintern (ibid., p. 77).
7. Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, pp. 9–10, par. 2; italics in the original.
9. Interviews held by this author with two field-grade Soviet officers, and examination of 1940–1941 Soviet training schedules.
12. Taktika Aviatsii ("Aviation Tactics"), Moscow, 1940, p. 55. This textbook contains a useful summary of Red Army doctrine prepared for Air Force students.
14. This is further discussed in Chap. 8. Obshchea Taktika, Vol. 1, 1940, p. 124, gives the figure of four or five battalions to one enemy battalion.
15. Ely, op. cit., p. 64, gives this estimate on the duration of preparation, and it is supported by other evidence.
17. Ibid., p. 7.
FOOTNOTES

26. Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, p. 132, par. 224; and in the 1940 Polevoi Ustav, p. 215, par. 455.
28. Polevoi Ustav, 1940, p. 215, par. 455; and p. 250, par. 505.
29. Ibid., p. 32, par. 46.
34. Maj. Gen. N. M. Zamiatin et al., Bitva pod Stalingradom ("The Battle of Stalingrad"), Moscow, 1944, p. 31; a study by members of the Historical Division of the General Staff.
40. Boevoi Ustav Pekhoty, Vols. 1 and 2, 1942-1945, p. 9; Vol. 2, p. 12, par. 5, also states: "Defense, as a rule, must be active..."; see also Oboronitel'nyi Boi ("Defensive Combat"), February, 1943, 75 pp.; and Polevoi Ustav, 1944, p. 10.
41. Shilovsky, L'Art Militaire, p. 32.
43. Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, p. 149, par. 248.
FOOTNOTES

46. Ibid.
47. Talensky, Voennaia Myśl', No. 6, 1946, p. 16. This article followed Stalin's writing of his letter to Col. Razin but preceded its publication.
49. Isayev, New Times, No. 52, 1949, p. 24, is a good example.
50. Talensky, Voennaia Myśl', No. 6, 1946, pp. 4 and 15.
52. Korkodinov, Morskoj Sbornik, No. 6, 1946, p. 22.

CHAPTER 5
The Principles of Maneuver and Initiative

1. Frunze, Voennaia Nauka i Revoliutsiiia, Vol. 1, 1921, p. 43.
2. Cited in Khrustov, op. cit., p. 29. This aim of "annihilation" is discussed in Chap. 9 of this study.
10. Marshal M. Tukhachevsky, "On the New Field Regulations of the RKKA," Bol'shevik, No. 9, May, 1937, pp. 46–47. This was written only a month before his execution, but the military ideas expressed here were never repudiated.
11. Korkodinov, Morskoj Sbornik, No. 6, 1946, p. 6. Max Werner, in The Military Strength of the Powers, London, 1939, passim, stressed this as a great advantage to Soviet doctrine and commanders, but he seriously overestimated this advantage, as later events were to show.
17. Korkodinov, Morskoj Sbornik, No. 6, 1946, pp. 30 and 33.
34. Leonov, *op. cit.*, p. 82.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 56. Tukhachevsky stressed this last point as a basic innovation of the 1936 Regulations.
CHAPTER 6

Forms of Offensive Maneuver

1. Polevoi Ustav, 1940, p. 106, par. 234; Boevoi Ustav Pekhoty (BUP-38), Vol. 1, 1942, p. 11, par. 5; Boevoi Ustav Pekhoty (BUP-42), Vol. 1, 1942–1945, p. 17, par. 12; Nastupatel’nyi Boi, 1942, p. 2; and Taktika Aviasii, p. 56.


5. Use of multiple attacks is often credited to Gen. Brusilov in the Galician operation of 1916; cf. Korkodinov, Morskoi Sbornik, No. 6, 1946, p. 27, and Redkin, Voennaia Mysl’, No. 6, 1946, p. 66. This writer has seen but one case where Brusilov’s breakthrough was regarded unfavorably in recent Soviet writings—Pavlenko, Voennaia Mysl’, No. 9, 1946, pp. 3–4.


8. Korkodinov, Morskoi Sbornik, No. 6, 1946, p. 27.


12. Voroshilov, in Bolshevik, No. 24, 1949, pp. 42–43, describes the frontal blow at some length but without contributing to the usual understanding of the term.

13. Subbotin, Voennaia Mysl’, No. 7, 1946, p. 5. Note that, mirroring their concern with unity of plan and structure, this is taken for comment rather than the more obvious effect of a breach in the enemy line of defense.


15. Nastupatel’nyi Boi, p. 3. The internal quotation in the last line is from NKO Order No. 306.


18. Ibid., pp. 20 and 26.


22. Ibid.; see also Talensky, Bolshevik, No. 3, 1946, p. 32.


26. Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, p. 16, par. 9; p. 96, par. 164; p. 63, par. 112; p. 100, par. 172. Obshcheia Taktika, Vol. 3, p. 10, paraphrases the last of these passages. Cf. also Gapich, Voennaia Myśl', No. 5, 1940, p. 95.
29. Ely, op. cit., p. 13; see also pp. 10, 132, and 134 for these examples.
31. The basic source for these figures is Talensky, Bol’shevik, No. 3, 1946, p. 31. In many cases comparison with German figures was made. The chief discrepancy is in the vagueness of the size of divisions. See also Talensky, Bol’shevik, No. 10–11, 1944, pp. 19–20, and Zamiatin, Voennaia Myśl’, No. 5, 1945, for a brief discussion of these encirclement operations. Stalin, on November 6, 1944, declared that 30 German divisions were cut off in Latvia (between Tukums and Libau); apparently the Soviets were later compelled to reduce this estimate by two-thirds.
34. Voroshilov, Bol’shevik, No. 24, 1949, p. 42; and Isayev, New Times, No. 52, 1949, p. 25 (direct quotation from the latter source).
38. Zamiatiin et al., Desiat’ Sokrushitel’nykh Udarov, p. 111.
40. Polevoi Ustav, 1944, p. 10.
41. Maj. Gen. N. Talensky, "The Red Army’s Operational Tactics" (a translation from some issue of Voennaia Myśl of 1945; original not available).
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p. 18.
49. Ibid., p. 15. Similar data are also given for the Korsun operation.
50. Ibid., pp. 20 and 27, and see Nastupatel’nyi Boi, p. 2.
51. Morskoi Sbornik, editorial, No. 8, August, 1938, p. 19.
FOOTNOTES

60. Tukhachevsky, *Bol'shevik*, No. 9, 1937, p. 54.

CHAPTER 7
The Principles of the Concentration and Economy of Force

7. *Obshchaja Taktika*, Vol. 1, p. 96; italics in the original. Although the quotation immediately above is postwar and this one prewar, in this instance it does not mark a change in doctrine.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 53; the figure given here is from 35 to 40 per cent; General Augustin Guillaume (French Army), *Soviet Arms and Soviet Power*, Washington,
1949, pp. 154-155, says that during the war this figure rose from 15 to 50 per cent of the combat forces.

14. Data all found in Col. Gen. F. A. Samsonov, "Artillery—The Main Striking Force of the Army," Voennaia Myśl', No. 5, May, 1946, pp. 15-27. He compares this with United States and United Kingdom doctrine, as follows: The United Kingdom favors 1 gun to every 7 yards (6.4 meters); the United States, 1 gun to every 3 yards (2.8 meters); while the USSR "often exceeds" 1 gun to every 3-4 meters (p. 22).


17. Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, p. 12, par. 7; Polevoi Ustav, 1940, p. 298, par. 629; and Nastupatel'nyi Boi, p. 41.

18. Cf. especially Maj. Gen. N. Solodovnik, "Special Points of the Field Regulations of the Army of the USA," Voennaia Myśl', No. 8, August, 1946, p. 75. General Marshall's Biennial Reports were also used in this article. The Soviet "tank corps" of pre-1946 was the equivalent of our armored division and has in fact been redesignated the "tank division" since 1946. They did use tanks in larger mass than the Americans, but their entire land army was proportionately larger.

19. Maj. Gen. Zamiatin et al., Bitva pod Stalingradom, p. 45, gives the figure of 12 tanks per kilometer, i.e., 41.5 per mile. Berteil, cited in Military Review, Vol. 31, No. 7, 1951, p. 76, gives 40 to 64 tanks per mile at Stalingrad, 97 at Kursk, and 320 "armored vehicles" per mile at Stettin.

23. Col. G. Kariakin, as quoted in *Air Age*, June, 1943, p. 73.
28. An anonymous high-ranking German military source, writing after the war in the West.
39. Zamiatin, *Voennaia Mysl*, No. 4, 1944 (see Chap. 6, footnote 6); Yarchevsky, *Voennaia Mysl*, No. 5, 1945; and Talensky as cited by Werth in *The Year of Stalingrad*, p. 349.
46. Korkodinov, *Morskoi Sbornik*, No. 6, 1946, pp. 26-27. The only exception given is the offensive of General Brusilov in Galicia in 1916, which struck along a 400-kilometer front.
FOOTNOTES

48. Stalin's words have been often repeated, although this alone would not, of course, in itself mean that they were operative in Soviet military strategy. For some explicit references to this passage from Stalin as the basis of military strategy, see Galatinov, Strategicheskaia Tsel', p. 128; Isayev, New Times, No. 52, 1949, p. 25; Korkodinov, Morskoï Sbornik, No. 6, 1946, p. 24; Talensky, Bol'shevik, No. 10–11, 1944, p. 15; Talensky, Voennaia Mysl', No. 6, 1946, p. 15; and Zamiatin et al., Bitva pod Stalingradom, p. 41.

49. The clear, precedent statements of this idea by Clausewitz and von Schlieffen are totally ignored. Maj. Gen. Korkodinov (Morskoi Sbornik, No. 6, 1946, pp. 22–23), who states that Stalin merely gave the conception "new content," credits Lloyd and Leer (the latter a Russian theoretician) with this idea. Galatinov (Strategicheskaia Tsel', p. 122) notes Jomini's statement of this idea. In one case Maj. Gen. Murav'ev (Morskoi Sbornik, No. 1, 1944, p. 17) terms this "a Leninist teaching."

50. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 5, 1947, pp. 173–174. (This is from the 1923 article cited above.)


52. Polevoi Ustav, 1940, pp. 30–31, par. 45; see also Obshchaia Taktika, Vol. 1, p. 16.


54. Galatinov, Strategicheskaia Tsel', p. 128.


56. Cited by Chuvikov, op. cit., p. 98.

57. Ibid.

58. See Garthoff, World Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1951, passim.


60. Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, p. 10, par. 3; and Polevoi Ustav, 1944, p. 15, par. 6.


65. Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, pp. 59–60, par. 106; p. 60, par. 107; p. 61, par. 109; and p. 62, par. 110.

66. Polevoi Ustav, 1940, p. 219, par. 463. See also pp. 109–111, pars. 239–244, for restatement of their offensive missions; and see Obshchaia Taktika, Vol. 1, pp. 19–20, and Vols. 2 and 3, p. 10.

FOOTNOTES


70. Boevoi Ustav Istrebitel'noi Aviatsii (BUIA-40), 1940, p. 17, par. 49.


73. Pavlenko, *Voennaia Mysl',* No. 9, 1946, p. 15.

CHAPTER 8

The Principles of Momentum of Advance and of Consolidation


20. Pavlenko, *Voennaia Mysl',* No. 9, 1946, p. 16, gives the first figure for the average, and Burshtynovich, *Voennyi Vestnik*, No. 1, 1947, p. 6, gives the two examples. Zamiatin et al., *Bitva pod Stalingradom*, p. 48, give the figure of 5 to 16 kilometers per day for the infantry.


22. Bronevsky, *Voennaia Mysl',* No. 5, 1946, p. 30; Subbotin, *Voennaia Mysl',* No. 7,
1946, p. 5; Antonov et al., *Tank*, p. 11. Zamiatin et al., *Bitva pod Stalingradom*, p. 48, give the average tempo for infantry advance as 20 kilometers per day and for advance in general as 30 to 35 kilometers per day.


