Russia’s Security and the War on Terror

Edited by
Mikhail Tsypkin
RUSSIA’S SECURITY AND
THE WAR ON TERROR

This book discusses and provides examples of Russia’s need to reshape its security and military policies in order to meet the global challenges of fighting terrorism and counterinsurgency. It addresses some of the problems facing Russia’s national security and military power, including:

- Military reform
- US-Russian relations
- The political economy of Russian security policy
- Russian policy regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- The chances for US-Russian cooperation in ballistic missile defence

*Russia’s Security and the War on Terror* provides an insight into Russian military policies and its changing relationship with NATO throughout the 1990s.

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CONTENTS

Introduction vii
MIKHAIL TSYPKIN

1 US-Russian Relations and the Global Counter-Terrorist Campaign 1
ALEXANDER A. BELKIN

2 Military Reform in Russia and the Global War Against Terrorism 17
ALEXANDER GOLTS

3 The US Military Engagement in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus: An Overview 31
RICHARD GIRAGOSIAN

4 Prospects for Russia-US Cooperation in Preventing WMD Proliferation 67
MIKHAIL POGORELY

5 Prospects for US-Russian Cooperation in Ballistic Missile Defense and Outer Space Activities 87
ALEXANDER G. SALEYEV

6 The Anti-Oligarchy Campaign and its Implications for Russia’s Security 99
VITALY SHLYKOV

7 The Soviet-Afghan War: A Superpower Mired in the Mountains 117
LESTER W. GRAU
vi CONTENTS

8 ‘The War in Iraq’: An Assessment of Lessons Learned by Russian Military Specialists Through 31 July 2003 141
TIMOTHY L. THOMAS

About the Contributors 169
Index 171
Introduction

MIKHAIL TSYPKIN

Russian military is not well prepared to meet the challenges of fighting terrorism and counterinsurgency. President Vladimir Putin has spoken repeatedly about the need to reshape the Russian military to confront the new tasks, but relatively little progress has been achieved. Resistance of the military’s corporate self-interest is an important obstacle to change: the top brass prefer to maintain a hollow military designed for fighting a global war, to serious restructuring and downsizing (including a transition to an all-volunteer force) that would result in a reduction of the number of billets for seniors officers. The military can persist in their attachment to the Cold War posture because the politicians have failed to provide for Russia’s security by building an alliance with NATO.

Russian politics have been in flux for more than a decade, and so have Russian security and military policies. Since 1991, Russian national security policy has veered from anticipation of equal partnership with the United States (US) in the early 1990s, to the verge of a shooting war with NATO in Kosovo in 1999, to the ‘strategic partnership’ with the US in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The armed forces withdrew from Central Europe, survived a collapse of their budget, reduced their size and have redefined their missions and organization structure in Chechnya (1994–96 and 1999 until the present) have presented the Russian military with the challenge of adjusting to counterinsurgency operations. Since 1999, the Russians have described their war against insurgents in Chechnya as a fight against terrorism, a fight in which the Russian military have not been highly successful.

The papers published in this volume were presented at a conference sponsored by the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and Foreign Military Studies Office of the Department of the Army in Monterey, in September 2003. They address some basic problems facing Russia’s national security and military power today: military
reform, US-Russian relations, the political economy of Russian security policy, Russian policy regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the chances for US-Russian cooperation in ballistic missile defense.

After ten years of debate on the subject, is the Russian military establishment finally reforming or not? Aleksandr Golts argues that the Russian high command has avoided real reform. Structural changes have been inconsistent. The goal of a transition to an all-volunteer force has been abandoned in favor of one mixing enlisted conscripts and volunteers (contract soldiers). No serious thought has been given to creating a professional cadre of non-commissioned officers (NCOs). The officer corps continues to suffer from poverty and insufficient professionalism, as well as from a very narrow and outmoded system of education and training. Despite much talk about the military’s role in the war against terrorism, the high command is quite reluctant to abandon the mission of fighting NATO.

Two weeks after the papers printed here had been delivered, President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov unveiled a document entitled *The Current Tasks of Development of the Armed Forces* on 2 October 2003 at a conference in front of the Russian top brass and members of parliament. The *Current Tasks*, as well the remarks by Putin and Ivanov, and some subsequent comments by high-ranking officers, provide a picture generally consistent with Golts’ pessimism about the current condition of the Russian military. The term ‘military reform’ has become so discredited that Putin apparently has decided to get rid of it: military reform, he proclaimed, consisted of cutting personnel and reducing redundancy in the organization of the armed forces, both processes quite unpopular with the officer corps. He insisted that the period of ‘radical reform’ of the military was over, and that a period of ‘profound transformation’ which will result in ‘qualitatively’ different armed forces was beginning. The time had come, said Putin, to change the military manpower system, to equip the armed forces with new weapons and create a new mobilization system adequate to new threats.

*The Currents Tasks*, a lengthy document (73 pages), provides ample and frank evidence of the problems that have to be fixed. No progress has been made in reducing dependence on conscripts, while the size of the draft pool is declining precipitously; all
attempts to raise the standard of living of officers have failed; the system of military education is in disarray and outdated; the weapons are rapidly becoming obsolete.

What about the future? The most painful issue, that of moving from the draft to a volunteer force (the Russian term is kontraktniki – ‘contract soldiers’), is to be resolved by mixing the two approaches. The quantitative parameters of this transition presented by Golts, have been confirmed in The Current Tasks. It appears that under the best circumstances not more than one quarter of the enlisted personnel (147,500) will become ‘contract soldiers’ by the end of 2007. Even this rather modest plan must have caused considerable unease among the officer corps, or at least among the high command, judging by the cautious language in which the future transition has been described:

The partial transition of the Armed Forces to the contract basis is not the goal of their development and improvement, but the means to strengthen defenses of the Russian Federation and increase combat ability of the Armed Forces. The decision to transfer some of the units to the contract basis is not a political declaration, unsubstantiated financially and organizationally, but is the result of a lengthy process of evaluation of the objective capabilities of the country.

