Irina Khmelko, Rick Stapenhurst, and Michael L. Mezey have assembled an authoritative guide to the declining institutional capacities of legislatures around the world.

Case studies represent a diverse sample of countries, ranging from newer democracies emerging from the post-communist world to more established but at times fragile democracies in Asia. Although largely focused on newer democratic systems, readers will be able to identify key factors that explain the general global trend toward the empowerment of executives at the expense of national legislatures. The cases, although different from one another, identify several factors that have explained the erosion of legislative power, including historical legacies, institutional design, economic factors, external factors, political polarization, personalization of politics, and the rise of populism. Original data and the presentation of testable theoretical propositions about the growing imbalance between executives and national legislatures moves the field in a promising new direction.

*Legislative Decline in the 21st Century* will be of interest to students and scholars of Legislative Studies and Comparative Politics. Lessons drawn from these case studies will allow policy makers to explore new solutions that can lead to the improved quality of democracy in countries around the world.

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“This timely volume is undoubtedly a must-read for anyone interested in legislative vulnerability, executive dominance, and democratic backsliding in emerging democracies and hybrid regimes. Leading experts on executive-legislative relations examine the main factors accounting for the global decline of legislative power. These include historical legacies, institutional design, economic conditions; globalization, political polarization, and the personalization of the politics. The essays included in this volume skillfully illustrate how these different factors affect executive-legislative relations in the post-communist world (both in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union), sub-Saharan Africa, fledgling democracies (Bangladesh, India, Mexico, Myanmar, and Turkey), as well as in a well-institutionalized democracy (Germany). While highly informative, the content of these chapters, is accessible to both scholars and students.”

—Sebastian Saiegh, Professor of Political Science, University of California San Diego
LEGISLATIVE DECLINE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

A Comparative Perspective

Edited by Irina Khmelko, Rick Stapenhurst, and Michael L. Mezey
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I grew up behind the Iron Curtain in one of the most beautiful and beloved cities of the former Soviet Union—Kiev. The political system was dominated by one-party rule, one ideology, leaders who ruled with an iron fist, and an “us” vs. “them” mentality depending on which side of the Iron Curtain “us” and “them” were. However, people never stopped wanting a society with freedom and liberty for all. During my teenage years, I would frequently spend time with my friends in a circle sending a handheld coffee grinder from one person to another and then enjoying a cup of coffee while having conversations about what a good society might look like. We all knew what we did not want—to be sent to Siberia for expressing ideas that were different from those of our leader. The label “enemy of the people” was applied to all dissidents, to anybody whose ideology and beliefs differed from the leader of the Soviet Union. Such enemies of the people faced harsh prosecution, including the possibility of execution or at least time in a labor camp. This was the time when it became clear to me that strength in leadership without kindness resulted in cruelty—something we did not want. However, the question remained: what kind of society did we want?

After the Iron Curtain fell in 1991, I traveled the world, living in different countries. My natural curiosity led me to listen carefully to people in these different countries and to find out what concerned them. What I discovered was that people in every country wanted to have freedom and liberty for all. Everybody wanted to live in a free society with opportunities for their children. However, the initial question remained—how to build such a society?

One reason that I pursued graduate studies was to be able to find answers to that question. I received graduate degrees in Public Administration and Public Policy from institutions in the United Kingdom and the United States in addition to a degree in Philosophy in the USSR. I used my fluency in three languages
and the ability to work in at least seven languages to search for answers. The obvious answer was a democracy, but democracies exist in multiple forms and differ significantly from each other. However, one feature was common to all democracies—representation—the idea that elected representatives of the people could govern on behalf of the people.

Although legislatures, parliaments, and legislative assemblies are different terms, all such institutions are composed of representatives elected by the people with a mandate to govern. These institutions are far from efficient, but they offer the best chance to achieve the free society that everybody around the world seems to want. This insight led me to the study of these representative institutions and their roles in building societies characterized by freedom and liberty for all. Legislatures, however they are structured, allow for debate and compromise, and this can lead to understanding. However, such institutions appear to be vulnerable to the ambitions of those who wish to return to the era of strong leadership and the “us against them” mentality.

To assess the current status of legislatures in countries, many of which have recently emerged from authoritarian political systems, and to identify main trends, I invited scholars from different parts of the world to share their research on what is happening in the various countries in which they live or that they study. The first accounts of their work appeared in The Decline in Legislative Powers and the Rise of Authoritarianism. I then asked these colleagues to expand these brief notes into full-blown chapters and solicited other scholars who had not been part of the original project to contribute chapters on additional countries. This anthology is the result of these efforts.

Working with such a diverse group of scholars from different countries, different ideological and academic traditions, different genders, ages, and stages of their academic careers posed significant intellectual and logistical challenges. I was fortunate to be able to share this work with my two co-editors, Rick Stapenhurst, and Michael L. Mezey, and we were all fortunate to work with an international group of scholars who respected our deadlines and responded promptly to our editorial and substantive concerns. Through our joint efforts, we hope that readers will see perspectives from different parts of the world as well as identifiable cross-national trends.
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INTRODUCTION

Vulnerable Legislatures in the Era of Strong Executives

Michael L. Mezey

Discussions either observing or predicting the decline of legislative institutions have been around for more than a century. In *Modern Democracies*, published in 1921, James Bryce, in a chapter titled “The Decline of Legislatures,” lamented the role that democracy played in diminishing the quality of legislators and the ceding of its institutional power and influence to the executive and to political parties.1 At about the same time, the German sociologist Max Weber discussed the rise of the bureaucratic state dominated by unelected policy experts and the dire implications of that phenomenon for legislatures composed of elected politicians.2 By the middle of the 20th century, K.C. Wheare’s book on *Legislatures*, required reading at the time for all political scientists interested in parliaments, reflected the prevailing wisdom of legislative decline.3

In the last third of the 20th century, however, other scholars began to offer a more nuanced view. Some argued that the “decline” thesis was flawed because it relied on an idealized notion of a past “golden age” of legislatures that never really existed. Others suggested that the thesis implicitly relied on the US Congress as the model against which all legislatures should be measured. The fact that the prerogatives and power of nearly all legislatures fell well short of that enjoyed by the American Congress was taken by some, especially US scholars, as a sign of legislative weakness or decline rather than a reflection of the *sui generis* nature of that institution and the American Constitution.4

These scholars made the point that legislatures never had, nor were they meant to have, the central role in policy-making. Rather, as John Stuart Mill noted, their main functions were to “watch and control” the executive and to act as the nation’s “Committee of Grievances and its Congress of Opinions” reflecting the mood and interests of its people. Policy-making, Mill concluded, was a task for which legislatures were “radically unfit.” He recommended that government
policies be designed by a panel of experts, presumably under the auspices of the executive, and then submitted to the legislature for either approval or disapproval. From this perspective, the most consequential legislatures were those that could inform and influence public policy decisions and constrain and hold to account executive leaders in whose hands the primary responsibility for governing resided. It was in the performance of these functions that the established parliaments in Western Europe and elsewhere excelled, a point often neglected by those who assumed that these legislatures were weak simply because the government seldom lost on recorded votes.

