Arms Control and the New Middle East Security Environment

edited by
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1. Introduction

Shai Feldman

This volume incorporates the talks delivered at a conference on "Arms Control and the New Middle East Security Environment," held in Ginosar (Israel) in January 1992. The conference was organized within the framework of the Project on Security and Arms Control in the Middle East conducted by Tel Aviv University’s Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. Some 28 scholars from eight different countries, together with some 30 Israelis, took part in the conference deliberations.

When the Jaffee Center’s arms control project was launched in 1990, the subject of arms control was foreign to all Middle East countries, including Israel. Having assessed that developments in the region would soon place the topic on the region’s agenda, we saw an acute need to educate and socialize members of Israel’s policy elite regarding the issues involved. For this purpose, the Ginosar Conference was designed to expose Israelis—scholars, government officials and senior members of the media—to international scholars and former officials well versed in the subject.

The objective of the conference was to air the experience gained in arms control in other regions—primarily but not exclusively in the US-Soviet and NATO-Warsaw Pact context—and to familiarize Israelis with this experience. In addition, a significant effort was made to examine the effects of the new Middle East security environment that was emerging after the end of the Cold War, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the 1990-91 Gulf War, on the prospects for applying arms control in the region. From the outset, our interest in the subject was broad, encompassing not only arms reductions and non-proliferation, but also confidence- and security-building measures (CBMs) as well as the means for verifying compliance with the various agreements reached.
Meanwhile, developments in the region confirmed the expectations and assumptions guiding our project’s design. And as it turned out, the Ginosar Conference could not have been more timely. Thus, soon after we met in Ginosar, the Middle East Multilateral Conference was held in Moscow, launching the complex deliberations of the working group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) in the Middle East. This produced immediate demand for education on the issues involved.

These unique circumstances also explain our decision to produce this volume despite the very late publication date. First, we feel we owe this to our colleagues, in Israel and abroad, who were not privileged to share our deliberations at Ginosar. Secondly, we believe that students of the Middle East might find it useful to have a picture of the factors that affected the prospects for applying arms control measures in the region when the multilateral process was launched. Finally and most significantly, our examination and editing of the texts convinced us that they contain significant insights and original analysis to merit publication.

Within this context, three reminders are extremely important. First, this volume does not comprise academic research papers. The speakers at Ginosar were asked to share their insights and experiences with us, and these were subsequently edited for the benefit of those who could not be there. The best indication of the quality of these insights is that most of them remain relevant to this very day. However, it is important to remember that the chapters of this volume comprise edited presentations. For the most part, these are think-pieces and briefs, and should not be held to the standards expected of academic research papers that are normally found in edited books or journal articles.

Secondly, while most insights remain relevant, it must nevertheless be emphasized that the presentations printed here were delivered in their original form in January 1992. Finally, most of our participants were employed in government, public or other institutions. Some have joined such institutions since the Ginosar Conference. In all cases they delivered their presentations
at the conference in their private capacity. Thus, none of the comments they have made should be viewed as reflecting the institutions to which they belonged or that they have joined since the conference was held.

The conference presentations addressed five main topics. Anthony Cordesman and Barry Posen laid the foundations by elaborating the role of arms and military systems in the Middle East, and their implications for the prospects for arms control in the region. Cordesman's analysis questions whether the magnitude of the problem propelling interest in Middle East arms control—fear that the huge quantities of advanced weapons acquired by the region's states will result in great harm—is as serious as most observers believe. He argues persuasively that most of the region's military establishments manifest gross mismanagement and structural inefficiencies. Their governments insist on purchasing NATO-standard state-of-the-art weapons that are usually more advanced than anything the human and military infrastructure of these states can absorb. These systems are also very expensive, limiting the number of units that can be purchased. At the same time, advanced weapons are far more dependent than area weapons on the efficient functioning of the integrated command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) support system. Yet most of the region's states lack such efficient support systems, while their dependence on outside technical support presents a serious constraint on the use of military force. As a consequence, these states can derive much less output from their arms than their high military expenditures would otherwise indicate. In turn, this means that their armed forces can do far less damage than most observers expect.

Cordesman's analysis also questions the commonly held premise that the proliferation of advanced weapons is particularly worrisome. Indeed, he argues that "high technology conflicts have tended to be quick and decisive and to produce far fewer casualties than long civil conflicts or prolonged conflicts between military forces with only moderate capability." This is probably because precision weapons kill far fewer people around the targets they hit, thus resulting in fewer casualties than those associated
with the use of 'traditional' area weapons. In any case, Cordesman's point illustrates that concern about casualty rates cannot be a credible motive for arresting the spread of advanced conventional munitions.

