In 2011 the U.K. Government reviewed its counter terrorism Prevent Strategy to include “all forms of extremism” with an emphasis on right-wing extremism. This book – written by the former Head of Strategy and Policy at the Office of the National Coordinator for Prevent – provides the most detailed assessment yet of this shift in emphasis.

It explores how the inclusion of right-wing extremism within the counter terrorism Prevent Strategy impacted local responses to the English Defence League. This is explored through numerous interviews and several case studies which were carried out by the author while he was serving as a senior police officer within the Counter Terrorism Command of the Metropolitan Police Service. The book balances empirical research with practical recommendations for policymakers and practitioners from a unique “insider” perspective.

This book will be of appeal to an array of audiences including scholars and students of Terrorism Studies, professionals working in the areas of counter terrorism, public order policing and the promotion of community cohesion, and to those who have an interest in wider non-political responses to right-wing extremism.

Dr Craig J.J. McCann is an independent counter terrorism consultant and researcher. He was previously Head of Strategy and Policy at the Office of the National Coordinator for Prevent.
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The Prevent Strategy and Right-wing Extremism
A Case Study of the English Defence League

Craig J.J. McCann
Dedicated to Hannah, Robyn, Georgina & Hugo.
For being My World.
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Since the U.K. Government reviewed its counter terrorism Prevent Strategy in 2011 to encompass “all forms of extremism” with an emphasis on the right-wing variant, there has been no empirical research undertaken to explore the impact of this decision on local responses to the phenomenon. In the absence of relevant, objective and timely research, we have been left with a plethora of unresolved definitional issues, muddled policy responses, political posturing, and the continued fuelling of inter-community tensions. Frontline practitioners from a range of statutory and non-statutory services have been left to navigate this interminable white noise against a backdrop of working within the most contentious area of the U.K.’s counter terrorism strategy.

The international literature on responses to right-wing extremism has thus far focussed on its various political manifestations, particularly in relation to both extreme right-wing and populist political parties and the ideology that underpins them. From a U.K. perspective, the emphasis over the last 30 years has been very much on attempting to understand the causal factors underpinning the extreme right-wing, the composition of these groups and how they compare with similar groups throughout Europe.

It is striking that there is very little material available which provides a platform for debate as to how the state should actually respond to movements such as the English Defence League (EDL) who do not seek legitimacy through the ballot box. As a movement at the zenith of its power and influence in 2011 the EDL mobilised thousands of people through its street protests, and although its ability to galvanise large numbers of people to turn out to protest has waned since 2013, the sentiment from which it gained its legitimacy and drew its strength has not, as evidenced by the 15,000 strong “Free Tommy Robinson” movement that protested on the 9 June 2018, highlighting how this constituency of protestors is still very much alive.1

This is the first book exploring how the U.K.’s counter terrorism Prevent Strategy has been used to respond to right-wing extremism and shines a light on hitherto unexplored accounts utilising data yielded through more than 80 interviews with frontline practitioners spanning the police service, local authorities and third sector partners in the three case study areas of Luton, Newcastle and Waltham Forest. The book’s origins lay in doctoral and postdoctoral research.
started at the University of Nottingham (2013–2015) and completed at the University of Kent at Canterbury (2015–2017).

I conducted this research on a part-time basis while serving as a senior police officer within the Metropolitan Police Service’s Counter Terrorism Command. I had joined the Metropolitan Police Service in 2002 and served in a range of policing disciplines including the criminal investigations department and neighbourhood policing, before moving into counter terrorism policing in 2010. I then worked across various portfolios delivering the Prevent Strategy: as a Channel Coordinator for East London, the Head of the Muslim Contact Unit, and as Head of the Extremism Disruptions Team. In 2013 I was seconded to the National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters as the Deputy to the National Strategic Lead for Channel, which led to me taking on the role of Head of Strategy & Policy for the national Prevent Policing portfolio where I led on setting the strategy for Prevent Case Management across England and Wales. I then took the difficult decision to retire from the police service in 2016 having reached the rank of Detective Chief Inspector. References to the academic literature have been mostly consigned to endnotes and a description of the methodology, including my considerations as an insider researcher can be found in the Appendix.

Based upon four years of fieldwork the major conclusions presented in this book are that; (1) the impact of the decision to explicitly include right-wing extremism within the Prevent Strategy has been minimal. With the exception of the Channel intervention programme, there are for instance no specific counter narratives that have been created as a response to the expansion of the policy to include “all forms of extremism”. Instead, this has led to a generalised approach to countering extremism without a clear understanding of right-wing extremism as a distinct phenomenon, separate and non-contingent upon Islamist extremism; (2) the EDL is understood by local actors as a threat to the public order and community cohesion, but not as a terrorism threat. Notwithstanding this position, the case studies highlight the continued role of counter terrorism Prevent officers in the pre, during and post phases of EDL attendance in maintaining community cohesion and providing reassurance with reference in particular to Muslim communities; and (3) right-wing extremism is poorly understood and articulated at a national policy level. There is a lack of synergy on this issue between the integration, cohesion, hate crime, the Prevent Strategy and Counter Extremism policy areas, the interpretation of which at a local level has led to inter-agency tensions that have been further negatively impacted by Government imposed austerity measures on public sector resourcing since 2010.

Studying for a PhD part-time and writing this book have been a challenge not only for me, but for my family and friends, none of whom signed up for this. I will be forever profoundly grateful to my long-suffering (her words) wife, Hannah, for her unending patience, encouragement and belief in me during the dark days, and for keeping my feet on the ground when I needed it. I’d like to express my thanks to our beloved children; Robyn, Georgina and Hugo, for making me smile and reminding me of what is important. Words cannot express
how grateful I am to my parents, my brother and sister for the start they gave me in life. I am where I am today in large part because of you all.

I would like to thank my academic supervisors both from where I started this PhD at the University of Nottingham, and latterly, the University of Kent at Canterbury, namely Dr Philip Cowley of the University of Nottingham and Dr Laura Sudulich of the University of Kent. I would like to express my special appreciation and thanks to Professor Matthew Goodwin for his direction and encouragement throughout my work. I am also grateful to the three anonymous reviewers who provided valuable suggestions for improving the manuscript.

Finally, I have to thank all those front-line practitioners who allowed me to interview them and for trusting me with their accounts. The responsibility I have had to accurately depict their experiences and observations and critically analyse them within the parameters of my research has weighed heavily on me. I hope I have done them justice. I have found police officers, safeguarding practitioners, members of local authorities, politicians and local activists to be incredibly open about these issues and extremely passionate in their desire for their voices to be heard by those authoring policies governing their operational roles. In keeping with promises made during my fieldwork, their names have been kept anonymous.

Craig J.J. McCann
October 2018

Notes
1 BBC News (09/06/2018) “Police Officers hurt at ‘Free Tommy Robinson’ protest”.
2 C.J.J. McCann (2017) How did the U.K. Government’s decision to include right wing extremism within its counter terrorism “Prevent” Strategy in 2011 impact on local responses to the English Defence League?
Introduction

This book analyses how the U.K. Government’s decision to explicitly add right-wing extremism (RWE) within its counter terrorism “Prevent Strategy” impacted on local responses to the English Defence League (EDL). As the first research into this subject matter, through data yielded from more than 80 qualitative interviews with frontline practitioners across three case study areas conducted by a serving counter terrorism police officer specialising in the Prevent Strategy, it will explore the ways in which this shift in the strategy played out at a local level among statutory actors interpreting and implementing it in their operational roles against the backdrop of central government imposed austerity measures since 2010.

While I will briefly address the political responses of mainstream political parties to RWE manifested by populist groups across Europe who seek legitimacy at the ballot box this book will focus on the non-political means of responding to RWE in the U.K. as set within the wider political context including engagement, prevention, and enforcement when identifying and managing individuals and groups carrying out activities in furtherance of their extreme right-wing world view. While the discourse regarding the threat posed by RWE has steadily gained prominence in the U.K., the focus has thus far been on the British National Party (BNP) and latterly the radical right populism of the U.K Independence Party, and has followed the same narrow focus on how to respond to party-political manifestations of right-wing extremism as is the case for similar parties across Europe such as the Front National in France, Jobbik in Hungary, Vlaams Blok in Belgium, the Danish People’s Party in Denmark, and the Swedish Democrats.

This book however, focuses on the non-political state responses to the EDL, a movement forged in 2009 from the response of local Luton residents to Islamist extremist marches and demonstrations in the town. There are now several similar groups that have developed as off-shoots to the EDL or that have been established in parallel and include The Infidels, The Casuals, Britain First and more recently the Football Lads Alliance. These groups, unlike the BNP and UKIP, have no such desire to engage in the political process, but instead articulate their views through a nation-wide street protest movement that is increasing linked with similarly minded “counter Jihad” groups across Europe and the United
Introduction

States. It is this international dimension to the RWE movement, as well as right-wing motivated incidents such as the 2011 attacks committed by Anders Breivik in Norway, and the campaign of right-wing motivated terrorism carried out by the National Socialist Underground (NSU) movement in Germany, whose very existence was only identified in late 2011, as well as data from the Global Terrorism Database depicting the true scale of RWE-related incidents, that have challenged the continued dominance of preventative measures against Islamist extremism in the post 9/11 counter extremism landscape. The Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Report for 2018 references the EU Security Commissioner Sir Julian King who in March 2018 highlighted the growing “menace” of RWE and that he was not aware of a single EU Member State that is not affected in some way by the phenomenon. Recent EU-funded research undertaken to explore “lone actor” terrorism found that;

... right-wing lone actors were less likely to have been under active investigation by authorities than religiously inspired individuals. Policymakers and the police must give greater consideration to the threat from far-right lone actor terrorism, and not underestimate its capacity when compared with Islamist extremism.

