Anti-System Parties

This book adopts an innovative conceptualization and analytical framework to the study of anti-system parties, and represents the first monograph ever published on the topic. It features empirical research using original data and combining large-N QCA analyses with a wide range of in-depth case studies from 18 Western European countries. The book adopts a party-centric approach to the study of anti-system formations by focusing on the major turning points faced by such actors after their initial success: long-term electoral sustainability, the different modalities of integration at the systemic level, and the electoral impact of transition to government. The author examines in particular the interplay between crucial elements of the internal supply-side of anti-system parties such as their organizational and ideological features, and the political opportunity structure. *Anti-System Parties* is a major contribution to the literature on populism, anti-establishment parties, and comparative political parties.

Mattia Zulianello is a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Political and Social Science, University of Florence, Italy.
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Anti-System Parties
From Parliamentary Breakthrough to Government

Mattia Zulianello
Learn the rules like a pro, so you can break them like an artist.
(Pablo Picasso)
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Five years have passed since I began to think seriously about this work: the same amount of time that was required by the Juno spacecraft to reach Jupiter. Fortunately, I have always lived political science as a passion, and nothing is more gratifying than having the freedom to wake up in the morning (or rather, given my love for the night, the early afternoon) and do research.

Max Weber said that ‘inspiration plays no less a role in science than it does in art’. Over the years, many people have been an inspiration, both from an academic and human point of view. Even before the PhD experience and while I still was a university identification number, two persons played a decisive role on the development of my research forma mentis: Giuseppe Ieraci and Marco Tarchi. To both I have accumulated a scientific and above all human debt that, I fear, I will never be able to repay. Giuseppe Ieraci literally initiated me into the world of political science thanks to his lessons and long talks; for me it is a matter of pride to be considered by him a ‘Stoppiniano’. Marco Tarchi played a crucial role even before I met him in person, as the casual discovery of a book he translated into Italian – *Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism* – in a Trieste bookshop triggered a series of events that led me to continue my studies in Florence. I still remember the wonder I felt while attending his course on Analysis and Political Theory.

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fortune to meet Sorina Soare, who soon became an ‘older sister’ for me; she is an incredible example of self-denial, correctness, and integrity both in research and in everyday life. In addition, I am grateful to Daniele Albertazzi, Nicolò Conti, and Paolo Graziano, excellent scholars from whom I’ve learned a lot.

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I also owe a huge thank to Þórr.

Writing is an extremely lonely process, and my cat Bernardo was a great companion especially during the (many) sleepless nights. Most importantly though, I cannot imagine how it would have been possible for me to successfully complete this book without Anna’s presence, support, understanding, friendship, and love. You have been my sólarsteinn in this long, five-year journey, and this book is dedicated to you.

Veneto, September 2018
Abbreviations

ADR  Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei  Alternative Democratic Reform (Luxembourg)
AfD  Alternative für Deutschland  Alternative for Germany (Germany)
AGALEV  Anders Gaan Leven  Live Differently (Belgium)
ALDE  Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (EU)
ALFA  Allianz für Fortschritt und Aufbruch  Alliance for Progress and Renewal (Germany)
ALÖ  Alternative Liste Österreichs  Alternative Greens (Austria)
ALP  Anders Langes Parti  Anders Lange’s Party (Norway)
AN  Alleanza Nazionale  National Alliance (Italy)
ANEL  Anexartitoe Ellines  Independent Greeks (Greece)
BE  Bloco de Esquerda  Left Bloc (Portugal)
BOR  Borgarahreyfingin  Citizens’ Movement (Iceland)
BP  Boerenpartij  Farmers’ Party (Netherlands)
BZÖ  Bündnis Zukunft Österreich  Alliance for the Future of Austria (Austria)
CD  Centrum Democraten  Centre Democrats (Netherlands)
CDA  Christen Democratisch Appel  Christian Democratic Appeal (Netherlands)
CDU  Christlich Demokratische Union  Christian Democratic Union (Germany)
CG  Comhaontas Glas  Green Party (Ireland)
CnP  Clann na Poblachta  Family / Children of the Republic (Ireland)
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<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>CnT</td>
<td>Clann na Talmhan</td>
<td>Family / Children of the land (Ireland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Centrumpartij</td>
<td>Centre Party (Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christlich-Soziale Union</td>
<td>Christian Social Union (Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td>D66</td>
<td>Democraten 66</td>
<td>Democrats 66 (Netherlands)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Democrazia Cristiana</td>
<td>Christian Democracy (Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDF</td>
<td>Den Danske Forening</td>
<td>The Danish Association (Denmark)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEVA</td>
<td>Demokraattinen Vaihtoehto</td>
<td>Democratic Alternative (Finland)</td>
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<td>DF</td>
<td>Dansk Folkeparti</td>
<td>Danish People’s Party (Denmark)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIKKI</td>
<td>Dimokratiko Koinoniko Kinima</td>
<td>Democratic Social Movement (Greece)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIMAR</td>
<td>Dimokratiki Aristera</td>
<td>Democratic Left (Greece)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DKF</td>
<td>Det Konservative Folkeparti</td>
<td>Conservative People’s Party (Denmark)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>Det Norske Arbeiderparti</td>
<td>Labour Party (Norway)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democrazia Proletaria</td>
<td>Proletarian Democracy (Italy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAR</td>
<td>Elliniki Aristera</td>
<td>Greek Left (Greece)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOLO</td>
<td>Écologistes Confédérés pour l’Organisation de Luttes Originales</td>
<td>Confederated ecologists for the organization of original struggles (Belgium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDU</td>
<td>Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union</td>
<td>Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland (Switzerland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFDD</td>
<td>Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EU)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>EKO</td>
<td>Ekologinen puolue Vihreät</td>
<td>Ecological Party (Finland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EL</td>
<td>Enhedslisten</td>
<td>Red-Green Alliance – Unity List (Denmark)</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
<td></td>
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<td>EVP</td>
<td>Evangelische Volkspartij</td>
<td>Evangelical People’s Party (Netherlands)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDF</td>
<td>Front Démocratique des Francophones</td>
<td>Francophone Democratic Front (Belgium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Freie Demokratische Partei</td>
<td>Free Democratic Party (Germany)</td>
</tr>
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Abbreviations

FdV  
_Federazione dei Verdi_
Federation of the Greens (Italy)

FK  
_Fælles Kurs_
Common Course (Denmark)

FNb  
_Front National belge_
National Front (Belgium)

FNf  
_Front National_
National Front (France)

FPÖ  
_Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs_
Freedom Party of Austria (Austria)

FPS  
_Die Auto-Partei / Freiheits-Partei der Schweiz_
Motorists’ Party / Freedom Party of Switzerland (Switzerland)

FrPd  
_Fremskridtspartiet_
Progress Party (Denmark)

FrPn  
_Fremskrittspartiet_
Progress Party (Norway)

Fs-QCA  
_Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis_

FUQ  
_Fronte dell’Uomo Qualunque_
Front of the Common Man (Italy)

FvD  
_Forum voor Democratie_
Forum for Democracy (Netherlands)

GA  
_Grüne Alternative / Die Grüne Alternative_
The Greens / The Green Alternative (Austria)

GAP  
_Déi Gréng_
Green Alternative Party (Luxembourg)

GL  
_GroenLinks_
GreenLeft (Netherlands)

GRÜNEN  
_Die Grünen / Bündnis 90 - Die Grünen_
The Greens / Alliance 90 - The Greens (Germany)

IRA  
_Irish Republican Army_

KKE  
_Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas_
Communist Party of Greece (Greece)

LAE  
_Laïki Enóttita_
Popular Unity (Greece)

LAOS  
_Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós_
Popular Orthodox Rally (Greece)

LDD  
_Libertair, Direct, Democratisch / Lijst DeDecker_
Libertarian, Direct, Democratic / List Dedecker (Belgium)

LdT  
_Lega dei Ticinesi_
Ticino League (Switzerland)

LEGA  
_Lega Lombarda / Lega Nord / Lega_
Lombard League / Northern League / League (Italy)