The authors of The Current Tasks found it necessary to say that the government’s commitment to the partially ‘contract’ forces was not a political gesture, probably because the issue of military draft is so political in Russia: conscription is so unpopular that President Yeltsin, desperately fighting for re-election in 1996, had to promise to end conscription, a pledge that has never been kept. Apparently, Putin is putting pressure on the officer corps to accept the coming change: they should believe both that the president means business, and that the unwelcome novelty is dictated by the needs of the military, who are facing a ‘demographic pit’ – a sharp decline of the draft pool in 2005–10. Still, politics appear to be an important consideration for Putin, who, as noted, is up for re-election in 2004. ‘Contract soldiers’ are supposed to replace conscripts first of all in the theater of war in Chechnya, which holds out a promise to Russia’s parents that their children will not have to fight in that war.

The draft, therefore, will not be eliminated. Just as Golts predicted, it will continue to provide the majority of enlisted personnel in the military, border guards and internal troops, and to ensure that
the armed forces have a mobilization reserve. Why? The official explanation is that, in addition to the expense of an all-volunteer military, it will be unable to produce enough reservists for mobilization. The reserves are to be mobilized if the ‘permanently ready’ forces based on ‘contract soldiers’ fail to deter or localize a military conflict that Russia is involved in. Golts explains the behavior of the Russian top brass by their self-interest: as long as the armed forces are based on a system of mass mobilization, the high command can preserve an excessive number of billets for senior officers (justified by the requirement to fill positions in new divisions mobilized for war), exercise control over considerable industrial mobilization capacities and avoid dealing with the post-superpower realities of Russian security policies.

A contradictory threat assessment appears to be behind this vision of a mixed volunteer/conscript military. On the one hand, *The Current Tasks* states that the military danger to Russia is ‘relatively low’, and that none of today’s military conflicts ‘directly threatens Russia’s security’. Among the major directions of Russia’s security policy are increasing interoperability of the Russian military with the forces of NATO members, and strengthening ‘strategic partnership’ with the US, especially within the framework of the coalition against terror (which *The Current Tasks* refer to as ‘an element of global stability and a means for establishing a more just world order’). The document in effect recognizes that the US military presence in Central Asia is in Russia’s interest: ‘destabilization in Afghanistan’ and return of the threat of ‘Islamic extremism’ in that theater (read: US withdrawal from Central Asia) would increase the military burden for Russia.

In a sharp break with the Soviet tradition of threat assessment, which regarded the liberal democratic countries of the West as just as threatening as Nazi Germany, *The Current Tasks* recognizes that it is the liberal democratic character of the most powerful Western nations, with its transparency and predictability, that makes Russia safe – and that weakening of liberal democracies in the West would be a threat to Russia.

On the other hand, *The Current Tasks* continues to refer to the danger from ‘military alliances’ growing at the expense of Russia’s security (read: NATO enlargement). Furthermore, the document refers to NATO’s allegedly ‘offensive military doctrine’ as a threat to Russia. The American R&D work on low-yield nuclear weapons
is also described as a threat, albeit an indirect one: it may encourage nuclear proliferation and lower the threshold of nuclear weapons use, thus destabilizing the international situation. Thus, even though it is recognized that the level of immediate military threat has declined, Russia finds itself unable to exclude any kind of military threat: from her southern neighbors, from China (this threat goes unmentioned, but is not explicitly dismissed either) and from her ‘strategic partners’, NATO and the US.

This worldview of the Russian political-military leadership also means that Russia does not have reliable and strong allies with whom it could divide the labor of its military effort. Therefore, Russia has to rely very much on mobilizing its own resources, including manpower. The Russian generals have put the plank quite low when it comes to reliance on their standing military: the ‘permanently ready’ forces, manned by a mixture of ‘contract soldiers’ and conscripts, should be able to fight two simultaneous local conflicts, and to provide for strategic deployment and mobilization of the armed forces in a larger conflict. Even though The Current Tasks says that the size of the mobilization reserve should be reduced, the document holds out no hope of getting rid of the draft, which provides the bulk of trained reservists.

Is there a chance that Russia would move to volunteer reserves, following the American model? This is not very likely. It appears that Russian officers genuinely cannot imagine armed forces that do not rely on conscription for mobilizing reserves. Thus, First Deputy Chief of General Staff Colonel General Yuri Baluevsky (whom Golts described as ‘one of the smartest and most non-conformist of Russian generals’) recently said that the Americans:

...have completely preserved the draft system, and today are forming three brigades out of conscript reservists in order to send them to Iraq.

The American experience in Iraq may yet provide a further argument in favor of retaining the draft. The limitations on the American mission by relatively small size of reserves will in all likelihood be noticed by the Russian military, who could make an argument that a small all-volunteer military does a good job winning a local conflict, but simply does not have the numbers for cementing political victory by putting enough boots on the ground. The outcomes of the US campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan are
likely to affect the future of Russian military reform, in as far as the reformers in Russia, who advocate all-volunteer, relatively small, highly mobile military have been inspired by the American successes in the Persian Gulf war of 1991, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001 and in the destruction of the Iraqi military in 2003. If the US finds, as Andrew Krepinevich suggests, a strategy that would allow an effective employment of a force that can be realistically sustained, the position of military reformers in Russia will be strengthened. If the US fails, the voices of those arguing in favor of a military ready for a mass mobilization of conscripts, will become louder.

The difficulty that Russia has in building reliable alliances that might alleviate the need to have a large mobilization system is well demonstrated by Aleksandr Belkin in his paper on US-Russian relations. He points to the narrow overlap of the two nations' security interests. Both agree about the danger of Islamic fundamentalism; Bush noted their mutual concern about this issue after his first meeting with Putin in June 2001. Cooperation in the war on terror has improved US-Russian relations, but, as Belkin observes:

... the new US-Russian rapprochement rests on a very delicate basis: the personal relationship of the two national leaders. While it is very important for a genuine trust and better understanding, it cannot be sufficient for building a stable structure of bilateral relations. The Putin-Bush interaction cannot substitute for the US-Russian relations. In this case President Reagan's formula that 'It takes two to tango' should be read as a concert of nations, of political and business elites, not only of leading individuals.