30. TASS, January 6, 1951.


35. Fomichenko, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

36. Anonymous high-ranking German military source.


CHAPTER 9

The Principle of Annihilation


3. Stalin, Voprosy Leninizma, Moscow, 1940, p. 131 (stated in 1926).
5. Lenin's annotations to Clausewitz' On War, previously cited (see Chap. 3, footnote 59), demonstrate this clearly.
6. Tukhachevsky, Voina Klassov, pp. 16 and 44.
7. V. Putna, purged in 1937, pointed this out well in his book K Visle i Obratno ("To the Vistula and Back"), Moscow, 1927. Stalin was one of those chiefly responsible for this error.
9. Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, p. 9, par. 2, and p. 120, par. 201; Polevoi Ustav, 1940, p. 9, par. 2, and p. 24, par. 33; Nastupatel'nyi Boi, 1942, p. 1; Obshchaia Taktika, Vol. 1, 1940, p. 16; Boevoi Ustav Pekhoty (BUP-38), 1942, p. 9, par. 1.
10. In addition to the references in the footnote above, see Gorodovikov, op. cit., p. 71, and Korkodinov, Morskiy Sbornik, No. 6, 1946, p. 14.
12. Col. A. I. Pokryshkin, Kril'ia Istrебителa ("The Wings of a Fighter"), Moscow, 1948, p. 5; italics mine.
18. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 8–9.
19. For a few examples, see the General Staff study by Maj. Gen. N. M. Zamiatin et al., Desiat' Sokrashitel'nykh Udarov, pasim; the Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, Vol. 52, 1948, col. 717; and Vorob'ev, Tovarishch Stalin, pasim.
20. Both of whom so termed these operations in their speeches at the time of Stalin's seventieth birthday celebration; see Voroshilov, Bolshevik, No. 24, 1949, p. 37, and Shtemenko, TASS broadcast, Moscow, Home Service, December 21, 1949.
21. Talensky, Voennaia Myst', 1945 (see Chap. 6, footnote 41); italics mine.
22. The first such statement was made by Malenkov, on the thirty-second anniversary of the Revolution; Bolshevik, No. 21, November, 1949, p. 11. Also, cf. Molotov, Bolshevik, No. 24, December, 1949, p. 21; Mikoyan, Pravda, March 11, 1950; Maj. Gen. N. Talensky, Bolshevik, No. 11, June, 1951, p. 36; Beria, Bolshevik, No. 21, November, 1951, pasim; Malenkov, Bolshevik, No. 19, October, 1952, p. 21; Beria, October 7, 1952 (reported by Radio Moscow, October 8, 1952); and Deputy Premier M. G. Pervukhin, Pravda, November 7, 1952.
23. Khrustov, op. cit., p. 54.
FOOTNOTES

25. Polevoi Ustav, 1940, p. 194, par. 406; entire passage italicized in the original.
27. Korkodinov, Morskoi Sbornik, No. 6, 1946, p. 26; italics mine.

CHAPTER 10

Retreat

3. ———, Selected Works, New York, n.d., Vol. 7, p. 358; italics mine. (Speech delivered on May 9, 1918.)
4. ———, in Sedmoi S'ezd Rossiiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii ("Seventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party"), stenographic account (March 6-8, 1918), Central Committee, Moscow, 1923, pp. 126 and 129.
7. ———, History of the CPSU(B), p. 96 (see also p. 89).
8. Talenslcy, Voennaia Mysl', No. 6, 1946, p. 7; italics mine.
11. Ibid., pp. 293-303, pars. 640-661.
19. Polevoi Ustav, 1940, p. 275, par. 568.
22. Prohibitions on surrender are discussed in detail in Chap. 14.
CHAPTER 11

Reserves

1. Riazanov, in *Voina i Voennoe Iskusstvo V Svete Istoricheskogo Materializma*, p. 22.
12. *Nastupatel'nyi Boi*, p. 55, states some of these missions explicitly.

CHAPTER 12

The Principles of Unity and Combined Arms

2. For example, the phrase cited is taken from Voroshilov, *Voennaia Myst'*, No. 1, 1940, p. 10.
8. For earlier attacks, see Tukhachevsky, *Bol'shevik*, No. 9, 1937, p. 46; and against stress on the strategic air force, see Zhuravlev, "Operational Concentrations," *Voina i Revoliutsiiia*, November–December, 1935, and Entch, "Foreign Opinion on the Role of Aviation in Modern Warfare," *Voina i Revoliutsiiia*,
FOOTNOTES

September–October, 1935 (both cited in Werner, *op. cit.*, p. 114); and Lapchinsky, *Vozdushnaia Armiia*, *passim*.

13. *Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav*, 1936, p. 11, par. 7; italics in the original.
15. *Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav*, 1936, p. 10, par. 4, italics in the original; *Polevoi Ustav*, 1940, p. 12, par. 13, and p. 135, par. 287; and *Taktika Aviatsii*, p. 9.

CHAPTER 13
Leadership, Planning, and Command

3: Anonymous high-ranking German military source.
16. *Bolshevaia Sovetskiaia Entsiklopediia*, Vol. 65, *The USSR*, Moscow, 1948. This article is 8680 words long, and the total number of mentions of Stalin's name is itself small; in most cases his name was used in quoting from his wartime statements, as a narrator rather than as a participant. The article was written by I. Razgon; Voroshilov was the only military man on the board of editors.
17. The strongest claim, that he "carried out the plan," is made in a USSR Home Service Radio broadcast of March 15, 1951.
35. Isaac Deutscher, in *Stalin: A Political Biography*, New York, 1949, pp. 495-496, advances a similar interpretation of Politburo decision-making. Former Lt. Col. G. A. Tokaev has also described his session with the Politburo (as an expert on German rocket and jet development), which confirms this explanation (in *Stalin Means War*, London, 1951, pp. 91-118).


39. Shaposhnikov, *Mozg Armii*, Vol. 1, Voeny Vestnik, Moscow, 1927, 259 pp.; Vol. 2, Gosizdat, Moscow-Leningrad, 1929, 263 pp.; Vol. 3, Gosizdat, Moscow-Leningrad, 1929, 379 pp. (It is not known whether the projected fourth volume was ever published; it was not available for this study.)


42. Hittle, *op. cit.*, p. 253, includes the Fortified Areas Administration, which has been abolished. The following brief discussion draws heavily on Hittle. Wollenberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 316–317, purports to give the organization as of 1939, but it does not appear to be correct.

43. Stalin, as quoted by Tukhachevsky in *Bolshevik*, No. 9, 1937, p. 51.


54. Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, p. 73, par. 128.


59. *Polevoi Ustav*, 1940, p. 29, par. 42; italics in the original.


65. Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, p. 73, par. 128.

FOOTNOTES

67. Ibid., p. 9.
70. Korkodinov, Morskoi Sbornik, No. 6, 1946, pp. 32-33.
71. Ibid., p. 32.
74. Distsiplinar'nyi Ustav Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR ("Disciplinary Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR"), Moscow, 1948, p. 5, par. 1, and p. 6, par. 6.
75. Ustav Vnutrennei Sluzhby Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR ("Internal Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR"), Moscow, 1946, p. 181.
82. Ibid., pp. 3 and 4.
84. Ibid.
87. Nastupatel'nyi Boi, p. 33.
88. Ibid.
89. Zlobin, Voennaia Mysl', No. 5, 1945; italics mine.
91. Ibid., p. 45.
92. Obshchaia Taktika, Vol. 1, p. 18; see also Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, p. 17, par. 11, and pp. 69-70, par. 123; and Polevoi Ustav, 1940, p. 13, par. 15, and p. 33, par. 49.
93. Fomichenko, op. cit., p. 25.
94. These quotations are taken, respectively, from the following sources: Psheniianik, "Mass Aviation Action on the Approaches to East Prussia," Vestnik Vozdushnogo Flota, No. 22, November, 1944, p. 16; Lt. Col. M. Krotov, "Fighter Cover for Attack and Bombing Aircraft," Vestnik Vozdushnogo Flota, No. 13-14, July, 1945, p. 9; Subbotin, Voennaia Mysl', No. 7, 1946,
p. 6; and Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, p. 73, par. 128; cf. also Pokryshkin, op. cit., p. 46.

95. Anonymous high-ranking German military source.
96. Ely, op. cit., p. 29.
97. Ibid., p. 132.
98. Anonymous high-ranking German military source.
99. Polevoi Ustav, 1940, p. 25, par. 35.

101. Anonymous high-ranking German military source.
104. Ibid., p. 7; Polevoi Ustav, 1944, pp. 7–8. See also Chuvikov, op. cit., p. 99, for a brief statement of this change and its reasons.
106. Ibid., pp. 14–18, pars. 26–35. This marked the addition since the 1935 Provisional Manual of the Topographic Section and the Administrative-Economic Unit.
108. Ibid., p. 80.
110. Ibid., p. 37.
114. Nitszi-Nitszi, Japan, December, 1938; Posev Calendar for 1951; Posev ("Sowing"), Germany, No. 49, December 2, 1950, p. 15; and Beck and Godin (pseud.), Russian Purge and the Extraction of Confession, New York, 1951, p. 106.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 14

Morale, Political Controls, and the Soviet Soldier

2. Martel, *An Outspoken Soldier, His Views and Memoirs*, p. 224. He had been in the USSR to see the 1936 maneuvers and noted the same thing at that time; see p. 142.
5. Ely, *op. cit.*, pp. 17–19, gives a good description of this endurance.
7. L. Pervomaisky, in *Orel*, p. 53.
10. The text of one such oath is given in the pamphlet *We Are Guerrillas*, London, 1942, p. 9.


33. Taktika Aviasii, p. 12; and Shilovsky, L'Art Militaire, p. 4.


37. Ibid., pp. 217-218.


39. Ibid., p. 468.


42. Leadership, Courtesy and Drill, U.S. Army Field Manual FM 22-5, 1946, p. 19, par. 18e.

43. For example, see the article "The Morale of Soviet Soldiers," by former Sr. Lt. P. Snegirev of the tank troops, in Novoe Russkoe Slovo ("The New Russian Word"), New York, January 23, 1951. He defected to the West late in 1949 after 10 years of service in the Soviet Army.

44. Leadership, Courtesy and Drill, U.S. Army Field Manual FM 22-5, 1946, p. 6, par. 6c.

45. For example, see Simonov and Krieger in Stalingrad, pp. 51 and 36-37; and B. Voyetekhov, The Last Days of Sevastopol, New York, 1943, p. 176.


48. Leonov, op. cit., p. 41.


50. This is clearly stated in the Ustav Vnutrennei Sluzhby Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR, 1946, p. 29, par. 69.


54. Polevoi Uстав, 1940, p. 10, par. 7.
55. Diszipliniarnyi Ustav Krasnoi Armii ("Disciplinary Regulations of the Red Army"), Moscow, 1941; Diszipliniarnyi Ustav Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR ("Disciplinary Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR"), Moscow, 1946, 1948, and 1950; and the Ustav Vnutrennei Sluzhby Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR ("Internal Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR"), Moscow, 1946 and 1950.


59. Ibid., p. 16.


66. Voprosy Istorii, editorial, No. 5, 1950, p. 12. As of April, 1948, the total was 7,170,910 decorations, according to Leonov, op. cit., p. 107.

67. Marshall, op. cit., p. 279. Of these, 1,034,676 were Air Medals; and of the remainder, 34.5% went to the infantry, 34.1% to the air corps, 10.7% to the field artillery, and the rest to the other arms and services.


70. For example, Col. Pokryshkin tells in his memoirs how he joined the Party "on suggestion" in 1942.


FOOTNOTES

75. Order No. 270; cited by former Soviet army men now in the West, and in

Bor'ba ("Struggle"), U.S. Zone, Germany, Nos. 2-3, February–March, 1949.
76. Halder, "Diary: Campaign in Russia," Vol. 6, July 12, 1941.
77. M. Bobrov, "The Terrible Silence of Russia," Vozrozhdienie ("Rebirth"), Paris,
No. 5, September–October, 1949, p. 88.
78. Cf. Appendix II for further discussion and evidence.