LENK  
_Déi Lénk_
The Left (Luxembourg)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
<th>Country/Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LN</td>
<td>Leefbaar Nederland</td>
<td>Netherlands (Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPF</td>
<td>Lijst Pim Fortuyn</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV</td>
<td>Liga Veneta</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M5S</td>
<td>Movimento 5 Stelle</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCG</td>
<td>Mouvement Citoyens Genevois</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiP</td>
<td>Miljöpartiet de Gröna</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRG</td>
<td>Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Nea Dimokratia</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
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<td>NyD</td>
<td>Ny Demokrati</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>ÖDP</td>
<td>Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>OE</td>
<td>Oikológoi Enallaktikoi</td>
<td>Greece</td>
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<td>ÖVP</td>
<td>Österreichische Volkspartei</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Politiki Anixi</td>
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<td>PASOK</td>
<td>Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima</td>
<td>Greece</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBP</td>
<td>People Before Profit</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCF</td>
<td>Parti Communiste Français</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
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<td>PCI</td>
<td>Partito Comunista Italiano</td>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>PD</td>
<td>Partito Democratico</td>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>PdCI</td>
<td>Partito dei Comunisti Italiani</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PdL</td>
<td>Popolo della Libertà</td>
<td>Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus / Die Linke</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDUP</td>
<td>Partito di Unità Proletaria per il Comunismo</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>Piratar</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abbreviations

POCH  Progressive Organisationen der Schweiz  
Progressive Organizations of Switzerland (Switzerland)

PP  Parti Populaire  
People’s Party (Belgium)

PRLW  Parti de Réformes et de la Liberté en Wallonie  
Walloon Party of Reforms and Liberty (Belgium)

PSA  Partito Socialista Autonomo  
Autonomous Socialist Party (Switzerland)

PSI  Partito Socialista Italiano  
Italian Socialist Party (Italy)

PSIUP  Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria  
Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (Italy)

PSOE  Partido Socialista Obrero Español  
Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Spain)

PVDA-PTB  Partij van de Arbeid van België / Parti du Travail de Belgique  
Workers’ Party of Belgium (Belgium)

PVV  Partij voor de Vrijheid  
Party for Freedom (Netherlands)

QCA  Qualitative Comparative Analysis

RB  Republikanische Bewegung  
Republican Movement (Switzerland)

RC  Partito della Rifondazione Comunista  
Communist Refoundation (Italy)

RES  Respect – The Unity Coalition (United Kingdom)

RKPN  Rooms Katholieke Partij Nederland  
Roman Catholic Party of the Netherlands (Netherlands)

ROSSEM  Radicale Omvormers en Sociale Strijders voor een Eerlijker Maatschappij  
ROSSEM (Belgium)

RPF  Reformato earische Politieke Federatie  
Reformatory Political Federation (Netherlands)

RV  Rod Valgallianse  
Red Electoral Alliance (Norway)

RW  Rassemblement Wallon  
Walloon Rally (Belgium)

SD  Sverigedemokraterna  
Sweden Democrats (Sweden)

SF  Socialistisk Folkeparti  
Socialist People’s Party (Denmark)

SK  Samtök um Kvennalista  
Women’s Alliance (Iceland)

SKDL  Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto  
Finnish People’s Democratic League (Finland)

SLP  Socialist Labour Party (Ireland)

SMP  Suomen Maaseudun Puolue  
Finnish Rural Party (Finland)
Abbreviations

SOL  
SolidaritéS
Solidarity (Switzerland)

SPD  
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
Social Democratic Party of Germany (Germany)

SPir  
Socialist Party (Ireland)

SPnl  
Socialistische Partij
Socialist Party (Netherlands)

SPÖ  
Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs
Social Democratic Party of Austria (Austria)

SPV  
Sonstige Politische Vereinigung - Die Grünen
Alternative Political Union - the Greens (Germany)

SV  
Sosialistisk Valforsaech / Sosialistisk Venstreparti
Socialist Electoral League / Socialist Left Party (Norway)

SVP  
Schweizerische Volkspartei
Swiss People’s Party (Switzerland)

SYRIZA  
Synaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras / SYRIZA
Coalition of the Radical Left / SYRIZA (Greece)

TS  
Team Stronach für Österreich
Team Stronach (Austria)

UDC  
Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e Democratici di Centro
Union of the Centre (Italy)

UDCA  
Union de Défense des Commerçants et Artisans - Poujadists
Union for the Defence of Traders and Artisans – Poujadists (France)

UDRT  
Union Démocratique du Travail
Democratic Union for the Respect of Labour (Belgium)

UKIP  
UK Independence Party (UK)

UPyD  
Unión Progreso y Democracia
Union Progress and Democracy (Spain)

V  
Venstre
Liberal Party (Denmark)

VB  
Vlaams Blok / Vlaams Belang
Flemish Block / Flemish Interest (Belgium)

VG  
Vinstrihreyfingin – Grænt framboð
Left-Green Movement (Iceland)

VGÖ  
Vereinten Grünen Österreichs
United Greens (Austria)

VIHR  
Vihreä liitto
Green League (Finland)

VU  
Volksunie
People’s Union (Belgium)

VVD  
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie
People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Netherlands)

XA  
Chrysi Avgi
Golden Dawn (Greece)

XS  
Samfylkingin jafnaðarmannaflokur Íslands
Social Democratic Alliance (Iceland)
It is an extraordinary paradox that the social sciences should be ever more prompted to explain politics by going beyond politics.

(Sartori 1990 [1968]: 182)

1 Introduction

Over recent decades, Western European party systems have increasingly been put under pressure by the growing relevance of political parties that question decisive elements of the status quo and challenge the established patterns of party competition. The spectacular breakthroughs of such parties have become frequent since the end of the so-called ‘golden age’ of party system stability (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967), as historically highlighted by the rise of formations such as the Danish Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet, FrPd) in the 1970s, the German Greens (Die Grünen/Grüne) in the 1980s, the Swedish New Democracy (Ny Demokrati, NyD) in the 1990s, and the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF) at the beginning of the new millennium. Such a long-term trend was further catalysed by the outbreak of the Great Recession in 2009, which opened an unprecedented phase of party system instability and registered the emergence of a variety of new antagonistic actors such as the Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle, M5S) in Italy, Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD), Podemos in Spain, and the Pirate Party (Piratar, PIR) in Iceland.

The conceptual and empirical challenges posed by the rise of such parties have been tackled by scholars through two principal perspectives. On the one hand, an impressive amount of research has been conducted following the so-called party family approach (Mair & Mudde, 1998; von Beyme, 1985) by focusing on populist (e.g. Mudde, 2007, 2010; Taggart, 1995; van Kessel, 2015), radical left (e.g. March, 2011; March & Rommerskirchen, 2015; March & Mudde, 2005), ethno-regionalist (e.g. De Winter & Cachafeiro, 2002; De Winter & Türsan, 1998; Tronconi, 2009), pirate (e.g. Cammaerts, 2015; Zulianello, 2018b), and green parties (e.g. Müller-Rommel, 1989, Poguntke, 1987; van Haute, 2016). On the other hand, especially more recently, scholars have increasingly attempted to tackle the phenomenon by going beyond the
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boundaries of the party family approach with the goal of identifying a set of defining properties that makes it possible to operate a major distinction between variously defined ‘anti’ parties and more conventional actors. The latter approach has usually adopted a bi-dimensional perspective, by focusing on two sets of properties: certain objective traits (e.g. propaganda, ideology or rhetoric) and some behavioural, or relational, properties (i.e. usually defined in terms of coalition potential). While this bi-dimensional approach has the great merit of putting the spotlight on specific features in order to conceptualize and analyse ‘anti’ formations as a single group, the outcome has been a ‘cottage industry’ of competing ‘anti’ labels referring to such political parties, including but not limited to: ‘a-system’ (von Beyme, 1985), ‘anti-political-establishment’ (Abedi, 2004; Schedler, 1996), ‘anti-party-system’ (Katz, 2011), ‘challenger’ (Hobolt & Tilley, 2016; Mackie, 1995), ‘new oppositions’ (von Beyme, 1987), ‘new protest’ (Taggart, 1996), ‘outsider’ (McDonnell & Newell, 2011), ‘pariah’ (Downs, 2012), ‘protest’ (e.g. Smith, 1989), and ‘structural opposition’ parties (Dewachter, Lismont, & Tegenbos, 1977).

Although the divergence of terminological opinions would not be a big problem in itself, the proliferation of alternative labels has severe implications for empirical research. On the one hand, Babelism is accompanied by the interchangeable use of different terms to refer to very similar phenomena, and this represents an obstacle for the accumulation of knowledge on the topic; on the other, the proliferation of ‘anti’ labels is – more often than not – accompanied by definitional vagueness and, even when clear definitions are provided, they are not equipped to cope with the dynamics of change (for details, see Zulianello 2018a and Chapter 2). These limitations become evident when the issue of reclassification arises.