Cordesman also points out the dynamics of the many different conflicts throughout the Middle East. This has significant implications for arms control, because in contrast to Europe, where the existence of a single conflict allowed an assessment of relative military power, such a yardstick for ascertaining 'military balance' does not exist in the Middle East.

Barry Posen proposes a different yet complementary cause for the difficulty of calculating a military balance in the Middle East. He points out that conventional military systems are quite fragile and that the military forces of different states are very dissimilar--much more than they appear to the superficial eye. This is particularly the case when 'traditional' military establishments confront systems that are structured along a new format--the "Thorough Exploitation of Science and Technology (TEST)." Posen points out that it is "the integrated application on the battlefield of capabilities laboriously developed in peacetime, supported by a military, scientific and industrial infrastructure that is active not only in peacetime, but capable of direct participation, even in a short war, that gives the new format its remarkable capability."

Posen argues that the IDF is the only military force in the region that meets the characteristics of the TEST format. Thus it would be difficult to apply conventional arms control not only because it would not be easy to estimate a balance between military systems that do not meet TEST standards with the IDF, but also because Israel "would need to preserve this asymmetrical advantage over the Arab war coalition. This advantage was hard won; it would drastically reduce Israeli casualties in any future conflict. Hence, it is almost inconceivable that the Israeli military would give up this advantage in the framework of an arms control agreement."

The second issue addressed in the framework of the conference was the threat perceptions of Israel and the Arab
states. Ascertaining these threats is exceedingly important, since the region's states are likely to view any future arms control agreement as an avenue for alleviating the threats they face. Ephraim Kam analyzes the Arab states' threat perceptions and points to a further difficulty facing the prospects for arms control in the region: the multiple sources of the threats perceived. For example Syria, while fearing Israel, also fears Iraq and Turkey. Indeed, as Kam argues, "during the last decade the threat cluster in the [Persian] Gulf overshadowed, at least for some Arab states, even the perceived Israeli threat." Thus Saudi Arabia's fears of Iraq and Iran seem greater than its concerns regarding Israel. These multiple sources of threats render difficult indeed the task of designing a new regional equilibrium through arms control or any other means.

Dore Gold analyzes Israel's threat perceptions, and points out that as a consequence of positive developments in the region--such as the enduring Israeli-Egyptian peace, the Arabs' loss of their Soviet patrons, and the divisions in the Arab world manifested in the 1990-91 Gulf War--the threat Israel faces has lost its specificity. Nevertheless, these developments might reverse course, thus exposing Israel once again to the constant and basic vulnerabilities that result from the long-standing asymmetries characterizing the relationships between Israel and its neighbors. These include asymmetries in size and in potential for coalition formation, and the asymmetries in numbers and force structures between the IDF and the large Arab war machines.

The third part of our conference was devoted to a preliminary discussion of the prospects of arresting the arms race in the Middle East. Ariel Levite elaborates a rather pessimistic view of the prospects for arms control in the region. He points out the continued appeal of acquiring high performance and ever more exotic conventional weapons, and the increasing interest in the acquisition of ballistic missiles. He discusses the role of civil and active defense programs, possibly propelling the region's states to acquire ever more robust forces in order to maintain strategic deterrence. He emphasizes the spreading perception that the utility of chemical arsenals is limited, resulting in increased
interest in nuclear weapons. He also argues that perceptions that supplier regimes may be tightening controls might encourage the region’s states to pursue preemptive purchases. Finally, he addresses the impact of the increased range of weapons in expanding the states’ threat horizons: states which earlier did not figure in other states’ threat assessments must now be taken into account, since for the first time they possess systems that can deliver munitions and do great harm to the assessing state.

Levite also argues that the character of most Middle East governments presents serious limitations on the prospects for applying arms control in the region. He notes the propensity of some of the region’s states to adopt a rather flimsy attitude regarding the need to comply with agreements they have signed; the likelihood that, having undertaken such agreements with the full intention to comply, the regime might abruptly disappear and be replaced by a new government that does not consider itself bound by commitments undertaken by its predecessors. Finally, the rather careless approach that some of the region’s states have adopted regarding safety and environmental issues, produces less responsible modes of storing weapons. This must affect assumptions that have traditionally guided the design and application of verification methods.