There are, however, differences even in this area: Putin sees the center of gravity for the war on terror in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, while Bush has put emphasis on Iraq. The ambiguous nature of US-Russian relations was stressed by the Minister of Defense, Sergei Ivanov, who said in October 2003 that, although the relations between the two nations had improved since the days of the Cold War, and they are no longer enemies, they were 'definitely' not allies. US ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow agreed with Ivanov, adding that '[t]he US-Russian partnership covers a broad range of subjects, but we have not reached the point where we consider ourselves part of the same family – in contrast with the relationships that the United States has with its traditional allies in Europe and Asia'. This view very much agrees with Belkin's.
The predictable American response to problems in relations with other nations is to suggest that they become more democratic—according to this logic, the more the public can influence foreign policy, the better it will be for the given nation’s relations with the US. Belkin, however, makes a very different suggestion: the Russian leaders should ignore public opinion when making foreign policy decisions, since the Russian public tends to react too emotionally to world events. Indeed, the outraged reaction of the Russian public to NATO’s campaign in Kosovo, various anti-American actions by the Duma (the lower house of the parliament) and consistently negative views of the US found in surveys of Russian public opinion, suggest that a foreign policy directly reflecting popular preferences would hardly improve US-Russian relations.

Mikhail Pogorely notes in his paper on US-Russian cooperation in non-proliferation of WMD that this cooperation is difficult and US-Russian perspectives on this issue are quite different. The Russian side frequently suspects that the American efforts to secure nuclear materials in Russia are part of a plan to unilaterally disarm Russia. Despite the shared desire to prevent proliferation of WMD, US efforts against proliferation of nuclear capabilities are often seen in Russia as a desire to drive Russia out of nuclear energy markets. Pogorely suggests that the lack of a clear ‘political strategy’ leaves the public confused about, if not hostile to, the West. Every US-Russian cooperative endeavor requires, as Alexsander Savelyev points out addressing the issue of ballistic missile defense, a ‘stable US-Russian relationship’, which, in its own turn, requires ‘the success of democratic reforms in Russia, effectiveness of the struggle against international terrorism, the results of military reform in Russia and many other things’. Unfortunately, Russia’s progress towards all of these objectives remains uncertain.

Russia’s geopolitical isolation may gradually become a consciously chosen policy. Vitaly Shlykov, in his paper on Putin’s attack against Russia’s most powerful businessmen – the ‘oligarchs’ – notes the change that has taken place in the government during Putin’s three years in office:

...the elite has become more militarized and less intellectual. Whereas in the early 1990s the elite’s strategic core consisted mainly of economists, under Putin military men and security officers have gained the upper hand in shaping national strategy. This has altered the state’s priorities with issues of security, military reform and the country’s geopolitical place in the world coming very much to the fore.
This new elite hopes to strengthen the government's control over extraction of natural resources and increase taxation of such businesses, thus replenishing the treasury. Indeed, in an interview in November 2003, Defense Minister Ivanov said that 'mineral and energy resources belong to the state, they are not private property'. Shlykov suggests that such a shift in economic policy might directly benefit Russia's defense industry: this money could be used to revive the defense industry, and produce a trickle-down effect helping to propel Russia into the era of high technology. Shlykov notes that some prominent Russian economists have been promoting such ideas.

Whatever the real chances of such plans, they are likely to contribute to Russia's isolation on the world scene.

First, a buildup of the defense industry does require certain political justification. Keeping Russia estranged from the West will allow the government to justify increased defense spending.

Second, a pursuit of such a plan may make its authors hope that Russia could preserve the autarkic nature of its defense industry, thus saving them from the need to cooperate in weapons production with other nations. If such cooperation is not necessary, Russia has one more reason to do without alliances with strong partners.

We are facing a situation quite typical of Russian politics today: Putin charts a course meant to bring Russia more closely to the West, while some of his actions may bring about the opposite results. In the 1990s, Western observers justifiably complained that the weakened and dysfunctional Russian state prevented Russia's progress towards market economy and democratic political system, and therefore her better integration with the West. As if in response, Putin is working to strengthen the state. This state, however, is based on the remnants of Soviet bureaucracy, with its organizational culture intact, thanks to the revolution from above which spared whole state structures complete with their employees. The security services and the military were the bulwark of the Soviet state and they, unlike the communist party, were spared (although downsized) during the collapse of the Soviet system. Thus, the return of the state means the return of the Soviet mindset, albeit considerably attenuated, as noted by Shlykov, by years of living without communism. The role of the so-called siloviki – personalities from the 'power agencies' (silovye struktury) – has been additionally enhanced by the fact that Russia has been at war (although an undeclared one) in Chechnya since 1999.
In the view of the siloviki Russia can be only the central and dominant element of any alliance that Moscow takes part in. In the Soviet past, there is no experience of playing the role of a junior partner; even an alliance of near-equals turned out to be elusive in the case of Sino-Soviet relations. Finding a place in the international security system commensurate with Russia’s reduced economic and military resources is not easy for the siloviki. They have been very uncomfortable about Putin’s decision to share the burden of fighting Islamism by going along with the US military presence in Central Asia.

One should note, for the sake of fairness, that it is not easy for Russia to find an alliance that is both not dominated by her and still serves her security needs. Because of Russia’s immense size and presence in different geopolitical regions, these needs can be met only with considerable difficulty. How willing, for instance, would NATO be to guarantee Russia’s security vis-à-vis China? And wouldn’t such a guarantee, if obtained, not sour Russia’s relations with her great eastern neighbor? Still, Russia tends to make things more difficult for herself by exaggerating threats, especially those allegedly presented on its western periphery by NATO. The Current Tasks, for instance, assigns Russia’s western group of forces, facing Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States, Finland and Scandinavia, the mission of ‘deterring a large-scale war’.27 One may doubt that the Russian political and military leadership worry about a real threat of war against NATO. Soon after the publication of The Current Tasks, General Baluevsky, the First Deputy Chief of General Staff, was asked about the likelihood of a war against NATO; he responded that while this possibility cannot be ‘completely ruled out’, such a war would be ‘like death for Russia’.28 Still, the Western direction is present in Russian military plans and uses up scarce resources.