This book is grounded in the conviction that empirical research should be conducted from solid conceptual foundations, and a considerable effort has been made to achieve, as much as possible, this purpose. After all, re-conceptualization is a necessary step for better empirical, and especially comparative, work, as Max Weber (1949 [1905], pp. 105–106) underlines: ‘The history of the social sciences is and remains a continuous process passing from the attempt to order reality analytically through the construction of concepts.

This book introduces a series of conceptual innovations that are then employed to empirically analyse anti-system parties. However, this book not only represents the first monograph dedicated to anti-system parties, but also introduces new analytical tools to investigate political parties more generally, both at specific points in time and over time.

Conceptual innovations

I often start my academic presentations by stressing that the major reason behind the rejection of Giovanni Sartori’s concept of anti-system party in the literature is based on a misplaced equation between the terms ‘anti-system’ and ‘anti-democratic’, which has no foundation in the Greek
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etymological roots of the word ‘system’ nor in the original Sartorian formulation (Sartori, 1966, 1976, 1982). However, my academic presentations usually then proceed by underlining the fact that the Sartorian concept of anti-system party itself presents evident limitations in terms of its capacity to set clear definitional boundaries and cope with the dynamics of change, with evident implications for empirical research. I usually emphasize that the relationship between the objective features of a given party, such as its ideology, propaganda, or rhetoric, and its behavioural properties is explored only in an inconsistent way by the classical Sartorian perspective (Sartori, 1966, 1976, 1982), while it is subject to problematic and over-simplistic assumptions in Giovanni Capoccia’s (2002) more recent ‘reassessment’ of anti-system parties. As I shall extensively discuss in Chapter 2, existing approaches to anti-system parties, like the competing ‘anti’ labels grounded on a bi-dimenensional perspective, fail to clarify how a political party that enters the coalitional game while remaining substantially different from mainstream moderate actors – especially in terms of its attitudes towards decisive features of the status quo – should be reclassified. This point is highlighted in particular, though not exclusively, by populist parties such as the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ), the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF), and the Northern League (Lega Nord, since 2017 only Lega¹) in Italy, which have become central players in the coalitional game while remaining characterized by ideological radicalism and by the articulation of an antagonistic rhetoric.

This book is based on a revisited conceptualization of anti-system parties, and a clear set of guidelines for its empirical application is provided (Chapter 2). The revisited concept is grounded on an explicitly bi-dimensional perspective, which focuses on the assessment of both the ideological features of a party (the articulation of an ideologically inspired anti-metapolitical opposition) and its functional role in the party system – that is, its very visible interaction streams at the systemic level (the absence of systemic integration). It is important to underline that, although my conceptualization differs from classical approaches to anti-system parties (Capoccia, 2002; Sartori, 1966, 1976, 1982) in decisive respects, it shares with the latter an emphasis on the importance of conceiving the positive term ‘system’ and its negation ‘anti-system’ as ‘neutral’ and ‘relative’. This represents a decisive point to be emphasized because, as previously mentioned, many scholars still treat the terms ‘anti-system’ and ‘anti-democratic’ as synonyms, but this represents a serious misconception based on an inaccurate reading of Sartori’s seminal works (for details, see Chapter 2).

The explicit bi-dimensional structure of my revisited concept plays a decisive role in the construction of a new typology of political parties, making it possible to set clear conceptual boundaries and cope with the dynamics of change. The typology identifies four types of political parties (anti-system, halfway house, complementary, and pro-system) and, in addition to providing the tools for reclassifying anti-system parties if a change in terms of their ideological orientation towards crucial features of the status quo and/or functional role in the party system occurs, it enables the
classification of political parties more generally. The revisited conceptualization and the novel typology I develop enable another major conceptual innovation, namely the identification of the modalities of the integration of anti-system parties (for details, see Chapters 2 and 4), thus tackling one of the most elusive points of the Sartorian conceptualization (Ieraci, 1992; Zulianello, 2018a). Positive integration indicates that an anti-system party has evolved into a fully-fledged pro-system party thanks to a substantial moderation of its core ideological concepts and to the achievement of systemic integration. Negative integration can be achieved through direct or indirect paths, and suggests that an anti-system party has evolved into a halfway house party because, despite integration into cooperative interactions at the systemic level, its ideological core remains in contrast with one or more crucial elements of the metapolitical system. Finally, the book also identifies a phenomenon pointing to a reversal of the status of integration: radical disembedding. This represents a process through which a political party that was previously integrated into cooperative interactions deliberately relinquishes systemic integration through substantial ideological radicalization and by the adoption of an isolationist stance in the party system.

A party-centric approach to the study of the anti-system parties: research questions and methods

Existing empirical research treating variously defined ‘anti’ parties as a single group tends to concentrate on the analysis of their aggregate electoral performance (e.g. Abedi, 2004; Hino, 2012; Hobolt & Tilley, 2016). At the same time, whereas the broader large-N comparative literature on political parties has widely employed ‘supply and demand’ analytical frameworks to investigate variations in electoral performance by testing the impact of the institutional environment and societal factors (for an excellent review, see Meguid, 2008), it is only over the last decade that an increasing number of broad comparative analyses have begun to include systematically the two crucial elements of the internal supply-side of politics, namely the organizational and ideological features of political parties themselves (Mudde, 2007), into their explanatory models (e.g. Carter, 2005; Norris, 2011; van Kessel, 2015). Significantly, this constitutes a common practice in the more case-oriented and small-N approaches, and represents a decisive step for comparative scholars to avoid interpreting political parties as being at the mercy of demand-side and/or external supply-side factors that are by definition outside of their own control.

In this book, anti-system parties themselves are at the centre of substantive interest, following a party-centric approach, and the study of such actors does not simply raise the question of their competitive prospects over time, but also involves examining the different patterns of integration into ‘the system’ they oppose, as well as their eventual evolution into governing
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parties. Indeed, instead of focusing only on a specific moment of the lifespan of anti-system parties, this book adopts a much broader perspective by investigating in detail the decisive turning points faced by anti-system parties following parliamentary entry.

This book thus explores three major research questions, each corresponding to a decisive turning point for anti-system parties:

RQ1) Why are some organizationally new anti-system parties able to achieve electoral sustainability following parliamentary breakthrough, while others fail to do so?

RQ2) What factors explain the different evolutions of anti-system parties in terms of their interaction streams at the systemic level?

RQ3) Why do some parties, transiting from anti-system status to government, suffer considerable electoral losses in the subsequent election, while others perform well at the polls?

As such research questions refer to different turning points; they obviously evoke different ‘universes’ of empirical cases. Accordingly, the case selection for each research question is carried out following a ‘variable-geometry’ principle (64 parties for RQ1; 6 extensive case studies for RQ2; 21 parties for RQ3) in order to ensure both a homogenous analysis as well as the widest analytical breadth to avoid selection bias (Table 1.1).

The three major turning points faced by anti-system parties following the achievement of parliamentary representation are investigated through the adoption of a mixed-methodology combining the two major approaches to causal complexity: qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and in-depth case studies. Indeed, as Carsten Schneider (2008, p. 57), following Bear Braumoeller (2003), underlines, ‘causal complexity can be understood in different, not necessarily mutually exclusive ways’. One conception of causal complexity focuses on the interaction between different factors over time (Abbott, 2001; Pierson, 2011) and is usually explored through the in-depth analysis of few cases, in particular through process tracing (George & Bennett, 2005). As David Collier (2011, p. 824) underlines, process tracing

<table>
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<th>Number of cases under analysis</th>
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<td>64</td>
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<td>Transition to government</td>
<td>21</td>
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‘is an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena. Given the close engagement with cases and the centrality of fine-grained case knowledge, process tracing can make decisive contributions to diverse research objectives’. This conception of causal complexity is adopted to tackle RQ2, as the integration (and possible disembedding) of political parties is a phenomenon whose analysis necessarily requires an intensive focus on the interplay between party agency and a broad set of factors, and thus a particular emphasis needs to be placed on timing, sequencing, and feedback loops.