For legislatures in authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, it was clear that these bodies generally had little to no influence over policy-making and rarely (if ever) exercised oversight of the executive. But instead of writing these institutions off entirely, some scholars concluded that their main function was to deal with the particularistic demands of citizens and to legitimize the decisions of executive leaders, providing the appearance—if not necessarily the reality—of a democratic political system. Although these functions were not signs of legislative strength, they were not inconsequential; they contributed to political stability and provided those in power with information that they could, if they wished, use to adjust policies at the margins to make them more palatable to the population.

The Third Wave

These various interpretations of the role of the legislature affected how scholars and practitioners viewed the so-called “third wave” of democracy that in the last decades of the 20th century saw several countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa move from more authoritarian to what seemed to be more democratic systems of government. This was also the time when the Soviet Union disintegrated and Eastern and Central European countries in that region began the process of transitioning away from authoritarian, single-party dominated systems and toward representative democracies.

Many hoped that this third wave marked a permanent and global change away from authoritarian government to more open and democratic political systems with an institutionalized and influential legislature at its core. Few believed that legislatures with strong policy-making roles akin to that played by the US Congress would emerge. However, the hope was that legislatures capable of overseeing, influencing, and restraining executives, and with members free to articulate policy disagreements with the government as well as public grievances and concerns, would become central components of their political systems. This was what leaders in most of the countries discussed in the chapters in this volume aspired to, especially those countries in Central and Eastern Europe. As these nations moved to more open economic systems and as they sought to develop economic and cultural ties to Western Europe, there was an expectation that more open political systems also would develop—systems that resembled established parliamentary
democracies. The European Union (EU) also played a role. Because many of these nations hoped to join the EU, that group’s requirement that its members be representative democracies with an independent judiciary, a functioning parliament, and a commitment to human rights created an external pressure to move away from authoritarianism.

And, at least initially, there was reason to be hopeful. As the Central European countries decided upon their new governing institutions, legislatures were in many cases at the center of these deliberations, providing forums for various political groups that had been suppressed under the former regime to advocate for their policy positions and for the sort of institutional arrangements that they favored. At the same time, the civil societies of these nations became more open, with a free press, multiple political parties, and an array of channels for public dissent.

Many who participated in these institution building processes favored a parliamentary system and opposed the creation of a strong presidency, fearful that such an office would presage a return to authoritarian government. Others worried that the highly fractionalized multiparty system that would likely emerge in the early days of these new systems would create a paralyzed parliament and a government unable to meet the challenges of the economic and political transformation going forth in the region. They thought that a presidential system, despite its perils, would provide the strong leadership that these countries required. In many cases (Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Ukraine), these deliberations produced a compromise arrangement that resembled the semi-presidential model of the 5th French Republic, with executive power split between a popularly elected President with independent power and a prime minister and cabinet responsible to an elected parliament. In other cases (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia), a more traditional parliamentary model emerged in which executive power was held by a government headed by a prime minister accountable to parliament, often with a figurehead president with little independent authority.

In Latin America, the military that had dominated countries such as Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and others returned to their barracks, political parties reemerged and legislative institutions came to prominence, if not always dominance. None of these countries considered a parliamentary system; all adopted or returned to a presidential system of government with a popularly elected president sharing power with a legislature the members of whom came to office through elections contested by multiple political parties. Although the balance of power usually favored the president who, in many instances, was able to act unilaterally through decrees, these Congresses were far stronger and more autonomous than the subordinated and intimidated institutions that existed when the generals were in power.

Despite the optimism and excitement surrounding these changes, by the second decade of the 21st century, the durability of these democratic transformations came into question. Presidents elected on progressive—and in some instances,
Marxist—platforms in Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela adopted many of the practices of the authoritarian leaders who preceded them, arrogating power, intimidating opposition parties and the press, and manipulating constitutional provisions to their own advantage. Sometimes these actions took place with the support of a compliant legislature and in other instances, legislative opposition was ignored or suppressed. Typically, these “electoral caudillos” asserted that their election constituted a popular mandate that justified their actions and in some cases, public opinion polls suggested that the people indeed had more faith in these strong presidents than they had in the legislature.8

In Africa, legislative institution never really thrived. As Rick Stapenhurst and Isabelle Côté (Chapter 9) indicate, at best, the consolidation of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa was uneven, with strong legislatures in some countries and legislatures subordinated to the executive in many others. In many of these countries, the “big men” who had always been prominent in post-colonial Africa continued to dominate their political systems from their presidential offices. Although many “presidents for life” were willing to submit to elections, they used a variety of methods to ensure that they would win such contests and that they would dominate the legislative institutions with which they served.9

In Europe, Russia’s experiment with parliamentary democracy proved to be particularly short lived, as Vladimir Putin used his popular mandate from his election victories to consolidate power, clamp down on political dissent, and eventually control virtually every aspect of public policy-making. The elected Duma was reduced to a democratic façade for an authoritarian political system, not very much different from the role that the Supreme Soviet played before the breakup of the Soviet Union. (See Khmelko, et al. Chapter 2).

In some Central and Eastern European countries, a slower, more nuanced retreat from representative democracy occurred. In Hungary, a compliant legislature has ceded extensive power to a prime minister who has harassed and intimidated his political opponents, undermined judicial independence, taken control of state and private media, and manipulated the electoral system to his party’s advantage. (See Nikolenyi Chapter 12). In Poland, the President and his governing party took steps to undermine the country’s independent judiciary, but backed down in the face of a warning of sanctions from the EU. Nonetheless, as Monika Nalepa demonstrates in Chapter 4, the governing party’s challenges to the rule of law continue, facilitated by a structure that limits the ability of the parliamentary opposition to provide effective checks.