Patrick Clawson provides a provocative critique of the economic rationale for conventional arms control. First, he argues that most Middle East states are perfectly capable of sustaining their current high level of arms purchases. He demonstrates this point through the examples of Syria and Israel. He claims that Syria’s newly-earned $2-3 billion in annual oil revenues compensates for its loss of previous Soviet subsidies for its arms acquisitions, and that Israel could increase its military spending by 50%, if it were willing to return to the levels of taxation it applied during 1986-87.

Clawson also argues that the conclusion of peace agreements in the Middle East would not necessarily lead the states involved to reduce their defense expenditures. This is because such accords will result in serious military dislocations, such as the loss of expensive facilities which would need to be
substituted, and the need to gain the support of the respective military establishments by ‘bribery.’ Finally, Clawson argues that the incentive to reduce defense expenditures perceived by the region’s states is in any case limited, since "lower military spending would not lead to greater economic growth." This is because the money saved is not likely to be channeled to investments that would generate economic growth, and because the economic impact of defense expenditures is not entirely negative. Clawson points out that economic growth in the Middle East requires structural reform, not more financial resources. He further argues that much of the foreign assistance that was channeled to the Middle East was politically motivated, and most probably would not have been provided without the rationale and requirements generated by the Arab-Israel conflict.

Christophe Carle presents a French perspective on the prospects for arms control in the Middle East. He notes that the gap between the US and French approaches to arms control have narrowed in recent years, partly due to the "increasingly common recognition that over time and in many cases, the spread of sensitive knowledge and its technological and industrial applications in the military realm are indeed inevitable." Carle also identifies greater American willingness to accept the French view that regards "some instances of proliferation as reflecting legitimate sovereign self-defense needs that result from genuine security concerns." On the other hand, France also moved closer to the US-led non-proliferation consensus by joining the NPT.

On the other hand, France remains critical of important aspects of Washington’s approach to non-proliferation. Arms exports assume ever greater importance for the survival of the French military industries. It also sees the US approach as suffering a "gap between the advertised intention to implement restraints on the one hand, and the magnitude of agreed and foreseeable US sales to the Middle East and the Gulf on the other hand." In reality, the US, France and other European states share an identical but competing interest in marketing their arms for foreign sales aggressively, thus making the prospects for supplier restraint less than promising.
Carle also examines the implications of Israel's nuclear posture on the prospects for arms control in the Middle East, and questions the merits of Israel's continued nuclear ambiguity. He argues that the claim that an explicit Israeli posture would accelerate regional proliferation does not hold ground, since Israeli ambiguity did not constrain Iraq and Iran from launching their nuclear programs. He also predicts that such a change in Israel's posture would not be heavily criticized, since the world already regards Israel as a nuclear state: "The fiction of Israeli nuclear virginity is wearing so thin that no one takes it at face value anymore." In his view, Israel can in any case easily sustain external pressures since "there is no credible scenario for Israeli denuclearization in the foreseeable future. Neither is it possible to argue that Israel has any less reason than France to maintain a nuclear security-insurance policy over the long term." Yet the effects of continued ambiguity on the prospects for arms control are negative because "there can be no valid and credible arms control and disarmament without transparency."

The fourth focus of the Ginosar Conference comprised an effort to examine the experience of other regions in arms control. Jerome Paolini's presentation examines the possibility that the negotiations and agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) might serve as a model for arms control in the Middle East. Paolini stresses that one of the most important lessons of NATO-Warsaw Pact arms control is that fundamental political preconditions are indispensable if concrete results are to be achieved. He argues that until such preconditions were achieved, "arms control had little to do with disarmament: it was about managing the nuclear arms race and attempting to foster strategic stability between superpowers." Indeed, the lesson of the CFE is that "arms control generates very few positive results when implemented without a political settlement of the confrontation at stake." Thus, the key to the CFE's success was that by the time the negotiations were opened, the strategic and political context in Europe had been completely altered following the advent of Michael Gorbachev.
Paolini also stresses a number of pertinent lessons that could be drawn from the experience gained with the CFE negotiations format: that arms control should be conceived as an element of a comprehensive peace process; that negotiations should be restricted to the region's states, even if the problems involved are relevant to extra-regional parties as well; and that negotiations should be conducted by sovereign states and should not follow an Arab-Israeli coalition negotiation format.

Paolini warns that "defining conventional stability in a truly multipolar negotiation would be very difficult." In his view, the experience with CFE suggests that conventional arms control should be negotiated separately from nuclear issues and that acceptance of the principle of asymmetric cuts is a prerequisite to success. Within this context, Israel might have to trade reductions in its air-power for significant cuts in the Arabs' ground forces.