Answering RQ1 and RQ3 evokes another form of causal complexity, pointing to the interplay between specific factors at specific points in time (see Schneider, 2008). For this reason, RQ1 and RQ3 are tackled through QCA, a research method increasingly employed by party politics scholars (e.g. Beyens, Lucardie, & Deschouwer, 2016; Hanley & Sikk, 2016; van Kessel, 2015; Zulianello, 2018b). RQ1 and RQ3 are further explored by highlighting the interaction between the different causal conditions identified by the QCA results, focusing on the ‘best typical cases’ of each configuration (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, pp. 307–308). This methodological choice is due to a decisive advantage of QCA, which has made it increasingly popular, namely its capacity ‘to allow systematic cross-case comparisons, while at the same time giving justice to within-case complexity’ (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, pp. xviii). Although QCA is an intimately case-oriented approach that requires an extensive knowledge of the individual units of analysis under investigation (Ragin, 1987), it nevertheless makes it possible to compare a medium to large number of cases systematically. This is possible because QCA relies on Boolean algebra and formal logic to analyse truth tables (i.e. the logical configurations between the causal conditions under analysis), and its goal is to assess the necessity and sufficiency of causal conditions for a given outcome of interest through the implementation of specific parameters of fit, namely consistency and coverage. In this light, QCA can be considered as the ‘most formalized and complete set-theoretic method’ (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 9). Nevertheless, QCA is not simply a mere ‘technique’ for data analysis, but it embraces specific epistemological foundations. QCA is grounded on causal complexity, which makes it possible to explore crucial features of real-world empirical phenomena such as the asymmetry of set relationships, conjunctural causation, and equifinality (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Fuzzy-set QCA (fs-QCA) – which draws on fuzzy logic (Zadeh, 1965) – is adopted to carry out the analyses conducted in Chapters 3 and 5, as it allows for cases to be calibrated in terms of their degree of set membership in both the causal conditions and the outcome set (Ragin, 2008). The degree of membership of the cases in both the causal conditions and the outcome is indicated in the form of values, ranging from 1.0 (full membership) to 0.0 (full non-membership), with a ‘crossover value’ of 0.5 representing the point of maximum ambiguity (in qualitative terms).
From parliamentary breakthrough to government: three turning points

As anticipated, following parliamentary entry, an anti-system party faces three decisive turning points, and each is analysed in this book through a party-centric approach and employing different analytical frameworks according to the different phenomena under investigation. It is important to underline that the distinction between these three turning points is analytical, as is the ordering in the present discussion. Although a frequent sequence is a party first ensuring electoral sustainability, then experiencing a change in its interaction streams at the systemic level, before finally transiting to government, some parties face all three turning points almost at the same time (e.g. the Dutch LPF), or face them in a different order (e.g. SYRIZA – Coalition of the Radical Left, Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aριστεράς – in Greece).

The first turning point: ensuring parliamentary representation over time

The wide empirical breadth of this book begins with the entry of anti-system parties into national political institutions – that is, with the achievement of parliamentary representation. Parliamentary entry represents a major step within the lifespan of any political party (Pedersen, 1982), and the crossing of the threshold of representation indicates that a formation has been able to gather sufficient support to overcome the (explicit or implicit) barriers imposed by the electoral system (Taagepera, 2002). In this light, parliamentary entry represents an achievement in itself, and suggests that a party has proven to be successful in the short-term. However, the very event brings to the newcomer the first turning point – namely, ensuring parliamentary representation over time. For an organizationally new party, the achievement of parliamentary representation does not simply correspond to the entry into a complex environment, but also raises at least two additional and simultaneous pressures: consolidating electoral support and facing the challenge of party institutionalization. Here, the importance of maintaining parliamentary representation over time for the future competitive prospects of a party is highlighted by the fact that parliamentary comebacks are ‘rare events’ (Bolleyer, 2013, p. 1), and that only the formations able to prove themselves to be successful over time may eventually trigger party system change (Mair, 1997).

The issue is particularly salient for new anti-system parties that often experience spectacular breakthroughs in the early phases of their lifespan, but – often – rapidly face considerable electoral losses or even disappear altogether from the political market following their initial success. Accordingly, the first major empirical question tackled by this book (Chapter 3) asks why some anti-system newcomers² are able to prove successful beyond
the short-term, while others fail. In this respect, it is followed Nicole Bolleyer (2013, p. 15) in defining success beyond the short-term as ‘electoral sustainability’ – that is, the ability of a party to ‘maintain and consolidate a certain level of support over time’, resulting in the capacity to secure two consecutive re-elections following parliamentary entry. However, the analysis of the electoral sustainability will be performed following a more nuanced approach in comparison to the author mentioned above, as it will not simply evaluate the capacity to ensure repeated re-elections (difference in kind), but also the varying levels of electoral support registered by the anti-system newcomers (difference in degree). In doing so, a party-centric approach will be adopted by placing the features of the individual parties – that is, the internal supply-side of politics – at the centre of substantive interest. This approach appears particularly important as Cas Mudde’s (2007, p. 275) considerations about the state of existing research on populist radical right parties also apply to the broader literature on political parties:

Few theoretical frameworks include internal supply-side factors, i.e. aspects of the populist radical right itself. Like so much research on political parties, the success or failure of populist radical right parties is primarily explained by external factors and the parties themselves are regarded as “hapless victims” of the demand-side and the external supply-side. While there might be some truth to this with regard to the first phase of electoral breakthrough, populist radical right parties play a crucial role in shaping their own fate at the stage of electoral persistence. The internal supply-side is even the most important variable in explaining the many examples of electoral failure after electoral breakthrough.

The study of electoral sustainability is carried out using QCA, and by testing the impact of five factors, namely the disproportionality of the electoral system, the level of electoral volatility, the type of party ideology, the type of party origin, and the level of intra-party conflict following parliamentary breakthrough (for details on the causal conditions, see Chapter 3). The analytical framework is based on these five factors, three of which refer to the internal supply-side (party origin, intra-party conflict, party ideology) and two to the external supply-side of politics (electoral volatility and the disproportionality of the electoral system), and the goal of the first QCA analysis is to assess their specific interplay in producing the outcome of interest. Most notably, to implement a party-centric approach appropriately, and to place a special emphasis on internal supply-side factors, the analysis of the electoral sustainability of new anti-system parties includes original data, constructed by the author, on party ideology and intra-party conflict for all 64 formations included in the analysis.

In terms of case selection, the analysis of the first turning point faced by anti-system parties will follow different periodizations to ensure a
homogeneous analysis. In the case of long-established Western European democracies (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom), the analysis covers the period 1968–2017, and includes the organizationally new anti-system parties formed since 1968 which, at the earliest, achieved parliamentary representation for the first time in the same year. This choice makes it possible to place at the centre of analytical attention the formations that have faced the similar challenge of proving to be electorally sustainable since the end of the ‘golden age’ of party system stability, symbolically represented by the year 1968 (Bolleyer, 2013; Chiaramonte & Emanuele, 2017). In addition, organizationally new anti-system parliamentary newcomers from Greece, Portugal, and Spain are also included, although using a different temporal scope for case selection (for Greece, since 1989; Spain, from 1995; Portugal, from 1996), given the different timing of democratization and party system institutionalization (Morlino, 1998). This choice makes it possible to extend the analytical breadth of the research significantly and assess the competitive fate, following parliamentary entry, of 64 organizationally new anti-system parties from 18 Western European countries, which have been able to contest at least two general elections following their parliamentary entry, up to and including 2017. Furthermore, the interplay between internal supply-side and external supply-side factors will be further explored by the means of post-QCA case selection, that is, by focusing on the best typical cases of each causal configuration identified by the QCA solution: the Northern League in Italy, the Icelandic Women’s Alliance (Samtök um Kvennalista, SK), the Independent Greeks (Anexartitoi Ellines, ANEL), and the Austrian Green Alternative (Die Grüne Alternative, GA).

The second turning point: changing interaction streams

As previously mentioned, anti-system parties may experience different evolutions from the status of non-integration by registering a major discontinuity in their interaction streams at the systemic level in the form of positive integration, negative integration, or radical disembedding. The study of the factors leading a party to register one or another specific pattern of change is a task that can be appropriately achieved by the means of case-study research, namely ‘the intensive study’ of paradigmatic instances of the phenomenon at hand ‘to shed light on a larger class of cases’ (Gerring, 2007, p. 20). More specifically, the ‘diverse-case method’ for case selection is adopted (Gerring, 2007, pp. 97–99), an approach that makes it possible to explore the various forms of the phenomenon of interest, namely the different types of integration or the occurrence of disembedding.