Russia faces today a predicament similar to the one it confronted in the late nineteenth/early twentieth century: Russia saw threats all along its periphery, while Russia’s size (which protected it from conquest) and lack of communications made it difficult for troops in one theater to reinforce another one. Therefore, Russia had ‘to maintain an enormous permanent armed force that would be capable of defeating all or most its principal enemies simultaneously’.29 The good news today is that the threat of a major war involving Russia is incomparably lower than it was a century ago. The bad news is that Russia, unlike its tsarist predecessor aligned with France and England, does not have any powerful allies. As a result, the Russian
military is 'approximately' one million strong, and will not become smaller.\textsuperscript{30} For comparison, active duty armed forces of the US (excluding the Coast Guard), a superpower with global responsibilities, are 1,427,000 strong.\textsuperscript{31}

The immediate result of the contradictory political context of military policy is that, four years since Vladimir Putin began his political ascent with proclaiming a ‘war on terrorism’ in Chechnya, the Russian military has not been reshaped to fight such wars. Chechnya continues to claim the lives of Russian soldiers, while the military now implies that defeating insurgency is not really its job. In the words of General Baluevsky, the armed forces ‘did their job’ in Chechnya: they ‘destroyed and dispersed the formations of the bandits’ there.\textsuperscript{32} Apparently, constant ambushes of the Russian forces, truck bombs and assassinations are not something the military can handle. It remains to be seen if a military effective in what the pundits refer to as the wars of the twenty-first century can be built in Russia in the near future.

\section*{NOTES}

1. The views expressed here are those of the author solely, and are not meant to represent the views of the Department of the Navy or any other agency of the US Government.
5. Aktual\’nye zadachi (note 2) p.49.
6. Ibid. p.51.
7. Ibid. p.54.
8. Ibid. p.55.
9. Ibid. p.53.
10. Ibid. pp.22, 23.
11. Ibid. pp.12, 18.
13. Ibid. p.23.
15. Ibid. p.18.
17. Ibid. p.41.
18. Ibid. p.55.
27. Aktualnye zadachi (note 2) p.47.
32. Babakin et al. (note 28).
US-Russian Relations and the Global Counter-Terrorist Campaign

ALEXANDER A. BELKIN

With the election of George W. Bush in 2000, the Kremlin had its reservations about the newly elected US president and his administration. For a time, mutual criticism between the two countries seemed to be the rule of the day. Among other things, the US pulled out of the 1972 ABM treaty unilaterally, and Russia prosecuted its war against the Chechen separatists. Then came 9/11, and the two countries found solid ground for mutually advantageous cooperation – the global war on terrorism. But with NATO/Yugoslavia still clearly in the rear-view mirror, and the war against Iraq still ahead, the course of future relations remained unclear. The author examines US-Russian relations as they evolved before and after the war in Iraq and offers conclusions and lessons learned for both sides.

Russia is an important partner in the war on terror and is reaching toward a future of greater democracy and economic freedom. As it does so, our relationship will continue to broaden and deepen.1

Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Throughout 2001 scholars of US-Russian relations on both sides of the Atlantic closely watched the foreign policies of the White House and the Kremlin. Many expected that President George W. Bush and his foreign and security policy team would implement a tough, possibly Reaganite-style hard line toward Russia led by a former KGB colonel. Their policy line toward Russia had less to do with a disdain for Putin, and was more indicative of an embrace of a ‘market correction’ to US-Russian relations. The administration had not permanently written off Russia, but preferred to downgrade the priority accorded to the relationship, waiting to re-invest in Russia at the bottom of the market. It was determined to conduct a serious
dialogue with Russia, but only after expectations were lowered and relations had been re-balanced.

The first indications of such a posture surfaced during the election campaign and the early formation of the new administration’s personnel and foreign policy. Those symptoms included: downgrading Russia in the US list of foreign policy priorities; the administration’s harsh statements declaring its intention to withdraw unilaterally from the 1972 ABM treaty and to end strategic arms control negotiations with Russia; leveling charges against Russia as an active proliferator of critical WMD technologies (meaning mostly its cooperation with Iran in the nuclear energy sector); persistent criticism of Russia’s method of resolving the domestic crisis in Chechnya (identified by President Vladimir Putin in 1999 as ‘an anti-terrorist operation’); and accusing Moscow of suppressing freedom of speech (regarding the awkward use of legal and economic instruments to deprive the notorious oligarchs Gusinsky and Berezovsky of their media assets).

Top Russian policymakers, in their turn, accused the new US leadership of adventurous unilateralism in the world arena, of breaking down the structure of international treaties on strategic arms control and starting a new nuclear arms race, of interference in Russia’s domestic affairs and of double-standards in the treatment of Russia.

Despite the fact that President Bush tried to establish, in his words, a ‘frank and honest relationship’ with the ‘trustworthy’ President Putin during the summits in Brdo and Genoa in June and July 2001, public opinion and the political and economic elites of the two nations were distressed. Americans experienced ‘Russia fatigue’, while Russians were disillusioned in their hopes for US expertise and help. Both nations were psychologically preparing for a disengagement, or even for another round of confrontation.

It seemed that US-Russian affairs reached a turning point on September 11, 2001, when Vladimir Putin placed a telephone call to George W. Bush to convey the Russians’ condolences to the victims of the terrorist attacks against the Americans, and to assure the US president of Russia’s full support for anti-terrorist counteractions.

Presidents Bush and Putin achieved further successes in encouraging a counter-terrorist coalition and securing the success of the fight against bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan, avoiding a crisis over the US abrogation of the 1972 ABM treaty, and steadily
improving Russia’s overall relations with the West. It looked like the presidents had managed to end a dangerous deterioration of the bilateral relations that occurred during the 1990s and to change the course of US-Russian affairs from a series of nervous ups and downs to a stable, mutually beneficial ascent.

Yet the new US-Russian rapprochement rests on a very delicate basis: the personal relationship of the two national leaders. While this is very important for a genuine trust and better understanding, it cannot be sufficient for building a stable structure of bilateral relations. The Putin-Bush interaction cannot substitute for US-Russian relations. In this case, President Reagan’s formula that ‘It takes two to tango’ should be read as a concert of nations, of political and business elites, not only of leading individuals.

During the year after 9/11, US-Russian relationships were in the ‘courting’ phase, as the two leaders cheered each other up with rhetorical bolstering. At the same time, the elites and the public were lagging behind the presidents in their visions, assessments and actions.

It appeared that the presidents had drawn certain lessons from the bilateral relations of the past two decades. The primary message was that each of the nations should learn to avoid Cold War-style harsh responses to any disagreements or contradictions, because emotional rhetoric prompted by instincts left over from the old days could seriously damage the fragile fabric of the new relationship. The Russian leadership demonstrates as much by its attitude to the establishing of the US military presence in Central Asia and Georgia – the regions of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) that are most sensitive for Russia – prior to the US-led counter-terrorist coalition operation in Afghanistan against bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network, as well as by the Kremlin’s reserved reaction to the abrogation by the White House of the ABM Treaty and the decision to start deployment of a national missile defense. Moscow remained calm when Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia joined NATO. For its part, if the US administration had not acknowledged the difference between the first (1994–96) and the second (1999–2002) Chechen wars, it so far remained mum on the continued Russian ‘anti-terrorist operation’ in Chechnya.