Wlodzimierz Konarski follows with some lessons that could be drawn from the architecture and dynamics of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Konarski emphasizes the importance of a CSCE-type process and the confidence-building measures adopted in its framework, when conditions are not yet suitable for arms reductions. Indeed, he argues that without this CBM infrastructure, the later CFE arms reductions agreement could not have been concluded. He also stresses the importance of the rule of consensus in insuring the survival and endurance of the CSCE.

Konarski points out that the success of a CSCE-type process in the Middle East would depend on the political will of the region's states; on the extent to which they would regard the peace process as progressing at a rate that promises eventual success; on the adoption of a framework based on the principle of equal rights; and on the contribution of outside powers--primarily the US--to the framework's success.

Shekhar Gupta shares with the conference participants the experience of applying CBMs in the India-Pakistan context. These include competitions and sports between soldiers of the two countries; the establishment of 'hot lines'--aimed at preventing inadvertent escalation--between local commanders on the two sides
of the border; the conduct of so-called 'flag meetings' between commanders, aimed at resolving practical problems; and the agreement on non-attack of nuclear installations.

Gupta argues that confidence building would have advanced further had India not rejected Pakistan’s proposal that a five-power (India, Pakistan, Russia, China, and the US) conference be held to discuss the nuclear issue in South Asia. He also recommends that India open its borders to Pakistanis, and that Pakistan allow the selling of Indian books and magazines. Ultimately, he says, "people from both countries have to sit down and clean up school textbooks reciprocally."

Gupta also makes a controversial point: "the first prerequisite for any serious confidence-building regime between India and Pakistan is that these two states go overt with their nuclear programs." Gupta argues that confidence cannot be built around ambiguity, because one cannot be assured who controls the weapons. Also, ambiguity does not allow the development of public awareness regarding the strategic and other consequences of nuclear weapons.

The final focus of our conference deliberations comprised an effort to examine various facets of the US approach to non-proliferation. Geoffrey Kemp places the efforts of the Bush administration to arrest proliferation in historical context, illustrating that while America’s record in this context was impressive, its desire to support close friends and allies--Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran--often propelled it to transfer state-of-the-art weapons.

Kemp argues that these conflicting pressures on US policy were only reinforced by the experience of the Gulf War: It "highlighted the dangers of what happens when a Saddam Hussein is allowed access to advanced military technologies. But at the same time it demonstrated that US military operations can derive much benefit from a close military assistance relationship with Saudi Arabia. Had it not been for the massive buildup of infrastructure in Saudi Arabia during the 1980s, Desert Storm might never have happened."
Kemp points out that these dilemmas continue to characterize US policy. Thus, a "successful global nuclear non-proliferation policy would make it more difficult to exempt friends and allies in the region from controls." But US interests in the Middle East, particularly in the Gulf region, would continue to require arms sales to key Arab countries.

William Keller follows by emphasizing the pressures exerted by the defense sectors of the advanced industrial countries to continue the export of arms. Given the post-Cold War cutbacks in the defense budgets of these states, and the resulting diminished demand for weapons from their respective arms manufacturers, production lines would have to be closed in the absence of compensating arms exports. Keller considers the result a "failure to bring together two different policy arenas--the defense industrial base community and the foreign policy community. Each has a separate legislative history, a separate stream of documentation, its own language, lobbyists, experts and expectations."

Keller argues that in the realm of defense industries, the most important recent development has been internationalization: "Companies from different countries have entered into strategic alliances, joint ventures, licensed production and codevelopment activities, and many other forms of joint R&D and dynamic technology transfer." In his view, "the result is a state of affairs in which advanced defense equipment and technology has proliferated beyond the control of any single state or group of states, with profound implications for the future of the Middle East."

Lise Hartman then analyzes America's role in efforts to arrest the proliferation of ballistic missiles. She argues that the US became concerned about the issue in the course of the 1980s, when US decisionmakers became aware of the possible impact of the proliferation of these weapons on Israeli security and the security of US troop concentrations in the region. By 1987, this concern--shared by a number of other missile producers--led to the joint articulation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
Hartman argues that producing ballistic missiles, especially for countries lacking an advanced industrial base, is difficult in and of itself. By making it hard to acquire key sub-components, the constraints imposed by the regime are intended to increase these difficulties, thereby also making the costs of missile production prohibitive. The real test of the MTCR has been the extent to which the various member states have been willing to translate its stipulations into domestic rules and regulations. In this context the relevant US legislation—the Missile Technology Control Act (MTCA)—has acquired an impressive record.