Even in more established European democracies, anti-system political parties that could pose a threat to representative democracy have risen in prominence. In Italy in 2018, the Five Star Movement, a loose organization arguing for the power of the people as opposed to the politicians, became part of the government. Its more established ally, the League, which had long questioned the performance and utility of Italian political institutions, also gained power. The Alternative for Germany (see Chapter 13) entered the Bundestag, while the Sweden Democrats
and the National Front in France achieved significant levels of popular support as well as representation in Parliament at the expense of their countries’ more established parties. In the United States, President Donald Trump has attacked the notion of an independent judiciary, has condemned the press as the enemy of the people, and in his third year in office, resisted or ignored attempts by the House of Representatives to exercise oversight of his Administration—in some cases claiming a unilateral right to withhold documents and witnesses from the Congress. The leaders of these parties and movements regularly voice their discontent with the people and processes associated with representative government and in doing so have chipped away at what has been a popular consensus in support of such institutional arrangements.

The experience of legislatures and parliaments in the West provides a larger context for the challenges facing legislatures around the world. In this volume, the focus is on the status of parliamentary institutions in a large number of nations in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, many of which can be considered emerging or fragile democracies. Although not all of these legislatures are in decline, these chapters, as a whole, suggest that the prerogatives of these institutions—even when conceived as overseeing and restraining the executive, rather than determining public policy—are regularly at risk, and always vulnerable to attempts by those in executive office as well as by anti-system parties to undermine them. Attempts by legislative leaders and international organizations to buttress these institutions with improved expertise and additional resources have met with uneven success, and have done relatively little to blunt the efforts of those in executive position to expand their prerogatives. (See Chapter 5 by Genckaya and Chapter 2 by Khmelko, et al.).

The argument of this introductory chapter is that legislative vulnerability to subordination by the executive is not peculiar to the countries discussed in the volume, but rather a constant across all political systems. Enhanced executive power is driven by the governing requirements of the modern nation-state, by the globalization of an increasing number of public policy issues, and by the forces of democratization, especially apparent in the more intimate contact between leaders and citizens enabled by a modern and often anarchic communication environment. These factors not only facilitate executive domination, but also open the door to populist movements and leaders who may well constitute a threat not just to parliaments, but to the project of representative democracy itself.

**The Executive Advantage**

Legislatures appear to be most vulnerable in those countries that have presidential or semi-presidential systems. When a nation has an elected president, there is a broadly shared public perception that places him or her at the center of the nation’s politics and therefore the person primarily responsible for dealing with the challenges before the country. One leading scholar summarized this
phenomenon in the following terms: “The president is taken to be the embodiment of the nation and the main custodian and definer of its interests.” The president is thought to be “the individual who is most fit to take responsibility for the destiny of the nation.”

Popular expectations for the welfare of the country and for the satisfactory performance of its political system focus on the presidency, sometimes to the exclusion or at least the marginalization of other public officials and political leaders, especially legislators. Research on public attitudes toward parliaments in Central and Eastern Europe has found that public attachment to the legislature is weaker in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems.

The case for presidential domination becomes more compelling at times of political, economic, or international crises when citizens are even more inclined to turn to “the man on horseback” for leadership. Presidents work diligently to exploit that state of mind, sometimes creating crises, or elevating ordinary issues to crisis status, often adopting apocalyptic rhetoric, all to convince citizens that an empowered leader is the only road to national salvation. They argue implicitly and often explicitly that because they are elected by all of the nation’s citizens—as opposed to the narrow constituencies that elect legislators—their policy decisions embody the will of the people and therefore deference to them and to their agenda is required. In this perverse analysis, support for the presidency epitomizes democracy, and therefore, political opponents—whether in the legislature, the courts, or civil society—are cast as anti-democratic forces.

Although popularly elected presidents have particular advantages as they seek to increase their power, the premiers, chancellors, and prime ministers in parliamentary systems have also seen an increase in their power and prerogatives as well as a public focus on their personal leadership that is not all that different from the attention that presidents receive. Parliamentary systems require the executive to maintain support from a legislative majority, and that requirement is supposed to constrain their actions. But as the experiences of several of the countries discussed in this volume demonstrate (Hungary, Poland, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and India) the emergence of de facto one-party systems or highly disciplined majority parties has led some parliaments to abandon any real pretense of executive control. The larger point is that no matter the constitutional arrangements, the personalization of politics and the public focus on the single leader rather than the collective governing body composed of legislatures, courts, bureaucrats, and political parties drive all political systems toward executive dominance.

The Administrative State

The rise of executive power is also attributable to the steadily increasing role that national governments have come to play in the lives of their citizens. As government does more, its size—calculated in terms of the number of people in its civilian and military bureaucracy, the number of agencies and departments that these people staff, and the cost of all the functions that government performs—grows.
exponentially. In addition, the discretionary power of these bureaucracies also increases because the laws that authorize government programs, especially in complex matters, are typically written in broad strokes that require bureaucratic experts to fill in the specifics. Because national bureaucracies are part of the executive branch and because every head of government—president or premier—is the chief executive, an expanded bureaucracy has meant expanded executive power.

Max Weber foresaw all of this a century ago, arguing that, in the modern nation-state, it was necessary to assign specific administrative responsibilities to officials who had the appropriate training and experience. For these people, administration and public service would become a profession—a vocation rather than an avocation—and that such career public servants should not be subject to the electoral process. Because their technical skills and training eventually would become indispensable, and because they would become a permanent part of government, Weber predicted that bureaucrats and bureaucratic institutions would come to eclipse politicians and the institutions associated with representative democracy that were supposed to control the bureaucracy.13