CHAPTER 15
Prediction, Intelligence, and Reconnaissance

1. Pukhovsky, op. cit., p. 3.
2. Chuvikov, op. cit., p. 7; italics mine.
3. Leonov, op. cit., p. 103.
4. Ibid., p. 108.
5. Fomichenko, op. cit., p. 98.

Sovetskogo Naroda V Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine ("J. V. Stalin—In-

spirer and Organizer of the Victories of the Soviet People in the Great
Fatherland War"), Moscow, 1949, p. 3.
7. Leonov, op. cit., p. 110.
8. Ibid., p. 109.
10. TASS, broadcast in English Morse to Europe, February 2, 1950; cf. also

Bragin, in Stalingrad, pp. 91–92. For similar statements regarding the
13. Ibid.
15. Zlobin, Voennaia Mys’, No. 5, 1945; and cf. Korkodinov, Morikoi Shornik,

No. 6, 1946, p. 31.
18. Galatinov, Strategicheskaia Tsel’, p. 128.
19. Quoted by L. Sabelev, Khrani1: Voennuiu Tainu ("Safeguard Military Secrets"),

Moscow, 1949, p. 9; italics in the original.
22. Tukhachevsky, Voina Klassov, p. 8; see also p. 6.
23. V. Melikov, Problema Strategicheskogo Razvoryvaniiia po Opity Mirovoi i

Grazhdanskoi Voiny ("The Problem of Strategic Development by the
Experiences of the World and Civil Wars"), Vol. 1: The World

Imperialist War, 1914—1918, Moscow, 1935, p. 11.
FOOTNOTES

32. Former Soviet officer, "Future War in the Conception of the USSR," Chasovoi ("The Sentinel"), No. 312, Brussels, October, 1951, p. 3.
33. Cf. Appendix I for the organizational relationships.
34. These statements appear in the Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, p. 29, par. 34, italics in the original; and Col. E. I. Lavrov, Tankovaia Razvedka ("Tank Reconnaissance"), Moscow, 1940, p. 11; italics in the original.
35. E. I. Lavrov, op. cit., p. 14; in Russian: "Boi dlia razvedka, a ni razvedka dlia boia."
36. Anonymous high-ranking German military source.
38. Prokhorenko and Pikalin, Zurnal Avto-Brontankovykh i Mekhanizirovannykh Voisk, No. 6, 1945, p. 16; italics mine.
FOOTNOTES 481

42. Rukovodsivo po Nazemnoi Razvedke ("Manual on Ground Reconnaissance"), Moscow, 1941, p. 5, par. 2.
43. Parot'kin, op. cit., p. 10.
44. Guillaume, op. cit., p. 143; see Chap. 23 for the role of the partisans.
45. From a Soviet field order.

CHAPTER 16
Deception, Surprise, and Security

1. Lenin, Sochineniia, Vol. 12, 1929, p. 16.
3. K. V. Bobrov et al., Matkivovka ("Camouflage"), Moscow, 1941, pp. 15–16.
5. Trukhin, Voennaia Mys', No. 5, 1940, p. 20; italics mine.
7. Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, p. 100, par. 171.
8. Former Imperial General Staff Col. S. Kamenev pointed out the value of feints in an article on "Chance or Conformity to Principle," Voennaia Mys' i Revoliutsiia, Vol. 2, 1923, pp. 63–66, in which he sought to demonstrate that "the shortest military distance to some target is not necessarily a straight line."
9. Indications of Soviet Russian Breakthrough Attacks, Foreign Armies East, No. 7290/44, August 28, 1944, signed by Guderian. A third influence was also mentioned, "The Development of the Situation on Other Fronts."
11. Deane, op. cit., p. 146.
13. Anonymous high-ranking German military source.
15. Paramonov, Zhurnal Avto-Brontankovykh i Mekhanizirovannykh Voisk, No. 4–5, 1945.
17. Ely, op. cit., p. 47.
18. Ibid., pp. 23–24.
FOOTNOTES


25. S. O. Maizel’, *Svetomaskirovka i Maskirovka* ("Light Discipline and Camouflage"), Moscow, 1942, 69 pp., pointed out the necessary controls in great detail. Other sources indicate a high degree of compliance.


42. Lt. Col. V. Pavlov and Maj. B. Korol, "Tempos in Break-through Operations," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, October 13, 1944. Cf. also Parot’kin, *op. cit.*, pp. 11 and 47; and Zamiatin et al., *Bitva pod Stalingradom*, p. 43; both of these are official publications of the Historical Division of the General Staff.

43. Baz’, *op. cit.*, p. 78.


45. *Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav*, 1936, p. 11, par. 6; *Polevoi Ustav*, 1940, p. 14, par. 16.
46. L. Sabelev, *Khranit' Voennuiu Tainu* ("Preserve Military Secrets"), Moscow, 1949, p. 25; italics mine. The State Secrets Act of 1947 added "information on discoveries, inventions and improvements of a non-military nature" to previous specific prohibitions in order to cover explicitly all scientific and technical work.

CHAPTER 17
Preparation, Training, and Improvisation

10. Fomichenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 42 and 43; italics mine.
FOOTNOTES

been credited with the initiative for these maneuvers); Vechny, *Voennaia Mysl*, No. 7, 1946, p. 28.


27. Halder, "Diary: Campaign in Russia," Vol. 6, July 12, 1941.

28. Anonymous high-ranking German military source.


31. For two claims of general resourcefulness, see Fomichenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37, and Kournakoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 142 and 148.


CHAPTER 18

The Importance of the Rear


6. *Ibid.*, p. 323. Note the high positive value attached to "compactness" and the reason for this value.


10. For example, see V. F. Vorob'ev, *Tovarishch Stalin*, p. 36.

12. _Ibid._, p. 49.


15. _Polevoi Ustav_, 1940, p. 133, par. 279.

16. K. Lavrov, _Voennaia Mysl_', No. 6, 1946, p. 47.


18. K. Lavrov, _Voennaia Mysl_', No. 6, 1946, p. 46.


22. _Ibid._, p. 49.

23. _Ibid._, p. 43.


25. K. Lavrov, _Voennaia Mysl_', No. 6, 1946, p. 41.

26. Interviews with former Soviet officers conducted by the author.

27. Marshal of Aviation Novikov is rumored to have been relieved for this cause. One former Soviet officer interviewed stated that he knew of cases of junior officers' doing this in the names of Novikov and other generals. Army General Khrulev, present Chief of the Rear of the Soviet Army, was rumored to have been involved in one scandal on the Northwest Front early in the war.


29. K. Lavrov, _Voennaia Mysl_', No. 6, 1946, p. 51.


32. _Ibid._, p. 17.

33. Quoted by Hart in _The German Generals Talk_, p. 226.


35. Arnold, _op. cit._, p. 471.


37. Ely, _op. cit._, p. 82.


41. Miasnikov, _Voennaia Mysl_', No. 5, 1946, p. 37; see also Pavlenko, _Voennaia Mysl_', No. 9, 1946, p. 6.

42. This statement is based on incomplete data. Officially, the Soviets claim to have a record equalling that of the U.S. Army, namely, 73 per cent of recoveries and returns to active service (see Dr. N. Priorov [Red Army Medical Ser-
vices] Information Bulletin, Embassy of the USSR, Washington, D.C., March 23, 1946, p. 245). This figure however, refers to recoveries in rear-area hospitals only; the great Soviet losses were primarily the consequence of inadequate front-line field collection and care.

43. For example, cf. J. V. Stalin, Speech Delivered at a Meeting of Voters of the the Stalin Electoral Area of Moscow, February 9, 1946, Embassy of the USSR, Washington, D.C., 1946; high productive rates are not verified but are plausible.

CHAPTER 19

Soviet Employment of Ground Forces

1. Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, p. 11, par. 7; Polevoi Ustav, 1940, p. 13, par. 21, and p. 12, par. 13; Nastupatel'nyi Boi, p. 21; Boevoi Ustav Pekhoty, Vol. 1, 1942-1945, p. 11, par. 1.

2. Cf. the first two citations in the footnote above, and also Col. Gen. N. Berzarin, "Infantry and Its Role in Battle," Voennyi Vestnik, No. 18, September, 1945, pp. 2 and 3.


4. Pavlenko, Voennaia Mysl', No. 9, 1946, p. 6; and Baz', op. cit., p. 79.


7. Ibid., pp. 466-468.


10. Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, p. 11, par. 7.


13. Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, pp. 11-12, par. 7; italics in the original.

14. Tukhachevsky, Bolshevik, No. 9, 1937, p. 52. See also Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, pp. 12-13, par. 7.

15. Polevoi Ustav, 1940, p. 122, par. 265. See also p. 16, par. 23, for the repetition of the basic mission of the artillery, and p. 127, par. 269, for another statement of it as the "decisive means" of support; and see p. 125, pars. 267 and 268.


FOOTNOTES 487

22. These stages are discussed briefly in Artilleriiskoe Nastuplenie, 1943, pp. 2–3; Nastupatel’nyi Boi, pp. 34–40; Polevoi Ustav, 1944, p. 8; and Bogatov and Merkur’ev, op. cit., pp. 24–25. See also Maj. Gen. (now Col. Gen.) F. A. Samsonov in Artilleriiskoe Nastuplenie (another publication by the same name), Moscow, 1942, pp. 5–12.
24. Ibid.
31. Bugaev, op. cit., pp. 15–17. (Col. Bugaev is an ordnance engineer in artillery.)
32. Interviews with former Soviet officers, including a captain of artillery.
33. Ely, op. cit., pp. 26–27; and interviews with former Soviet officers.
36. For a standard history of the Soviet armored forces, see Bronin and Yaroslavtsev, op. cit., passim.
38. Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, p. 12, par. 7; Polevoi Ustav, 1940, p. 296, pars. 622 and 623, and p. 303, par. 642; Obshchaia Taktika, Vol. 1, 1940, p. 73; and Tukhachevsky, Bol’shevik, No. 9, 1937, pp. 46–57.
40. Tukhachevsky, Bol’shevik, No. 9, 1937, passim.
41. Polevoi Ustav, 1940, p. 127, par. 270.
43. Halder, “Diary: Campaign in Russia,” Vol. 6, July 31, 1941.
44. Cf. Appendix II for sources and further information.
45. Nastupatel’nyi Boi, p. 41. This manual required that tanks should not separate themselves from the infantry by more that 200 to 400 meters.


58. E. I. Lavrov, *op. cit*.


66. *Ibid.*, pp. 168–169. This was also true before the war. One writer, Col. A. Ignat'ev, in *Tanki v Obschevoiskovom Boiu* ("Tanks in Combined Troop Combat"), Moscow, 1939, *passim*, declared that "the regulations do not give stereotypes"; he then proceeded to outline almost mathematically the only prescribed tactical patterns: "on line," "corner forward" (V-wedge), "corner to the rear" (inverted wedge), and "echelon to the right (or left)."


73. "Theses of the Cavalry Section of the VNO [Military-Scientific Organization] of


**CHAPTER 20**

**Soviet Employment of Airpower**

3. Col. A. Kravchenko, "Changes in Combat Formations of Soviet Fighters," *VVF*, No. 10, October, 1949, p. 7. Although this context concerns fighter aircraft, it is even more applicable to bombers.
FOOTNOTES


12. See all references in the footnote above.


16. Ibid.


18. Interviews with several former high-ranking Soviet air force and ground force officers.

19. Interviews with several former high-ranking Soviet air force and ground force officers.

20. Interviews with several former high-ranking Soviet air force and ground force officers.

21. Interviews with several former high-ranking Soviet air force and ground force officers; see also Merinov and Romanenko, VVF, No. 23–24, December, 1944, p. 17.