Zachary Davis then elaborates the mechanisms available to the US Congress in shaping America’s non-proliferation efforts. These include the holding of hearings; requiring the administration to provide it with certain reports; attaching conditions to proposed military and economic assistance; assigning responsibility to existing or newly-created agencies within the federal bureaucracy; imposing sanctions on violators of US non-proliferation policy; and legislating various forms of support for multilateral efforts to control the spread of conventional and nonconventional arms.

The final presentation, delivered by Lewis Dunn, provides an American scholar’s view of the impact of the nuclear agenda on the Middle East. Dunn points out that the global nuclear agenda is in the midst of fundamental change: nuclear deterrence is irrelevant to the challenges presented by the breakup of the Soviet Union. His assessment is that the nuclear status quo in the Middle East is unstable, since Arab states will not accept Israel’s nuclear monopoly. Dunn also argues that if nuclear weapons spread in the Middle East, the region will become unstable, partly because the states involved may emphasize readiness at the expense of weapon safety.

Dunn recommends that Israel exercise unilateral self-restraint in the nuclear realm. He argues that such restraint would enhance the legitimacy of unilateral measures, including covert or direct military action, for blocking proliferation in the Middle East. Finally, Dunn acknowledges that the long-term solution to avoiding a multi-nuclear Middle East requires the political resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. But he warns that, given
current nuclear developments in the region, the time required for this resolution may not be available.

In conclusion, we hope that this volume will constitute a modest contribution to the embryonic literature available to scholars and practitioners regarding the prospects for arms control in the Middle East.
arms control fails or is only partially successful. American military presence is not an answer in itself, and arms control and regional deterrents will always be preferable. Where possible, American action should also take place as part of international coalitions and under the auspices of the United Nations. It will be at least a decade, however, before the various arms races and aggressor states in the region can be contained through arms control and regional deterrents. In the interim, the alternative to American power projection will be war, and an even greater risk of the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Notes

1. Totals include Arab African states. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) totals do not include Algeria, Ethiopia, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia.

2. These percentages on arms imports are taken from various editions of ACDA, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*, Washington, GPO. The totals for the "Middle East" include data on Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, PDRY, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, and YAR. For historical reasons, ACDA totals do not include Algeria, Ethiopia, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia. The source data do not permit adjustment of the percentages.


5. The reader should be aware that the author is defining the Middle East to include all of the Arab states, plus Israel, Iran, and Ethiopia. Mauritania is defined as an Arab state. The statistical information on the region is highly uncertain, and major differences exist among virtually all sources. Few countries in the region report any statistical information on their military forces or defense spending, and when they do it is heavily politicized and often inaccurate. The UN data on the arms race in the region is notoriously poor, and even the most authoritative sources are uncertain. Unless otherwise specified, the economic and manpower statistics used in this chapter are taken from the CIA data presented in ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987 (Washington: GPO, 1988); Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook, 1987, September 1987. The data on military forces are estimated by the author based on personal knowledge and background, but are adapted from two primary sources: The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, 1988-1989 (London: IISS, 1988); and the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS), The Middle East Military Balance 1987 (Boulder: Westview, 1988).

period—a breathing spell, in which the intensity of the competition slows down. This may provide a window for more ambitious arms control schemes or political negotiations.

Notes


4. If a nation-state is incapable of putting a TEST military format into the field, and faces an enemy that does have this capability, it may simply be forced to put a mass mobilization military format into the field. Its task will then be to so perfect that format, and to so perfect its political and military strategy, that any military clash that occurs does so under circumstances that are most favorable. For example, it is plausible that in defense of difficult terrain, augmented by fortifications and obstacles, a large, motivated, and well-handled mass mobilization force could impose significant casualties on a TEST force. This prospect may be enough to dissuade a country fielding a TEST
force from launching an attack in any political crisis other than one deemed absolutely vital to its survival. This is, in effect, the Syrian strategy against Israel today.


Notes

5. Regarding the sale of the F-15 XP to Saudi Arabia, Major General Herzl Bodinger, Commander of the Israel Air Force, noted that the sale "will require us to divide our force differently among the missions that the Air Force has to take care of." Yediot Aharonot, September 27, 1992. Implicit in his remark is the commitment of more Israeli aircraft to counter increased Saudi capabilities and a corresponding reduction in the number of aircraft for other missions, e.g., participation in the land campaign, SAM suppression, and the destruction of SCUD launchers.
6. Ron Ben Yishai, interview with the Director of IDF Intelligence, Major General Uri Saguy, Yediot Aharonot, April 5, 1993.