Although it is possible to identify three major discontinuities in terms of the interaction streams experienced by anti-system parties, the analysis will focus on five rather than three extensive case studies. This is due to the fact that negative integration can be achieved through two different paths (direct
and indirect) and due to the decision to include two empirical instances of negative integration through the indirect path rather than one, because of its high relevance: (i) this pattern is the most empirically recurrent; (ii) negative integration is often experienced by populist parties, and an additional focus on such a pattern bears substantive interest in itself because, despite the extensive literature on populism, the conceptual and analytical tools for understanding the impact of populist parties on the functioning of party systems are still largely focused on the outdated (and very crude) challenger-outsider paradigm (see Mudde, 2016; Zulianello, 2018a). Accordingly, following the principle of ‘diverse-case method’ for case selection, five in-depth case studies are carried out (Chapter 4): the German Greens (positive integration), the Greek SYRIZA (negative integration through the direct path), the Danish DF and the M5S in Italy (negative integration through the indirect path), and the Dutch Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) (radical disembedding). Following the party-centric approach characterizing this book, the analysis will place a special emphasis on the role of party agency, and the analytical framework will draw on important insights from existing research on party change (Deschouwer, 1992; Harmel & Janda, 1994; Harmel, Heo, Tan, & Janda, 1995; Panebianco, 1988).

The third turning point: the transition to government

Entering government represents the ‘point of culmination’ (cf. Pedersen, 1982) of the lifespan of any political party and constitutes the third and last turning point analysed in this book. While the transition to government is a risky move for any political party, given the considerable pressures the very event brings with itself (Deschouwer, 2008), it may have devastating implications for formations that over their history underwent a phase as anti-system parties, given their antagonistic background in both ideological and behavioural terms. Here, whereas government participation often results in a loss of votes in the post-incumbency election, parties that transit from anti-system status to government are usually considered to be doomed to face an ‘additional cost of governing’ in comparison with conventional parties (cf. Van Spanje, 2011). However, beyond this consideration, the literature does not provide systematic, empirical explanations of why parties in transition from anti-system status to government face considerable electoral losses at the polls in many cases, while, in others, their post-incumbency electoral performance actually presents only a marginally negative variation or even an upward trend.

In this light, the third major empirical question explored by this book is represented by the analysis of whether, and to what extent, anti-system parties transiting to national government do face an additional electoral cost at the polls, with a particular emphasis on the identification of the factors triggering such a phenomenon. However, as political parties that have undergone a phase as anti-system formations over their lifespan may transit to national office under very different conditions, including following a transformation
as fully fledged pro-system actors (such as the German Greens), case selection is performed with the goal of ensuring a high degree of internal homogeneity. For this reason, the analytical focus is placed on the formations that transit to government following a phase as anti-system parties and while maintaining an anti-metapolitical ideological core. Following such criteria, the analysis tackles the post-incumbency electoral performance of 21 Western European political parties over the period 1945–2017. Post-incumbency electoral performance is assessed through the electoral fate index developed by Jo Buelens and Airo Hino (2008), which indicates the variation in electoral support before and following incumbency, and the QCA analysis is carried out by focusing on four factors (for details on the causal conditions, see Chapter 5): the conduct of the party in the post-incumbency election campaign, the set of institutional rules and practices of the broader context, the type of coalition government, and the party’s status within the coalition.

In explaining the variation in post-incumbency electoral performance of formations in transition from anti-system status, a central emphasis is placed on the agency of political parties themselves, and more specifically their capacity to conduct a consistent election campaign, as such a factor may be influenced, but not mechanically determined, by the three other factors included in the analysis. Here, it is important to stress that the study of this turning point employs original data constructed by the author on the post-incumbency election campaigns conducted by all the 21 parties under analysis. Finally, the interplay between the four factors included in the analysis of the post-incumbency electoral performance will be further explored by the means of post-QCA case selection – that is, by focusing on the best typical cases identified by the QCA solutions: Clann na Poblachta (CnP) in Ireland, the French Communist Party (Parti Communiste Français, PCF), the Dutch LPF, the Northern League in Italy, and SYRIZA in Greece.

Structure of the book

This book is organized as follows. Chapter 2 expands my previous work on anti-system parties (Zulianello, 2018a). It provides the reader with the revisited definition of anti-system parties as well as the typology of political parties to assess their evolution over time. This chapter outlines a set of clear – and comparable – guidelines for the empirical application of the concepts introduced, illustrates the payoff of my approach in comparison with existing approaches to ‘anti’ parties by assessing their differing classificatory power and empirical utility in the analysis of controversial cases from Greece and Italy. Chapter 3 carries out a QCA analysis of the conditions favouring or inhibiting the electoral sustainability of organizationally new anti-system parties by focusing on 64 formations from 18 Western European countries over the period 1968–2017. In addition, by using post-QCA case selection, Chapter 3 investigates four case studies in detail (the Northern League in Italy, the Icelandic SK, the Greek ANEL, and the Austrian GA) to highlight the mechanisms
underlying the configurations identified by the QCA solution. Chapter 4 analyses the cases of the Danish DF, the M5S in Italy, the German Greens, the Dutch PVV, and SYRIZA in Greece in depth, with the goal of explaining why such parties experienced different evolutions in terms of their interaction streams at the systemic level over time. Chapter 5 investigates the electoral cost of government transition for anti-system parties by focusing on 21 formations from the Western European context over the period 1945–2017. In addition, on the grounds of post-QCA case selection, it illustrates the interplay between the different causal conditions through a focus on the best typical cases identified by the empirical analyses (the Irish CnP, the French PCF, the Dutch LPF, the Northern League in Italy, and SYRIZA in Greece). The final chapter of the book explores the rise of new anti-system parties within the context of the multiple crises that hit the European Union (EU) over the last decade: the Great Recession, the migrant crisis, and Brexit. With the goal of identifying the conditions leading to the parliamentary breakthrough of new anti-system parties within the profound context of crisis affecting the Old Continent, a QCA analysis of the 47 elections held between 2009 and mid-2018 is provided. Finally, the main implications of the book are discussed, and some possible avenues for future research are outlined.

Notes

1 In 2017 the Northern League dropped the adjective ‘Northern’ and simply renamed itself as Lega (League).
2 The analysis of electoral sustainability includes the parties that at the time of parliamentary entry qualify as anti-system. For details, see Chapter 3.
3 In this introduction, the broad term ‘factor’ is used in a general way to avoid, for the time being, a lengthy discussion of the actual causal conditions employed in the various QCA analyses of the book (see the relevant chapters for details).
4 It is important to underline that, although radical disembedding constitutes a modality of non-integration, it always presupposes a previous discontinuity of party’s interaction streams. More specifically, radical disembedding always follows a phase of integration, with the latter, in turn, implying that a party had previously left the initial status of non-integration.
5 This is possible because there are no reasons to narrow the temporal scope of the analysis in order to ensure a homogenous case selection, unlike the analysis of electoral sustainability that focuses on the period 1968–2017 to account for a major historical discontinuity directly relevant for the phenomenon of interest (i.e. the end of the so-called ‘golden age’ of party system stability).
1 This chapter expands my previous study, Zulianello, Anti-System Parties Revisited: Concept Formation and Guidelines for Empirical Research, 2018, published by Cambridge University Press, reproduced with permission. First, it provides a more extensive discussion of the limitations of the existing approaches to anti-system parties, as well as of the alternative ‘anti’ labels found in the literature. Second, it further clarifies important issues related to the revisited concept of anti-system party, the novel typology of political parties and regarding the interaction streams taking place within the party system.
2 Linz (1978, pp. 27–28) uses the term ‘disloyal opposition’ to refer to actors ‘that question the existence of the regime and aim at changing it’. The term is very similar to the Sartorian concept of anti-system party as it includes, in addition to communist and fascist parties, the French Gaullists and secessionist parties.
3 The process reached its climax in 1978 with a reciprocal and ‘formalized inter-party agreement’ that resulted in a ‘full national solidarity formula based on the explicit parliamentary support from the Communists’ (Verzichelli & Cotta, 2000, pp. 460, 449, fn9, see also p. 434).

4 Furthermore, the rise of parties that are very difficult to locate on the left-right political space and that nevertheless qualify as anti-system (e.g. the Italian M5S until 2018) clearly highlights the weakness of such an approach.

5 A similar shortcoming emerges in a very preliminary discussion of anti-system parties I carried out elsewhere when I still followed classical approaches (Zulianello, 2013).

6 For a brilliant critique of assumptions made on the ‘non-coalition points’ and ‘points of non-transfer of votes’ implied by the Sartorian framework, see Ieraci (1997).