23. Ibid.; and interviews with former high-ranking Soviet officers.

24. Interviews with former high-ranking Soviet officers.

25. Interviews with former high-ranking Soviet officers.

26. Ostroumov, VVF, No. 18, September, 1944, pp. 4–12.

27. Ibid.; quotations cited from pp. 4–12.


30. Interviews with former high-ranking Soviet officers.

31. Interviews with former high-ranking Soviet officers.

32. Interviews with former high-ranking Soviet officers.


34. Instruktsiiia po Organizatsii Sviazy v Aviasoedineniakh i Aviachastiakh ("Instructions on the Organization of Communications in Air Formations and Units"), Moscow, 1943, pars. 71, 80, and 96.
35. Interviews with former high-ranking Soviet officers.
36. *Instruktsiia po Organizatsii Sviazy v Aviasoedineniakh i Aviachastiakh*, 1943, par. 1.
37. Interviews with former high-ranking Soviet officers.
38. Interviews with former high-ranking Soviet officers.
41. Interviews with a number of former Soviet air force and ground force officers.
44. Ibid., pp. 5-6, par. 5; and p. 8, par. 9.
52. Pokryshkin, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
53. Ibid., pp. 57-58; italics mine.
55. Lt. Col. A. Kuleshov, "The Defeat of German Aviation in the Battles North of Jassy," *VVF*, No. 18, September, 1944, p. 13; Pokryshkin, *op. cit.*, pp. 68ff. As Pokryshkin wrote: "The free hunt quickly became the favorite form of action of the flyers of our unit." This may in part explain how, although Pokryshkin flew from 550 to 586 combat sorties during the war (at least 220 more than the nearest ace), he participated in only 137 to 144 "aerial battles." He downed 57 enemy planes.
57. Ibid., p. 29.

59. The 1942 Rukovodstvo stated (p. 5, par. 6): "the number of attack planes together in one formation flight must not exceed six to eight aircraft; a group of less than six single seat aircraft, not covered by fighters, is insufficiently armed against an attack by enemy fighters."

60. Explicitly stated to be the basic forms of attack blows in the 1942 Rukovodstvo, p. 4, par. 3, and in the 1944 Nastavlenie, p. 16; and stated more recently by Lt. Col. N. Ostrov, "Means of Attack Aviation Action in the Offensive," VVF, No. 5, May, 1947, p. 8.


62. Ostrov, VVF, No. 5, 1947, pp. 8-14, gives these examples.

63. Rukovodstvo po Boevyem Deistviiam Shтурмовoi Aviatsii, 1944, p. 49, pars. 117-118.

64. Ostrov, VVF, No. 5, 1947, p. 12.


68. Ibid., p. 50.

69. Col. V. M. Lozovoi-Shevchenko, Bor'ba s Aviatsiei Na Ee Aerodromakh ("The Struggle with Aircraft on Airdromes"), Moscow, 1941, p. 35; italicized in the original. Although this was written in 1941, consistent wartime practice indicates its relevance today.


74. Rukovodstvo po Boevyem Deistviiam Bombardirovochnoi Aviatsii, 1942, p. 34, par. 89; italicized in the original.

75. Ibid., p. 27, par. 63.


77. Ibid., p. 24.


82. Lapchinsky, *Vozdushnaia Armiia*, p. 144.
83. Ibid., p. 185.
84. Cited in editorial of *VVF*, No. 6, June, 1948, p. 60.
88. Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 166, makes this point.
94. Ibid., p. 144, par. 353; italics in the original. Pages 143–166, pars. 351–414, concern ADD.
100. Moscow Radio, overseas to North America in English Morse, February 11, 1950.
101. Cf. Lt. Col. V. Chalikov, "On the Role of Strategic Aviation," *Voennaia Mysl*, No. 9, September, 1946, pp. 81–84. This article is based on the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) report of October 21, 1945, and an article by General Spaatz in *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1946.
104. Interview with Pirogov.
106. *Polevoi Ustanov*, 1944, p. 30, par. 34; *Rukovodstvo po Boevomu Primeneniiu Vozdushno-Desantnykh Voisk Krasnoi Armi* ("Manual on the Combat Employment of Airborne Troops of the Red Army"), Moscow, 1941, p. 3, par. 3 (not known to have been superseded); hereinafter cited as *Rukovodstvo po Boevomu Primeneniiu VDVKA*. This was already the case before the war; cf. *Obshcheba Taktika*, Vol. 1, p. 88.


117. *Rukovodstvo po Boevomu Primeneniiu VDVKA*, p. 31, par. 109; italicized in the original.


120. *Rukovodstvo po Boevomu Primeneniiu VDVKA*, p. 78, par. 327; see also pp. 78–79, pars. 328–336.


134. Yarchevsky, *Voennaia Mysl*, No. 9, 1946, p. 27.

135. Taktika Aviatsii, p. 190.

136. *Vremennaya Instruktsiia po Organizatsii Sviazi, Opoweshcheniia i Signalizatsii PVO na Promoblektakh* ("Provisional Instructions for the Organization of Communications, Warnings, and Signaling for the PVO of Industrial Objectives"), Moscow, 1939, passim.


138. Vlasov, *Voennaia Mysl*, No. 6, 1946, p. 32. Colonel Vlasov also states (p. 29) that in the First World War 8000 aircraft were shot down by other aircraft and only 2347 by ground antiaircraft fire.
FOOTNOTES

139. Ibid., p. 30.
141. Ibid., p. 23.
144. Vestnik Protivo-Vozdushnoi Obrony ("Herald of the Anti-Air Defense Force"), No. 6, June, 1940, pp. 23–26; and interviews with two former Soviet air force officers who served in the PVO.
149. Former Russian staff officer, "The Soviet Air Force: Postwar Reorganization," Manchester Guardian, June 23, 1950. This was confirmed by an admission made by Lt. Gen. Ushakov that in 1946 there were "shortcomings in preparation for altitude flights." (See B. Ushakov, VVF, No. 1, 1947, p. 27.)

CHAPTER 21

Soviet Employment of Sea Power and Amphibious Operations

1. This same idea, even this sentence, appears in both the military press, as in the editorial "Praise to the Soviet Naval Fleet!" Krasnaia Zvezda, July 23, 1950, and in a children's book by Z. N. Perlia, Boevye Korabli ("Ships of War"), Moscow-Leningrad, 1948, p. 3; cf. also P. Ancharysk, SSSR—Velikaia Morskaia Derzhava ("The USSR—A Great Sea Power"), Moscow, 1949, passim.
FOOTNOTES

15. Belli, *Voennaia Mysl*, No. 9, 1946, p. 36. The minor exceptions listed are the ultimately successful German landings on Sukho Island in Lake Ladoga and on Oesel Island in the Baltic.
17. Isakov, *op. cit.*, pp. 15–16; italics in the original.
18. Ibid., p. 11.
22. Ibid., p. 24.
26. Ibid., p. 54.
27. Isakov, op. cit., p. 35, gives one example in the Baltic.


30. As reported in Krasnyi Flot, February 15, 1947.


32. Polevoi Ustav, 1940, p. 311, par. 663.

33. Ibid., p. 309, par. 660.

34. Isakov, op. cit., p. 92; see also p. 18 for another statement that navy men were used as "the advanced striking force." Cf. also Maj. Gen. Desinevich, "Training the Naval Infantry," Krasnyi Flot, September 10, 1946; Shmakov, op. cit., p. 281; and Alafuzov, Voennaia Mysl', No. 8, 1946, p. 28.

35. Desinevich, Krasnyi Flot, September 10, 1946.

36. Isakov, op. cit., p. 18; see also ibid., pp. 46–47; Heroic Leningrad, Moscow, 1945, p. 93; and Kovalevsky, Boevoi Put' Sovetskoi Armii, p. 138. (Isakov compares this with land service by Russian seamen in 1854 and at other times.)

37. Isakov, op. cit., p. 90.

38. According to a former Soviet official and a former Soviet fighter pilot, both then in Moscow, interviewed by this writer.


40. Ibid., p. 91; cf. also Halder, "Diary: Campaign in Russia," Vols. 6 and 7, entries for December 29 and 31, 1941, January 5, 1942, and May 17, 18, and 19, 1942.


42. These landings are discussed in great detail in an article by Capt. of the First Rank Yu. P. Kovel' and Lt. Col. (Navy) P. K. Utkin, "Operations of the Black Sea Fleet during the Summer–Fall Campaigns of 1944," Morskoi Shornik, No. 6, June, 1946, pp. 35–47; cf. Isakov, op. cit., pp. 91–92.

43. Isakov, op. cit., p. 91, mentions this operation.


45. Isakov, op. cit., pp. 92–93, 17, and 18; italics in the original.

46. Ibid., pp. 17–18 and p. 90.

47. "Aviation during the Landing Operation in Forcing the Kerch Strait" (no author given), Vestnik Vozdushnogo Flota, No. 13, July, 1944, passim.


49. Ibid.


51. Cf. Kovel' and Utkin, Morskoi Shornik, No. 6, 1946, passim, and Isakov, op. cit., pp. 92 and 93. (Citations to commanders were all given to majors and lieutenant colonels, indicating the size of the assault units used.)

52. Ibid., p. 90.

53. Bondarenko, Krasnyi Flot, July 12, 1946; cf. also Desinevich, Krasnyi Flot, September 10, 1946.

54. Polevoi Ustav, 1940, p. 310, par. 662; p. 312, par. 663; and p. 314, par. 666.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 22
Special Combat Conditions

2. For one example, in a popular exhortatory vein, see "Glory to Our Victorious Red Army!" (editorial), Bol'shevik, No. 5, March, 1944, p. 10.
3. Polevoi Ustav, 1940, p. 102, par. 225; p. 103, par. 226; italics in the original. For earlier statements, see the Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, pp. 177-180, pars. 293-298; and Obshchaia Taktika, Vol. 1, 1940, pp. 291-297.
6. Nastavlenie Dlia Deistvii Voisk V Gorakh, projected, Moscow, 1940, p. 15, par. 34.
9. Ibid., pp. 17-28; Gastilovich does not explicitly draw these conclusions. Cf. also "The Soviet Army and Mountain Warfare," La Suisse, January 15, 1949, based on an article from Krasnaia Zvezda by Gastilovich.
13. Ibid., p. 20.
14. Ibid., pp. 20 and 24; and cf. the Nastavlenie Dlia Deistvii Voisk V Gorakh, 1940, p. 17, par. 42.
18. Gastilovich, Voennaia Mysl', No. 6, 1946, p. 27; cf. also the Polevoi Ustav, 1940, p. 102, par. 224; and the discussion of the airborne troops in Chap. 20 of this study.
20. Nastupatel'nyi Boi, 1942, p. 5; italics mine.
21. Anonymous high-ranking German military source.
23. Cf. Brigade Comdr. P. Yarchevsky, "The Character of Operations in Desert-Steppe Regions," Voennaia Mysl', No. 5, May, 1940, pp. 80-94. (Materials were not complete enough to permit determination as to what Soviet evaluations of the early African campaigns of the Second World War were made.)


31. Ibid.


39. Ishchenko, op. cit., p. 55; italicized in the original.

40. Cf. Kournakoff, op. cit., p. 144, for an account of winter combat conditions.

41. Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, p. 159, par. 261; italics in the original.


43. Boevoi Ustav Pekhoty, Vol. 1, 1942–1945, p. 260, par. 812; Polevoi Ustav, 1940, p. 322, par. 679; Vremennyi Polevoi Ustav, 1936, p. 160, par. 263; Kol-


50. It is reported that 163 searchlights were so used at Berlin; *Military Review*, Vol. 31, No. 7, October, 1951, p. 81.

CHAPTER 23

*Soviet Employment of Partisan Forces*


3. Ibid.


5. Tukhachevsky, *Voina Klassov*, p. 139.

6. Ibid., p. 19.

7. Ibid.


18. Interviews with about one dozen former Soviet partisans conducted by Dr. Herbert Dinerstein of The RAND Corporation.

19. P. K. Ignatov, *Partisans of the Kuban*, London, 1944, pp. 12 and 21. (This is a translation of the first of two volumes written by Ignatov under the title *Zapiski Partizana* in 1944 and 1947; see the Bibliography.)

20. In addition to Kovpak’s memoirs, one of his lieutenants has also written an account; cf. P. Vershigora, *Liudi S Chistoi Sovesti* ("People with a Pure Conscience"), Moscow, 1948, 402 pp. Also cf. Vasily Andreev, "The People’s War: From the Diary of a Briansk Partisan," *Novy Mir* ("New World"), Moscow, No. 6, June, 1948, pp. 90–207.