All that time Putin was facing some domestic opposition to his policy of ‘appeasing’ Washington. Exploiting the widespread public anti-Americanism, certain groups among the Russian national security and foreign policy bureaucracy were cherishing their xenophobic
suspicions towards the US and growing dissatisfied with the fact that Russia thus far had received little reward for its support of the domineering role of the US. They argued that Russia had shared vital intelligence with the CIA concerning North Korea, had withdrawn from the communication facilities in Cuba, and from the naval base at Cam Rahn Bay in Vietnam, but had received very little in return.

'The perpetuation of the antiterrorist war is fully in line with the new military doctrine of the United States, which centers on preemptive strikes against adversaries arbitrarily made up by the US itself', as Evgeny Primakov, former Russian prime minister, foreign minister and director of foreign intelligence, wrote in his recently published book.²

Critical voices were heard not only from the left flank, but from the conservative realists as well. Thus, leading political expert Vyacheslav Nikonov, summing up the diplomatic year 2002, stated that:

...the US withdrawal from the ABM treaty was a failure of the Russian foreign policy. In fact, we had no reason to support that decision, just as we had no reason to support NATO's expansion. Of course, this [NATO enlargement] is not a direct threat to the Russian security, but it is a creation of a European security system without our full participation in it.³

The dissent was heard even among Putin's men. 'The discussion of key military threats would be incomplete without mentioning the US invalidation of the 1972 ABM Treaty and the ongoing expansion of NATO', asserted Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov in an interview in December 2002. 'These steps do not pose an immediate threat to Russia's national security, [although] they undermine the existing strategic stability system'.⁴

However, President Putin managed to control the situation at least within his own ranks. The same Defense Minister, Sergey Ivanov, was quoted as saying that:

...the main threat to Russia's security is posed by terrorist groups active in the North Caucasus and Central Asia. To counter terrorist threats, we are maintaining close international ties within the antiterrorist coalition. We are ready for active ties with any country combating this evil.⁵

The Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Sergey Lebedev, sounded even more in line with his president:
The main threats [to Russia] today come from international terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is also a major threat because we cannot be sure that maniacs will never assume control of such weapons. Ecological security is another vital task. No country in the world, not even the powerful USA, can stand up against these threats single-handed. We need to join forces.  

Skeptics within the Bush administration, while in retreat, rather than remain silent had precipitated a nuanced debate over the significance of Russia’s contribution to the war on terrorism. They argued that Russia’s support was inevitable because the US was doing Russia’s bidding in rooting out terrorists in Central Asia. Those voices were balanced in part by reasonable thinkers in the Capitol and in the White House. ‘US-Russian cooperation in the war on terrorism’ – in Condoleezza Rice’s opinion – ‘has been path-breaking in its breadth, depth, and openness. The passing of the ABM [1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty and the signing of the Moscow Treaty reducing strategic arms by two-thirds make clear that the days of Russian military confrontation with the West are over.  

In all, US-Russian relations were on an obvious ascent in 2002. Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin carried out successful summit meetings in Moscow and St. Petersburg in May and managed to sign a groundbreaking strategic arms reduction agreement. In addition, Russia was welcomed into NATO and given a seat on a council (though with a non-decisive voice). The US also was behind the pledge by the G-7 nations to contribute $20 billion over ten years to nonproliferation programs in Russia and the former Soviet republics and to give Russia a permanent seat at future G-8 meetings. The Bush administration lobbied Congress hard to grant Russia the status as a free-market economy; this was finally granted on 6 June 2002. Most important, the US and Russia have continued their cooperation in the war on terrorism.

As the US Ambassador to Russia, Alexander Vershbow, admitted:

The new NATO-Russia Council set up last year [2002] is another good example of how much the security environment has changed, and it underscores Russia’s importance to meeting today’s challenges. The NRC is off to an impressive start. Russia held a joint civil-emergency exercise with NATO Allies and Partners last fall in Noginsk, and also hosted a NATO-Russia seminar in Moscow two months ago on the military’s role in combating terrorism. NATO and Russian military authorities in Brussels have completed joint assessments of the threat posed by
Al Qaeda to our troops in the Balkans and to civil aviation, and they have begun an assessment of the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.8

The Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, stated in December 2002:

From the viewpoint of possible consequences for our foreign policy and for the situation in the world as a whole I would put Russia’s relations with the United States in the first place. This year we have managed to negotiate a very complex period connected with the Americans’ unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty and not only to avoid sliding into confrontation, which for Russia would have entailed many unpleasant aspects, but even to maintain a constructive air of partnership. It was this that enabled us to move on within an extremely short period of time to the signing of a new treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive potentials, which provides real prospects for the next decade of reducing them by almost two-thirds, and to sign an important political declaration formulating the principles governing the relationship between our countries in the spheres that are the most important for Russia – the political, military, and economic. All this has enabled us to continue joint efforts in the fight against international terrorism, and not only in Afghanistan.9

The state of bilateral relations is also described positively in a reference note on the website of the Russian Foreign Ministry:

RUSSIAN-US RELATIONS

During the two years from September 2001 till September 2003 Presidents Putin and Bush met nine times in bilateral and multilateral formats, including President Putin’s visit to the United States (November 12–15, 2001) and the reciprocal visit to Russia of President Bush (May 23–26, 2002). The last time the presidents met on June 1, 2003, during the celebrations to mark the tercentenary anniversary of St. Petersburg.

Prime Minister Mikhail Kas’yanov officially visited the United States during January 31 through February 4, 2002. The head of the Presidential Administration Alexander Voloshin visited Washington during February 23–26, 2003. Heads of the Russian governmental agencies visited the United States on official and business trips, among them Vice Prime Minister Alexey Kudrin, Minister of Agriculture Alexey Gordeev, Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov, Minister of Economic Development Hermann Gref, Chairman of the Accounting Chamber Sergey Stepashin, Minister of the Press Mikhail Lesin, Minister of Fuel and Energy Igor Yusufov, Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Roumyantsev, Minister of Transportation Sergei Frank, Minister of Communications Leonid Reyman, Head of the Federal Construction Committee Nikolai Koshman and others. Assistant to the President on National Security Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, as well as Secretaries of Commerce, Treasury, Energy, Justice and other departments visited Russia during the same period.
Contacts between the heads of the foreign policy agencies of the two countries were upheld on a permanent basis. During the period of interaction with the administration of President George W. Bush, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and Secretary of State Colin Powell met 35 times in bilateral and multilateral formats.