From a U.K. perspective, the recognition that threats of extremism emanate from non-Islamist forms of extremism has been emphasised by recent extreme right-wing motivated attacks such as the 2013 murder of Mohammed Saleem, an 82-year-old British Muslim from Birmingham, killed by Pavlo Lapshyn, an extreme right fanatic who went on to bomb mosques in Walsall, Wolverhampton and Tipton. In January 2015, Zack Davies attempted to murder Dr Sarandev Bhambra in a racially motivated attack in a supermarket in North Wales and was sentenced to life in prison. He had claimed the attack was “revenge for Lee Rigby”, and extreme-right publications were found at his home. In June 2016 Jo Cox, the British Labour Party Member of Parliament for Batley and Spen was murdered by Thomas Mair while she was on her way to meet with her constituents at a routine surgery. Mair was motivated by his belief that Cox was a “collaborator” in the betrayal of white people because of her pro-European Union stance in the run-up to the 2016 referendum on the U.K.’s membership of the European Union. Amid a wave of Islamist extremist attacks in 2017, on the 19th June Darren Osborne drove a van into pedestrians near Finsbury Park Mosque targeting the group of Muslims as they were leaving Ramadan night prayers, killing Makram Ali and injuring 12 others. In late 2016 we also saw the U.K.’s first proscription of a far-right group, National Action, using counter terrorism legislation. Over the last two years there have been a slew of arrests of individuals, including members of the British Army, for offences ranging from membership of the organisation through to planning terror attacks such as a plot to murder Labour MP Rosie Cooper. As an indication of the increased threat profile emanating from right-wing extremism, in February 2018 the U.K.’s
head of counter terrorism policing, Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service, Sir Mark Rowley, announced that since the Finsbury Park Mosque attack four further terror plots that demonstrated a level of organisation not seen before within the far-right had been thwarted.18

What is “right-wing extremism”?

Throughout this book, I will use the term “right-wing extremism” as this is how it is articulated within the Prevent Strategy, although it is not defined within the strategy.19 Definitions of right-wing extremism are subject to wide variation with some scholars grounding the term within illiberal forms of ultra-nationalism, which at the most extreme take the form of fascism, neo-fascism and neo-Nazism.20 Others define right-wing extremism in the modern context more expansively, capturing less extreme but still “far right” groups and political parties who may not necessarily ostensibly reject democracy as they operate within political systems but nonetheless continue to galvanise populist sentiment in relation to key issues associated with “far right” narratives.21 For the purposes of this book, amid the lack of consensus on terminology to be used, I will be using the definition presented by Carter, which consist of two elements: (1) A rejection of the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional state, and (2) A rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality.22 It is important to highlight this as a fundamental issue that needs to be addressed in devising an effective response, that is, to clearly define the problem. I have adopted Carter’s definition of right-wing extremism as in my view it very simply distinguishes the necessary ideological components of the phenomenon without being overly distracted by the wider discourse concerning populist political parties. More expansive definitions risk conflating the rejection of democratic institutions and fundamental human equality as necessary components of right-wing extremism with wider issues such as immigration, integration and social cohesion, rendering them operationally irrelevant when considering the stark reality facing practitioners.

The term “right-wing extremism” is used as an umbrella concept encompassing a plethora of actors, including legitimate political parties with a “right-wing” mandate, most notably in relation to immigration and integration policies, those groups who have rejected the ballot box and articulate their views through street protest movements, and those lone actors who perpetrate acts of terrorism acting upon the ideology of the “extreme right-wing”.23 It is therefore exceptionally difficult to identify a singular policy response which effectively meets the challenges to a liberal democracy as posed by each of these groups in turn.24 It has become increasingly challenging to define the actors within this new extremism “scene”. Due to the proliferation of different ideologies, movements and leaders that are available through the internet, we now live in an age of Supermarket Extremism, with individuals shopping around the marketplace of ideas for narratives that conform and/or build upon their pre-existing world view, selecting content for instance from the AfD in Germany, the alt-right in the U.S. and
Britain First in the U.K., re-interpreting it and making it their own. There is yet very little understanding as to how inter-connected organisations and individuals are within the extreme right-wing milieu that now extends internationally, not just operationally but significantly from an ideological perspective.

Mudde describes the “terminological chaos” evident in academic literature in this area, whereby numerous definitions of the target group are used interchangeably, creating an ambiguous platform on which to develop further thinking. In exploring how we define “far right” parties as opposed to “anti-immigration” parties, this argument is endorsed by Spanje who emphasises that “such conceptual problems create methodological difficulties, for example, they are conducive to the violation of the assumption of unit homogeneity, which is a key assumption for drawing valid causal inferences”. Jamin explored the concepts of “populism” and “the extreme right” and highlighted the difficulties caused by how these concepts are used just as much to pass judgement on a reality as to describe it. The truth of it is that nowadays, it’s very difficult to talk about subjects like uncontrolled immigration or child sexual exploitation without being dragged into and unwittingly contributing to the very polarisation of debate we are seeking to avoid, which is only further aggravated by the identity politics driven value judgements we find chipping away at the centre ground. In a world in which we have shifted from fact-based to emotion-based discourse, we’re all extremists.

**Why the EDL?**

At an organisational or movement level, the EDL does not subscribe to RWE ideology or fulfil the criteria as set out in Carter’s definition discussed earlier. The EDL website contains their mission statement, setting out its role in “protecting and promoting human rights”, framing the EDL as a “human rights organisation”. The movement distances itself from the label of “the far right”, stating; “The EDL are, in fact, one of the best safeguards this country could have against the rise of the far right”. Adrian Tudway, the former National Coordinator for Domestic Extremism was quoted as saying:

> In terms of the position with EDL, the original stance stands, they are not extreme right-wing as a group, indeed if you look at their published material on their web-site, they are actively moving away from the right and violence with their mission statement etc.

That is not to say that the movement has not attracted individuals who do adhere to this ideology, indeed its leader, Tommy Robinson (real name Stephen Yaxley-Lennon), left the movement in 2013 citing his concerns that it was being infiltrated by the far-right. However, there was evidence that for many frontline practitioners, in the absence of experiencing smaller, less visible RWE groups such as National Action and The Aryan Strikeforce, the EDL is the only manifestation of the extreme right-wing that they would be likely to recount. Treadwell describes the EDL as being synonymous with the “face of the far right”.
since 2009. During my preliminary research it became clear just how true this was. Frontline practitioners had very little experience of responding to extreme right-wing groups, organisations, movements other than the EDL and subsequently the movement had become a shorthand for referencing the practitioner experience of the “extreme right-wing in the U.K”. The definition of the EDL matters because it determines not only the policy response but also provides direction for state actors who are responsible for implementing this policy within their operational context.

We can see how the definitional difficulties surrounding the movement presented themselves even within the public consultation which fed into the Prevent Review in 2011. Of note, in reference to the EDL; “some respondents viewed this threat as distinct from terrorism, but others saw no barrier to dealing with counter-terrorism and the EDL under the same Prevent Strategy”. It is significant that the EDL was presented as the only example of the “right-wing extremism” that should be included within the updated strategy. Subsequent commentary including statements from senior politicians, academics and commentators has referenced the EDL as “extreme right-wing” and an example of “the new far right” in the U.K. It is significant that in a speech entitled “The new far right” in 2013, the then Security Minister, James Brokenshire MP, depicted “the far right” only by way of reference to the EDL, a group who fit within the category of an organisation who have rejected political legitimacy through the ballot box and utilise street-based protest as a means of articulating their mandate. However, later in the same speech he went on to state that the EDL would not be subject to the Prevent Strategy but to work led on by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). And herein lays the contradiction. If the EDL are referred to as “extreme right-wing” and/or the “far-right” and yet the movement does not fall within the “right-wing extremism” to which the Prevent Strategy now refers, then what are the implications for state actors interpreting this highly contentious policy area for their local communities? How representative the EDL are of RWE more broadly and the implications of devising policy responses that cater for this one manifestation of RWE will be explored further in this book.

Given the problematic identification of the EDL within the RWE categorisation and the perceived normalisation or “mainstreaming” of the narratives that underpin its support, going forward it will be vitally important for policy makers and practitioners to demonstrate a comprehension of the strata within “the extreme right-wing” scene when developing effective response tactics. It is within this context that I have used the movement as the entry point to explore how the Prevent Strategy has been utilised to respond to this form of extremism. This book explores practitioner experiences of the EDL as the movement most likely to have precipitated local response strategies, and to have been conceptualised as a RWE group for the purposes of the revised Prevent Strategy, through which an analysis to assess the impact of the Prevent Review is possible.