In response to the growth of the administrative state, partisans of legislative prerogatives emphasize an enhancement in the legislature’s oversight role. Among the typical prescriptions is a larger, more professionalized, and better-compensated legislative staff as well as a more institutionalized committee system so that legislators and their staff members can develop and maintain the policy expertise necessary to control the bureaucracy. But even with such steps, achieving effective oversight is easier said than done. There will always be an imbalance of expertise between the legislature and the executive. At best, legislators are policy generalists, often with some knowledge about a number of policy areas but unlikely to be expert in any. The bureaucracy, in contrast, is populated by those who are experts in particular policy areas. Legislators, no matter how diligent they may be, no matter how developed their committee system is, and no matter how fulsome their staff support, usually will not be able to overcome the policy expertise resident in the executive branch. Bureaucratic experts, after all, are careerists, while legislators and often their staff members come and go. Even a legislature as well-staffed and as well-funded and with as strong a committee system as the US Congress generally gets poor marks for effective oversight, especially when it is controlled by the President’s party.14 Similarly, as Khmelko et al. (Chapter 2) point out, the Ukrainian Parliament, although also relatively well-institutionalized, struggles to perform basic oversight functions, primarily because they lack sufficient information to do so. And as Drago Zajc (Chapter 3) notes, in Slovenia, the Parliament has become even more submissive to the executive and less able to set limits on the government’s actions, especially as the nation has confronted serious economic problems.

Globalization

Another factor driving the growth of executive power is the inexorable movement toward the globalization of public policy decisions, whether one is talking
about considerations of war and peace, or the interconnected financial and trade regimes that have such a huge effect on the economies of every nation in the world. Because the chief executive is typically in charge of the nation’s armed forces, and because the arguments for executive domination of policy-making have always been most persuasive in regard to military and diplomatic issues where the nation is expected to speak with one voice, large military establishments add significantly to the power of both presidents and premiers. But military questions aside, there is an international dimension to an increasing range of public policy issues. Trade, monetary policy, access to scarce natural resources, migration, environmental questions, and agriculture policy are just a sampling of the issues that have both domestic and international dimensions. Because most political systems, either implicitly or explicitly, concede to their executive broader prerogatives in regard to the nation’s intercourse with foreign governments and institutions, the globalization of public policy issues has further enhanced the role of presidents and prime ministers.

This is clearly the case in Europe. One of the persistent complaints that one hears about the EU is the dominant role played by the Brussels bureaucrats who, it is said, often function beyond the control of not just national parliaments but the European Parliament as well. Negotiations among EU members, or between the EU and a member state on trade issues, fiscal and monetary policy, immigration, and the movement of people among member nations take place at the executive level involving presidents, prime ministers, and the European and national bureaucratic specialists relevant to the issue at hand. Although all need to be conscious of the constraints imposed on their actions by national legislatures, more often than not the decisions made at the executive level are those that come into force. Only on the most visible issues—Brexit in the case of England, and immigration throughout Europe—do domestic political forces reflected in parliamentary debate constrain the actions of executive leaders in any significant way.

Ironically, although the EU expects its members to adhere to the values of representative democracy, the fiscal demands that it makes on its members, as well as those who wish to be members, may lead to greater executive control. Strong executives and bureaucrats are often better positioned to meet the EU’s demands to bring fiscal order to a nation’s budget than a parliament whose members are more disposed toward satisfying the particularistic needs of constituents and interest groups. As Zajc points out (Chapter 3), this seems to have been the case in Slovenia, and it may be one of the reasons why the EU has tolerated Orban’s undermining of democracy in Hungary.

**Democratization**

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, democratization, with its imperative that political leaders must cultivate and depend upon popular support if they are to
wield legitimate power, has driven political systems in the direction of executives. The idea of popular support has developed a wider meaning in the modern age than it had when representative systems first emerged. During the 20th century, restrictions on the franchise that were in place during the 19th century and earlier began to wither away to the point where today, in almost every nation in the world where elections take place, all adults, with only a very few restrictions, are eligible to participate. This has encouraged and in some ways required presidents, presidential candidates, and incumbent as well as aspiring prime ministers to appeal to a broad and extensive mass public with variable interest in and information about politics and public policy.

Communication systems also have been democratized. At one time, media elites at established newspapers and television stations controlled the flow of information among political leaders and between leaders and citizens. Although this oligarchy sometimes squeezed out opinions that should have been heard, it also provided a degree of quality control. The emergence of the internet and the multiplying of television stations has changed this. The Internet is home to a nearly infinite number of news sources. Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and the like, along with countless blogs and websites, provide a means to instantly transmit information and opinion to huge numbers of people. These platforms allow facts, rumors, and utter falsehoods to metastasize across the internet at warp speed. To an increasing extent, what people know about politics and public policy is shaped by what they see and read in this fully democratized communication environment, an environment open to all, no matter what they know or don’t know about the topic or issue they are addressing.

This technology has transformed both political campaigns and the governing style of political leaders. Sitting and aspiring chief executives now have the means to stay in direct and continuous contact with the public and especially with their supporters. This has affected the way in which these leaders are selected, the way in which they seek support for their policies, and the manner in which they choose to govern.

A more democratized communication environment and a fully democratized electorate, combined with the psychological need of voters, especially in times of real or perceived crises, to commit themselves to a singular leader, has moved politics in the direction of personalism. With party structures acting more as enablers of, rather than constraints on, executive control, the emphasis is now on the individual leaders rather than collective decision-making processes involving multiple political actors.

This emphasis on a singular leader is readily apparent in presidential systems. Presidents hold the nation’s executive power. They may choose to consult with others as they exercise their power, or delegate responsibilities to others who report to them, but the president sits atop the executive hierarchy and has the final say on all executive decisions. They need not conduct a vote among their advisors or cabinet members prior to taking action; they can simply act.
Presidents sometimes articulate an outright disdain for other political actors. Writing about Latin American presidencies, but in terms that are more generally applicable, O’Donnell remarks that presidents tend to “view themselves as above both political parties and organized interests,” that they seem to view other institutions such as legislatures and courts as “nuisances,” and that they depict themselves as standing alone as the sole representatives of the people as a whole.\(^\text{16}\) Certainly, presidents such as Donald Trump and Recep Erdogan of Turkey have displayed dismissive-to-hostile attitudes toward other political institutions as well as toward the press and opposition groups. In the case of Turkey, Omer Faruk Gençkaya (Chapter 5) shows how that country’s shift to a full presidential model has made it more difficult for the legislature to secure resources to allow it to counter presidential power. Similarly, Khemvirg Puente (Chapter 11) discusses the impact of the new president of Mexico who, with a strong majority in Congress, is already moving toward what Puente calls legislative submission and deinstitutionalization.