In the military political sphere efforts were focused on forming a new relationship in the strategic field on the principles of partnership and consideration of respective security interests based on the documents signed during the visit to Russia of President Bush (May 23–26, 2002) – the political Joint Declaration on the new strategic relationship between Russia and the USA, as well as the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (effective since June 1, 2003). We are in a process of working out definite agreements with the United States on specific measures for implementation of the initiative of the G8 summit (Kananaskis, June 2002) on Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

Cooperation is developing in the field of non-proliferation, first of all with regard to raising the effectiveness of the international control regimes – the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), CTBT, CWC, BWC, as well as missile technology non-proliferation. We have accumulated significant experience in the process of implementation of the program of assisting Russia in the annihilation of its WMD, disposal of strategic arsenals.

Russian-U.S. cooperation is also developing in resolving key international and regional issues, joint search for solutions to new global threats and challenges. Primarily it relates to the problem of international terrorism. The Joint Statement on anti-terrorist cooperation was signed by the presidents during the Moscow-St Petersburg (May 2002) summit. Issues pertaining to the fight against terrorism are regularly discussed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State.

A tested and efficient instrument of the bilateral cooperation in this field is the Russian-U.S. Working Group on fighting terrorism, which conducts regular meetings. The mandate of the Group is quite large and includes in particular issues related to countering terrorist nuclear and other WMD threats, coordinating activities in blocking the channels of financial support of terrorism (within the framework of implementation of UN SC Resolution 1373), as well as combating against illegal drugs trafficking as the major means of financial support for terrorist and extremist activities.

Even the firm political stance shown by Russia during the eight weeks of an agonizing search for a compromise on the highest governmental level during the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1441, which prevented the US from an unconditional war with Iraq – though it called on Iraq to submit to weapons inspections or face the threat of forced compliance – did not yet presuppose a serious crisis in the US-Russian relationship.

US officials were also rather optimistic about the future of bilateral relations. 'Whatever happens, I don't think the bilateral
relationship between the United States and Russia will be strained to the breaking point', claimed Alexander Vershbow, the US Ambassador to Russia. ‘Whatever the differences in our approach to the problem of Iraq, we have the same underlying goal’.11

In late January 2003 Putin announced that Moscow would toughen its line on Iraq should Baghdad fail to come clean on its weapons program. He also admitted the Kremlin did not want a confrontation with Washington over Iraq, prompting the influential daily Kommersant to assert that for Russia, ‘America is more important than Iraq’.

However, the crisis developed when it became clear that Russia would veto the US-proposed UN resolution for an attack on Iraq. The confident claims by many US experts that Russia had no choice but to join the US against Iraq proved to be a faulty analysis.

The launching of the war against Iraq was seen in the US as part of a global war against terrorism. However, many in Russia saw the attack on Iraq as part of an effort by the US to monopolize the world petroleum markets and further its political and economic domination of the globe.

The Russian Foreign Ministry was the first to openly state its opposition to the ‘aggressive’ US policy against Iraq. Putin and his presidential staff seemed to be using Foreign Minister Ivanov as a sounding board both internationally and within Russia itself.

Then, in a major televised interview on 21 February 2003, Putin warned about a ‘growing aggressiveness of influential forces in certain countries’. In his annual address to members of both houses of the Russian parliament on 16 May 2003, speaking about nuclear and terrorist threats, Putin made a remark that ‘strong, well-armed national armies are sometimes used not to fight this evil [international terrorism] but to expand the areas of strategic influence of individual states’, obviously pointing to the US-led operation in Iraq.

Why did the arch-realist Putin, who had worked so hard since September 11 to forge a bond with President Bush, choose to break ranks?

Foreign policy analysts and Russia-watchers singled out several reasons for that. The most obvious was domestic public opposition to the war conducted without the legitimate backing of the UN. Long before the operation in Iraq, Russian public opinion demonstrated rather widespread anti-American sentiment. An opinion poll of 500 city residents conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation–Gallup
International in October 2001 has shown that a total of 42.4 per cent of Muscovites approved of the US military efforts in Afghanistan, while 49.4 per cent disapproved of them; at least 32 per cent of Muscovites feared that the conflict would grow further and spill into other countries, including Russia. An overwhelming 60 per cent of the respondents believed that the US military action posed a threat to Russia, while 36.3 per cent of those polled opposed that opinion. More than half, 57 per cent, said that Russia must fully cooperate with the US, except in committing forces to action. At least 24.7 per cent advocated the position of a standby observer, while 11.3 per cent wanted Russia to denounce the US and demand a termination of the action.12

Leon Aron from the American Enterprise Institute provided an extended review of the Russian public attitude to the war in Iraq and in this relation to the US.13 He pointed out that in a January 2003 national poll, 52 per cent of Russians felt ‘indignant’ about a possible US-British ‘military operation against Iraq’, while only three per cent approved of the idea.14 Asked which side would enjoy their sympathy in the event of war, 50 per cent said neither, while ten percent would root for America and 32 per cent for Iraq.15 While about one-fifth thought the US was preparing for war in order to ‘destroy terrorist bases’ or prevent Iraq from manufacturing weapons of mass destruction, twice as many ascribed America’s bellicosity to a desire to ‘show the world “who’s the boss”’, and over a third (34–37 per cent) considered US ‘economic interests’ – including control over Iraqi oil – as the underlying casus belli.16

In the months leading to war, positive attitudes toward America fell from 69 per cent in October 2002 to 48 per cent in March 2003, while negative ones rose from 24 per cent to 40 per cent.17 With coalition forces massing in the Persian Gulf in early March, far more Russians considered the US a greater threat to world peace (71 per cent) than they did Iraq (45 per cent).18

By the end of March, as the coalition forces raced across the Euphrates plain, only 14 per cent of Russians believed that America played ‘a mostly positive role in today’s world’,19 91 per cent disapproved of the war, while in another poll, 82 per cent expressed indignation over it.20 President Bush commanded an all-time unfavorable ‘high’ of 76 per cent in Russia.21 At the same time, Saddam Hussein’s favorability ratings – at 22 per cent – barely budged with the outbreak of war, up a mere seven points from February 2002.22 Similarly, in early March the majority of respondents (51 percent) felt that Iraq was neither a hostile nor a friendly country to Russia.23

Thus, most Russians’ anger appears to have stemmed not from a sympathy with the target of American power but from its very exercise.