Although many believe the English Defence League to be a spent force, there has never been a definitive end to the movement, brought about either by social
change or policy innovation. The broad constituency of people who turned out for EDL events has not simply disappeared, and we are reminded of this during flashpoints such as the protests of June 2018 in support of its former leader, Tommy Robinson. In framing the responses to the EDL solely through the prism of reactive public order policing the movement will continue to limp on in one guise or another, awaiting a perceived social injustice or the anointing of a charismatic and influential leader in the mould of Tommy Robinson to once again galvanise social grievances and expose the absence of strategic thinking at both the central and local government levels in ensuring white working class communities are not left behind by social change.

**Site selection**

This book makes use of case studies to explore the experiences and perceptions of frontline practitioners regarding how they have responded to the Government’s decision to explicitly include RWE within its counter terrorism Prevent Strategy in 2011. It is the very nature of the central “how” that makes this methodology so appropriate within the context of the research question. A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly defined. This book explores the impact of this policy direction within the context of governmental Prevent Strategy prioritisation in relation to local resource allocation to realise the aims of the Prevent Strategy, namely to challenge RWE ideology, to support vulnerable individuals and to work with key sectors and institutions. This is only possible through the exploration of the real-world accounts of those frontline practitioners who are charged with the management of risk, threat and vulnerability for their communities. A case study allows investigators to focus on a “case” and retain a holistic and real-world perspective, such as in studying individual life cycles, small group behaviour, organisational and managerial processes, neighbourhood change, school performance, international relations, and the maturation of industries. In identifying the three sites which are central to this book I used two variables to triangulate those local authorities which most aptly demonstrate the operational environment which possesses the following characteristics;

1) Those local authorities which are afforded Prevent prioritisation, “Prevent Priority Areas”.
2) Those local authorities with significant experience of responding to the EDL.

The research underpinning this book does not seek to attain findings which are generalisable to the larger population. The very fact it is focussed on the two variables discussed instead marks the case study areas as “crucial” or “extreme” cases, thereby telling us something of a phenomenon from where it is most
likely to occur.\textsuperscript{42} If we were to consider the external validity of the research supporting this book, i.e. to what populations, settings and variables can this effect be generalised, it is clear that it is of most relevance in those locations where the variables converge.\textsuperscript{43} I have not included a fourth case study area to explore a non-Prevent Priority Area without significant experience of responding to the EDL as in my view a negative case would not contribute to the thinking on statutory service response strategies.

Prevent prioritisation was set out in the 2011 Prevent Strategy with reference to the additional funding (in addition to ring-fenced staff), which would be made available with which to deliver specific project work;

\begin{quote}
Funding will be made available by the Home Office to the 25 priority areas for project work on a grant basis and for activities which address specific local risks and are designed to establish specific Prevent benefits. OSCT will have oversight of funding for projects and will work with local authorities to agree associated evaluation and monitoring procedures.\textsuperscript{44}
\end{quote}

In identifying those local authorities with significant experience of responding to the EDL, I have used data depicting the number of EDL demonstrations over the period of June 2011 to June 2015 with the expectation that those areas which have accommodated the most EDL demonstrations, both in terms of frequency and numbers attending, would have developed appropriate response strategies.

My rationale for selecting this time span is that the Prevent Strategy review was published in June 2011. The review for the first time explicitly set out that the Prevent Strategy was applicable to “all forms of extremism”\textsuperscript{45} and drew out its utility in responding to RWE. As this book is intended to explore the impact of this shift in policy, its date of being published is a sensible starting point. That is not to say that the applicability of the Prevent Strategy to RWE pre-2011 will not be explored, as it will be vitally important to understand how service delivery changed if at all as a result of the review, and so participants were also asked about their responses to RWE pre-2011 to provide this context. The end date was selected as the Prevent Strategy statutory duty was enshrined into law as of June 2015 by virtue of the Counter Terrorism & Security Act 2015. The impact of this statutory duty is that all local authorities now have a legal obligation to “have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”.\textsuperscript{46} While the “Prevent Priority Area” system of prioritisation is still in

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Table depicting site selection criteria}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
 & \textbf{Significant experience of responding to the EDL} & \textbf{Lack of significant experience of responding to the EDL} \\
\hline
Prevent Priority Area & Site 1 & Site 3 \\
Non-Prevent Priority Area & Site 2 & X \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
place (and the sites remain under review by the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) within the Home Office), the scope of this duty extends to all non-priority local authorities who will be held to account on their delivery of the 2011 Prevent Strategy, despite for the most part not receiving any further resources in the form of staff and/or funding. This therefore represents a natural break for the purposes of this book as although there will still be differentiation between priority and non-priority sites, the level of Prevent Strategy related activity conducted in each will likely not be as markedly different given the increased level of government scrutiny on local authorities to deliver Prevent Strategy related outcomes.

**Structure of this book**

It is within the context of the definitional issues surrounding the EDL that this book explores how local practitioners interpret the new breadth of focus for the Prevent Strategy, drawing upon unique first-hand accounts of those mandated to safeguard their communities while managing not only public expectations but also those of local politicians and media when responding to the attendance of the EDL, a movement which acts as a “stressor” to even the best community cohesion plans when it comes to town. Chapter 1 sets out the broad context of known responses to right-wing extremism in Western Europe and the United States, drawing on research into political manifestations of the phenomenon and exploring non-political responses spanning counter extremism, hate crime and public order approaches. Chapter 2 serves as an introduction to the evolution of the U.K.’s Prevent Strategy with a particular emphasis on its utility in responding to right-wing extremism, drawing upon the perspectives of policy makers and practitioners. It was necessary to dedicate a chapter of this book to an exploration of the Prevent Strategy in order to provide the reader with an understanding of what has been the most controversial area of U.K. counter terrorism policy since 9/11, and the years of development that culminated in the review published in June 2011. Even though the Prevent Strategy has existed in a number of iterations since 2006, it is still a relatively new area of policy provision. Furthermore, since its expanded mandate to address “all forms of extremism” in 2011, there is very little in the way of empirical research into its applicability to non-Islamist forms of extremism, which had been the focus thus far. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 focus on the three areas selected as case studies to explore in more depth the impact of the policy shift on frontline practitioners delivering the Prevent Strategy through analysing how they have incorporated RWE into their work streams, how they relate to their work under associated policies in this area, and whether the threat and/or service delivery varies according to location.

It is important to note that the organisations mandated to safeguard the public are very much entrenched in far ranging Crime and Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs), often referred to as “Community Safety Partnerships”. Under the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 these partnerships were placed on a legislative
footing in recognition of the fact that no one organisation could deal with crime and disorder in isolation. These partnerships increased information sharing and risk management coordination across organisations such as the police service, local authorities, probation services and a range of voluntary services. My research has cut across these collaborative responses and intends to identify how the state responds to the challenges posed by the EDL with an emphasis on the applicability of the Prevent Strategy. It is the essence of these inter-organisational responses to this phenomenon that are brought to life in this book through the first-hand accounts of those charged with managing risk, threat and vulnerability under the auspices of this contentious and high-profile area of public safety policy provision. Chapter 6 summarises and compares the findings of the case studies and the final chapter offers a set of firm conclusions and associated policy recommendations based upon the rich data gathered and analysed in support of this book which is intended to contribute to the wider debate not only on how we respond to non-political forms of right-wing extremism but also on the relationship of the Prevent Strategy with policy areas governing integration, social cohesion and counter extremism in the U.K.

Notes


Introduction


9 START – National Consortium for the study of terrorism and responses to terrorism website. www.start.umd.edu/.


13 Counter Extremism Strategy (Cmnd. 9148, p. 10).

14 Telegraph Online (17/06/2016) “It’s time to call the killing of Jo Cox what it is: ‘An act of far-right terrorism’ “.

15 The Guardian (02/02/2018) “Darren Osborne jailed for life for Finsbury Park terrorist attack”.


17 The Independent (23/02/2018) “National Action: Suspected neo-Nazi arrested in terror raid amid crackdown on extremist group”.

18 The Independent (26/02/2018) “Four far-right UK terrorist plots foiled since Westminster attack, police reveal”.

19 “Extremism” is defined as vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.

Prevent Strategy Review (Cmnd. 8092, June 2011) p. 107, Appendix A: Glossary of Terms


Introduction


27 Lord Macdonald’s review counselled against expanding the scope of proscription legislation in order to capture movements such as the EDL (and Hizb ut-Tahrir) as “labelling their activities as ‘terrorism’ risks the negation of society’s values for the sake of remote threats which are better dealt with by other means” – see Home Affairs Committee – Nineteenth Report: “Roots of violent radicalisation” (HC 1446, 2012) p. 19.

Introduction


44 See Section 11.17, p. 98. The list of Prevent Priority Areas was listed as follows: (Prevent Strategy, Cmnd. 8092 p. 97).
   • Barking and Dagenham
   • Birmingham
   • Blackburn with Darwen
   • Bradford
   • Brent
   • Camden
   • Derby
   • Ealing
   • Hackney
   • Hammersmith and Fulham
   • Haringey
   • Kensington and Chelsea
   • Lambeth
   • Leeds
   • Leicester
   • Lewisham
   • Luton
   • Manchester
   • Newham
   • Redbridge
   • Stoke-on-Trent
   • Tower Hamlets
   • Waltham Forest
   • Wandsworth
   • Westminster


The right response?