7 Following a Sartorian perspective, anti-democratic actors are a subset of the broader group of anti-system formations only in democratic systems, as the term ‘anti-system’ can also be applied in non-democratic contexts. For example, according to Sartori (1982, p. 300), Solidarność was an anti-system formation within the context of communist Poland.

8 One exception is constituted by McDonnell and Newell (2011, p. 447) who argue that political parties may join a government while retaining or attempting to retain ‘significant features of an outsider status’. However, the boundaries of the concept itself are not clearly outlined and in this case too the crucial issue of determining the negative pole of the conceptual structure remains unresolved.

9 However, in this case too, the boundaries of the concept ‘outsider party’ are not clearly specified and the crucial issue of determining the negative pole of the conceptual structure remains unresolved. As the concept of outsider party is built upon two necessary and jointly sufficient properties – having gone through a phase of being non-coalitionable and the articulation of a metapolitical opposition (McDonnell & Newell, 2011) – it is clear that we are talking about a different phenomenon once such actors enter the group of potentially governing parties.

10 Furthermore, the term ‘anti-establishment’ can be meaningfully employed only to refer to the rhetoric, or appeal, of a given actor but not when attempting to grasp its ‘behavioural’ propensities. This point is highlighted by important instances of political parties that take part in the coalitional game and even participate in government while consistently using anti-establishment appeals.

11 Sartori (1976, p. 121) uses the term ‘interaction streams’ only in relation to the number of parties, by simply suggesting that the higher the number of parties, ‘the greater the complexity and probably the intricacy of the system’. In this book, the term interaction streams is used to discuss the different functional roles played by political parties at the systemic level.

12 As the two arenas are qualitatively different, the crucial test is the assessment of the different scenarios at the statewide level. Whereas participation in sub-national governments may eventually lead to the achievement of systemic integration, as previously defined, the presence of cooperative interactions in the former arena is often not accompanied by similar interactions at the statewide level. This point is highlighted by the cases of numerous parties that are ‘coalitionable’ at the local or regional level but ‘uncoalitionable’ (for whatever the reason) in the national party system.

13 Whereas many mainstream parties are also core-system parties, such categories often do not overlap.

14 Gianfranco Pasquino and Marco Valbruzzi (2013, p. 474) argue that in 2013 the M5S represented a case of anti-system party because ‘they reject[ed] all coalitional arrangements and claim[ed] to want to restructure the entire democratic regime/system’. However, it is not clear why, following these criteria, they consider the PCI during the phase of the Historic Compromise as anti-system (Pasquino & Valbruzzi, 2013, p. 472, figure 2) despite its participation in a formal minority government, as in the latter ‘there are grounds to believe [that] this
support was based on some sort of agreement with the leaders of government parties’ (de Swaan, 1973, p. 143). In other words, as with classical perspectives, the problem of setting clear conceptual boundaries emerges.

15 The emphasis on the adverb ‘deliberately’ is necessary to underline the role played by the agency of the party itself. This possibility is clearly different from the case of a party that following its inclusion in very visible cooperative interactions is subsequently marginalized by the others because of contextual or tactical reasons, despite its centripetal efforts, as exemplified by the case of the Italian PCI in the 1980s (see Levite & Tarrow, 1983).

16 As previously mentioned, the term ‘halfway party’ was first introduced by Sartori (1966, 1982) himself; however, its conceptual boundaries were never really defined.

17 The choice of the term ‘complementary’ refers to the fact that although such parties often introduce new issues into the political market, such issues may be integrated into the established metapolitical system without resulting in the alteration of crucial features of the status quo.

18 For an application to the Hungarian case, see Zulianello (2018).

19 Similar considerations apply to the ‘positive definition’ of anti-system parties by Keren (2000).

20 Mudde (2014) also considers Communist Refoundation (Rifondazione Comunista, RC) as an anti-system party, a case that is not analysed in this chapter for reasons of space.

1 For details on the operationalization of organizational newness, see Bolleyer (2013, p. 26).

2 For example, the Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, BZÖ), despite its populist radical right ideological profile, is not included in the present analysis because, by the time of its parliamentary breakthrough, it qualified as a halfway house party, as it previously achieved systemic integration through participation in national government with the mainstream centre-right (see Chapter 2). Following a similar logic, the Luxembourian Action Committee 5/6 Pensions for Everyone (Aktionskomitee 5/6 Pension fir jiddfereen) did not qualify as an anti-system at the time of parliamentary entry, as its ideological radicalization occurred only in the 1990s, following its transformation into Alternative Democratic Reform (Alternatív Demokratische Reformpartei, ADR). In other words, the Action Committee 5/6 Pensions for Everyone did not qualify as an instance of a party ideologically questioning established metapolicies by the time of its parliamentary breakthrough (1989) but rather as a single-issue party seeking ‘better pension provision for private sector workers’ (Hanley, 2011, p. 37; see also Hearl, 1989).

3 This means that in the Greek, Portuguese, and Spanish contexts, parties formed, respectively, since 1989, 1995, and 1996, and that entered parliament in the same year at the earliest, are included in the analysis.

4 The Greek DIKKI (Dimokratiko Koinoniko Kinima), a party that possibly matches the criteria outlined in Chapter 2, is excluded from the analysis as ‘there is no detailed empirical research’ on such a formation (Takis Pappas, personal communication, 28 January 2016). This prevents the inclusion of DIKKI because of the impossibility of determining the levels of intra-party conflict following parliamentary breakthrough, one of the causal conditions tested in the QCA analyses performed in this chapter. In addition, as extensively discussed in Chapter 5, by the time of its parliamentary entry, Synaspismós, the predecessor of SYRIZA, qualified as a moderate centre-left party (Eleftheriou, 2009), and is therefore excluded from the present analysis.

5 Although Golden Dawn was founded in 1983, it ‘was inactive for a decade and started its political activity in 1993’ (Ellinas, 2013, p. 547).

6 The party run the 1976 election as a part of the electoral alliance with Proletarian Democracy (Democrazia Proletaria, DP) and three out of six MPs elected by the alliance belonged to the Party of Proletarian Unity for Communism (Partito di Unità Proletaria per il Comunismo, PDUP). However, the actual
breakthrough of the PDUP as a distinct party occurred only in 1979 (Colarizi, 1994).

7 Proletarian Democracy initially emerged as an electoral coalition: an organizationally new party with the same name was formed in 1978 (Jacobs, 1989).

8 As it can be seen, the fs scores in the outcome set are not necessarily equidistant (i.e. between 0.70 and 0.60; 0.35 and 0.25; 0.10 and 0.00). This is perfectly acceptable in applied QCA on the grounds of theoretical motivations (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Here, this choice is due to the necessity of providing a more nuanced differentiation across the cases. The interval between 0.70 and 0.60 is due to the fact that the parties receiving the latter score present a very limited average electoral support despite their capacity to ensure two re-elections (less than 1 per cent). On the other hand, the interval between 0.35 and 0.25 is motivated by the fact that parties receiving the latter score did fail, in comparison to the former, to contest both the elections following breakthrough. Similarly, the interval between 0.10 and 0.00 reflects that the former fs score points to parties at least contesting both the elections following breakthrough, while the latter refers to formations failing to do so.

9 Only the post-war period is considered.

10 In addition, many parties classified by Abedi (2004, p. 11) as ‘anti-political-establishment parties’ do not ‘challenge the status quo in terms of major policy issues and political system issues’, to echo one of his own criteria – a similar concern is raised by Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (2015). For example, the Dutch Union 55+ (Unie 55+) was a single-issue party focusing on the rights of the elderly and it represented a simple instance of conventional anti-incumbent and policy-oriented opposition (see Chapter 2).

11 The existing research on party factions and factionalism has explored a wide range of empirical phenomena (for an excellent review, see Ceron, 2012, Chapter 1). Nevertheless, factionalism does not mechanically lead to specific levels or degrees of intra-party conflict. As Françoise Boucek (2009, p. 469, 479) argues, factionalism ‘may acquire different faces [cooperative, competitive or degenerative] in different parties in different times’ and ‘there is nothing predetermined about these processes’. Furthermore, factionalism ‘is not necessarily a bad thing’ as ‘it can provide a structure for internal power-sharing and conflict resolution’ (Boucek, 2009, p. 473, 479). For these reasons, by focusing on the levels of intra-party conflict, we refer to a different phenomenon rather than factionalism per se.

12 In the case of statewide parties, exceptions were made when conflicts at the sub-national level had a major resonance in the national public sphere (see Table 3.5 for the sources used).