27. See M. Nikitin, *ibid.*, p. 131, for examples.


34. According to Dinerstein interviews with former partisans.

35. *Banden-bekampfung* ("Fighting Guerrilla Bands"), Field Order, German Army High Command, Field Headquarters, May 6, 1944, p. 4.


FOOTNOTES

40. Banden-bekämpfung, p. 10.
41. The Heroic Defense of Sevastopol, p. 68.
42. Quoted in We Are Guerrillas, p. 32.
45. For one example, see Nekrasov, in Behind the Front Line, p. 140.
46. Ponomarenko, in Behind the Front Line, p. 12.
47. Kovpak, op. cit., p. 78.
48. Ibid., p. 77.
51. Cf. We Are Guerrillas, pp. 24-25.
52. Ibid., p. 25.
53. Ibid., p. 20.
54. Soviet Calendar, Moscow, 1947, p. 178.
55. Ponomarenko in Behind the Front Line, p. 10.
56. Ibid.

APPENDIX II

The Trial by Arms: June to December, 1941

1. Lenin, in Zvezda ("The Star"), April 1, 1912; and in Novy Luch ("New Light"), February 24, 1907.
3. R. J. Sontag and J. S. Beddie (eds.), Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, documents from the German archives, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 1948, pp. 260-261. This passage is also found in Lt. Col. Yu. Korol'kov, "How 'Plan Barbarossa' Was Prepared," Voennaia Mysl', No. 8, August, 1946, p. 43. This article is a Soviet presentation of the German strategy and is intended for higher Soviet officers. It is also quoted by Firsov, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
6. Halder, "Diary: Campaign in Russia," Vol. 6, July 3, 1941; hereinafter cited as "Diary."
11. Halder, "Diary," June 21, 1941. Other sources vary slightly, especially in the number of active satellite forces committed, but these are the most reliable and authoritative.
13. Stalin himself told Hopkins that their initial force was 180 divisions and 60 tank divisions (brigades), increasing to 260 by the end of July (Sherwood, op. cit., p. 333); Churchill gives 188 divisions, including 119 on the frontier (The Grand Alliance, p. 378). Cyril Falls, The Second World War, 3d ed., London, 1950, p. 108, gives as the total figure 180 divisions plus 55 tank brigades, 158 divisions being on the frontier; and Goudima, op. cit., estimates the total as being 180 divisions.
15. Ibid., July 8.
16. Ibid., July 23.
20. Estimates on the size of the Soviet air force in June, 1941, vary widely, but the German combat reports indicate that the figures given are approximately accurate. In the article "Russian Air Strategy," Military Review, Vol. 30, No. 8, November, 1950, p. 94, Soviet air losses in the summer of 1941 are estimated at 8000 aircraft; this is consistent with combat reports mentioned by Halder (cf. especially "Diary," Vol. 6, July 1, 1941). In Pravda, October 5, 1941, A. S. Shcherbakov, an alternate member of the Politburo, even admitted Soviet losses of 5316 aircraft.
22. Ibid., July 1, 1941.
25. Pirogov, in an interview with this author.

27. Tippelskirch, *op. cit.*, p. 203, states that 1300 combat aircraft were committed in June, 1941; Churchill, in *The Grand Alliance*, p. 354, gives the figure as 2700; and Lee, in *The German Air Force*, New York, 1946, p. 110, and Lt. Col. J. Accart (France) in *Forces Aériennes Françaises* ("French Air Forces"), No. 19, April, 1948, both estimate that 3000 aircraft were committed.

28. Stalin himself told Hopkins that the Soviet strength was 24,000 tanks in 60 divisions (brigades) of 350 to 400 each, and an allotment of 50 tanks to each infantry division (Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 335). United States estimates give the losses indicated (Army Information Digest, Vol. 5, No. 11, November, 1950, p. 61, and G. Underhill, "The Story of Soviet Armor," *Armed Cavalry Journal*, No. 3, May–June, 1950, p. 21). Hart, *Defense of the West*, p. 21, gives the figures in the German specific reference and the total; Assmann also gives the over-all Axis total at 3000 tanks (Foreign Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 2, January, 1950, p. 310). Halder, "Diary," Vol. 6, July 2, 1941, estimated Soviet strength at that date as being 15,000 tanks. Guderian reports that Hitler told him in August, 1941, that if he had believed Guderian's statement in 1937 that the Soviets had 10,000 tanks, he would never have attacked. (Gen. Heinz Guderian, *Erinnerungen eines Soldaten* ["Memoirs of a Soldier"], Heidelberg, 1951, p. 172.)


30. Halder, "Diary," Vol. 7, entry for October 10–November 3, 1941 (made in one entry because Halder was in the hospital during this time).


34. In an appended postwar commentary to Halder's unpublished "Diary."

35. One ring was headed by a veteran Soviet spy, Richard Sorge, in Tokyo. (For the official United States account of this, see *The Congressional Record*, Vol. 95, Part 12, February 10, 1949, p. A-719.) The other source was through a network in Switzerland which obtained information from a high-ranking German staff source (cf. Foote, *op. cit.*, pp. 113–115 and 205).


39. A number of interviews conducted by the author. The only exceptions are Lt. Colonel Tokaev (Tokaev, *op. cit.*, p. 34), who states that on April 16, 1941, General Klokov, of the Political Administration, announced to a small select group that war was expected "at any moment"; that "it is essential that we should not be caught unawares"; and that to meet this the Soviets would themselves attack first in August; and Nora Korozhenko Murray, then a minor NKVD agent in Moscow, who said that she was told by an NKVD captain in late May, 1941, that "Russia will be at war in a month's time" (Nora Murray, *I Spied for Stalin*, London, 1950, pp. 202–204 and p. 215).

41. Markoff, *Saturday Evening Post*, Vol. 222, No. 46, 1950, pp. 175-176; several interviews with former Soviet officers; and a former high-ranking German military source.


43. Tippelskirch, *op. cit.*, pp. 214-216.

This bibliography has been selected from the sources used in the preparation of this study, eliminating highly technical works of relatively little interest or value for our subject. Many sources were taken from the Soviet military periodical press, but to list the relevant articles drawn from military periodical sources of thirty-five years, the last ten of them intensively covered, would do the reader little service. Accordingly, only a few of the most generally useful recent articles have been listed, and the various organs of the military press have been described in a bibliographical note on Soviet periodical military publications.

Although a subject categorization of sources has its advantages, it also requires a great deal of duplication; and since the footnotes to the text carry much of this burden, the bibliography is arranged according to the nature of the source: Soviet—official regulations, manuals, and field orders, and other military writings; and non-Soviet—former Soviet officers, German sources (given separately because of the particular German military contact), other Western observers and analysts of Soviet military affairs, and certain related non-Soviet sources referred to in this study. The vast amount written of late in the Western periodical press has been sifted for the most useful recent articles of special relevance to a study on doctrine, omitting the numerous discussions of current capabilities and speculations on intentions.

The bibliography is divided into the following sections:

Note on Soviet periodical military publications;
A. Official Soviet regulations and manuals;
B. Soviet sources: books and pamphlets;
C. Soviet sources: selected recent periodical references;
D. Soviet sources: Radio Moscow and TASS;
E. Former Soviet sources;
NOTE ON SOVIET PERIODICAL MILITARY PUBLICATIONS

The military nonperiodical press is centralized in the Military Publishing House [Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, or, usually, Voenizdat], and although all its publications are not official, they at least pass through official channels. Those which are official are thus designated: before 1946, the Peoples' Commissariat of Defense (NKO); from 1946 to 1950, the Ministry of the Armed Forces (MVS); and since February, 1950, the Ministry of War (VM) and the Ministry of the Navy (MVMF). The Voenizdat is apparently under the Affairs Administration of the Ministry of War (now Defense).

There are no "unofficial" service journals or newspapers. Aside from local newspapers, there are two official newspapers, Krasnaia Zvezda and Krasnyi Flot. Krasnaia Zvezda ("Red Star"), published by the Chief Political Administration of the Soviet Army (since 1924), appears daily. It discusses military and political subjects, with a very significant continuing decline in the former since the end of the war. It has special correspondents, especially in wartime, and also takes articles by officers. Krasnyi Flot ("Red Fleet") is the equivalent for the Navy and is published by its Chief Administration (since 1938). On neither letterhead is the political administration listed, and each states merely that it is the "organ of the Ministry of War (the Navy)."

The most important military periodical is Voennaia Mysl' ("Military Thought"), published monthly since 1937 by the Historical Division of the General Staff of the Soviet Army.* It usually carries articles by leading military authorities on strategic and tactical problems of importance, although it, too, is less useful in time of peace. The chief editor is Major General Nikolai Talensky. It is marked: "For Generals, Admirals, and Officers of the Soviet Army and Navy only" and is further limited in its actual circulation.

Voennyi Vestnik ("Military Herald") is published monthly by the Chief Administration for the Ground Forces and has been since 1921. Since 1948

*Of the numerous early military journals which did not survive the 1930's, we need mention only a few which were especially important, and which were used in this study. Voennaia Nauka i Revolutsiia ("Military Science and the Revolution") was the organ of the Revolutionary Military Council (High Command). In 1922 its name was changed to Voennaia Mysl' i Revolutsiia ("Military Thought and Revolution"), and, later, to Voina i Revolutsiia ("War and the Revolution"), which was replaced in 1937 by Voennaia Mysl' ("Military Thought").
it has declined very considerably in terms of tactical information and now presents primarily political indoctrination and general training guides.

*Vestnik Vozdushnogo Flota* ("Herald of the Air Fleet") is published by the Chief Administration of the Army Air Force (VVS). Published since 1917; twice monthly until 1945, since then, published monthly.

*Artilleriiskii Zhurnal* ("The Artillery Journal") has been published monthly, since 1931, by the Chief Administration of Artillery.

*Tankist* ("The Tankist"), recently renamed from *Zhurnal Avto-Brone-tankovykh i Mekhanizirovannykh Voisk* ("The Journal of the Tank and Mechanized Troops"), is published monthly by that Chief Administration.

*Sovetskii Sviazist* ("Soviet Communications Man"), formerly *Sviaz* ("Communication") is the organ of the Chief Administration for the Communication Troops.

*Voennno-Inzhenernyi Zhurnal* ("The Military Engineering Journal") is published by the Chief Administration for Military Engineers.

*Tyl i Snabzhenie Vooruzhennykh Sil* ("The Rear and the Supply of the Armed Forces") is published by the Chief Administration of the Rear.

*Vestnik Protivo-Vozdushnoi Oborony* ("The Herald of the Air Defense Force") has been issued monthly since 1929 by the Main Administration of the Anti-Air Defense Force (PVO).

*Morskoi Sbornik* ("The Naval Journal"), the official naval organ, is a useful tactical-instructional magazine for naval officers, published monthly since the early 1930's.

The DOSAAF ("Voluntary Society for Aid to the Army, Aviation, and the Fleet") publishes several paramilitary periodicals. The most important is *Voennoe Znamia* ("Military Banner"), formerly the organ of DOSARM, published since 1948. Its predecessor was the journal *Za Oboronu* ("For Defense"), published since 1924 by Osoaviakhim and the MPVO of the NKVD (MVD). Since October, 1950, an aviation journal called *Kril'ia Rodiny* ("Wings of the Motherland"), has been published—first by DOSAV, and then, since the amalgamation of the preservice organizations, by DOSAAF.

The Ministry of the Aviation Industry (MAP) published a highly technical monthly periodical from 1926 to 1946 (now believed discontinued), called *Tekhnika Vozdushnogo Flota* ("Technology of the Air Fleet").

The Ministry of the Maritime Fleet (MMF) has, since 1940, published a technical journal called *Morskoi Flot* ("The Maritime Fleet") for the guidance of its officers.

*Voennye Znaniia* ("Military Knowledge") is a recent popular journal on military affairs.
A. OFFICIAL SOVIET REGULATIONS AND MANUALS


Ibid., Part II (Vol. 2) (Squadron and Regiment), provisional, Voenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1942, 170 pp.