Despite their opposition to the war, the majority of Russians – when asked in polls between December 2002 and April 2003 which side their country should take – consistently replied that Moscow should remain neutral (61–73 per cent). Between
seven and nine per cent advocated support for the US, while 19 to 32 per cent were for 'diplomatic assistance' to Iraq. Only one per cent of Russians believe that the US is a guarantor of peace in the world. The majority of respondents polled by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center in late April believe that the US interferes in the affairs of other countries, imposes its values on them (61 per cent) and is also trying to gain world dominance (61 per cent).

A less articulated, though a quite important, reason for Putin’s stance on the war in Iraq is the Islamic factor. Muslims account for 18 per cent of Russia’s population. They live in the North Caucasus and in Bashkortostan and Tatarstan. The Tatars are, in fact, Russia’s second largest nationality. Then there are six post-Soviet Muslim states on Russia’s southern border: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Islam is now an integral part of politics within and around Russia. The US-led war against Iraq followed by a prolonged occupation could inflame the Muslim world and bring upheaval to Russia and its southern flank.

A series of research papers and memos prepared by Russian analysts after the NATO war against Yugoslavia emphasized the vital necessity of preserving the United Nations Organization as the only existing – although growing obsolete and demanding modernization – international instrument for settling inter-state disputes and maintaining the world order. And it seems that Putin truly adheres to this concept and persistently brings it to the floor. In his 2003 annual address to the Russian Federal Assembly the president devoted a significant part of his foreign policy analysis to the role and future of the United Nations:

The foundation of our foreign policy, the fundamental task of Russia’s foreign policy, is the implementation of our national interests. And here, the basic principle continues to be the observance of the norms of international law. The events of the past year have once again demonstrated that guaranteeing national interests requires in equal measure both an effective diplomacy and a reliable Russian defense potential.

In today’s world, the relations between states are determined to a considerable degree by the existence of serious, world-scale real and potential threats. Among such threats we include international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional and territorial conflicts, and the drugs menace. In the event of an aggravated threat to the world community as a whole or to an individual country, it seems extremely important to have a decision-making mechanism which has to be comprehensible, transparent and recognized by everyone. It goes without
US-Russian Relations

saying that the United Nations and its Security Council are the most important such mechanism.

Yes, it is not always easy for the Security Council to pass a decision. Sometimes no decisions are passed. It happens sometimes that the initiators of a resolution do not have enough arguments to persuade other countries that their initiative is right.

Of course, UN decisions are far from being favored by everyone every time. But the world community has no other more universal mechanism. This mechanism should be looked after and maintained.

Of course, it is necessary to modernize the work of international organizations and to make it more effective. Russia is open to discussing these questions. I think that such approaches to international matters are civilized and correct.

These approaches are not directed against anyone or are in favor of anyone. It is our position, a position of principle, and we will adhere to it in the future.

The next significant cause (not often mentioned by observers) of Putin’s posture on the Iraqi war was closely related to the previous one. As Steven Sestanovich put it, ‘he was carried along by the French [and Germans] into a more openly anti-American position than he expected. He found it a little hard to drop off their bandwagon’.27 Moscow must have actually believed that France and Germany were ready to put up a serious opposition to the US to make them adhere to the UN charter. Very soon Putin discovered that both Chirac and Schroeder were pursuing their own, different goals, similar in only one way – both tried to improve their domestic political positions. A suspicion was also articulated that ‘one of the goals of our European friends . . . has always been to prevent excessive rapprochement between Russia and the US, for such a development could strengthen the positions of both countries, especially that of Russia’.

Many analysts agree that one more factor that influenced Putin’s opposition to the US operation in Iraq was the abovementioned pressure from a part of the Russian ruling class, especially from the national security bureaucracy.

Finally, some scholars of Russian politics proposed the so-called psychological reason. They hint at a skeleton in Putin’s closet: his habits and mindset of a security service officer have not died away; he is still suspicious of his Western partners and their intentions. His former colleagues from the intelligence service obviously reported to him varying assessments of the Bush team’s global intentions published in the foreign press. For one example, see Anatol Lieven’s
article in the *London Review of Books* where he analyses what the US administration hopes to gain:

The planned war against Iraq is not after all intended only to remove Saddam Hussein, but to destroy the structure of the Sunni-dominated Arab nationalist Iraqi state as it has existed since that country’s inception. The ‘democracy’ which replaces it will presumably resemble that of Afghanistan – a ramshackle coalition of ethnic groups and warlords, utterly dependent on US military power and utterly subservient to US (and Israeli) wishes.

Similarly, if after Saddam’s regime is destroyed, Saudi Arabia fails to bow to US wishes and is attacked in its turn, then – to judge by the thoughts circulating in Washington think-tanks – the goal would be not just to remove the Saudi regime and eliminate Wahabism as a state ideology: it would be to destroy and partition the Saudi state.

Beyond lies China. When the Bush Administration came to power, its major security focus was not the Middle East. The greatest fears of right-wing nationalist gurus such as Robert Kagan concerned the future emergence of China as a superpower rival – fears lent a certain credibility by China’s sheer size and the growth of its economy. As declared in the famous strategy document drawn up by Paul Wolfowitz in the last year of the first Bush Administration – and effectively proclaimed official policy by Bush Jr in his West Point speech in June – the guiding purpose of US strategy after the end of the Cold War should be to prevent the emergence of any ‘peer competitor’ anywhere in the world.

Maybe knowing that, Putin, when asked at the press conference on 22 November 2002 whether the US had invited him to participate in or contribute to any military action in Iraq, avoided a direct answer. Instead he tried to draw attention to some other states of the Middle East and South Asia.

We should not forget about those who finance terrorism. Of the 19 terrorists who committed the main attacks on September 11th against the United States, 16 are citizens of Saudi Arabia, and we should not forget about that.