13 In the case of the parties which did not contest both the national elections following parliamentary breakthrough, only the relevant period is coded. For example, in the case of the Belgian ROSSEM, the levels of intra-party conflict are measured only over the immediate period following parliamentary entry (1991–1995).

14 The single condition which came closest to the conventional parameters for the analysis of necessity is the absence of a disproportional electoral system (~DISPR) (consistency, 0.857; coverage, 0.412). Nevertheless, in addition to the low consistency score, this value appears to be only the reflection of the fact that most European electoral systems are characterized by relatively low levels of disproportionality, a point already acknowledged in previous QCA studies (van Kessel, 2015, p. 79).

15 In other words, parties without a prophetic ideology do not attempt to activate a new ideological line of competition (see Beyens et al., 2016, p. 6; Lucardie, 2000a, pp. 181–183). Purifiers do challenge one or more pre-existing parties on ideological grounds, while prolocutors focus on issues disregarded by pre-existing parties ‘without reference to an explicit ideology’ (Lucardie, 2000a, p. 176).

16 In the case of the Red Electoral Alliance, the ‘peculiarity’ lies in the fact that it managed to enter parliament in 1993 despite obtaining only 1.1 per cent of the vote (with one MP elected) thanks to a heavy concentration of its support in Oslo, a district with many seats (Aardal, 2002). In the two subsequent elections,
the Red Electoral Alliance did not manage to return any MPs to parliament despite its higher vote share in comparison to 1993 (1.7 per cent in 1997 and 1.2 per cent in 2001) because of a more homogeneous distribution of its support across the country.

17 For details on the German Greens, see Chapter 4.

18 The Swedish Greens failed to achieve re-election in 1991 for two main reasons: on the one hand, ‘it was forced into “left-right” political debates despite claiming these divisions to be irrelevant’; on the other hand, it ran a poorly organized election campaign, ‘with party spokespersons at times openly contradicting one another’ (Burchell, 2002, p. 72). Nevertheless, the lessons were learnt by the Greens, who subsequently engaged in a process of substantial moderation and organizational reform after 1991 that meant the party became ‘remarkably free of internal ideological divisions’ (Burchell, 2002, p. 26). This allowed the Swedish Greens to develop a more professional and efficient organizational structure and deliver a well-coordinated and united message in the 1994 election, which secured their return to the parliament (with 5.0 per cent of the national vote).

19 As a logistic function is used for direct calibration, the actual set membership score received by the cases in the causal conditions INTCONF, DISPR, and VOL are, respectively, 0.05 for full non-membership and 0.95 for full membership (see Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).

20 The Venetian League proved to be electorally unsustainable, see Table 3.7.

21 In this respect, a paradigmatic example is represented by the fact that Franco Rocchetta, the founder of ‘the mother of all leagues’, the Venetian League, was expelled from the Northern League as ‘a traitor’ in 1995 (Zulianello, 2014b, p. 4, 11).

22 Nevertheless, given the refusal of the Women's Alliance to use the labels ‘left’ or ‘right’, this alienated the support of parts of the Red Stockings, which was grounded on a ‘dogmatic separation of bourgeoisie and working-class women’ (Sigurdjarnardóttir, 1998, p. 73).

23 The most radical members of the SK and the People's Alliance (Alþýðubandílagið) refused the compromises that came with the process of unification on the left, and founded the radical Left-Green Movement (VG), which, by adopting an antagonist posture within the party system, especially an uncompromising position on environmental and socio-economic issues (Hálfdanarson, 2008), presented itself as a ‘clear-cut alternative for voters furthest to the left’ and to the XS more generally (Hardarson & Kristinsson, 2000, p. 412).

24 Notable defections were those of Christos Zois, Yiannis Manolis, Yiannis Kourakos, Mihalis Giannakis, and Dimitris Stamatis, who formed a new formation called Greeks’ Initiative.

25 Significantly, if the two parties had presented a common list in 1983, they could have received at least five seats (Haerpfer, 1989).

26 This dynamics resulted in the creation and consolidation of consensual arrangements by the SPO and ÖVP at all the levels of government, including the governance of public and quasi-public sectors (the Proporz), which extended the ‘reach’ of the party system to a level comparable to the Belgian and Italian partitocrazie (De Winter, della Porta, & Deschouwer, 1996).

27 However, despite the ‘continuous public quarrelling characterising the early history of the party’, the intra-party conflict did not trigger a major organizational crisis in the case of the Austrian Greens, in contrast to their German counterparts (see Chapter 4).

28 Although the full development of coalition potential has not been concretized in actual coalition governments – especially because of reasons of arithmetic – this suggests that the functional role of the Austrian Greens in the party system has qualitatively changed (see Chapter 2; cf. Bolleyer, 2008).

29 The analysis of necessity for ~SUST does not return meaningful results.

30 As ~SUST represents the negation of SUST, the deviant cases for coverage that emerged in the former analysis correspond to the deviant cases for consistency identified by the latter solution; at the same time, the deviant cases for consistency in the analysis of ~SUST correspond to the deviant cases for coverage identified by the complex solution for SUST.
While the process of radical disembedding is empirically rare and is usually experienced by parties that in the past had already undergone a previous phase as anti-system, it is also possible that, through such a twofold process, a party actually becomes anti-system for the first time in its history.

Panebianco (1988, pp. 38–40) distinguishes between the conformation of the dominant coalition, which refers to the distribution of power relations within the party, and its composition, which points to the specific individuals that constitute the coalition.

The first signs of organizational adaptation occurred in the 1986 Hamburg Conference with the party removing the mid-term rotation of elected MPs (Frankland, 1988).

Alliance 90 managed to have eight MPs elected, two of which were members of the Eastern Greens.

If the two green lists had run together in 1990, they would have obtained 34 seats in the new Bundestag (Schoonmaker & Frankland, 1993).

In the case of complementary parties, the absence of coalition potential is also due, in some cases, to the fact that following substantial ideological moderation there may be a ‘time lag’ between the ‘objective’ change of a party and the ‘subjective’ response by mainstream parties, with the latter possibly requiring a short or long period before considering it regierungsfähig.

Between 1989 and 1991, Synaspismós was an electoral coalition that also participated in a government with the mainstream centre-right New Democracy under the premiership of Tzannis Tzannetakis (Pridham & Verney, 1991).

In the run up to the 2009 general elections, SYRIZA was offered a pre-election alliance by PASOK, which was nevertheless rejected (Pappas, 2010).

Kjersgaard remained an MP, and in 2015 was the first female to be elected to the position of chair of the Danish Parliament.

The FrPd failed to field candidates in the 2005 general elections, and it has not taken part in any general election since then.

As Pepe and di Gennaro (2009) underline, the first V-day ‘was the first experiment in political organization and action developed primarily via the use of social media on the Web’ in Italy.

Other V-days were held in 2008 and 2013.

Some expulsions of the M5S’s representatives occurred following the violation of the media ban.

On 13 February 2014, the National Direction of the Democratic Party approved (136 votes in favour, 16 against, and 2 abstentions) Renzi’s motion calling for the resignation of Letta as Prime Minister and the formation of a new government.

The M5S’s seven-point programme for the 2014 EU elections included the call for a referendum on the euro.

In addition to Di Maio, the other four people indicated by Grillo were Alessandro Di Battista, Roberto Fico, Carla Ruocco, and Carlo Sibillia.

The change was decided by online voting on 17 November 2015.

The first beta release version of Rousseau was published one year later, on 17 July 2015.

The proposal included a number of important reforms: the abandonment of equal bicameralism, a reduction of the number of MPs, limiting the operating costs of institutions, the suppression of the CNEL, and the revision of Title V of the Constitution (for details, see Pasquino & Valbruzzi, 2017).

The ‘Contract for the government of change’ was approved by the M5S’s members following an online vote with 92 per cent of votes in favour.

Such parties include EénNL (0.64 per cent), the Lijst Vijf Fortuyn (0.21 per cent), and the Partij voor Nederland (0.05 per cent).

Although hard evidence is lacking, the PVV is said to receive considerable donations from sponsors in Israel and the United States (Vossen, 2017).
1 The national unity governments formed shortly after the Second World War are excluded for reasons of comparability. Thus, the ‘oldest’ empirical cases under investigation are the transitions to government of two Irish parties: the Clann na Poblachta and Clann na Talmhan in 1948.