Boevoi Ustav Pekhoty Krasnoi Armii ("Infantry Combat Regulations of the Red Army"), Part I (Vol. 1) (Soldier, Squad, Platoon, Company), Voenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1942, 267 pp. (Security classified in USSR). Reissued in 1943, 1944, and 1945, and not known to have been superseded.

Ibid., Part II (Vol. 2) (Battalion, Regiment), 1942, 293 pp. (Security classified in USSR). Reissued in 1943, 1944, and 1945, and not known to have been superseded.


Distsiplinarnyi Ustav Krasnoi Armii ("Disciplinary Regulations of the Red Army"), Voenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1941, 31 pp. (by order No. 356 of Marshal Timoshenko, October 12, 1940).

Distsiplinarnyi Ustav Vooruzhennyykh Sil Soiuza SSR ("Disciplinary Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR"), Voenizdat, MVS, Moscow, 1946, 50 pp.

Ibid., 1948, 50 pp.


Doprizyvnaia Voennaia Podgotovka ("Pre-Military Training"), Uchebgiz, Moscow, 1941, 378 pp., edited by Colonel S. F. Petrovsky. Textbook for 8th, 9th, and 10th grade students.


(Vremennaya) Instruktsiia po Organizatsii Sviazi, Opoveshecheniiia i Signalizatsii PVO na Promob’ektakh ("Provisional Instructions for the Organization of Communications, Warnings, and Signaling for the PVO [Air Defense] of Industrial Objectives"), PVO Administration, Moscow, 1939, 4 pp. (Security classified in USSR.)

Instruktsiia po Organizatsii Sviazy v Aviasoedineniakh i Aviachastiakh ("In-
Instructions on the Organization of Communications in Air Formations and Units”), Voenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1943, 51 pp.


A translation of this manual exists in the Pentagon Library.


(Vremennyi) Polevoi Ustav RKKA ("The Provisional Field Regulations of the RKKA"), Moscow-Leningrad, 1925.


Polevoi Ustav Krasnoi Armii, 1940 Goda ("Field Regulations of the Red Army, 1940"), projected, Gosvoenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1940, 366 pp.


Programma Doprizyvnoi Voennoi Podgotovki Uchashchikhsia, RSFSR ("Program of Premilitary Military Training of Students, RSFSR"), NKO, Moscow, 1942, 80 pp.


Rukovodstvo po Nazemnoi Razvedke ("Manual on Ground Reconnaissance"), Voenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1941, 125 pp.


No further volumes are known to have been published.


General close-order drill regulations, basic unit formations, commands, etc.

Ibid., 1939, 132 pp.

Ibid., 1940, 134 pp.

Stroevoi Ustav Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR ("Drill Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR"), Voenizdat, MVS, Moscow, 1947, 192 pp.

An adaptation of the prewar infantry drill regulations to fit the "unified" armed forces of the postwar era.

Ibid., 1948, 189 pp.

Taktika Aviatsii ("Aviation Tactics"), textbook for VVS students, Voenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1940, 408 pp.


Vozdushnoi Boi Istrebitelei ("Aerial Fighter Combat"), Voenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1942, 40 pp.

Conclusions from the combat experience of fighters of the PVO.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

B. SOVIET SOURCES: BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS


AGOKIS, E. V., Osnovy Vooruzhennia Samoilov ("Basic Aircraft Armament"), Gosizdoboprom, Moscow, 1940, 152 pp.


A general history and technical survey.

Artilleriiskoe Nastuplenie ("The Artillery Offensive"), Staff of the 82 OMSB, 1943, 28 pp.

Artilleriiskoe Nastuplenie ("The Artillery Offensive"), Voenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1942, 48 pp.

Articles on this subject which appeared in Red Star through March, 1942.

Artilleriia v Gorakh ("Artillery in the Mountains"), Voenizdat, NKO, 1940, 37 pp.

A collection of articles.

Artilleriia v Nastupatel'nykh Boiakh ("Artillery in Offensive Battles"), Voenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1944, 68 pp.

A collection of articles.


A political-ideological tract.

BAZILEVICH, PROFESSOR K. V., Russkoe Voennoe Iskusstvo ("The Russian Art of War"), Voenizdat, Moscow, 1944, 23 pp.

A Soviet eulogy of Russian military commanders of the past.


A translation of the book listed above.

*Bitva pod Kurskom* ("The Battle of Kursk"), A Short Outline, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1945, 95 pp.

A study of the Historical Division of the General Staff of the Red Army.


The basic Soviet work on the subject.

*Boevoi Opot Artillerii v Otechestvennoi Voine* ("The Combat Experience of Artillery in the Fatherland War"), Collection 1, Artillery Staff of the Red Army, Voenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1943, 81 pp.


A general account based on published Western sources.

*Bols'haia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia* ("The Great Soviet Encyclopedia"). See especially the articles listed below:

BIBLIOGRAPHY


The authors of these articles in the second edition are mostly, if not all, Soviet generals who serve as professors of military science or in the Historical Division of the General Staff.


Bor’ba S Nemetskoi Artilleriei (“The Struggle with German Artillery”), Collection of Articles No. 1, Voenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1944, 56 pp.


Stories of a war correspondent.


An unusually thorough Soviet account. (The last volume has been translated into English and is in the Pentagon Library.)


Reprint of his speech on Stalin’s seventieth birthday from Bol’shevik, No. 24, 1949.


Reprint of his speech of February 23, 1948.


The best and most complete Soviet account of this subject.


This book was criticized in a number of particulars in the Soviet military press after both editions. It remains a very interesting account, despite these "errors.


*Deistviia Strelkovogo Otdeleniia v Boiu (Boevye Primery)* ("The Actions of a Rifle Squad in Battle [Combat Examples]"), Voenizdat, MVS, Moscow, 1949, 102 pp.

Written by noncommissioned officer participants under the guidance of Colonel Ya. F. Potekhin.


*Desiat’ Let Krasnoi Armii* ("Ten Years of the Red Army"), Voennyi Vestnik, Moscow, 1928.


EVSTIGNEEV, MAJOR GENERAL V. N., *Razgrom Imperialisticheskoi Iaponii Na Dal’nom Vostoke v 1945 Godu* ("The Defeat of Imperialist Japan
BIBLIOGRAPHY


FEDOTOV, A. V., Ob'edinenniaa Brigada ("A United Brigade"), Moscow, 1945, 39 pp.


Notes of an army correspondent.


———, COLONEL N., The Defence of Moscow, FLPH, Moscow, 1944, 39 pp.


First appeared in the periodical Armiiia i Revoliutsiia, No. 1, 1921.

———, Isbrannye Proizvedeniia ("Selected Works"), Voenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1940, 262 pp.

———, Sochineniia, Vols. 1–3, Moscow, 1929.


GALATINOV, MAJOR GENERAL M., Strategicheskaiia Tsel' ("The Strategic Objective"), pp. 117–154.

This is an excerpt from some unidentified Soviet publication of 1943 or later.

GALIN, B., Ofitser Tankovykh Voisk ("An Officer of Tank Troops"), Voenizdat, MVS, Moscow, 1946, 80 pp.

Memoirs in biography of Major General Gusakovsky.
GA.PICH, MAJOR GENERAL N. I., Sluzhba Sviazi v Osnovnykh Vidakh Obschchevoiskogo Boia (SD i SK) ("Communication Service in Combined Arms Combat, Infantry Division and Corps"), Voenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1940, 303 pp.

GARNICH, MAJOR GENERAL N. F., Borodinskoe Srazhenie ("The Battle of Borodino"), public lecture, Moscow, 1949, 31 pp.

——, Otechestvennaia Voina 1812 Goda ("The Fatherland War of 1812"), public lecture, Moscow, 1949, 39 pp.


——, Razgrom Iudeniacha ("The Defeat of Yudenich"), Gosizdat, Moscow-Leningrad, 1929, 152 pp.


GOLUBEV, A., M. V. Frunze O Kharaktere Budushchei Voiny ("M. V. Frunze on the Character of Future War"), Frunze Military Academy, Gosvoenizdat, Moscow, 1931, 126 pp.


GORODOVIKOV, O., Konnitsa v Otechestvennoi Voine ("Cavalry in the Fatherland War"), Voenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1942, 80 pp.


Grazhdanskaia Voina: Materialy po Istorii Krasnoi Armii ("The Civil War:
520  BIBLIOGRAPHY


The Heroic Defence of Sevastopol, FLPH, Moscow, 1942, 128 pp. Collected articles by participants in its defense and observers.

Heroic Leningrad, FLPH, Moscow, 1945, 152 pp. Collected articles by participants in its defense and by observers.


IGNAT'EV, S. P., Khotim Letat’ (“We Want To Fly”), DOSARM, Moscow, 1950, 123 pp.

A continuation of the author's memoirs.
Translation of Book 1 of Zapiski Partizana.

IKONNIKOV, I. A., Maskirovka Boitsa ("Camouflage of the Fighter"), Voenizdat, Moscow, 1942, 30 pp.
———, Maskirovka Boitsa Zimoi ("Camouflage of the Fighter in Winter"), Voenizdat, Moscow, 1941, 38 pp.

IONOV, MAJOR GENERAL P. P., Istrebitel'naia Aviatsiia ("Fighter Aviation"), Moscow, 1940, 150 pp.

The history of the Soviet Navy in the war by the former Naval Chief of Staff.

ISAYEV [ISAEV], MAJOR GENERAL F., Bitva za Dnepr ("The Battle for the Dnepr"), Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1944, 31 pp.
By a Soviet General Staff officer.
A Ukrainian translation of a lecture given in Russian on October 20, 1944.


Joseph Stalin, A Short Biography, FLPH, Moscow, 1947, 204 pp.
The usual eulogy of Stalin's role in the Civil and Fatherland Wars is included.

———, Voennaia Opasnost' i Zadachi Oborony SSSR ("Military Danger and the Tasks of Defense of the USSR"), Partizdat, Moscow, 1933.

1928, 91 pp.
———, AND K. BERENDS, Kievskaia Operatsiia Poliakov 1920 Goda ("The
Primarily concerned with machine-gun tactics.


KARATUN, F. I., Ukreplenie Mestnosti Zimoi ("Fortification of the Terrain in Winter"), Gosvoenizdat, Moscow, 1940, 31 pp.

KARATYGIN, P., Mobilizatsiia Promyshlennosti Dlia Nuzhd Voiny ("Mobilization of Industry for War Needs"), Voennyi Vestnik, Moscow, 1925.


KATAEV, VALENTIN, Za Vlast' Sovetov ("For the Power of the Soviets"), Moscow-Leningrad, 1949, 554 pp.
A novel of Odessa and its partisan underground.

KATUKOV, MAJOR GENERAL OF TANK TROOPS M., Boevye Deistviia Tankov ("Combat Actions of Tanks"), Voenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1942, 20 pp.

KEKCHEEV, PROFESSOR K., Psikhofiziologija, Maskirovka i Razvedka ("Psychophysiology, Camouflage and Reconnaissance"), Gosizdat, Moscow, 1942, 105 pp.

Kharkov, FLPH, Moscow, 1943, 27 pp.
Collection of articles on this battle.


KHRUSTOV, F. D., Frunze O Voiskom Vospitanii ("Frunze on Military Education"), Voenizdat, MVS, Moscow, 1946, 64 pp.

KNIAZEV, MAJOR GENERAL M. S., Oborona Strelkogo Korpusa ("Defense of a Rifle Corps"), Voenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1940, 74 pp.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

---, Bor'ba v Pozisionnykh Uslugakh ("Position Warfare"), Voenizdat, Moscow, 1939, 156 pp.
The story of the Belorussian partisan group under Kovpak's command.
An autobiography of the famous ace, with stress on peacetime preparation made by the youth. He was thrice Hero of the Soviet Union.
Memoirs of a partisan.
An account of the military operations of the Western Allies by a Soviet war correspondent.
KUZNETSOV, SEMEN, Zhezlov i Ego Druz'ia ("Zhezlov and His Friends"), Molodaia Gvardiia, Moscow, 1946, 112 pp.
Stories about military flyers.
---, *Rastkazy o Perezhitom* ("Stories on [wartime] Experiences"), Voenizdat, MVS, Moscow, 1947, 47 pp.
Tales of Soviet airmen; a shorter edition of the book listed above.