Offences carried out as a result of wider group activity remain unexplored in a U.K. context. A weakness in the work undertaken thus far is its over-dependence on top-level data as produced by the Office of National Statistics, which does not capture the key relationships between individual and group activity. To evaluate the potential linkages between those committing racist crimes, and the ideology acting as a driver to that criminality, this can be better assessed through engaging with the practitioner experience in interpreting the various policies working in this area and translating them for a local context.

The research thus far has focussed on the strategic political dimension to right-wing extremism without reference to detailed frontline service delivery. My intention for this book is to explore the ways in which the state responds to the activities of the EDL as an entry-point to the thinking as to how the Prevent Strategy has been applied to RWE. There is been very little research to explore the connections between the policy areas which are applied to this phenomenon so I can think of no better place to start than by examining the responses of those frontline practitioners who must make sense of this fractious policy landscape in order to carry out their roles in managing risk, threat and vulnerability. Given the plethora of ways in which RWE can be interpreted and manifested, engaging in empirical research to inform the way in which the state responds comprehensively and holistically to identify threats is vitally important. The Prevent Strategy which governs the U.K. response to “extremism” now explicitly references RWE and by implication the EDL, but apparently without any research basis for concluding that this strategy is appropriate for any form of extremism other than Islamists extremism, for which it was originally devised. Is a “one-size-fits-all” approach to combating extremism appropriate, or indeed effective? As a strategy, Prevent itself is relatively young and its applicability to forms of extremism other than Islamism is of too much importance to continue un-researched.

Notes


See for example: Mudde, Cas, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2007); Hainsworth, Paul, The Extreme Right in Western Europe (Routledge, 2008).


See for instance; Copshey, N. (2011) “Article for Soundings – Policy matters for Muslims in Britain”.


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22 Gable, Gerry, and Jackson, Paul, Note 21, Chapter 1, *supra*.
23 Eatwell, Roger, and Goodwin, Matthew J., Note 6, Chapter 1, *supra*, p. 211.
25 Communities and local government.
28 Ramalingam, Vidhya, Note 18, Chapter 1, *supra*.
31 Gable, Gerry and Jackson, Paul, Note 21, Chapter 1, *supra*, p. 10.
32 DCLG funded Special Interest Group “Managing Far Right Toolkit”.
33 See the University of Northampton’s “Research Excellence Framework 2014” impact case study document regarding the “Radicalism and New Media Research Group” – http://impact.ref.ac.uk/casestudies2/refservice.svc/GetCaseStudyPDF/39094.
38 See for example Copsey, Nigel, Note 11, Chapter 1, *supra*.
39 For an example of the use of this legislation to ban an EDL demonstration see; www.gov.uk/government/news/home-secretary-agrees-march-ban.
40 For an example of the use of a CRASBO as a response to EDL demonstrations see; “Plaistow EDL demonstrator banned from Islamic venues” (29/02/2012) – www.newhamrecorder.co.uk/news/crime-court/plaistow-edl-demonstrator-banned-from-islamic-venues-1-1223260.
41 See for instance; Merkl, Peter H., and Leonard Weinberg, Note 1, Chapter 1, *supra*, p. 277.
43 Eatwell, Roger, “Community cohesion and cumulative extremism in contemporary Britain”. *The Political Quarterly* 77.2 (2006): 205; See also Gable, Gerry, and Paul Jackson, Note 21, Chapter 1, *supra*.
44 Renton, David, and Matthew Goodwin, “How can the rise of the far right in the U.K be halted?” *Political Insight* 1.3 (2010): 88.
45 Renton, David, and Matthew Goodwin, Note 44, Chapter 1, *supra*, p. 89.
47 HMIC Report: “Adapting to Protest” (p. 10) The most relevant recommendations were as follows;

1) In planning future public order operations for protest the police should: Demonstrate explicit consideration of the facilitation of peaceful protest throughout the planning process and the execution of the operation or operations. The right to
freedom of assembly places obligations on the police. The starting point for the police is the presumption in favour of facilitating peaceful assembly. However, the police may impose lawful restrictions on the exercise of the right provided such restrictions are lawful, have a legitimate aim (such as the interests of public safety or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others) and are necessary and proportionate.

2) In relation to communication with protest groups the police should: Seek to improve dialogue with protest groups in advance where possible, to gain a better understanding of the intent of the protesters and the nature of the protest activity; to agree how best to facilitate the protest and to ensure a proportionate policing response. When protesters are not forthcoming to the police, the police should consider informing and warning the protesters and the public that this may result in some additional disruption, that restrictions may be placed on protesters and that particular tactics may be employed to reduce disruption and the threat of disorder.

48 The only reference within the Hate Crime Strategy was as follows;

The Extremism Analysis Unit is carrying out extensive research on a range of areas of extremism, including extreme-right groups who seek to incite racial and religious hatred. Policymakers will use this research, and commission further work, to build our understanding of the connections between neo-Nazi and extreme-right groups across Europe. This will help us to understand how such groups share information and support each other to promote hatred and sow civil disorder.

*Action against Hate: The UK Government’s Plan for Tackling Hate Crime* (June 2016) p. 17, para. 119


According to the independent Crime Survey for England and Wales, there were an estimated 222,000 hate crimes on average each year from 2012/2013 to 2014/2015. This represents a decrease of 56,000 since the previous period covered by the survey. However, despite an increase in the number of hate crimes recorded by the police – from 44,471 in 2013/2014 to 52,528 in 2014/2015 – the difference between police figures and the crime survey show that hate crimes continue to be significantly underreported.

51 Goodey, Joanna, Note 49, Chapter 1, *supra*, p. 24.


53 Challenge It, Report It, Stop It: Delivering the Government’s hate crime action plan (2012) p. 11.

54 Goodwin, Matthew *et al.*, Note 24, Introduction, *supra*, p. 75.

55 See Ramalingam, Note 18, Chapter 1, *supra*, p. 12 who points out that “this approach has seen varied outcomes across Europe. In Germany, repression has not led to a reduction of far-right extremism”.
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56 See for example; Husbands, Christopher T., Note 36, Chapter 1, supra.; Eatwell, Roger, and Goodwin, Matthew J., Note 6, Chapter 1, supra., p. 214.

57 Merkl, Peter H., Weinberg, Leonard, Note 1, Chapter 1, supra.; Eatwell, Roger and Goodwin, Matthew J., Note 6, Chapter 1, supra.

58 See for instance Bartlett, Jamie, and Littler, Mark, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra., p. 7.


61 Merkl, Peter H., and Leonard Weinberg, Note 1, Chapter 1, supra, p. 52.

62 www.counterextremism.org/ website – “EXIT Fryshuset”.

63 “EXIT Fryshuset” Note 62, Chapter 1, supra.

64 “Violence Prevention Network” Note 62, Chapter 1, supra.


67 Butt, Riazat, and Henry Tuck (2014) Note 66, Chapter 1, supra, p. 17.


69 www.counterextremism.org/website – “Channel process”.


71 Kundnani, Arun, Note 10, Introduction, supra, p. 27.

72 Hope Not Hate website http://hopenothate.org.uk/ – the website records details of how the English Defence League is developing links with like-minded groups across Europe and North America.

73 European Freedom Initiative Facebook site (accessed 20/10/2016). Its previous website listed defence league affiliates from England, the United States, Norway,
Denmark, Finland, Italy, Sweden, Germany, Australia, Serbia, Greece, Indonesia, Poland, the Philippines, Belgium, Czech Republic, Romania and Luxembourg.


75 Lambert, Robert, and Jonathan Githens-Mazer, Note 10, Introduction, supra. p. 81.


78 Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (2011) p. 29. In addition, the report noted how in this year, there were a total of 3 Islamist terrorist attacks, 179 arrests of individuals for Islamist terrorist offences and 89 arrests of individuals for preparing attacks against EU member states. Meanwhile, there were a total of 160 attacks by violent separatist groups and 349 arrests of individuals for engaging in, or planning, such acts. In stark contrast, Europe witnessed not a single act of right-wing extremist terrorism. The comparatively weak challenge from the latter was attributed by the security services to a combination of poor internal cohesion, a low degree of coordination, lack of public support and effective law enforcement.


80 BBC News (14/05/2010) “County Durham terror plot father and son are jailed”.

81 BBC News (17/10/2014) “Newcastle University student Vladimir Aust jailed over bomb scare”.

82 See for example; Kundnani, Arun, Note 10, Introduction, supra. p. 10.

83 The “Hate Crime Action Plan” was published in July 2016. It makes reference to the Extremism Strategy but there is no discussion of how these concepts are separated and there no reference to the Prevent Strategy.