This is not supposed to be the case in parliamentary systems where policymaking power is in the hands of the leader of the majority party or coalition. The prime minister, functioning as head of government, is supposed to work in close consultation with individual legislators, particularly members of the governing party or the parties that comprise the governing coalition, as well as with a cabinet that reflects the majority in the legislature. The prime minister typically does not have the unilateral power to act without cabinet approval or at least discussions prior to major executive decisions, especially in those cases when the government has a narrow majority of seats or is composed of a coalition of political parties.

That said, there is evidence that at least some parliamentary systems are moving toward the more personalized leadership that is typical of presidential systems. Some of the same forces driving presidential systems in the direction of greater executive power have contributed to what Poguntke and Webb\(^\text{17}\) call the “presidentialization” of parliamentary systems. They cite the internationalization of politics, the growing role of the state, the changing structure of mass communication, and the weakening of political parties due to the erosion of a politics based on traditional social cleavages as forces leading to the increased personalization of parliamentary systems. As a result, many of these systems are experiencing an increased focus on the singular head of government. Evidence can be found in Great Britain where the Prime Minister dominates policy discussions, in Germany where the Chancellor speaks for the country on most policy issues, and in Israel where the Prime Minister is the most dominant figure. Of course, this increased focus on the prime minister does not always mean that she or he will prevail, as the Brexit discussion so clearly demonstrates. In this and in other cases, the legislature still is able to impose significant constraints on the chief executive.

But in Hungary, the premier seems to have gathered all the powers of the state in his hands (see Nikolenyi, Chapter 12) and in Bangladesh, as Ali Riaz notes (Chapter 7), a one-party state under the control of the prime minister and her governing party has enfeebled the legislature through manipulated elections,
winning 288 of 300 seats in the most recent parliamentary election. Similarly, in India, the single-party dominant system established with the rise of the BJP and the Modi government has diluted the legislative and debating function of the Lok Sabha, rendering it “irrelevant” (See Thakar, Chapter 6).

To the citizens of presidential states, and increasingly of parliamentary systems, the chief executive is by far the nation’s most visible political actor. The selection of the chief executive attracts enormous media attention and once in office, the nation’s politics tend to revolve around him or her. Although nearly all Americans know the name of their incumbent president, few members of Congress or judges can be named by a majority of the people. Similarly, the prime minister of England and, perhaps, the leader of the Opposition, is known to the entire country, but her cabinet members and certainly backbench MPs are much less visible. His or her words and actions dominate the news and on major issues, citizens as well as the Parliament look to her for leadership and policy initiatives. Leaders now regularly use Twitter accounts to keep in touch with their followers, to generate public support for their policy priorities, and in some cases, to vilify their political opponents.

Populism

Representative democracies originated as a way to check monarchs who claimed absolute power. But they also were seen as a way to reduce the influence of ordinary citizens on major political decisions. When these institutions emerged, the franchise was typically restricted to a relatively small number of citizens—usually male property holders. But even then, elites were concerned that these citizens had neither the knowledge nor the political virtue that would lead to wise decisions in the national interest. The men who wrote the United States Constitution, for example, were convinced that self-interest rather than the public good would motivate the policy preferences of average citizens. The virtue of a representative system, observed James Madison, was its capacity to “refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.” Thus, “the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves.”

Representatives and, later, political parties were to be intermediaries between citizens and public policy decisions. And, as Edmund Burke argued, although representatives should always accord a hearing to those whom they represented, they were not to rely on the views of their constituents when they decided upon policy but rather use their own judgment and their own sense of what was wise and what was good for the nation.

In our modern age, however, the franchise is available to virtually all citizens, no matter their economic status or their level of education. Moreover, that extended
The electorate expects that political leaders will be responsive to their demands, and the democratic ethos is that public policy should respond to the voice of the people, no matter how ill-informed or narrow-minded that voice might be. What we call populism is a version of this democratic commitment that the voice of the people should be dispositive when it comes to the course that the nation should follow.

Populism has become a fairly elastic term, referring to some distinctly different leaders and their styles. In its most benign version, populism can refer simply to politicians trying to connect with voters by demonstrating empathy with their concerns and by speaking in terms that average citizens can understand and relate to. And politicians who criticize existing political and economic institutions for ignoring the interests of those citizens with less in the way of financial resources are certainly acting within a democratic paradigm.

But at its most fundamental level, populism refers to candidates and political movements that argue that they, and they alone, are the authentic representatives of the popular voice. As one scholar notes, populism considers “society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ and argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people.” Another scholar suggests that populism exalts “the purity of the people as a condition for a politics of sincerity against the quotidian practice of compromise and bargaining that politicians pursue.”

The concerns that are raised about populism focus as much on what such leaders communicate to voters in order to generate their support as it does on their specific policy proposals. The malevolent side to populism is demagoguery, which occurs when leaders, in order to gain or retain office, manipulate popular opinion by speaking to the passions and prejudices of citizens rather than to their reason. Typically, the demagogue identifies himself with popular and patriotic symbols, and names and vilifies his opponents as the enemies of the nation and its people. As a candidate for office, the demagogue fans the fears of the public by exaggerating both the problems that the nation confronts—because he knows that it is the fear itself that evokes support from the followers he seeks—as well as his capacity to solve those problems. He promises order and safety to replace chaos and danger, pride in place of humiliation, superiority in place of inferiority, leadership in place of inertia, strength in place of weakness, hope in place of despair, and a return to the mores of an idealized past in place of what he depicts as the political and cultural chaos of modern society.

In this way, demagogues prey upon the political, economic, and cultural anxieties of citizens, particularly those at the bottom end of the socio-economic scale, and offer often simplistic solutions to what are intrinsically complex problems. In doing so, they depend upon the limited knowledge that most citizens have about public policy and upon the electronic media that allow them to amplify their message by connecting them directly with citizens and mobilizing their support,
bypassing traditional mediating institutions such as interest groups, political parties, and print media.