Now, where has Osama bin Laden taken refuge? They say that somewhere between Afghanistan and Pakistan. We know what Mr Musharraf is doing to achieve stability in his country and we are supporting him. But what can happen with armies armed with weapons that exist in Pakistan, including weapons of mass destruction, we are not sure on that aspect and we should not forget about that. And we agree with the President of the United States and his colleagues who say that we have to make sure that Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction in its possession.

It seemed for a while that despite Condoleezza Rice’s ‘Forgive Russia’ formula, the relationship was on a downhill slope again.
Some analysts in the US believed that Putin was ‘in a genuinely awkward political position. He opposed the United States on Iraq, was ignored, showed himself to be basically irrelevant on the main issue of world politics, and he doesn’t see an easy fix…there’s no question that the personal relationship between the two presidents has already changed. There is a strong sense of disappointment in Putin’.31

But then on 1 June 2003 Presidents Bush and Putin signed a Joint Statement ‘On The New Strategic Relationship’, reaffirming the two nations’ partnership and commitment to meet together the challenges of the twenty-first century.

What lessons can both nations and their respective leaderships learn from the experience of the last year?

It is not obvious what lessons were drawn by the Russian defense leadership. Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov seems to prefer to seek knowledge on the future of the Russian defense system from such sources as ‘experienced experts and specialists’, such as ‘prominent senior commanding officers and veterans of the [Soviet] Armed Forces’. Defense Ministry mouthpiece Krasnaya Zvezda often quotes, for example, the last Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal Dmitry Yazov, as such an expert on many issues of military reform.32 During the US-led operation in Iraq he presented an analysis which might have prompted the Defense Ministry’s erroneous advice to President Putin:

Iraqi soldiers resemble us when were fighting for Stalingrad…The moral, psychological and, consequently, combat characteristics of the soldiers of [the US-led] coalition are doubtful. They are so sensitive. And, look, how much junk they carry on themselves! We had been going into assault [during World War II]…throwing away our kit-bags and gas-masks – everything but our rifles. And we did not do badly. And here scantily clad Iraqi soldiers, fighting light, are thrashing the life out of the very well-equipped mercenaries…33

For Russia’s political class, the lessons from the war in Iraq and Russia’s diplomatic posture toward this war in the context of US-Russian relations had been formulated in a series of publications. Here is a summary of those conclusions:

- Russian policy lacked a clear strategic objective. It was not obvious whether we wanted to ensure that international law was observed, to save the UN Security Council, to befriend European states and play them off against the US, or to remain on good
terms with America. Any of these objectives could be justified as part of an overarching strategy. But there was no strategy. And the absence of a strategy was not unique to this crisis – it was true of Russia’s foreign policy as a whole.

- Russia’s foreign policy was not very well-coordinated. At times Russia was clearly improvising and on occasions was clearly acting at cross-purposes.
- One of Russia’s policy objectives has been and remains erroneous. It is counterproductive at the UN – even for tactical purposes – to attempt to play against its most powerful member. The UN ship is only barely afloat. It needs to be saved, rapidly repaired and modernized, and this should be done together with those whom we can sail on with.
- Out of slovenliness Russia simply did not look after its economic interests in Iraq. The government agencies did not try to prioritize those interests.
- The Russian intelligence services misled the Russian political leadership and the Russian political class deluded itself about Iraq’s ability and readiness to fight.
- The Russian leadership must draw, without delay, this very important conclusion: Russia’s foreign policy must be consistently unpopular. Only then will it be able to meet genuine national interests of Russia. The Iraq war has demonstrated that an overwhelming majority of the Russian population, as well as a large part of the Russian elite, react to international events emotionally rather than objectively. Russia’s foreign policy must become more pragmatic, as President Vladimir Putin repeatedly and justly says. This means that political developments in the world must be subject of a calm and non-biased analysis, occasionally defying Russian public opinion.34

The most obvious and important lesson for US foreign politics drawn from the American diplomatic efforts prior to and during the Iraq war is the one which is recognized both by the critics and proponents of US-Russian rapprochement: ‘the Bush administration has not helped potential allies to understand its outlook and direction, and without such understanding, friendly governments fear they are being led around by the nose’; ‘the United States has failed to explain in clear terms to Russia its strategic objectives and interests’.35
NOTES


5. Ibid.


7. Rice (note 1).


11. Vershbow (note 8).


18. Ibid.


32. ‘Armiya menyaet oblik’ [Armed Forces Change its Character], Krashaya Zvezda, 22 April 2003; ‘Yazov odobril reformu armii’ [Yazov Approved the Armed Forces Reform], Moskovskii Kommomlet, 21 April 2003.
References

3 3. The US Military Engagement in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus: An Overview


17. United States Senate Armed Services Committee, hearing testimony of Thomas W. O'Connell as nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, 10 July 2003.


NOTES

1. The five Central Asian states were formally transferred from the US European Command to CENTCOMM in Oct. 1999.

2. The only exception to the five Central Asian states is Tajikistan, which formed its national armed forces around the remnants of several armed groups involved in the country's civil war. All other Central Asian states reconstituted their armed forces on the inheritance of units of the Soviet Turkistan Military District.

3. The Special Forces, known officially as the US Army
Special Forces and unofficially as the 'Green Berets', comprises a very small element in the overall US military known as Special Operations Forces (SOF), codified by the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act of 1986.


5. The Pankisi Gorge is a nearly 30-mile long valley of rock and forest roughly 80 miles from Tbilisi and has been beyond the control of the central Georgian government for some time, with a minimal police presence limited to the roads leading into and out of the gorge. Separated from Chechnya by 36 miles of rugged mountainous terrain, the gorge is populated by large numbers of Chechen refugees and local ethnic Chechens, but is dominated by well-armed informal paramilitary militias and criminal gangs engaged in the smuggling of arms and narcotics, exacerbated by severe unemployment and under-development.


7. Testimony of Thomas O'Connell, Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on his nomination as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, 10 July 2003.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.


11. SOF involvement in such 'Operations Other Than War' (OOTW) has steadily increased to also include disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation, humanitarian de-mining operations, public health and refugee aid, and the enforcement of sanctions or exclusionary zones.


13. Of the four additional CA battalions, one is already 'on line' with the second to follow shortly. The two other
battalions are to be activated in 2004 and 2005, respectively.

14. Testimony of Lieutenant General Peter 1. Shoomaker, Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on his nomination as Chief of Staff of the US Army, 29 July 2003.


16. Ibid.

17. Ibid. This page intentionally left blank