2 In this respect, a paradigmatic exception is represented by the case of SYRIZA, see Chapter 4.

3 van Spanje’s (2011) analysis is grounded on the concept of anti-political-establishment party developed by Abedi (2004). However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the latter presents evident shortcomings that seriously undermine its utility for empirical research. Furthermore, as Albertazzi and McDonnell (2015) underline, Abedi’s (2004) own classification of anti-political-establishment parties contradicts his own criteria, as it includes formations that actually qualify as moderate parties in ideological terms.

4 As extensively discussed in Chapter 4, both SYRIZA and ANEL qualified as anti-system until their acceptance of the Third Memorandum, which signalled their negative integration through the direct path.

5 The party adopted the shorter official name ‘Lega’, thus dropping references to the North in late 2017.

6 The case of Synaspismós’ participation in the Tzannetakis government (July–October 1989) is excluded for two reasons. First, at the time Synaspismós represented an electoral coalition, containing both the reformist Greek Left (Elliniki Aristera, EAR), which since its foundation rejected Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, and democratic centralism (Marantzidis & Kalyvas, 2005), as well as the hard-line Stalinist Communist Party of Greece (KKE). Second, as Pappas (2003, p. 108) underlines, ‘the KKE was not admitted to the coalition governments by itself’ but rather as ‘partner’ in the broader left alliance.

7 In terms of case selection, it can be noticed that no green parties have been included in the analysis. This is the consequence of the fact that by the time they enter government, Western European green parties have largely abandoned their anti-metapolitical orientation towards the economic and political system characterizing the ‘New Politics’ wave (Poguntke, 1987), which therefore no longer constituted their ideological core (see the previous pages).

8 The classification refers to the time of transition to government.

9 Although among the broad group of regionalist actors (Massetti & Schakel, 2016) only secessionist parties qualify as instances of anti-metapolitical opposition per se (Zulianello, 2018), the cases of the People’s Union and the Walloon Rally are included in the present analysis because of their radicalism in relation to ‘the system’ in which they operated. As Dewachter et al. (1977, p. 247) maintain, both the People’s Union and the Walloon Rally were not considered ‘as parties eligible for government given […] the values prevailing in these systems and the values and objectives proposed by these parties, and on the other hand, the values and objectives of the leading political elite embodied in the elitist consensus’. Although Dewachter et al. (1977) considered not only the People’s Union and the Walloon Rally, but also the Francophone Democratic Front (Front Démocratique des Francophones, FDF) to be ‘structural opposition parties’, the latter is excluded from the present analysis because it ‘followed a more moderate path’ (Abedi, 2004, p. 35; see also Buelens & Van Dyck, 1998).

10 Bossi was replaced by Roberto Calderoli as Minister of Reforms and Devolution after he suffered a stroke on 11 March 2004. After the accident, Bossi progressively returned to the political scene during 2005.

11 The Left-Green Movement had participated for three months (1 February–9 May 2009) in the first cabinet of Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir with the Social Democratic Alliance after the previous coalition government of the Alliance and the centre-right Independence Party collapse. However, this represented a short-term transitory government that rapidly called for a new election, which was held only after 83 days (25 April 2009).
12 As Ireland progressively moved away from its Westminster roots (Bulsara & Kissane, 2009), the cases of Clann na Poblachta and Clann na Talmhan (1951 general election) are attributed a score of −0.20 in the executive-parties dimension, following the location of the Irish case provided by Lijphart’s two-dimensional map before this major evolution took place (Lijphart, 1999, pp. 255, 312).

13 For each party, a country score is attributed on the executive-parties dimension of the relevant period under analysis. For example, in the case of the Austrian Freedom Party’s post-incumbency election (2002), the 1981–2010 average is used, while in the case of the SKDL (1970 Finnish election), the 1945–2010 score is taken.

14 Following Lijphart (2012, p. 12), the score used to calibrate the causal condition for the threshold for full non-membership in condition CONS corresponds to the UK values on the executive-parties dimension in the period 1981–2010 rather than the 1945–2010, as ‘the normalcy of cabinet dominance was largely restored in the 1980s under the strong leadership of Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’.

15 The analysis of condition CONS as necessary for ASSET returns a high consistency (0.929), but also a low RoN (relevance of necessity) value (0.345). This suggests we ought not to consider it as a necessary condition but rather as a ‘trivial necessary condition’ (see Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, pp. 233–237), as it is simply the reflection of the fact that there are many more instances of the alleged necessary condition (CONS) than of the outcome (ASSET).

16 As Schneider and Wagemann (2012, p. 165) underline, the conservative solution is ‘the subset of all other possible solutions’.

17 In this respect, a decisive role was played by the Minister of Justice Roberto Castelli (Northern League) who became ‘the figurehead of governmental policy on the justice system (and against the judiciary)’ (Diamanti & Lello, 2005, p. 22).

18 As previously mentioned, at the time of formation, the First Tsipras government consisted of 15 ministers: 11 from SYRIZA, three independents, and only one from the populist radical right ANEL.

19 However, it is important to underline that although SYRIZA’s loss was very marginal in percentage points, Tsipras’ formation, as well as almost all the other parties, experienced a decline in its absolute votes, given the considerable increase in abstentions in the September 2015 elections.

20 Although the relationship between the PCF and the non-communist left registered some temporary interruptions (for example in 1986), the French Communists never experienced the process of radical disembedding following 1972, as indicated by the very rapid re-establishment of an electoral coalition between the former and the socialists for the second round of the 1988 legislative elections (see Golder, 2006; Raymond, 2005). As March (2011, p. 65) maintains, until recently ‘the two-round parliamentary electoral system make[d] the PCF dependent on the Socialist Party: “stand-down” electoral agreements guarantee it parliamentary seats on which much of its little remaining national prestige (and funding) depends. It has long had little choice but to back the larger (Socialist Party) in the second round of presidential election’. However, the impact of the 2017 ‘electoral earthquake’ on the development of the future patterns of cooperation and competition within the French party system remains to be seen (see Gougou & Persico, 2017).

1 The 2009 Greek general election is given the crisp-set value of 0, as the escalation of the economic crisis occurred following this event (Dinas, 2010; Pappas, 2010). As a comparison, on the other hand, the 2009 elections held in Iceland and Portugal were already characterized by the severe impact of the economic crisis, and both receive the score of 1 (see Indridason, 2014; Magone, 2010).

2 For the Italian case, the most recent data available refer to 2017 (Eurostat, 2018).

3 While the cases under analysis receive the crisp-set value of 1 if a populist radical right party with seats is present given their nativist ‘core’ (Mudde, 2007), the Norwegian elections under analysis in the relevant period also receive the
score of 1 in this condition because the Progress Party (FrPn), albeit belonging to the neo-liberal variant, is known for its ‘aggressive anti-immigration rhetoric’ (Zulianello, Albertini, & Ceccobelli, 2018, p. 450; see also Chapter 5).

4 In the case of the Irish PBP, the limited credibility was primarily due to the scarce visibility in the election campaign of the party, which received substantial nationwide coverage only when one of its candidates, Joan Collins, ‘spat in the face’ of the former Prime Minister Bertie Ahern (O’Leary, 2012, p. 331). In a similar fashion, the Belgian PP obtained sporadic media visibility, which occurred primarily for the ‘negative’ publicity produced by the fact that Laurent Louis, one of its leading candidates (and its only elected MP), made frequent headlines for his racist statements that undermined the public image of the party (La Libre, 2011).

5 The credibility of the appeal of the Sweden Democrats (SD) was decisively influenced by the skills of his leader, Jimmie Åkesson who, thanks to ‘his smart appearance, his low-key but confident and reasoned style and his “clean” background belied any accusations of extremism or quirkiness’ (Widfeldt, 2008, p. 271, see also van Kessel, 2015).

6 According to March (2011), for the Dutch Socialist Party (SPnl), populism is not a core element of its ideological profile, but is instead dependent on strategic considerations, thus presenting variations according to the incentives provided by the political opportunity structure.

7 As discussed in Chapter 2, a typical misunderstanding in the literature is that anti-system parties necessarily need to be ‘relevant’ in Sartorian terms (Sartori, 1976). Nevertheless, possessing blackmail potential, which is, in turn, a function of a party’s competitive strenght, is not a defining property of anti-system parties, either following Sartori’s classical approach (1966, 1976, 1982) or in my revised concept.

8 This also appears influenced by the (previously mentioned) limitations of Abedi’s (2004) concept of anti-political-establishment party (see Chapter 5, fn2, and Chapter 2).

References