The current wave of populism in the West is fueled by at least two elements: xenophobia, resulting from a wave of migration from Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America to Europe and North America, and economic and cultural anxiety created by an increasingly globalized economy and culture. These forces have combined to create a fertile ground for nationalistic appeals from populist and demagogic leaders. In some instances, populists define nationalism in ethnic terms; because immigrants may be different from native citizens in terms of race, religion, language, and/or culture, their arrival is depicted as a threat to national identity. Or they can invoke nationalism to exploit the concerns that some have about changing cultural and social mores, many of which have little to do with immigration. The Alternative for Germany discussed in Chapter 14 of this volume has taken both of these tacks as has Victor Orban and the Fidesz Party in Hungary. Thus, populist leaders often condemn changes in customs surrounding marriage, sexuality, and religion as attacks upon the nation's cultural traditions. In other instances, nationalism is defined as economic independence from international organizations such as the EU, multi-national corporations, or cosmopolitan elites—forces that the populist tells his followers are geographically and culturally distant from and hostile to their own needs and values.

Populist leaders blame foreign forces, particularly immigrants and transnational organizations, for the economic and cultural anxieties that many citizens experience. In the United States, the Trump Administration has encouraged the belief among its supporters that people of color, particularly Latinos, but also African Americans and Muslim Americans, constitute a threat to America's national identity. Similarly, in Germany, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, and several other European countries, populism has taken the form of ethno-nationalism, identifying the nation with its dominant ethnic group and/or religion. In India, as Milind Thakar demonstrates in Chapter 6, the Modi Government has pursued Hindu nationalist policies in contrast with the more inclusive approach that characterized the Congress Party when it was in power.

When populist leaders claim that the government is not responding to the problems that citizens face, they typically point the finger at political corruption. Citizens around the world tend to be suspicious of their political leaders and open to the suggestion that they are enriching themselves at the expense of the public. In several countries discussed in this book, these charges are clearly true—Ukraine, Russia, India, Moldova, and Macedonia are obvious examples. In much of the world, political leaders live far better and more privileged lives than the average citizen, lives that often are well beyond what their salaries can support. There is always a connection between financial interests and political leaders, as private economic interests seek to influence the public policy decisions that can affect their profits. These relationships exist in representative democracies as well as in authoritarian systems. Once again, populist leaders tell the voters what they
want to hear—that incumbent legislators and bureaucrats are corrupt, incompetent, and in thrall to domestic or international economic elites. The populist offers himself as the savior who will do battle with this entrenched and corrupt political order.

Legislatures are easy targets for populists. They are vulnerable to the charge that all their members do is talk about problems and that they never come up with solutions. Because they are collective bodies, legislatures require majorities to act; executives can simply act. Legislatures are equally vulnerable to the charge that they are unduly influenced by the financially strong who provide them and their political parties with funds. Legislatures are also more representative; their membership is more likely to reflect minority groups and opinions than the executive is. Most important, legislatures operate through negotiation and compromise, while populists tend to offer either/or alternatives. And because they come to power by exploiting popular anger and anxieties, they stigmatize the compromises that legislatures usually make as surrender or corrupt bargains. The aversion to compromise often guarantees that the legislature will be stalemated and therefore unable to act. This inertia is a boon to the populist leaders, for when legislatures fail to act, especially in the context of a real or manufactured crisis, they provide an excuse for populists to argue that their leader should be in control and that legislatures should be restricted or even abolished.

This tactic is nothing new. In the days when legislatures in Latin America and Asia were regularly subject to closure by military leaders, those who engineered these coups often argued that the legislature and its members were corrupt and that it was the patriotic responsibility of the armed forces to take over and cleanse the system. Of course, once they were in power, there was little evidence that such military regimes were less corrupt than the regimes that preceded them.

For countries contending with populist leaders, well-meaning initiatives that seek to provide additional resources for parliaments are likely to be insufficient to the real challenge that these systems are facing. For populism in its most malevolent and virulent form is an attack not just on the prerogatives of the legislature, but on the very premises of representative democracy. It argues that leaders must always honor the will of the majority—sometimes a majority that they have manufactured through their inflammatory rhetoric—no matter if doing so flies in the face of technical expertise, or if doing so will address short-term problems but do long-term damage, or if these actions might undermine the values to which the nation is ostensibly committed. It argues that discussion, deliberation, and compromise—the very essence of legislative activity—is a waste of time and in any event, a process that is corrupt at its core. And, most importantly, it is an argument for the wisdom of the people as represented by an individual leader rather than the collective wisdom to which a functioning legislature aspires. In that context, legislative attempts to “watch and control” the government are depicted, ironically, as an attack on democracy.

Finally, the forces of populism are best exploited by executive leaders or those who aspire to those positions. They, rather than legislators, are able to command
a national platform and microphone to communicate with voters and to exploit their anxieties. They, rather than legislators, are best suited to promise action to deal with these anxieties and to claim, often without much evidence, that simple solutions for their problems are available. And, in the face of a crisis, they, rather than legislators, are more likely to be perceived as capable of providing the strong leadership that will see the nation through.

Conclusion

The argument of this introduction is that all legislatures are vulnerable to executive attempts to aggrandize their power and influence at the expense of parliamentary prerogatives. Whether this is a reflection of legislative decline or simply a continuing condition of representative democracy in the modern age is in some ways beside the point. A personalized politics arising from democratization of both the electorate and the communication system is tailor made for individual executives as are the internationalization of public policy and the growth of the administrative state. Certainly, not all legislatures succumb to these forces and many continue to be central institutions in their political system. In addition, there is a certain ebb and flow to all of this; periods of legislative subordination may be followed by periods of dominance, as issues, party coalitions, and leaders change. But the long term trend appears to be away from legislatures and toward executives.

Populism, however, is not just another force for executive enhancement; unlike the other factors discussed above, populism has the potential to undermine not just parliamentary prerogatives but representative democracy itself. Writing 230 years ago, one of the American Founders, Alexander Hamilton, observed that “of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by playing an obsequious court to the people, commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.”

References


14. Ibid., 72–75.
16. Rossos, 250–256.
35. Maleska.
39. As Ecaterina Mcdonagh points out, the absence of EU membership as an incentive did not eliminate the effectiveness of conditionality in the Moldovan case. Conditionality based on incentives continued to function, but one must expect at a more limited level. Ecaterina Mcdonagh, “Is Democracy Promotion Effective in Moldova? The Impact of European Institutions on Development of Civil and Political Rights in Moldova,” Democratization 15:1 (2008), 142–161.
41. Moldova began negotiations for an EU Association Agreement in 2010, which brought its engagement to a new level. In June of 2014, Moldova signed an Association Agreement with the EU and entered into a provisional Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU. This became permanent when the EU Association Agreement came into full force in July 2016.
49. Cornelie Ciurea, “Political Risks in Moldova—A Barrier to International Investment?” in Johannes Leitner and Hannes Meissner, eds., State Capture, Political Risks and


55. Szałkowski.


13. David W. Rivera & Sharon Werning Rivera. “The Militarization of the Russian Elite under Putin,” *What We Know, What We Think We Know (but Don’t), and What We Need to Know* (24 Mar 2017), 221–223.