85 Kundnani, Arun, Note 10, Introduction, supra. p. 29.


88 Blazak, Randy, Note 87, Chapter 1, supra. p. 989.


perspective; Ringnalda, Allard, and Kool, Renee, “The prosecution of bias crime in the Netherlands and the problem of net-widening: fundamental limits to criminal liability” Crime, Law and Social Change 58 (2012): 53–74. See also: Levin, J., Rabrenovic, G., Ferraro, V, Doran, T., and Methe, D., “When a crime committed by a teenager becomes a hate crime: Results from two studies”. American Behavioral Scientist 51 (2007): 246. This work explored whether membership of an organised “hate group” (for example, the Ku Klux Klan, which in the U.K. would be termed an “extremist group”) was an aggravating factor in the prosecution of teenagers committing hate crimes.


94 Husbands, Christopher T., Note 36, Chapter 1, supra, p. 264.


97 Blazak, Randy, Note 87, Chapter 1, supra, p. 982.
organized protest group, partly on a threat basis, you know, they can’t mobilize the people they could even two years ago or even this summer. And partly also because what we do see as the organized far right is shrinking and fracturing, there is still the wider sentiment out there that certainly the new far right has fed off.\(^{103}\)

This direction of travel would seem to be in keeping with those researchers who have challenged the commonly held stereotypes of EDL supporters, to find a wider base of support for their values, if not their tactics.\(^{104}\) It is perhaps ironic that this goes back to the work undertaken by the Connecting Communities initiative in terms of the wider societal challenge to “drain the pool”\(^{105}\) of the wider support for extremist parties and organisations. It is clear that more work is required to clarify ownership of these various issues from an over-arching policy perspective. When we consider the identification of the National Action group as a proscribed far-right terrorist organisation, and the ensuing level of counter terrorism policing activity and public attention on the RWE phenomenon, we must not forget about the more difficult challenge posed by the EDL. National Action represents a clear example of a far right terrorist organisation that necessitates a counter terrorism response, and yet the definitional and operational challenges surrounding the EDL as a result of years of ineffective policies are not as straightforward to resolve.

Notes

1 Contest Strategy (Cmnd. 6888, 2006) p. 9 para. 42.
2 Interview 16 – researcher specialising in RWE, August 2014.
5 The Four Pillars of Contest are as follows: Preventing terrorism by tackling the radicalisation of individuals; Pursuing terrorists and those that sponsor them; Protecting the public, key national services, and UK interests overseas; and Preparing for the consequences – Contest Strategy (Cmnd. 6888, 2006).
6 Interview 16 – researcher specialising in RWE, August 2014.
7 Interview 1 – retired Home Office senior civil servant, September 2013.
8 Gable, Gerry and Jackson, Paul, Note 21, Chapter 1, supra, p. 24.
9 Interview 1 – retired Home Office senior civil servant, September 2013.
10 In the original Contest Strategy, the Prevent Strategy objectives were: (1) tackling disadvantage and supporting reform – addressing structural problems in the UK and overseas that may contribute to radicalisation, such as inequalities and discrimination; (2) deterring those who facilitate terrorism and those who encourage others to become terrorists – changing the environment in which the extremists and those radicalising others can operate; and (3) engaging in the battle of ideas – challenging the ideologies that extremists believe can justify the use of violence, primarily by helping Muslims who wish to dispute these ideas to do so (Contest Strategy (Cmnd. 6888, 2006) p. 1).
Prevent Strategy Review, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 8 para. 3.29.


The revised objectives were to; (1) Challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices, (2) Disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the places where they operate, (3) Support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment, or have already been recruited by violent extremists, (4) Increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism, and (5) Address the grievances which ideologies are exploiting. (Contest Strategy (Cmnd. 7547, 2009) p. 83).

“The perception that Prevent funding is targeted at projects which ‘spy’ on Muslims was shared by a large number of our witnesses and is seen to be a major failing of the programme” – House of Commons, Communities and Local Government Committee: “Preventing Violent Extremism” – Sixth Report of session 2009–2010 (HC 65, March 2010) p. 13 para. 25.

HC 65, March 2010, p. 8 para. 11.

HC 65, March 2010, p. 15 para. 31.


Maher, Shiraz and Frampton, Martyn, Note 18, Chapter 2, supra.

For more on this topic see: Spalek, Basia, and Robert Lambert, Note 70, Chapter 1, supra.; Gartenstein-Ross, D. and Grossman, L., 2009. Homegrown terrorists in the US and UK: An empirical examination of the radicalization process. FDD Center for Terrorism Research, 11; Kundnani, Arun, Note 70, Chapter 1, supra.

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24 HC 65, March 2010, p. 22 para. 53.
25 Interview 1 – retired Home Office senior civil servant, September 2013.
26 HC 65, March 2010, p. 20 para. 45.
27 HC 65, March 2010, p. 20 para. 46.
28 The EDL were the only group noted as an example of the extreme right wing within the “Prevent Review: Summary of Responses to the Consultation” p. 9.
30 Channel: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into Terrorism (2012) p. 11.
33 Interview 2 – civil servant, OSCT, September 2013.
35 See for example; Blazak, Randy, Note 87, Chapter 1, supra, p. 989.
36 Interview 11 – John Denham MP, former Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government, July 2014.
37 Interview 17 – Channel practitioner, August 2014.
38 Interview 15 – local authority Prevent practitioner, July 2014.
40 Interview 11 – John Denham MP, former Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government, July 2014.
41 Interview 11 – John Denham MP, former Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government, July 2014.
42 HC 65, March 2010, p. 20 para. 47.

For an example of where these funding streams have become blurred and precipitated significant backlashes from communities see; Lewis, Paul (17/06/2010) The Guardian; “Birmingham stops camera surveillance in Muslim areas”.

See Kundnani, Arun, Note 70, Chapter 1, supra.; Maher, Shiraz and Frampton, Martyn, Note 18, Chapter 2, supra.; Richards, Anthony, “The problem with ‘radicalisation’: The remit of ‘Prevent’ and the need to refocus on terrorism in the U.K”.


See for example; Saggar, Shamit, “The one per cent world: Managing the myth of Muslim religious extremism”. The Political Quarterly 77.3 (2006): 314–327; Kundnani, Arun, Note 70, Chapter 1, supra.; Maher, Shiraz, and Martyn Frampton, Note 18, Chapter 2, supra.

Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech at the Munich Security Conference – Saturday 5 February 2011.

Contest Strategy (Cmnd. 7547, 2009) p. 80.

Desai, Unmesh (14/06/2011) The Guardian; “No, you cannot treat violent and non-violent extremism separately”.

See Prevent Strategy Review, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 21 para. 5.43;

Extreme right-wing terrorism, like Al Qaida-influenced terrorism, is driven by a supremacist ideology, which sanctions the use of extreme violence as a response to perceived social injustice and dysfunction. That ideology is a response to and reflects a perception that identity itself is under threat from social change. People can be drawn to right-wing terrorist ideology through the rhetoric and language of apparently non-violent right-wing extremist groups.

We accept that Prevent resources should be allocated proportionately to the terrorist threat and that to an extent we must rely upon the intelligence and security services to make this judgement. However, we received persuasive evidence about the potential threat from extreme far-right terrorism. The ease of travel and communications between countries in Europe and the growth of far-right organisations, which appear to have good communications with like-minded groups within Europe, suggest that the current lack of firm evidence should not be a reason for neglecting this area of risk. The Prevent Strategy should outline more clearly the actions to be taken to tackle far right radicalisation as well as explicitly acknowledge the potential interplay between different forms of violent extremism, and the potential for measures directed at far-right extremism to have a consequential effect on Islamist extremism, and vice versa.


Home Affairs Committee – Nineteenth Report: “Roots of violent radicalisation” (HC 1446, 2012), notably para. 28;


HC 65, March 2010, p. 21 para. 48.

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59 Interview 2 – civil servant, OSCT, September 2013.
60 Security Minister’s speech for the Far-Right Special Interest Group conference delivered on the 5 September 2013.
61 HC 65, March 2010, p. 3.
64 This contains the Secretary of State’s view on what makes an integrated community and consists of five parts: Common ground, Responsibility, Social mobility, Participation and empowerment, and Tackling intolerance and extremism – “Creating the Conditions for Integration” – Department for Communities and Local Government, p. 5.
65 The DCLG approach to tackling intolerance and extremism consists of the following work streams: (1) Setting a tone publicly, i.e. Ministers talking about the EDL and influencing public debate, (2) Helping academic experts to develop the research and thinking in this area, and (3) This is underpinned by funding specific projects to undermine the EDL. There are three such “Demonstration Projects”, namely (a) The Special Interest Group (SIG) on the EDL was set up by Blackburn with Darwen Borough Council and Luton Borough Council, working with DCLG. DCLG allocated £200,000 of funding to the group for project work (which largely consisted of workshops to share best practice). The group was launched in January 2013 and had a series of seminars and a conference which took place in September 2013, (b) Searchlight has been funded £66,000 and have run pilots in four neighbourhoods, producing newspapers that are pro-integration, and support the voluntary sector and development of social capital/communities who see the benefits of increased integration, and (c) “Show Racism the Red Card” has been given £200,000 to deliver workshops to young people. The theme of the workshops is to address the EDL narrative directly.
66 Interview 3 – civil servant, DCLG, September 2013.
67 Interview 8 – civil servant, DCLG, February 2014.
68 Interview 3 – civil servant, DCLG, September 2013.
69 Interview 15 – local authority Prevent practitioner, November 2014.
70 Interview 14 – senior police officer, National Domestic Extremism & Disorder Unit, May 2014.
71 The “14 words” are as follows; “We must secure the existence of our people and a future for White children”. This is the motto of Pro-White activists worldwide and first coined by David Lane. The 14 words were derived from Volume 1, Chapter 8 of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf;

What we must fight for is to safeguard the existence and reproduction of our race and our people, the sustenance of our children and the purity of our blood, the freedom and independence of the fatherland, so that our people may mature for the fulfilment of the mission allotted it by the creator of the universe.