---, *Vozdushnaiia Razvedka* ("Aerial Reconnaissance"), Gosvoenizdat, Moscow, 1938, 326 pp.


A review of Russian and Ukrainian military heroes through the Napoleonic period.


A documented account covering the period from June 23, 1943, through March 24, 1944.

An interesting presentation of the political Soviet view of the nature and role of morale in wartime.

LIAKHNITSKY, V. E., *Maskirovka Portov I Vodnykh Putei v Usloviakh SSSR*
BIBLIOGRAPHY

("Camouflage of Ports and Waterways under Conditions Prevailing in the USSR"), NKF, Moscow, 1944, 90 pp.


LOZOVOI-SHEVCHENKO, V. M., *Bor'ba s Aviatsiei Na Ee Aerodromakh* ("The Struggle with Aviation on Airdromes"), Voenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1941, 130 pp.


This is a collection of the writings of Admiral Makarov taken from his writings and lectures in the 1890's, published with only a very brief note—and internal evidence—to show that it is not current. It has not, apparently, been "purged."


A good study, with a foreword by Shaposhnikov.


A translation of a popular tract by a well-known Soviet historian.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

—-, AND E. N. GORODETSKY, Dokumenty po Istorii Grazhdanskoi Voiny ("Documents on the History of the Civil War"), OGIZ, Moscow, 1940, 544 pp.


MITIN, M., Moral'noe Sostoianie Germanskogo Tyla i Germanskoi Armii ("The Morale of the German Rear and Army"), OGIZ, Gospolitisdat, Moscow, 1942, 9 pp.

A political tract.


A popular tract with quotations from Lenin.


Na Dal'nykh Podstupakh K Moskve ("On the Far Approaches to Moscow"), Moscow, 1942, 186 pp.


NIKITTIN, M. N., Partizanskaia Voina V Leningradskoi Oblasti ("The Partisan War in Leningrad Region"), OGIZ, Gospolitisdat, Moscow, 1943, 114 pp.


A "popular" work.


A collection of articles.


Collected documents and commentary.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


The story told by a number of participants and observers.


A fictional description of artillery close support in combat.

PAROT'KIN, LT. COLONEL I. V., *Osvobozhdenie Zapadnoi Ukrainy* ("Liberation of the Western Ukraine"), OGIZ, Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1945, 48 pp.

By a Soviet General Staff officer.


A play about partisan life in the Lake Ilmen sector.


Divisional and regimental command points discussed.

PEKHOTA V NASTUPATEL'NOM BOIU ("Infantry in Offensive Combat"), Voenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1942, 168 pp.

A collection of articles on infantry tactics, taken from *Red Star*.


Memoirs of a former Soviet tank officer; in two parts. (Part I was published previously [1947] under the same title.)


An historical outline for children.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


An account by the Soviet writer and correspondent of his war experience from August, 1943, to May, 1944.

———, *We Are Soviet People*, FLPH, Moscow, 1949, 590 pp.

A collection of 25 short stories on the war years and heroes; Stalin prize of 1948.


Describes the breakout from encirclement of Major General Galitsky and his men, the author with them.


The story of Soviet partisan warfare as told by many participants and Soviet correspondents.


A translation of the above work.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


Includes a large bibliography.


Includes many very good, although dated, illustrations.


A study by two Soviet General Staff officers.


Severnyi Flot v Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine ("The Northern Fleet in the Great Fatherland War"), Voenizdat, MVS, Moscow, 1949.


A fourth volume was projected and possibly published, but was not available for this study. This work has the reputation of having been very influential in forming Soviet military doctrine. It is a rather pedestrian account in detail of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff under Konrad from 1908-1915, written to bolster the author's contention of the necessity of having a strong general staff.


The original Russian was not available. The author is a military historian on the General Staff.

———, *Razgrom Nemetskykh Voisk pod Moskvoi* ("The Defeat of the German Troops before Moscow"), Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1943, 32 pp.


Historical Division of the General Staff.


Historical Division of the General Staff.


SHORICHEN, L. F., *Voprosy Strategii i Taktiki v Trudakh I. V. Stalina Perioda 1921–1925 Godov* ("Questions of Strategy and Tactics in the Works of


An account attributed to many Soviet participants in the operation.


A Soviet equivalent of “Janes’ Fighting Ships.”


A novel on the battle of Stalingrad.


Speech made at the Party Congress of the Volga Military District on November 12, 1927.


———, Proryv Ukreplennoi Polosy (“Breakthrough of a Fortified Zone”), Voenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1941, 461 pp.

Smirnov, S., V Boiakh Za Budapesht (“In the Battles for Budapest”), Voenizdat, MVS, Moscow, 1947, 127 pp.


Textbook for Military Schools of the RKKA.


Stories about sailors.


Materials for political education studies.


Materials for political education studies.

The official manual issued to partisan forces, including tactical, material, weapons, and climate adjustment instructions.


This carries his writings through June, 1930. Later volumes containing his other writings are expected. Footnotes in the present study indicate the most important articles bearing on the subject of this book.


A reprint of his speech of February 23, 1928.


Translated from the final fifth Russian edition listed above; collected wartime addresses and orders of Stalin.


A Soviet translation into French; unfortunately not available in Russian.


Accounts by a number of Soviet officers and observers.


Collected articles by Soviet officers and correspondents.

SURINOV, MAJOR A., AND CAPTAIN V. NIKOL'SKY, TAKTIKA AVIATSII ("Aviation Tactics"), Osoaviakhim Central Committee, Moscow, 1940, 289 pp.


A work of great importance by a former Tsarist major general.


TALENSKY, MAJOR GENERAL NIKOLAI, DEUX CHOCS FOUDROYANTS ("Two Crushing Blows"), FLPH, Moscow, 1944, 71 pp.

Available only in official French translation. The defeats of the German armies at Moscow and Stalingrad in 1941 and 1942 are discussed.

——, LETNAIA KAMPANIЯ 1943 GODA ("The Summer Campaign of 1943"), Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1944, 29 pp.


——, VELOKOE SRAZHENIE POD STALINGRADOM ("The Great Engagement before Stalingrad"), Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1943, 30 pp.


A eulogy of the Tsarist admiral, Nakhimov, by the noted Soviet historian.

TEPLINSKY, BRIGADE COMMANDER B. L., AVIATSIIA V BOIu NAZEMNYKH VOISK ("Aviation in Combat against Land Troops"), Gosvoenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1940, 142 pp.


Academy of the General Staff.


Collected articles by participants.

TIMOSHENKO, S., SHKO LA BOEOVI UCHEBY ("The School of Combat Study"), Voenizdat, Moscow, 1940, 137 pp.

On training and discipline.

TOKAREV, VOENO-MORSKOI FLOT SSSR V OTECHESTVENNOI VOINE ("The Naval Fleet of the USSR in the Fatherland War"), Gosizpolit, Moscow, 1943.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

A bibliography.


TROTISKY, LEV, SOCHINENIIA ("Collected Works"), Vol. 17, Moscow-Leningrad, 1926.
On the Red Army in 1918.

TSIOLOKSY, K. E., TRUDY PO Raketnoi Tekhnike ("Works on Jet Technology"), Oborongiz, Moscow, 1947, 365 pp.

TUKHACHEVSKY, M., VOINA KLASSEV ("The War of Classes"), speeches of 1919-1921, Gosizdat, Moscow, 1921, 140 pp.


A translation of the above work.

Ulichnye Boi ("Street Fighting"), Voenizdat, Moscow, 1945, 94 pp.

USHAKOV, COLONEL SERGEI, BOEYVE BUDNI ("Daily Combat"), Voenizdat, MVS, Moscow, 1946, 94 pp.
Memoirs of a heavy bomber pilot.


V BOIAXH ZA OREL ("In the Battles for Orel"), OGIS, Moscow, 1944, 297 pp.
Edited by Major General N. Talensky of the General Staff.


VELICHKO, GUARDS LT. COLONEL V., PADENIE KENIGSBERGA ("The Fall of Koenigsberg"), Pravda Press, Moscow, 1945, 39 pp.

Memoirs of a partisan leader, assistant to Kovpak.

VIZVOLENA LVIVSCHCHINA ("Liberation of Lvov"), Vil'na Ukraina, L'viv (Lvov), 1945, 158 pp. (in Ukrainian).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Voin Krasnoi Armii v Plen ne Sdaet'sia ("Warriors of the Red Army Do Not Become Prisoners"), Leningrad, 1940, 14 pp.


Includes articles by Riazanov, Tukhachevsky, Gusev, et al.

Voiskovaiia Razvedka ("Troop Reconnaissance"), Voenizdat, NKO, Moscow.

A series of at least seventeen collections of articles in the period from 1943 to 1946; the collections vary in length from 60 to 120 pp. each.

VOLIN, B., Kak Rabochie i Krest'iani Ustanovili Sovetskuiu Vlast' i Otstoiali Ee v Grazhdanskoi Voine ("How the Workers and Peasants Established the Soviet Power and Defended It in the Civil War"), Pravda Press, Moscow, 1946, 40 pp.

Vooruzhennye Sily Sowiiz SSR ("The Armed Forces of the USSR"), Voenizdat, MVS, Moscow, 1949, 44 pp.

Materials for political education studies.


VOROB'EY, COLONEL F. D., Osvobozhdenie Pravoberezhnoi Ukrainy ("Liberation of the Eastern Ukraine"), OGIZ, Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1945, 48 pp.

By a Soviet General Staff officer.


"For Command Personnel."


A reprint of the speech on the occasion of Stalin's seventieth birthday; printed first in Bol'shevik, No. 24, 1949.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

——, Stalin and the Red Army, FLPH, Moscow, 1939, 43 pp.
——, Statii i Rechi ("Articles and Speeches"), Partizdat, Moscow, 1936, 661 pp.
Collected works to that date.

Speeches at the 18th Party Congress, March 10–21, 1939.

By a Soviet correspondent observer.

Vozdushnaia Razvedka ("Aerial Reconnaissance"), Voelizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1942, 86 pp.
Collected articles from Stalinist Falcon and Red Star.

Pages 43ff are excerpts from guerrilla leaders' diaries.


YANOFSKOV, A. Y., Maksirovka Zheleznykh Dorog v Usloviakh PVO ("Railway Camouflage in Anti-Aircraft Conditions") Transzheldorizdat, Moscow, 1941, 115 pp.


Collected articles from Herald of the Air Fleet on research and on progress of Soviet aviation.


An unpublished Bulgarian translation of a lecture given in Russian.
A study by the Historical Division of the General Staff.

A study by the Historical Division of the General Staff.


**C. SOVIET SOURCES: SELECTED RECENT PERIODICAL REFERENCES**

ALEKSEEV, LT. COLONEL I., "Assembly of an Attack Group after Completion


Since published as a book.


This article was written on the occasion of Stalin’s seventieth birthday and has since been reprinted in pamphlet form.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


"Combat Experience—The Basis for Further Perfecting Military Mastery" (editorial), Vestnik Vozdushnogo Flota, No. 11, June, 1945, pp. 1–4.


——, "The Offensive Power of Soviet Aviation," Krasnaia Zvezda, August 16 and 17, 1944.


GATOVSKY, L., "The Industrial Foundation of the Military Might of the USSR," Bol'shevik, No. 17–18, September, 1944, pp. 43–54.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


KORKODINOV, MAJOR GENERAL P. D. (General Staff), "The Operating Art of the Red Army," Morskoi Sbornik, No. 6, June, 1946, pp. 6–34.


KOROBKOV, N., "Russian Naval Traditions," Bol'shevik, No. 5, March, 1944, pp. 50–64.


The author discusses foreign experience in the main.


**MUSIYAKOV, MAJOR GENERAL P., "Coast Artillery," *Krasnyi Flot*, June 20, 1945.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


———, "On the Permanently Operating Factors Which Decide the Outcome of Wars," *Vestnik Vozdukhnogo Flota*, No. 4, April, 1951, pp. 8–15.