15. Thus, according to Art. 117 of the Russian Constitution,


18. Khmelko.

19. Ibid.


7. Paul Warwick’s (1992) study related the changing economic conditions during the economic crisis in the 1970s to government survival in 16 post-war democracies; using the partial likelihood (PL) method, it revealed an interconnection between time trends of indicators and government survival.

8. Slovenia’s parliament established by the Constitution of 1991 is composed of two chambers—the main chamber is the National Assembly with 90 deputies; the second—National Council—is an atypical chamber, representing functional and local interests with limited competences.

9. Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2,000 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources.

10. Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available and seeking employment.

11. The impact of the inflation rate has not been included in our investigation of the impact of the economic crisis since other studies have not sufficiently explained it. Although the inflation rate in Slovenia rose from 3.6% in 2007 to 5.7% in 2008, it remained lower than 1.8% in the following years (the average annual inflation rate in the 2008–2014 period amounted to 2.4%, while the average inflation rate in the 2004–2007 period reached 3.0%). Nevertheless, it will not be neglected in a further examination, as it was discovered in some previous investigations.


16. The first was formed by the Mayor of Ljubljana, Zoran Janković, and the second by the former Minister of Public Administration, Gregor Virant, Ph.D. The third new party (TRS), established by a group of civil society activists promoting the values of active citizenship and co-existence with nature, has remained under the threshold.


18. European Budget Pact, also known as the European Fiscal Compact, signed on March 2, 2012 by all Member States (except the Czech Republic and the UK), determined the
limits of the states’ budget deficits. The Member States which signed the Pact are required to establish self-correcting mechanisms which guarantee that their national budgets will remain in balance, i.e., that the general deficit will be less than 3% of the GDP and the structural deficit less than 1% of GDP if the debt-to-GDP ratio is below 60%.

19. “Troika” was an invention of the European Commission which imposed harsh economic austerity measures on several European economically less efficient countries. It enables a direct intervention by the EU economic advisers with the power of implementing immediate austerity measures which interfere with the sovereignty of the country.

20. The restriction of Slovenia’s economic sovereignty due to the new EU rules became apparent in December 2013 when the government, after conducting expensive financial tests on the Slovene banks, received the heavily anticipated permission by the Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission to ameliorate the financial conditions of the Slovene banks.

21. According to the report of the Statistical Office of the RS of August 2016, the GDP has in the first half of the year increased by 2.7% in comparison with the same period in the previous year.


* The author is grateful to Royce Carroll for extensive help in writing this chapter and to Irina Khmelko and Michael L. Mezey for comments. All mistakes are the author’s responsibility.


2. 1000 PLN is the equivalent of about 330 USD.

3. Archival research for this project was conducted in the Polish Sejm between 2009 and 2011 in Warsaw.


5. Chairman Leszek Miller according to a transcript from SLD meeting November 27, 2001.


9. The lower house of the Polish assembly in 1989–1991 was referred to as the “contractual Sejm” to reflect that its composition—non-communist candidates were allowed to compete for only 35% of seats—was part of the roundtable agreement.


12. Ibid.


20. See Nalepa (2017) for more details on changes in the legislative organization that took place in the Polish chamber to allow for such inflation of speaker powers.


23. The US Congress at the low points of partisan polarization is the classic example of striking the executive-legislative balance this way in the context of individual representation. Another historical example comes from the Golden Age of the Private MP, described by Cox (1986).

24. An example of this is Japan under the long reign of the LDP. Membership in the LDP was a prerequisite to obtaining legislative power, which was centralized in the cabinet. However, MPs had to cater to their constituents to maintain office individually. That is, it was individual legislators who served as vehicles of representation, rather than the party, which was an umbrella organization incapable of offering a consistent policy brand.

25. Examples, where a powerful president entirely substitutes the role of parties, include Latin American systems such as historical Brazil and Colombia.


4. Constitutional court can theoretically review presidential decrees.


12. Currently, there are 18 standing committees to which 26 members are assigned, except State Economic Enterprises (35), Plan and Budget (30), Security and Intelligence (17), and the Petition Committee (12). There are also 13 inter-parliamentary committees that represent Turkey’s multilateral relations abroad such as OSCE, COE, and NATO Parliamentary Assemblies.


22. IPU and UNDP.


24. Ibid., 207.


3. Ibid.


17. Ibid.


20. Levitski and Way.


8. Mansfeldová, 143.


11. Mansfeldová, 143; Olson and Ilonszki, 249–251.


4. Samuel Huntington. op. cit.
8. Samuel Huntington. op. cit.
9. As measured by Freedom House, which ranks countries as ‘free,’ ‘partly free’ or ‘not free.’
11. In 2003, Freedom House added a numerical rating on the top of the initial ranking. Under that rating, 24 countries decreased on the Freedom House Index (from the greatest to the smallest decline, Central African Rep., Mali, Gabon, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Ethiopia, Kingdom of eSwatini, Gambia, Eritrea, Mauritania, Botswana, Eq. Guinea, South Africa, Burundi, Chad, Somalia, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Niger, Sao Tome et Principe, Madagascar, and Uganda), 21 countries increased their score (from the most significant improvement to the smallest: Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Comoros, Togo, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone, Malawi, Guinea, Senegal, Benin, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Seychelles, Rep. of Congo, Zambia, Rwanda, Namibia, Mauritius, and Cape Verde) and only two countries kept the same rating (Cameroon and Kenya) (South Sudan could not be evaluated on numerical ground due to lack of data). However, most country’s fluctuation in the freedom rating was incremental, with 29 countries maintaining their status over the last two decades.
12. Ibid.
13. Freedom House aggregate score gives relatively relevant information when comparing countries within the same region, as it analyses the political and civil rights in comparison with neighboring countries. However, the aggregate score might not be the best available tool to compare countries across the globe. For example, Ghana scored 83 while the United States scores 86 in 2018. While Ghana is the outlier in sub-Saharan Africa, we could not state with confidence that its population has political and civil liberties to the same level as the United States, even though America has dropped considerably this year.
17. Joel Barkan. op. cit.
18. Steven Fish. op. cit.
19. Joel Barkan. op. cit.
23. Ibid.
24. Steven Fish. op. cit.
25. Ibid.
26. Riccardo Pelizzo and Rick Stapenhurst. op. cit.; Steven Fish. op. cit.
31. Joel Barkan. op. cit.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Rick Stapenhurst and Riccardo Pelizzo. op.cit.; Staffan Lindberg and Yongmei Zhou. op.cit.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Steven Fish and Mathew Kroening. op. cit.
42. Staffan Lindberg and Yongmei Zhou. op cit.
43. Riccardo Pelizzo and Omer Baris. op cit.
49. The ten countries which have the highest FDI inflow (as a percentage of GDP) are Mozambique, Angola, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Seychelles, Ghana, Cape Verde, Chad, and Malawi.