(Source: Stormfront website, www.stormfront.org/)
72 Interview 5 – far right intervention specialist, June 2014.
73 Interview 9 – former head of local authority, February 2014.
74 Interview 16 – researcher specialising in RWE, August 2014.
75 Interview 20 – senior police Prevent practitioner, September 2014.
76 Interview 17 – Channel practitioner, August 2014.
78 Interview 14 – senior police officer, National Domestic Extremism & Disorder Unit, May 2014.
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Interview 16 – researcher specialising in RWE, August 2014.

Interview 20 – senior police Prevent practitioner, September 2014.

Interview 15 – local authority Prevent practitioner, July 2014.

Interview 10 – civil servant, OSCT, August 2014.

Security Minister’s speech for the Far-Right Special Interest Group conference delivered on the 5 September 2013.

Interview 8 – civil servant working within DCLG, February 2014.


BBC News (19/08/2017) “UK terror threat increased by IS losses, security minister says”.


Interview 2 – civil servant, OSCT, September 2013.


Contest: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, Annual Report (Cmnd. 8583, March 2013) p. 22 para. 2.47.

For instance, as posited during the Home Affairs Committee on the “roots of radicalisation”;

The potential for a spiral of violence between different forms of extremism. What I mean by that is something that we have not seen since Northern Ireland, which is the potential for far-right extremisms to enact violence or confrontation against, for example, an AQ-inspired group, to bomb a mosque or something of that nature and then for that action to be retaliated. It wouldn’t really take too long for a spiral of violence to emerge.

(HC 1446, 2012) para. 45

Interview 3 – civil servant, DCLG, September 2013.

This view was echoed during the Home Affairs Committee discussion on “the roots of radicalisation”;

I think even though far right parties and movements like the EDL are not overtly violent in their ambitions to the same extent that Al Qa’ida-inspired groups are, I would make a case that this movement contains the potential for violence. It gives its followers a specific set of narratives that under certain conditions validate the use of violence.

(HC 1446, 2012) para. 44

MI5 website – “Domestic Extremism” section; www.mi5.gov.uk/terrorism.

House of Commons Debates; HC Deb, 02/12/2014, c209.

House of Commons Debates; HC Deb, 02/12/2014, c219.

62 Preventing right-wing extremism

100 BBC News (19/06/2017) “London Bridge Attack; Timeline of British Terror Attacks”.
101 The Independent (27/05/2017) “Theresa May to set up commission for countering extremism”.
102 The Guardian (06/02/2017) “UK Government hires M&C Saatchi to fight far-right threat”.
103 Interview 8 – civil servant, DCLG, February 2014.
104 See: John, Peter, and Helen Margetts, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra.; Bartlett, Jamie and Mark Littler, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra.; Goodwin, Matthew, Note 11, Chapter 1, supra.
105 Interview 11 – John Denham MP, former Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government, July 2014.
Notes

1 Interview 27 – police Prevent practitioner, December 2014.
2 See Home Office “Proscribed Terrorist organisations”; Under the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation if she believes it is concerned in terrorism. For the purposes of the Act, this means that the organisation:
   • commits or participates in acts of terrorism;
   • prepares for terrorism;
   • promotes or encourages terrorism (including the unlawful glorification of terrorism); or
   • is otherwise concerned in terrorism.
3 Interview 25 – senior public order police officer, November 2014.
6 Interview 29 – police Prevent practitioner, February 2015.
7 Harris, Gareth et al., Note 4, Chapter 3, supra, p. 39.
8 Interview 35 – local authority Prevent practitioner, August 2015.
10 Interview 29 – police Prevent practitioner, February 2015.
11 Luton 2012: “Making Luton a safer place in which to live, work, learn and have fun” p. 25.
15 Interview 25 – senior public order police officer, November 2014.
17 Interview 22 – senior police Prevent practitioner, October 2014.
18 Interview 25 – senior police officer, public order policing, November 2014.
19 Interview 34 – senior public order police officer, May 2015.
22 Interview 34 – senior public order police officer, May 2015.
23 Interview 36 – senior public order police officer, June 2015.
24 Interview 34 – senior public order police officer, May 2015.
26 Interview 25 – senior public order police officer, November 2014.
27 Communication with protest groups: In relation to communication with protest groups the police should seek to improve dialogue with protest groups in advance where possible, to gain a better understanding of the intent of the protesters and the nature of the protest activity; to agree how best to facilitate the protest and to ensure a proportionate policing response. When protesters are not forthcoming to the police, the police should consider informing and warning the protesters and the public that this may result in some additional disruption, that restrictions may be placed on protesters and that particular tactics may be employed to reduce disruption and the threat of disorder – Adapting to Protest (2009) HMIC p. 10.
For research on challenging the stereotypes of EDL members see Goodwin, Matthew, Note 11, Chapter 1, supra.; John, Peter, and Helen Margetts, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra.; Bartlett, Jamie and Littler, Mark, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra.

Interview 25 – senior public order police officer, November 2014.
Interview 25 – senior public order police officer, November 2014.
Interview 25 – senior public order police officer, November 2014.
Interview 30 – police officer, community engagement team, March 2015.
Interview 30 – police officer, community engagement team, March 2015.
Interview 32 – Luton Borough Councillor, March 2015.


Interview 32 – Luton Borough Councillor, March 2015.


Interview 32 – Luton Borough Councillor, March 2015.
Interview 38 – police Prevent practitioner, June 2015.
Interview 22 – senior police Prevent practitioner, October 2014.
Interview 38 – police Prevent practitioner, June 2015.


Interview 29 – police Prevent practitioner, February 2015.
Interview 22 – senior police Prevent practitioner, October 2014.
Interview 21 – local authority Prevent practitioner, September 2014.
BBC News (08/10/2013) “EDL leader Tommy Robinson quits group”.
Interview 31 – far right intervention specialist, March 2015.
Interview 37 – far right intervention specialist, July 2015.
Interview 29 – police Prevent practitioner, February 2015.
BBC News (26/04/2012) “EDL and UAF banned from Luton town centre”.
BBC News (26/04/2012) “EDL and UAF banned from Luton town centre”.

Luton Today (20/11/2014) “Appeal for calm as EDL march looms”.
Luton Council Website (12/11/2014) “Leader’s pledge on EDL demonstration: ‘Luton will remain united and open for business’”.

BBC News (05/05/2012) “Luton protest: EDL and WAL marchers kept apart”.
Interview 38 – police Prevent practitioner, June 2015.
Interview 31 – far right intervention specialist, March 2015.
Interview 32 – Luton Borough Councillor, March 2015.
Interview 34 – senior public order police officer, May 2015.
Interview 34 – senior public order police officer, May 2015.
Interview 31 – far right intervention specialist, March 2015.
Interview 36 – senior public order police officer, June 2015.
Interview 34 – senior public order police officer, May 2015.
Interview 34 – senior public order police officer, May 2015.

BBC News (05/02/2015) “Luton MP Gavin Shuker tells EDL ‘stop targeting town’”.

76 Interview 32 – Luton Borough Councillor, March 2015.
77 BBC News, Note 75, Chapter 3, supra.
78 Interview 36 – senior public order police officer, June 2015.
80 Harris, Gareth et al., Note 4, Chapter 3, supra, p. 97.
81 Interview 35 – local authority Prevent practitioner, August 2015.
82 Interview 35 – local authority Prevent practitioner, August 2015.
83 Interview 35 – local authority Prevent practitioner, August 2015.
right-wing extremism. Elected officials have not only failed to recognise their role in representing all sections of the community, but worse, have contributed to further polarising communities in meeting the EDL on their own terms through mobilising counter street protests. This strategy is short sighted and fails to move the dialogue any further forward. Opposing a set of entrenched views with their diametric opposition on different sides of the street has failed to reach a common ground and success in defeating the EDL argument is not measured through how many people you were able to encourage onto the street to demonstrate against them, as is currently the case. It is only through bridging this gap through the local authority taking risks in entering into what may be at times very challenging dialogue that they can reclaim control of the narrative from the EDL leadership and draw people from the extremes back into mainstream discourse.