This is the only pronouncement on military affairs made by Stalin after the war.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


SVIATKOVSKY, MAJOR V., "The Organization of Tank Ambushes in the Mountains and Wooded Terrain," Zhurnal Avto-Bronetankovykh i Mekhanizirovannykh Voisk, No. 6, June, 1945, pp. 25ff.

TALENSKY, MAJOR GENERAL N. (General Staff), "A Great Lesson of History," Bol'shevik, No. 11, June, 1951, pp. 24-36.

An article on the anniversary of the German attack on the USSR.


------, "The Strategic Counter-Offensive," Voennaia Mysl', No. 6, June, 1946, pp. 3-16.

------, "Three Years of the Great Fatherland War of the Soviet People against the German Invaders," Bol'shevik, No. 10-11, May-June, 1944, pp. 9-21.


Tukhachevsky's last work; it expatiates on the 1936 Field Regulations.


VASILEV, COLONEL A., "Major Stages in the Struggle for the Dominion of


———, "How To Teach Flyers the Art of 'Reading' the Field of Battle from the Air," *Vestnik Vozdushnogo Flota*, No. 1, January, 1946, pp. 23–33.


This is a very useful account, in that it summarizes "formal" Soviet military doctrine. The article comprises the speech delivered on the occasion of Stalin's seventieth birthday anniversary and has since, with slight revision, been reprinted in pamphlet form.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


D. SOVIET SOURCES: RADIO MOSCOW AND TASS

The broadcasts of TASS and the Moscow Radio in Morse and English abroad and in Russian to the Moscow home audience and to the provincial press have been used. Reference is made in the footnotes to specific broadcasts cited.

E. FORMER SOVIET SOURCES

Books and Monographs

Ostensible memoirs of unevaluated veracity.

An account by a former Soviet farm director and officer who defected to the West in 1949.

Memoirs of a former Soviet reserve general and diplomat who defected in 1937 (cf. interviews).
BIBLIOGRAPHY

The story of the Soviet military intelligence network operating from Switzerland during the war, by a former member of its group.

The author was cipher clerk for the Soviet military intelligence network operating in Canada.

The author has made wide use of Soviet military journals from 1928–1930 and apparently served as an officer in the Red Army.


KALINOV, CYRILLE [Kyril], *Les Marchaux Soviétiques Vous Parlent . . .* ("The Soviet Marshals Speak . . ."), Libraire Stock, Paris, 1950, 302 pp. Ostensibly by a former Soviet General Staff colonel who defected to the West in 1949. The existence of this "colonel" has been disputed. The book contains some facts known to be true and others that are spurious, but its real interest is in anecdotal material, the veracity of which cannot be determined.


The author defected from the Soviet Purchasing Commission in the United States. He observed many interesting sidelights on the conduct of the war from his position high in the industrial apparatus.

The author was formerly head of the Soviet military intelligence in Western Europe.

The memoirs of a former Soviet General Staff captain who defected in 1948. Reliability very doubtful.

An English translation of the above book.

An account by a former instructor in this school in the 1930’s.
Although never in the Red Army, the author observed and recorded interesting aspects of it.

The story of a former Soviet air force officer who defected to the West after the war.

An account by a former Soviet colonel.

Allegedly the story of an anti-Soviet underground agent who infiltrated the Soviet military counterintelligence *Smersh* after the war in Central Europe.

Memoirs of a former instructor in a special school for Civil War generals in the 1920's and 1930's.

Written by a former Soviet diversionist agent in wartime-occupied Belorussia and including discussion of the *Smerish* surveillance in the Red Army.

The stories of thirteen former Soviet citizens, some of whom served in the Red Army.

The author was formerly a lieutenant colonel in the Soviet air force and was engaged in aerodynamics research. His experience includes a session with the Politburo and high-level contacts in line with his technical expertise on jet and rocket development and the enlistment of the aid of German specialists after the war. He defected to the West in 1949.

Memoirs of a former Communist agent in Germany.

The story of a former Polish soldier drafted into the Red Army.

The story of a former Soviet air force officer as told to the author, above.

An historical account by a former Soviet officer and Trotskyite.
Written by a former Soviet employee of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico; of some use concerning Soviet foreign intelligence methods.

By a former Soviet major who defected to the West since the war. His interpretation is that the Soviet high command is heedless of manpower losses.

Contains useful articles on the Soviet secret police.

Chasovoi ("The Sentinel"), an émigré Russian publication published monthly in Brussels.  
Contains articles by former Tsarist and Soviet officers and also news-editorials on military affairs.


By a former Soviet air force general captured during the war. Reliable.


Novoe Russkoe Slovo ("The New Russian Word").  
A Russian-language newspaper published daily in New York. It occasionally has articles by former Soviet officers.

Posev ("Sowing").  
An émigré Russian publication published weekly since 1947 in Limburg/Lahn and Frankfurt, U.S. Zone, Germany. It contains useful articles by former Soviet officers.

Rossiiskii Demokrat ("The Russian Democrat").  
An émigré Russian publication published in Paris since 1946 and appearing irregularly and under varying titles (Svobodnaia Mysl', "Free Thought"; Nezavisimyi Golos, "The Independent Voice"; Nezavisimaya Mysl', "Independent Thought"; Svobodnyi Golos, "Free Voice"; etc.). By the same editors as those
of Vozrozhdenie. Included in it are a number of useful articles by former Soviet officers.


The author, for 10 years in the Red Army, commanded a tank battalion before defecting to the West in 1949.

*Vozrozhdenie* ("Rebirth").

An émigré Russian publication published bimonthly in Paris. This journal contains interesting articles by former Soviet officers.

**Interviews**

A number of interviews of former Soviet officers by this author have been used as background sources in preparing this study. In almost all cases anonymity is required or preferred, and the few specific interviews listed below are the only ones of which the sources can be named, directly identified, and cited.

MARKOFF, ALEXEI (pseud.), formerly a major general in the Soviet army air force. General Markoff served in the Red Army from 1917 until his capture in combat during the Second World War. His prewar work in Soviet military planning and his wartime command experience have made him a most valuable source. His reliability has proved to be very high.

BARMINE, ALEXANDER, former Soviet general. He fought in the Civil War, graduated from the General Staff Academy (later named for Frunze) in 1923, and returned for a refresher course at the Frunze Academy in 1934. He defected from a diplomatic post in 1937.

KORIAKOV, MIKHAIL; formerly a Soviet writer and a captain serving on Timoshenko's staff. He was then with the air force, and later with the infantry until his capture shortly before the close of the war. As a professional journalist, he was observant of some matters of interest not often noted.

PIROGOV, PETER, former Soviet air force lieutenant. He was a navigator of a Soviet reconnaissance plane during and after the war. He defected to the West in 1948.

The author has personally interviewed the following former Soviet officers, who can be identified only by rank: Major General (infantry), Colonel (infantry), Colonel (army air force), Lt. Colonel (long-range air force), Lt. Colonel (rear services), Major (infantry), Captain (army air force), Captain (infantry), Captain (artillery), Senior Lieutenant (army air force), Senior Lieutenant (NKVD and NKGB), and Senior Lieutenant (tank troops).
In addition, I have benefited from accounts of interviews held by colleagues. In particular, I am indebted to Dr. Herbert Dinerstein, who is currently preparing a study on Soviet partisans, for making available data collected by him in extended interviews with about a dozen former Soviet partisans.

F. GERMAN SOURCES

Books


EINSIEDEL, HEINRICH GRAF VON, *Tagebuch der Versuchung* ("Diary of Temptation"), Pontes Verlag, Stuttgart, 1950. Memoirs of a German flyer; especially interesting are conversations with Soviet officers after his capture.


HALDER, GENERAL FRANZ VON, "Diary: Campaign in Russia," Vols. 6 and 7, February, 1941, through September, 1942. The unpublished diary of the Chief of the German General Staff during this period. A very useful document.

---, *Hitler als Feldherr* ("Hitler as Commander"), Munchener Dom-Verlag, 1949, 63 pp.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg (November 14, 1945–October 1, 1946), Nuremberg, 1949, 42 vols.
This source contains a wealth of testimony and documents from German sources by the prosecutors and the defense.

Field Orders


Periodicals


The author was formerly head of the Historical Division of the German Navy and had personal access to high German commanders.


"Russian and German Tactics in World War II," *Military Review*, Vol. 29, No. 6, September, 1949, pp. 100-102. (Based on an article by a former German battalion commander.)


Special Source

An additional German military source of great knowledge and high reliability has occasionally been cited as "anonymous high-ranking German military source." Identity is known to this author but cannot be divulged. The material cited was in written form, prepared since the end of the war in the West.

G. NON-SOVIET COMMENTARIES ON SOVIET MILITARY AFFAIRS

Books


BUNYAN, JAMES, *Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in Russia*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1936, pp. 267–276. The pages indicated contain the texts of several early Bolshevik military decrees and speeches by Trotsky.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

A former Comintern leader describes the Soviet Union at war, with some interesting sidelights.


The author was Chief of the Intelligence Division, Army Field Forces. This is probably the best published work on the Soviet Army.

Memoirs of a B-29 flyer shot down over Siberia and later repatriated.


An interesting survey based on Soviet materials.

The author served as military attaché of the French Embassy in Moscow from 1946 to 1948.


Written by a renegade former White officer who became pro-Soviet.


The most complete published work on this subject, by a former RAF intelligence officer.

Written by a former White officer in exile.

These are sections on the Soviet Army as observed in 1936 and during the recent war.


A book by Manstein's British defense counsel at the War Crimes trial.


By a former White officer.

(See pp. 88–137, 245–262, and 359–422.)


The full account of the famous Canadian spy case.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


SERGE, VICTOR, Hitler Contra Stalin ("Hitler against Stalin"), Ediciones Quetzal, Mexico, 1941, 226 pp.

SIMONE, ANDRE, La Batalia De Rusia ("The Battle of Russia"), El Libro Libre, Mexico, 1943, 174 pp.


An amusing memoir of the author's experience in meeting Soviet troops and generals in Yugoslavia and Austria during the war.


Extracts translated for this author.


Periodicals

The monthly Military Review, published by the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is a particularly rich source, since it contains digested translations of useful articles from numerous foreign military journals, including occasional Soviet articles.


Full text of a release by the Department of Defense on "The Sorge Spy Ring—A Case Study in International Espionage in the Far East," as given in extension of remarks by the Honorable H. O. Lovre.


Dingler, "Der Rotarmist als Kämpfer" ("The Red Army Man as a Sol-
BIBLIOGRAPHY


A review by this author of the books by Ely, Lee, and Guillaume cited in this bibliography; and an outline of particular points in Soviet military doctrine, strategy, and tactics.


In this article the author has examined the Soviet "calculation of the relation of forces," particularly in political decision-making, but with reference to strategy.


Written by the former commander of the Fourth Polish Infantry Division.


By the former British military attaché in Moscow.


An analysis of Stalin's letter to Razin.


A very competent review.


A recent and interesting evaluation.


"Russian Tactical Principles," *Military Review*, Vol. 28, No. 5, August, 1948, pp. 94-96. (Digested from an article by Capt. H. Kurz in a Swiss military journal.)
"Russian Tactics," *Military Review*, Vol. 28, No. 8, November, 1948, pp. 85–86. (Based on a Danish source.)


This entire issue is devoted to this subject. It contains interesting information but unfortunately also suffers from a number of errors.


A survey of Russian, and recent Soviet, naval policy.


An account of Soviet generals.


ZACHAROFF, LUCIEN, "The Red Air Fleet Two Years After," Air Age, June, 1943, pp. 6ff.

H. SELECTED NON-SOVIET COMMENTARY REFERENCES

Books


———, Principles of War, Military Service Publishing Co., Harrisburg, Pa., 1942. (Written in 1812.)


EISENHOWER, GENERAL DWIGHT D., Crusade in Europe, Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1948, 478 pp. A chapter on his contact with the Soviet Army and visit to Moscow is included (pp. 457–478).


The section indicated discusses the Russian and Soviet General Staffs.


A pioneer study of the subject indicated.


An analysis of the current strategic scene based on a very confused neo-Marxian political-strategic outlook.


Periodicals