50. Lateef Olatunji and Muhammad Shahid. op cit.


52. Regional Political Handbooks of the World. op cit.


54. Ibid.


56. Regional Political Handbooks of the World. Ibid.


59. Regional Political Handbooks of the World. op cit.; Central Intelligence Agency. op cit.


69. Regional Political Handbooks of the World. op. cit.


71. An Ansoms. op cit.

72. Ibid.


75. Samuel Huntington. op cit.

76. World Bank. op. cit.

77. UNDP. op. cit.

78. George Ayittey. op. cit.

79. An Ansoms. op. cit.

80. Botswana, Namibia, Ghana, Senegal, South Africa, and small island-states attained and maintained high democratic standards. Other countries such as Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire have improved dramatically although, in South Sudan, Mali, and the Central African Republic, democracy has fallen, mainly because of civil wars and insurgency.

82. G. O'Donnell. op cit.
83. Larry Diamond. op cit.
85. An Ansoms. op cit.

5. The Union Parliament’s legislative and representative functions fall outside of the scope of this chapter. T. Egreteau’s study (op. cit.) provides a more detailed examination of the structures, organization, and legislative performance of the Union Parliament since 2011. The study examines the three core functions of the Union Parliament (law-making, representation, and oversight) and concludes that the Parliament has “fallen into the category of a nascent, marginal legislature, with the willingness and capacity to influence, rather than command, policy, and law-making and a potential for vetting, rather than thoroughly overseeing the activities and behaviors of other branches of government.”
6. The Pyithy Hluttaw, the lower house, consists of 440 Hluttaw, 330 of which are elected and 110 nominated by the Commander-in-Chief from Defense Services personnel (Article 109). The Amyotha Hluttaw, the upper house, is comprised of 224 Hluttaw representatives, 12 elected from each Region and State (totaling 168) and 56 nominated by the Commander-in-Chief from Defense Services personnel (Article 141).
10. Anthony Staddon and Gabriela Thompson. op. cit.
11. T. Egreteau. op. cit.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. T. Egreteau. op. cit.
22. International Budget Partnership. op. cit.
23. Anthony Staddon and Gabriela Thompson (2020) found that many CSOs are actively attempting to monitor and engage with the Parliament as well as disseminate parliamentary information. These include the Open Myanmar Initiative; Spectrum; the Myanmar Center for Responsible Business; and the Myanmar Alliance for Transparency and Accountability (MATA).
29. Anthony Staddon and Gabriela Thompson, op. cit.
30. T. Egreteau, op. cit.
32. T. Egreteau. op. cit.
33. Ian Lienert. op. cit.
35. Anthony Staddon and Gabriela Thompson. op. cit.
36. T. Egreteau op. cit; Anthony Staddon and Gabriela Thompson op. cit.; Ian Lienert op. cit.; International Budget Partnership op. cit.
37. T. Egreteau. op. cit.
3. Ibid.
5. According to the text of the bill, Hungary had a bicameral legislature from 1608 to 1944.
6. For the text, see www.parlament.hu/irom39/05273/05273.pdf
7. For the text, see www.parlament.hu/irom39/05006/05006-0044.pdf
8. For the text, see www.parlament.hu/irom39/13253/13253.pdf
9. The Orders impose strict limits on the types of amendments that can be introduced to the consolidated final version of the bill that is approved by the Committee on Legislation.
10. The data in this section are based on official reports compiled by Parliamentary Information System of the Parliament of Hungary. See www.parlament.hu/documents/10181/56582/Adatok+az+Orsz%C3%A1ggy%C5%B1l%C3%A9s+tev%C3%A9kenys%C3%A9g%C3%A9r%C5%91l+1014/972b3b5-e7c5-482d-a082-8cb0565ed808 and www.parlament.hu/documents/10181/56582/Adatok+az+Orsz%C3%A1ggy%C5%B1l%C3%A9s+tev%C3%A9kenys%C3%A9g%C3%A9r%C5%91l+2014+2018/1daa8ca6-i7d5-6833-0a47-3ba5a87c4aa.
11. See Ilonszki.


18. Ibid., 10.


30. Ibid., 107.


34. *Original quote:* “Entgegen anderslautender Behauptungen entscheiden Bürger in Schicksalsfragen der Nation weitsichtiger und gemeinwohlorientierter als macht- und interessegeleitete Berufspolitiker.” *Translation by the authors.*


Schnapp, and Claudius Wagemann, eds., Computational Social Science (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018), 180.


39. Ibid.


43. Ibid., 1275.

44. As a first validation step, we manually checked our initial dictionary for polyvalent words (using a Keyword-in-Context, or KWIC, analysis) and excluded words which carried multiple/or other meanings in the texts we wanted to analyze (“betrug,” “herrscht”). Also, we identified terms which must occur in the vicinity of the search term and terms which must not disambiguate the search terms. The resulting dictionaries for both dimensions can be found in the online appendix.

45. The speeches of two former AfD MPs who now form The Blue Party (Die Blaue Partei), Frauke Petry and Mario Mieruch, contain both a high number of radical right words per speech, but are not as radical right as those of AfD MPs.

46. The category fraktionslos (non-attached) refers to Uwe Kamann MP, who left the AfD group in December 2018.