Notes
1 Interview 45 – police Prevent practitioner, September 2015.
2 Interview 49 – senior public order police officer, August 2015.
3 Interview 43 – senior Prevent police officer, June 2015.
4 Interview 48 – community safety officer, Newcastle City Council, September 2015.
6 Newcastle’s submission to the Riots Communities and Victims Panel (2012) p. 1.
7 For further on the way these issues were reported in the media, see; Telegraph online (25/06/2015) “Report about Asian grooming gangs was suppressed to avoid inflaming racial tension”.
8 Interview 45 – police Prevent practitioner, September 2015.
10 Chronicle Live (05/02/2015) “Northumbria Police have charged 20 people with sexual offences as part of Operation Sanctuary”.
11 The Star (22/02/2017) – “Home Office refuses to grant powers to stop EDL marches in Rotherham”.
12 The Guardian (28/02/2015) “Far-right Pegida eclipsed by its opponents at first UK demo”; PEGIDA stands for “Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West”. The group was formed in Dresden in 2014 and it campaigns against what it perceives as the growing influence of Islam in Europe and increasing immigration.
13 Tyne and Wear Anti-Fascist Association website.
14 Note 13, Chapter 4, supra.
16 The Daily Mail Online (15/12/2012) “Setting of Byker Grove youth club to become an Islamic school after council approved plans”.
17 Interview 53 – police officer, community engagement team, October 2015.
18 Interview 46 – senior public order police officer, July 2015.
19 BBC News (19/12/2013) “Two guilty of Lee Rigby murder”.
20 Interview 43 – senior police Prevent practitioner, June 2015.
21 Interview 42 – senior police officer, Northumbria, July 2015.
22 Interview 56 – Newcastle City Councillor, December 2015.
23 Interview 48 – community safety officer, Newcastle City Council, September 2015.
24 Interview 49 – senior public order police officer, August 2015.
Newcastle: rolling out the welcome mat

26 The *Yorkshire Post* (10/06/2013) “Islamists get long jail terms for Dewsbury EDL bomb plot”.
28 Interview 49 – senior public order police officer, August 2015.
29 Interview 53 – police officer, community engagement team, October 2015.
30 Interview 50 – senior public order police officer, September 2015.
31 Interview 52 – police officer, community engagement team, October 2015.
33 Interview 56 – Newcastle City Councillor, December 2015.
34 Interview 45 – police Prevent practitioner, September 2015.
35 Interview 56 – Newcastle City Councillor, December 2015.
36 Interview 43 – senior police Prevent practitioner, June 2015.
38 Interview 45 – police Prevent practitioner, September 2015.
39 Interview 43 – senior police Prevent practitioner, June 2015.
40 BBC News (17/10/2014) “Newcastle University student Vladimir Aust jailed over bomb scare”.
41 Interview 60 – community engagement worker, February 2016.
43 Interview 48 – community safety officer, Newcastle City Council, September 2015.
46 Interview 45 – police Prevent practitioner, September 2015.
47 Interview 52 – police officer, community engagement team, October 2015.
48 Interview 55 – senior safeguarding practitioner, Newcastle City Council, December 2015.
49 Interview 43 – senior police Prevent practitioner, June 2015.
51 Interview 43 – senior police Prevent practitioner, June 2015.
52 Security Minister’s speech for the Far-Right Special Interest Group conference delivered on the 5 September 2013.
53 Interview 43 – senior police Prevent practitioner, June 2015.
54 Interview 42 – senior police officer, Northumbria, July 2015.
57 Northumbria Police & Crime Commissioner Update on the 16/06/2014 EDL demonstration (PCC website).
58 Chronicle Live (17/05/2014) “English Defence League march through Newcastle City Centre”.
60 In preparation for the May 2014 demonstration – see The Chronicle Live website; “Police plan to stop English Defence League march through Newcastle’s West End”.
61 Interview 50 – senior public order police officer, September 2015.
62 Interview 50 – senior public order police officer, September 2015.
63 Interview 48 – community safety officer, Newcastle City Council, September 2015.
64 Interview 42 – senior police officer, Northumbria, July 2015.
borough, from an extremism perspective, was around better engagement with Muslim communities especially against the historical backdrop of Islamist extremism on the borough.

Notes
2 Interview 79 – former Waltham Forest Council official, January 2016.
3 The Guardian (06/12/2013) “Muslim vigilantes jailed for ‘Sharia Law’ attacks in London”.
4 Interview 73 – senior public order police officer, December 2015.
5 Waltham Forest Guardian (05/05/2015) “EDL confirm Walthamstow march through ‘Islamist Bandit Country’”.
6 In 2006 a local former member of the then-proscribed ALM group, Omar Brooks, had heckled the Home Secretary, John Reid at a public meeting being held in Leyton on Waltham Forest borough. See BBC News (20/09/2006) “Home Secretary John Reid has been heckled during a speech about targeting potential Muslim extremists”.
7 Interview 79 – former Waltham Forest Council official, January 2016.
10 Interview 66 – former senior police officer, July 2015.
11 Waltham Forest Guardian (30/07/2011) “Extremists march through borough”.
12 Interview 80 – Waltham Forest Councillor, January 2016.
13 Interview 76 – senior police officer, January 2016.
14 Interview 66 – former senior police officer, July 2015.
15 Interview 62 – local authority Prevent practitioner, April 2015.
16 Interview 62 – local authority Prevent practitioner, April 2015.
17 Waltham Forest Guardian (26/10/2012) “Police ‘ban’ EDL static protest”.
18 Section 13 of the Public Order Act 1986 – “prohibiting public processions”; 13 (4) If at any time the Commissioner of Police for the City of London or the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis reasonably believes that, because of particular circumstances existing in his police area or part of it, the powers under section 12 will not be sufficient to prevent the holding of public processions in that area or part from resulting in serious public disorder, he may with the consent of the Secretary of State make an order prohibiting for such period not exceeding 3 months as may be specified in the order the holding of all public processions (or of any class of public procession so specified) in the area or part concerned. For more information see “Public Order Legislation”, U.K Government website (search: section 13 Public Order Act).
20 Interview 64 – community engagement officer, May 2015.
21 Interview 68 – former police Prevent practitioner, October 2015.
22 Interview 73 – senior public order police officer, December 2015.
23 Interview 73 – senior public order police officer, December 2015.
24 Interview 68 – former police Prevent practitioner, October 2015.
25 Interview 73 – senior public order police officer, December 2015.
26 Interview 73 – senior public order police officer, December 2015.
27 Interview 80 – Waltham Forest Councillor, January 2016.
28 Interview 68 – former police Prevent practitioner, October 2015.
29 Interview 76 – senior police officer, January 2016.
30 Interview 76 – senior police officer, January 2016.
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31 Interview 62 – local authority Prevent practitioner, April 2015.
32 Interview 80 – Waltham Forest Councillor, January 2016.
34 Interview 79 – former Waltham Forest Council official, January 2016.
36 Interview 68 – former police Prevent practitioner, October 2015.
37 Interview 64 – community engagement officer, May 2015.
38 Interview 70 – counter terrorism police practitioner, November 2015.
39 Interview 70 – counter terrorism police practitioner, November 2015.
40 Interview 62 – local authority Prevent practitioner, April 2015.
41 Interview 62 – local authority Prevent practitioner, April 2015.
42 Interview 63 – former police Channel practitioner, May 2015.
44 Interview 63 – former police Channel practitioner, May 2015.
45 Interview 79 – former Waltham Forest Council official, January 2016.
46 Interview 79 – former Waltham Forest Council official, January 2016.
48 Waltham Forest Guardian (21/09/2012) “Waltham Forest Guardian and council launch joint campaign to ban English Defence League march”.
49 Waltham Forest Guardian (29/08/2012) “Waltham Forest Police say they have no intelligence to suggest an EDL march in Walthamstow will result in violence”.
50 Walthamstow Networker (26/10/2012) “Local MPs react to EDL march ban in Walthamstow”.
51 Interview 76 – senior police officer, January 2016.
52 Interview 80 – Waltham Forest Councillor, January 2016.
53 Interview 80 – Waltham Forest Councillor, January 2016.
54 Interview 76 – senior police officer, January 2016.
55 Waltham Forest Guardian (06/05/2015) “Waltham Forest community condemns EDL march as counter-demo planned”.
56 Interview 80 – Waltham Forest Councillor, January 2016.
57 Waltham Forest Guardian (05/05/2015) “EDL confirm Walthamstow march through ‘Islamist Bandit Country’”.
associated with RWE as the overriding threat, that notwithstanding all these points, there is not a more developed application of the Prevent Strategy with regard to right-wing extremism for this operational context.