According to US congressional sources, "Iraq has managed to reconstruct 80% of the military manufacturing capability it possessed before Desert Storm.... Iraq is manufacturing T-72 tanks, artillery munitions, and even short range ballistic missiles. See Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, June 29, 1993, Opening Statement by Congressman Tom Lantos.
9. Address given at Yom Dado--Conference in Memory of Lt. General David Elazar, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, May 17, 1993.
capita. Again, recall that these data refer only to official development assistance, which excludes military aid.

In conclusion, military spending is paid for in part by aid which would not otherwise be available; reduced military spending will not necessarily release funds for civilian purposes. To the extent that more spending on civilian purposes is possible, it is not apparent that money will create more growth; if military spending comes at the expense of consumption, then reduced military spending will only change the nature of consumption without affecting growth at all. Furthermore, whatever negative effects are created by military spending, they are at least in part offset by the positive influences of the military in training labor and providing employment.

Notes

6. A case made strongly by Lavy and Sheffer, *Foreign Aid*.

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7. World Development Report 1991, p. 48. That page is devoted to a debate about whether aid has a positive or negative effect on growth. Interestingly, the main arguments for aid refer to financing of specific projects, not of policy reforms.

8. At a seminar held by the Israel International Institute, quoted in The Financial Times, June 27, 1989.

9. World Bank, World Development Report 1991. To be fair however, the world total is low because China and India receive aid equal to $2.00 and $2.30 per capita respectively. The world average without China and India is $14.40 per capita.
Notes

2. United States Congress, *Congressional Record*, January 24, 1992, p. E-67. The detailed tabulation, placed in the *Congressional Record* by Representative Lee H. Hamilton, was provided to the Committee on Foreign Affairs on January 9, 1992 in a quarterly report in compliance with section 36(a) of the Arms Export Control Act.
3. Within the Defense Department, the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) has overall responsibility for carrying out foreign military sales. DSAA charges a 3% administrative fee for its services which funds over 80% of the agency's budget. If all of the $22.9 billion in foreign military sales made in FY 1991 were delivered, the DSAA fee would be approximately $690 million.
4. There are exceptions such as the Defense Production Act which falls under the jurisdiction of the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.
6. Among many other examples, the United States has transferred highly advanced production technology for the Stinger missile to Germany, Belgium, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey; for the Patriot to Japan and Italy; and for the AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missile to Japan, Germany, Norway, Italy, and Taiwan.
7. Major systems transferred have included the US M-1 Abrams tank (to Egypt), the US F-16 fighter and Multiple Launch Rocket System (to Turkey), the German Type 209 submarine (to Brazil and South Korea), the French Alpha Jet (to Egypt), the Soviet MiG-27 fighter (to India), the British Jaguar fighter (to India), the UK Swingfire Anti-Tank Missile (to Egypt), the French Super Puma helicopter (to Indonesia), the French Milan Anti-Tank
Missile (to India), the German BK 117 helicopter (to Indonesia), among others.

8. *Global Arms Trade*, figures 1-7 and 1-9, pp. 7 and 9.


13. For example, following the October 1973 war, from 1974-1978, the Soviet Union transferred $2.7 billion in military equipment to Syria largely in an effort to resupply equipment lost or damaged in the war. See U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, "Middle East Arms Control and Related Issues," 91-384 F, May 1, 1991, p. 10.


anything." The US applies its leverage by saying to the PRC, "You have a ten billion dollar trade surplus with us. You don't earn more than two billion dollars on arms sales every year. And we're going to deny you Most Favored Nation status if you sell missiles to Syria and Iran." With certain countries, that is the only way to succeed: China and North Korea are two prime examples. The point of the matter is for the US to say to potential proliferators: "Whether it's in your interest to do this or not is your problem, but it is not in the US interest, and the US is going to do absolutely everything within its power to punish you unless you come to agree with it." There is nothing moralistic about it.

Finally a word on the reason why the MTCA sanctions legislation is aimed at suppliers, rather than at recipients. At least some of the sponsors of the legislation on missile non-proliferation said that they were not going to tell a country not to do everything it could, that it thought it needed to do, for its own security. But they were going to do everything in their power to stop it from happening, "if the US does not think it is in its own interest." That is why the supplier route was taken. This may seem like a distinction without a difference, but it is at least a passing nod that what the US is seeking is not to tell other nations how to live, but rather to do what it can to ensure that how other people behave is in its own security interests.

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