Notes
2 See for example; Goodwin, Matthew, and Robert Ford, Note 2, Introduction, supra.
3 Prevent Strategy Review, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 15 para. 5.10.
4 “Prevent Review: Summary of Responses to the Consultation” p. 9.
5 See Note 66, Chapter 2.
6 See the ITV News timeline in relation to the murder of Mohammed Saleem (21/10/2013).
7 Prevent Strategy Review, Note 3, Chapter 6, supra.
8 See Home Office “Proscribed Terrorist organisations”; Under the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation if she believes it is concerned in terrorism. For the purposes of the Act, this means that the organisation:
   • commits or participates in acts of terrorism;
   • prepares for terrorism;
   • promotes or encourages terrorism (including the unlawful glorification of terrorism); or
   • is otherwise concerned in terrorism.
9 Telegraph Online (17/06/2016) “It’s time to call the killing of Jo Cox what it is: ‘an act of far-Right terrorism’”.
10 See www.cps.gov.uk/terrorism.
12 For further on this point see the Prevent Strategy Review, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 25 para. 6.9.
13 See www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2016-to-march-2017 – The attrition rate between referral to acceptance at a Channel panel is around 1 in 5 (increasing from 14% to 19% between 2015 and 2016). This indicates that for every five individuals referred to the programme, one is discussed by the panel, and even then, they are not necessarily adopted as a case requiring intervention. RWE referrals represent 16 per cent of the overall referrals to Prevent, yet this increases to 24 per cent at the Channel panel stage, and then increases again (37%) for those actually receiving Channel support. Further exploration is required to better understand these variances.
14 Interview 33 – police Prevent practitioner, April 2015.
15 Interview 26 – researcher, December 2014.
16 Interview 26 – researcher, December 2014.
17 Interview 34 – senior public order police officer, May 2015.
18 For further on the way these issues were reported in the media, see the Telegraph Online (25/06/2015) “Report about Asian grooming gangs was suppressed to avoid inflaming racial tension”.
21 For research on challenging the stereotypes of EDL members see Goodwin, Matthew, Note 11, Chapter 1, supra.; John, Peter, and Helen Margetts, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra.; Bartlett, Jamie, and Mark Littler, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra.
22 Waltham Forest Guardian (05/05/2015) “EDL confirm Walthamstow march through ‘Islamist Bandit Country’”.
23 Interview 40 – Protest Liaison Team officer, July 2015.
The policy muddle

24 See Bartlett, Jamie, and Mark Littler, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra.


26 BBC Three Online (01/05/2018) “Football Lads Alliance: ‘We could have a civil war in this country’”.


28 Waltham Forest Guardian (05/05/2015) “EDL confirm Walthamstow march through ‘Islamist Bandit Country’”.
1986, and complying with Human Rights legislation, see the EDL as a logistical challenge in terms of the numbers attending, and significantly, the numbers of counter demonstrators that their presence in the area precipitates. However, local authorities have a political mandate and reflect the views as they see it from locally elected representatives. Tensions between the police service and the local authority were evident in all three case study areas, with the police often being portrayed as being in some way supportive of the EDL through discharging their obligations under the Human Rights Act 1998 rather than seeking to ban demonstrations. We can see the way in which local officials have failed to engage on the salient issues of their constituents through their responses to the EDL. This has led to an entirely reactive response to the movement’s street protest activities in the absence of a much-needed longer term strategy to re-balance civic engagement and political representation which could reduce the need for demonstrations as a vent for locally held frustrations.

If policy makers persist in their failure to recognise the need for mainstream discourse on issues that underpin support for, and have become synonymous with, the EDL then they risk swelling the ranks of the “extreme right-wing” and bestowing legitimacy on individuals presenting themselves as the spokespeople of those who feel left behind by political representatives who no longer represent them. The threats posed by the various forms of extremism are not contingent upon one another. We must start talking about them on their own merits because otherwise we will persist with a bland one-size-fits-all approach to counter terrorism. We have to be clear as to the nature of these threats and the role of the various state actors in responding to them. Furthermore, if we respond to Muslim communities’ concerns about the impact of counter terrorism policies by simply stating how we’re also now responding to right-wing extremism, this does nothing to resolve those issues. Worse than this, it avoids them. This book has sought to navigate a path through the interminable white noise that surrounds state responses to right-wing extremism in the U.K. It is clear that this is an area that is home to a range of government policies which represent a dangerous confluence between political necessity, strategic intent and operational reality which is only set to endure for frontline practitioners interpreting them and the communities subject to the work flowing from them.

Notes
2 Interview 61 – Walthamstow MP, May 2014.
3 Integration Minister, Don Foster MP Speech to the Special Interest Group in January 2013; “Why we must continue to tackle far right extremism head on”.
4 The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 15, para. 5.11.
5 The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 15, para. 5.10.
6 HM Government: “Channel Duty Guidance; protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism – Statutory guidance for Channel panel members and partners of local panels” p. 5.
7 See the ITV News timeline in relation to the murder of Mohammed Saleem (21/10/2013).
8 Telegraph Online (17/06/2016) “It’s time to call the killing of Jo Cox what it is: ‘an act of far-Right terrorism’”.
11 This is referenced in the Prevent Strategy review: “Channel needs to deal with all types of terrorism. We note in practice this is already happening at the initiative of the police and local authorities. We welcome this and it should continue” p. 60, para. 9.30.
13 Security Minister’s speech for the Far-Right Special Interest Group conference delivered on the 5 September 2013.
14 Interview 8 – civil servant working within DCLG, February 2014.
15 Note 13, Chapter 7, supra.
16 House of Commons Debates; HC Deb, 02/12/2014, c209.
18 See Goodwin, Matthew, Note 11, Chapter 1, supra.; John, Peter, and Helen Margetts, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra.; Bartlett, Jamie, and Mark Littler, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra.
19 For further on the way these issues were reported in the media, see the Telegraph Online (25/06/2015) “Report about Asian grooming gangs was suppressed to avoid inflaming racial tension”.
22 Interview 31 – far right intervention specialist, March 2015.
28 Interview 61 – Walthamstow MP – 19/05/2014.
30 The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 20, para. 5.42.
31 The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 20, para. 5.42.
32 The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 15, para. 5.10.
33 The Prevent Strategy, Note 19, Introduction, supra, p. 15, para. 5.10.
34 For evidence of the fractious nature of the EDL see the EDL News (19/01/2014) “EDL fall apart due to bitter infighting”.
36 BBC News (22/03/2015) “Tory candidate Afzal Amin denies ‘fake EDL march’ claim” – A Conservative election candidate who has been suspended by his party has said he did not seek a “fake” English Defence League march to win votes. The Mail on Sunday reported Afzal Amin plotted to persuade the EDL to announce a march in Dudley North and then to scrap it to allow him to take credit.
37 See “Adapting to Protest” (2009) – HMIC.
38 Interview 34 – senior public order police officer, May 2015.
39 West Yorkshire PCC website (29/07/2015) “Call for greater powers to be able to consider banning protests in the county”;

The West Yorkshire Police and Crime Commissioner Mark Burns-Williamson has repeated his call for greater powers to be able to consider banning protests in the county. The renewed call comes after figures show that more than £750,000 was spent by West Yorkshire Police policing just one EDL demonstration.

40 Police Oracle (03/08/2015) “Call for increased police powers to ban protests”.
41 Police Oracle (11/09/2015) “Chief wants to ban protests”.
42 Interview 45 – police Prevent practitioner, September 2015.
43 Craig Woodhouse; “UKIP leader condemns radical Islam ahead of Wilders visit”, Press Association, 05/03/2010, quoted in Goodwin, Matthew and Robert Ford, Note 2, Introduction supra, p. 83
44 See Goodwin, Matthew and Robert Ford, Note 2, Introduction supra, p. 80.
45 The Guardian (17/11/2011) – Writing in the “Response” column, Matthew Collins and Sunder Katwala question the paper’s report on recent research from the Demos thinktank on the rise of the far right in Europe.
46 See for instance; Bartlett, Jamie, and Mark Littler, Note 13, Chapter 1, supra.
49 Interview 33 – police Prevent practitioner, April 2015.
51 Deardie, Lizzie (01/08/2018) The Independent; “Tommy Robinson is richer and has more international support after two-month imprisonment, research shows”.
52 Harris, Gareth et al., Note 4, Chapter 3, supra, p. 97.
54 The Economist; 26 March–1 April 2016 – “The new normal”.
55 The Economist; 25 June–1 July 2016 – “Commented Out”. See also; Eatwell, R. and Goodwin, M., Note 6, Chapter 1, supra.
56 For a notable change in stance on the issue of “Muslim Grooming Gangs” see Modhin, Aamna. The Guardian (20/10/2018) “Sajid Javid lambasted for ‘Asian paedophiles’ tweet”.
Notes


17 Note 11, Appendix, supra.

18 Zuckerman, Harriet, Note 10, Appendix, supra, p. 162.


26 Heckathorn, D, Note 24, Appendix, supra, p. 175.


38 See for example; Shepptycki, James, “Police ethnography in the house of serious and organized crime”. In Transformations of Policing (Routledge, 2017): 65–92.

39 See for example; Mac Giollabhuí, Shane, Benjamin Goold, and Bethan Loftus. “Watching the watchers: Conducting ethnographic research on covert police investigation in the United Kingdom”. Qualitative Research 16.6 (2016): 630–645.

40 See for example; Marks, Monique, “Researching police transformation: The ethnographic imperative”. British Journal of Criminology 44.6 (2004): 866–888.

41 Brannick, Teresa, and David Coghlan, Note 30, Appendix, supra, p. 59.


Appendix: methodology


49 Note 43, Appendix, supra, p. 79.

50 Note 43, Appendix, supra, p. 78.

51 Colosi, Rachela, Dirty Dancing: An Ethnography of Lap Dancing (Willan, 2010).

52 There are no other studies conducted by practitioners researching the application of the Prevent Strategy save for Bettison’s work, which focussed on information sharing and community policing at a strategic level rather than local responses – see Bettison, Norman, “Preventing violent extremism: A police response”. Policing 3.2 (2009): 129–138.